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Undergraduate Studies: BA, Economics & Accounting, Tel Aviv University, Magna Cum Laude, 1995-1998 Graduate Studies: MA Economics, New York University, 2002-2005 Ph.D. Economics New York University, 2005 to present Thesis Title: “Essays in Experimental Economics” Expected Completion Date: May 2008 Thesis Committee and References: Professor Andrew Schotter Department of Economics New York University 19 W. 4th Street, 6FL, New York, NY 10012 +1-212-998-8952 [email protected]

Professor Guillaume Frechette Department of Economics New York University 19 W. 4th Street, 6FL, New York, NY 10012 +1-212-992-8683 [email protected]

Professor David Pearce Department of Economics New York University 19 W. 4th Street, 6FL, New York, NY 10012 +1-212-992-8667 [email protected] Teaching and Research Fields: Primary fields: Microeconomics, Game Theory Secondary fields: Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics Research Papers: 2007 “Search in Social Setting” (Job market paper) 2007 “Convergence: An Experimental Study of Teaching and Learning in Repeated Games” (joint with Erkut Ozbay, Kyle Hyndman and Andrew Schotter) Research Experience 2005, 2007 New York University, Research Assistant for Andrew Schotter 2005-2006 New York University, Research Assistant for Douglas Gale

Work Experience: 2007 NERA Economic Consulting, Analyst Intern 2001-2002 I.S.F (Israel Structured Finance), Financial Analyst 1998-1999 BDO Ziv & Haft, Accounting & Business Advisors, Staff Accountant Teaching Experience: Spring, 2007 Intermediate Macroeconomics, NYU, TA Fall, 2006 Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Efe Ok Summer, 2006 Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, Lecturer Summer, 2005 Economic Principals I, NYU, Lecturer Spring, 2005 Intermediate Macroeconomics, NYU, TA for Aditi Thaper Summer, 2004 Economic Principals II, NYU, TA for Sophie Bade Spring, 2004 Intermediate Microeconomics, NYU, TA for Ennio Stacchetti Professional Activities: Grants NSF, Doctoral Dissertation Research in Economics: “Search in Social Setting” Seminars 2005 – Economic Sciences Association, Tinbergen Institute Referee Games and Economic behavior Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships: 2002-2007 McCracken Fellowship, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, NYU Research:

“Search in Social Setting” (Job Market Paper) In this paper I examine the effect of information externalities in an on-the-job search model with multiple agents. In each period agents earn a wage but can choose the engage in a costly search for a better paying position. Three different information structures are then analyzed and the equilibrium strategies of the agents are identified. The model is then tested in a series of experiments using human subjects. The results show that when subjects have no information regarding the other subjects’ wages or employing firms, they tend to search less than expected. When all information about others wages and employing firms is revealed, search becomes less frequent as predicted by the mixed strategy equilibrium. However, evidence suggests that subjects tend to free ride on the choice of others more than predicted by the equilibrium. When partial information about the wages earned is disclosed, in contradiction to theoretical prediction, subjects are more likely to search, especially those with lower wages than their peers

“Convergence: An Experimental Study of Teaching and Learning in Repeated Games” (joint with Erkut Ozbay, Kyle Hyndman and Andrew Schotter) Nash equilibrium can be interpreted as a steady state of a game where players hold correct beliefs about the other players' behavior and act rationally. In this paper, we experimentally examine the process that leads to this steady state. We find: (1) For non-dominance solvable games the existence of a teacher greatly facilitates (is necessary for) convergence to Nash equilibrium. (2) For dominance solvable games, while a teacher is again a facilitator for convergence when the time horizon of the game is relatively short (20 periods), if the horizon is long enough subjects appear to be able to converge by iteratively eliminating dominated strategies, even if teaching is difficult. (3) The ability to see one's opponent's payoffs is essential for convergence. (4) A successful model of belief formation should include a component taking a player's opponent's payoffs into account.