Welfare, Meaning, and Worth

Aaron Smuts

Table of Contents Acknowledgements Ch.1

Introduction

Part I. An Axiology of Lives Ch.2

Worth: An Objective List Theory

Ch.3

Meaning: The Good Cause Account

Ch.4

Well-Being: A Mental Statist Account

Part II. Implications Ch.5

Morality: Against Welfarism

Ch.6

Immortality: Deficiencies of the Everlasting

Ch.7

Painful Art: The Limits of Welfare

Ch.8

Taste: Should we Cultivate Better Taste?

Ch.9

Pessimism: Better Never to Have Been?

Bibliography

1 Introduction Near the end of the Apology, shortly after the Athenian jury reaches a guilty verdict, Socrates explains why he would rather die than forego philosophy: "I say that it is the greatest good for a man to discuss virtue every day and those other things about which you hear me conversing and testing myself and others, for the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being."1 Although I admire Socrates' brave defense of philosophy, I think that he is likely mistaken. I am not entirely sure what Socrates means, and I will not try to settle the issue here, but on a plausible interpretation he radically overstates the importance of philosophical inquiry.2 It defies credibility to suggest that the overwhelming majority of people throughout human history have lived worthless lives due to insufficient self-examination. Fred Feldman voices a similar concern: Surely there are plenty of unreflective, philosophically unsophisticated people who have been happy, and whose lives have been morally good, beneficial to others, and good in themselves for those who lived them. To say otherwise, it seems to me, is to suggest that if you are not happy in the peculiar way preferred by some philosophers, then your life is not worth living. This seems to me to be an astonishing view (whether Socrates' or not).3

I agree. My goal in this book is to develop a more plausible account of what makes a life worth living.4 Although Socrates' claim is contentious, it does not seem at all controversial to say that some lives are not worth living. For instance, most intuitively, a life that significantly advances horrendous evil is not worth living. Hitler, Pol Pot, and Stalin lived worthless lives. Killing millions of people is hideously evil. And, most plausibly, moral repugnance is sufficient to sap a life of positive worth. But it is not the only thing to do so. Intense pain can suffice. Lives spent in persistent, incapacitating agony are not worth living. By any plausible account, they are lives worth avoiding (LWA). There are clear cases of lives not worth living. And there are not so clear cases. Worth comes in degrees. Lives entirely consumed by meaningless activities, such as counting blades of grass, colleting rubber bands, or making 1

Apology, 38a. My hesitation concerns how to interpret these remarks in light of his likely commitment to the unity of the virtues and intellectualism. See: Penner (1992). If selfexamination cannot fall without toppling all the other virtues, then there is a plausible case to be made for the bold claim. I will not be exploring this issue here. 3 Feldman (2006, p.15, n.6). 4 Although this quote suggests that Feldman has in mind a theory of worth that includes both welfare and moral worth, he does not offer such a theory. He defends a theory of well-being; I defend a theory of worth. In the next section, I argue that the two notions are conceptually distinct. 2

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handwritten copies of War and Peace, appear to be less worth living than those spent in pursuit of valuable ends, but it is not so clear that they are not worth living.5 The same goes for unexamined lives. I develop a theory that accounts for these intuitions. My goal is to provide a theory of worth and to show where such a concept fits in the taxonomy of axiology.6 I argue that the notion of worth captures matters of importance that no plausible theory of welfare can account for. Worth is a higher-level kind of value Shelly Kagan argues that we should distinguish between the value of a life for the one who lives it and the value of the life, or, as he puts it, between "me and my life."7 Kagan leaves it an open question as to how welfare and the value of a life are related. I offer an explanation of the relation. Although the notion of the value of a life is somewhat more obscure than the notion of a life worth living (LWL), I think that they amount to roughly the same thing. As Kagan suggests, I think that there is something morally salient about the worth of a life that cannot be reduced to welfare. The worth of a life is plausibly more important.

Overview The book is divided into two parts: theory and applications. The first part develops an axiology of lives. Here I defend a theory of worth, a theory of meaning, and a theory of well-being. I devote a chapter to each form of value. The second part of the book explores the implications of this axiology for some issues in ethics and the philosophy of art. I discuss five topics: morality, immortality, painful art, taste, and pessimism. I devote a chapter to each topic.

Part I: An Axiology of Lives Chapter 2 "Worth: An Objective List Theory" defends the central theory of the 5

Rawls (1971, p.432) and Wolf (1997, p.211). There is next to no literature making the distinction between what makes a life worthwhile and what makes a life meaningful. Trisel (2007) provides the only sustained discussion of the distinction, though he offers what appears to be a welfarist notion of worth. Apart from this, Metz (2007, p.213) makes a clear statement of the difference. Metz (2002, p.788, n.10) also briefly notes the distinction. Blumenfeld (2009, p.8, n.2) seconds Metz’s proposal, but does not develop a theory of worth. Haack (2001) proposes that we ditch the concept of meaning for worth. She does not explain the conceptual difference. Wollheim (1984, pp.444-8) proposes a distinction between a life worth living and a worthwhile life. I decline adopting this terminology, since there is better, more familiar conceptual machinery: his distinction closely tracks that between welfare and meaning. Baier (1997, pp.67-9) makes a few passing remarks on worth. McDermott (1991) and Harries (1991) putatively discuss worth, and both are cited as making a contribution to the literature, but neither directly addresses the topic. 7 Kagan (1992 and 1994). 6

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book. I argue that a life worth living (LWL) should pass a pre-existence test— given a synoptic pre-view, a benevolent caretaker should allow one to be born rather than to never have been. A life worth avoiding (LWA) is one that a benevolent caretaker should disallow. I defend an objective list theory of the worth of a life: the most worthwhile lives are those high in various objective goods. These principally include welfare and meaning. My argument proceeds in three steps. First, I propose a pre-existence test to help identify lives worth living. I argue that the set of lives that pass the test is roughly extensionally congruent with the set of lives worth living. After identifying the general extension of the concept of worth, I offer an analysis. I defend an objective list theory of worth—lives worth living are net high in various objective goods.8 These principally include meaning and well-being. Chapter 3 "Meaning: The Good Cause Account" defends the theory that one's life is meaningful to the extent that one promotes the good. Call this the good cause account (GCA) of the meaning of life. It holds that the good effects that count towards the meaning of one's life need not be intentional. Nor must one be aware of the effects. Nor does it matter whether the same good would have resulted if one had not existed. What matters is that one is causally responsible for the good. I argue that the best theory of the meaning of life should clearly distinguish between subjective fulfillment and objective meaningfulness. The GCA respects the distinction. And it is superior to its leading rivals in the recent literature. This chapter proceeds in a few steps. The bulk of the effort is devoted to defending the general contours of the GCA. I begin by sorting out some of the conceptual terrain. First, I develop a defense of the GCA of the meaning of life in response to the problems facing a few other theories.9 I argue against both subjectivist theories and hybrid theories—those that include both objective and subjective conditions. I show the relative virtues of the GCA over two of the most compelling theories in the current literature, those offered by Erik Wielenberg and Susan Wolf.10 Finally, after defending the major commitments of objectivist theories of the meaning of life, I respond to several novel objections to objectivist theories of meaning. Most important, I offer reasons to reject a problematic refinement. In the process, I suggest a few options for a more precise formulation of the GCA. Chapter 4 "Well-Being: A Mental Statist Account" defends a theory of wellbeing. My principal goal in this chapter is to defuse objections to mental statism—the theory that the sole bearers of intrinsic prudential value are conscious mental states. Although I defend mental statism, I reject the popular forms of hedonism—the view that the only thing that makes a life better for the 8 My theory is not meta-ethically agnostic. Is it incompatible with nihilism, expressivism, and subjectivism. I assume a robust form of moral realism. 9 For an overview of the literature, see: Metz (2002, 2005, and 2007). 10 Wolf (1997 and 2010) and Wielenberg (2005).

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one who lives it is pleasure. Many think that the most plausible form of hedonism holds that attitudinal, not sensory, pleasure is what matters. I find this style of hedonism unworkable, principally because I reject the distinction between attitudinal and sensory pleasure. Although I reject attitudinal hedonism, I do not endorse classical sensory hedonism. It holds that the sole bearers of intrinsic prudential value are sensory pleasure and pain. I find this implausible, because many nonpleasurable experiences appear to be intrinsically prudentially valuable. At least, many pleasurable experiences appear to be prudentially valuable disproportionate to the pleasure involved. This is what Mill tried to capture with "qualitative hedonism." Simply think of embracing a loved one. It might be pleasurable, but the prudential value of the experience exceeds its hedonic quotient. Or consider flow experiences: It is not clear that they are very pleasurable, but surely they are prudentially valuable. My argument in this chapter proceeds in three steps. First, I present an argument in favor of mental statism. I show that the burden of proof lies with the anti-mental statist. My second task is to raise objections to the main forms of mental statism: attitudinal hedonism, subjective desire-satisfactionism, and sensory hedonism. Finally, I reply to several objections to general mental statism, such as the problem of base pleasures. I show that the most challenging objections ask us to confuse welfare and worth. One of the principal benefits of the objective list theory of worth is that it promises to resolve several stalemates in the welfare literature.

Part I: Implications Chapter 5 "Morality: Against Welfarism" develops a case against three forms of welfarism. In its most general form welfarism holds that the ultimate ground of all moral obligations is welfare. Welfarism takes three general forms: (1) a theory of the good, (2) a theory of the right, and (3) a theory of rationality. I think that all three are false. I argue that welfarism as a theory of the good is highly implausible. It is far more certain that there are other forms of value besides welfare than it is that any of the considerations in favor of welfarism, jointly or in conjunction, are true. As a theory of the morally relevant good, welfarism stands or falls on the breadth of the concept. On a narrow theory of welfare, as I prefer, welfarism as a theory of the morally relevant good is implausible. Too much else is important. Welfarism as a theory of the right fails for the same reason. There is a good case to be made for the independent moral significance of other forms of value, such as autonomy. Welfarism about rationality is more persuasive, but it too fails to accord with our best intuitions about reasons for action. Chapter 6 "Immortality: Deficiencies of the Everlasting" presents a novel argument against the desirability of immortality. Although I think Bernard Williams’s argument fails, I endorse his claim that we would lose reason to go 4

on if we were to live forever. I argue that immortality would be motivationally devastating, since our decisions would carry little weight, our achievements would be hollow victories of mere diligence, and the prospect of eternal frustration would haunt our every effort. An immortal life for those of limited ability will inevitably result in endless frustration, since the number of significant projects that one is capable of completing is finite, but the span of time is infinite. The only plausible ways to remedy this subjective deficiency, such as recurrent amnesia, would make the life not worth living. I begin by examining Williams’s argument, first explaining the parameters by which he thinks we should evaluate the desirability of any form of immortal existence. Provisionally, against Williams’s charges, I defend what he calls the Tiresias model of immortality. Then, through an examination of Borges’s story “The Immortal” I develop an argument against immortality that has some similarities to Martha Nussbaum’s position. In response to John Martin Fischer’s objections, I attempt to reveal the principal problems with immortality by systematically examining the various forms of immortal life. I show that they are all lives worth avoiding. Chapter 7 "Painful Art: The Limits of Welfare" provides a solution to the paradox of tragedy, or, what I call "the paradox of painful art." It certainly seems that people are far more willing to experience negative emotions in response to artworks than in their daily lives. This difference begs for an explanation. Why do people desire to see horror films or watch tragedies? More specifically, we might ask, why do people seemingly want to be scared by a movie or feel pity for a character when they avoid situations in real life that arouse the same emotions? The most popular solution to the problem is a hedonic compensatory theory. It holds that audiences find other sources of pleasure to compensate for the pain. I argue that the hedonic compensatory theory lacks phenomenological support. Not only does the hendonic compensatory theory fail, it appears that painful art frequently fails to provide sufficient prudential compensation, at least according to mental statist views. Rather than see this as a reductio of mental statism, I think we should accept the implication. We do not always seek out painful art to improve our welfare. There are other forms of value to be had. Overall, I argue that even though painful art may not always enhance our well-being, it can enhance the worth of our lives. Chapter 8 "Taste: Should we Cultivate Better Taste?" provides an answer to the question, Should we try to cultivate better taste in art? Even if better art is better for us, it's not clear if we should try to cultivate our taste, since there are significant costs. Undeniably, there can be great costs involved in developing better tastes. For instance, one must invest a good amount of time before one can appreciate classical music. Even then, one may never develop an affinity, no matter how hard one tries. Should we take such a risk? Although it might be better for me to have better taste, my taste in art is largely not up to me. We might be able to exercise some influence here and there, but our powers are 5

limited. The problem is that with my actual tastes, my experiences of better art will not be so valuable, nor will I get much out of the work. Even worse, as Epicurus warns us, by cultivating taste we often make ourselves vulnerable to dissatisfaction with what is available. I think that there are likely two kinds of considerations in favor of liking better things: (1) There are plausible prudential reasons. Liking better things might be prudentially better for us. Of course, it depends on the kind of "better" at issue. It also depends on both the nature of welfare and some empirical issues. (2) There are also plausible non-prudential reasons to like better things. These reasons arise from various sources other than welfare. Morality is a good candidate source. For instance, it might be morally bad to like morally bad things. There are other plausible grounds for liking better things besides morality. Most plausibly, the worth of our lives is enhanced by liking better things. This gives us an additional reason to cultivate better taste despite the risks. Chapter 9 "Pessimism: Better Never to Have Been?" argues against pessimism. David Benatar claims that being brought into existence is always a net harm and never a benefit. I disagree. I argue that if you bring someone into existence who lives a life worth living, then you have not all things considered harmed her. Per the theory developed in chapter 2, lives are worth living if they are high in various objective goods and low in objective bads. These lives constitute a net benefit. In contrast, lives worth avoiding constitute a net harm. It is the prospect of a LWA that gives us good reason to not bring someone into existence. Happily, many lives are not worth avoiding. Contra Benatar, many are indeed worth living. Even if we grant Benatar his controversial asymmetry thesis, we have no reason to think that coming into existence is always a net harm. I begin with a presentation of Benatar’s asymmetry argument. Although I do not accept the asymmetry, I show that Benatar’s argument is unsuccessful either way. We do not wrong the one we bring into existence if she lives a life worth living—a life that is high in various objective goods. However, we should not bring anyone into existence who will live a life worth avoiding. Happily, not all lives are worth avoiding. Benatar anticipates this style of objection. In reply he defends a wholesale pessimism about the human condition. I argue that his reply to objective list modes of evaluating lives is unsuccessful. To be worth living a life need not be the best that we can conceive; it merely needs to be preferable to non-existence.

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