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Violence and drug control policy Mark A. R. Kleiman, Jonathan P. Caulkins, Thomas Jacobson, and Brad Rowe The Drugs–Violence Connection Violence by and against drug dealers causes havoc, from the streets of United States cities to source and transit countries including Afghanistan, Mexico, Honduras, and Colombia. About two-thirds of those arrested for violent crimes in the United States test positive for illicit drugs or have a history of substance abuse or dependence (U.S. ONDCP ADAM II Annual Report 2012), and we have no reason to assume that the United States is an anomaly in this regard (Parry et al. 2004). Though the association between drug consumption and violent crime does not, by itself, demonstrate causality, the overlap is breath-taking. Those facts point to drug policy as a potentially important element of a violence-control strategy. But the academic literature largely focuses on distilling the drugs–violence connection to the minimal quantity of violence that can safely be directly attributed to drugs. That leads to an understatement of the actual causal linkages, because it ignores many indirect or delayed pathways. Paul Goldstein’s widely used tripartite framework (1985) for distinguishing between different types of drug violence illustrates alike the power and the limits of such partial analysis. Goldstein’s category of ‘psychopharmacological violence’ includes violence perpetrated by users due to intoxication or withdrawal. To this might be added the indirect consequences of changes in behaviour patterns and social connections resulting from substance abuse disorders. Intoxication of victims can be a factor in interpersonal violence, and intoxication is also involved in a large fraction of intentional self-injury. ‘Economic-compulsive violence’ traditionally includes robberies committed to pay for drug purchases; logically, the category should be extended to income-producing crimes committed to pay for other things, such as food and rent, by persons whose licit employment opportunities are diminished by habitual intoxication, a phenomenon that can arise with licit as well as illicit drugs. ‘Systemic violence’ arises from illicit drug markets. It includes crimes against dealers (e.g. robberies), crimes by dealers (against customers, employees, suppliers, competitors, law enforcement agents, or witnesses), and the lawful (or, sometimes, lawless) violence by law enforcement against participants in drug markets. Arrest and incarceration for drug law violations could be, though it generally is not treated as a form of systemic drug-related violence. The transactional nature of drug dealing forces drug enforcement

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to rely on unusually intrusive enforcement techniques including ‘dynamic entry’ raids on suspected dealers, with sometimes fatal results to innocent victims of police error (Balko 2006). The practice of enticing or coercing some drug-market participants to testify against others can also sow the seeds of violence. The Goldstein taxonomy, while well-established, is less than comprehensive (Caulkins and Kleiman 2013; Office of National Drug Control Policy 2013). Focusing on contemporaneous effects, it omits important developmental, neighbourhood, and inter-generational phenomena: for example, violence committed as a result of foetal exposure to alcohol; violence committed later in life as result of childhood exposure (personal or vicarious) to drug-related crime, including domestic violence; violence by and against people made homeless by substance abuse, even if they are not current consumers; violence by and against people whose life-courses were influenced by their own incarceration or by the incarceration of a parent; and gun violence among those who are not dealers but who arm themselves in response to weapons possession among drug dealers in their neighbourhoods. Much of drug dealers’ violence turns out, on close examination, to be more interpersonal than directly business related (Atkinson et al. 2009), excluding it from Goldstein’s tripartite taxonomy; but when drug selling gives a dealer the money and incentive to acquire firearms and the motivation to cultivate a reputation for toughness, and that dealer then shoots someone in a dispute over an affront, that incident ought to be counted as drug-related violence.

How much Violence is Attributable to Drugs? By analogy with the literature on disease causation, the ‘attributable fraction’ of drug-related violence could be defined as the incidence of violence perpetrated or suffered by the drug-involved subpopulations (users and dealers) minus the incidence of violence that would be perpetrated or suffered by the same subpopulation were drugs not a factor. That is, in a hypothetical world where drugs did not exist but all else were the same, how much less violence would there be? Unfortunately, existing methods are nowhere nearly sophisticated enough, nor existing data rich enough, to calculate such an attributable fraction (Caulkins and Kleiman 2013). Not all of the observed difference between drug-involved and

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non-drug-involved individuals can be attributed to drug-related activities as opposed to personal and social characteristics correlated with both drugs and violence, or causation running from violence to drug use rather than the other way around. Furthermore, even if the drug-attributable fraction were measurable, there is no reason to think that reducing drug activity by a given fraction would lead to a proportional reduction in drug-related violence (by contrast with, for instance, tobacco-related disease, where a 10 per cent reduction in pack-years ought to lead to roughly a 10 per cent reduction in attributable morbidity and mortality) (Caulkins 2013). In addition, drug-dealing might—for an individual or an organization—substitute for predatory acquisitive crimes such as theft, robbery, kidnapping, or extortion, or it might facilitate such crimes; the net effect might not be the same in the long run as it is contemporaneously. As a result, the fraction of violence attributable to drug dealing in historical terms might not be the same as the fraction by which violence could be reduced by eliminating drug dealing going forward (Kleiman et al. 2013). That suggests a focus on marginal rather than total or average quantities: How much less (or more) violence could we expect to see as the result of a given change in drug policy? While much of the drugs violence discussion focuses on drug legalization, the details of both prohibitory and regulatory control regimes also matter. Prohibition regimes differ in enforcement practices, sentencing patterns, treatment policies, prevention and treatment efforts, and the management of drug-involved offenders. Likewise, the example of alcohol illustrates that the amount of drug-related violence can vary substantially among different regimes of legal availability (Cook 2007). Undue concentration on legal status can distract from opportunities for gain from less dramatic policy shifts.

Violence-Minimizing Enforcement Strategy Prohibition tends to decrease consumption, thereby decreasing psychopharmacological violence from the prohibited drug. It also decreases all forms of violence generated indirectly by dependence: for example, subsequent violence by children abused by their intoxicated parents. Furthermore, inasmuch as poly-drug abuse is the norm, reduced dependence on the prohibited drug (e.g. cocaine) might indirectly lead to reduced abuse of other criminogenic drugs (e.g. alcohol). However, other effects might diminish or conceivably even reverse any such beneficial effect. For example, there may be substitution away from the prohibited drug and into other, more violence-inducing drugs; this may be a particular issue with marijuana prohibition. More generally, prohibition creates risky, high-price markets that foment economic-compulsive and systemic violence. Enforcement involves its own set of policy choices. Prohibition by itself suppresses prevalence by making consumption risky and establishing abstinence as the implicit societal norm. But there is little evidence that further increases in the general intensity of enforcement have been very effective at raising prices (Caulkins 2000; Caulkins and Chandler 2005). Even if prices do increase, the effect on violence is ambiguous; psycho-pharmacological violence would be expected to decrease, but economic-compulsive violence might go up or down depending on how strongly consumers respond to price changes. If an increase in price produces

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a more-than-proportional decrease in volume consumed (a situation economists call ‘elastic demand’) the result is a decrease in total expenditure and thus, presumably, users’ need for crime-derived income. In that case, enforcement-driven drug price increases would be expected to reduce non-drug crime. But if demand is relatively ‘inelastic,’ so that a price increase creates a less-than-proportional decrease in quantity, the result will be an increase in total expenditure, with possibly perverse effects on acquisitive crime. Imagine, for example, a drug whose consumption is financed entirely from criminal proceeds, and whose demand is relatively inelastic, so that a 20 per cent increase in price is associated with only a 10 per cent decrease in quantity purchased. Then the total expenditure after such a price increase will be 8 per cent greater (1.2 × 0.9 = 1.08) than it was before. At first blush, the same analysis applies to systemic crime. However, even if that were true in the long run, in the short run any change may increase violence as individuals and organizations contest who will gain and who will lose from the new circumstances (Beittel 2012). The overall outcome may depend on the nature of that additional drug enforcement. Vigorous but unselective enforcement may exacerbate violence in drug markets by increasing the benefits accruing to those best able to wield it. Conversely, enforcement targeted at especially violence-prone dealers may reduce the amount of violence per kilogram or per million dollars of illicit revenue. Whatever resources are devoted to drug law enforcement cannot be devoted to enforcement against predatory crime (though of course the population of dealers overlaps with the population of predatory criminals, so incarcerating drug dealers may incapacitate away some violent acts unrelated to their dealing). Thus increased violent crime might be among the opportunity costs of the drug enforcement effort. Retail drug markets can be ‘flagrant’ or ‘discreet’. An open-air market is flagrant; so is a market characterized by dedicated drug sales locations, such as ‘smoke shops’ or ‘crack houses’. By contrast, both indoor selling in multi-purpose locations (e.g. bars) and sales mediated by cell phone or on-line order and consummated by delivery to the user’s home can be nearly invisible to non-participants. Flagrant markets create violence because both buyers and sellers offer attractive robbery targets (as they hold cash and valuable inventory and are reluctant to call the police) and because dealers therefore have a strong incentive to arm themselves. Flagrant drug dealing also tends to create local disorder. Which discourages licit commerce and thereby reduces licit economic opportunity It follows that, if enforcement focused on unusually violent flagrant retail markets can force displacement into more dispersed and discreet retail patterns such as home delivery, the result can be to reduce violence, even without reducing the volume of sales (Caulkins 1992): that is, the ‘drug market intervention’ approach represented by the successful crackdown on the crack market in the West End of High Point, North Carolina and subsequently elsewhere (Kennedy 2011). An alternative approach to violence-minimized drug enforcement would concentrate on the most violent actors (individuals or organizations) while relaxing enforcement against less-violent dealers, thus both incapacitating the most violent and creating a disincentive for violence (Caulkins and Reuter 2009).

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Heterogeneity Among Drugs The extent to which reducing consumption reduces violence varies enormously from drug to drug. (Ironically, alcohol, which remains legal, is responsible for more violence than all the illegal drugs combined, although not necessarily the most per user.) Psycho-pharmacologically, the central nervous system stimulants (cocaine and the amphetamines) seem to be at least as dangerous as alcohol on a dosage unit basis, albeit with a much smaller consumer base. The effects of alcohol and the stimulants are hard to disentangle in part because they are frequently used together; they appear to be consumption complements, and there are specific chemical mechanisms—such as the formation of cocaethylene in the bloodstream of people who consume alcohol and cocaine together—that make combination use especially violence inducing (Pennings et al. 2002). Cocaine, unlike alcohol, is expensive enough for economic-compulsive violence to be a significant problem. Especially in the form of crack, cocaine—more, for example, than methamphetamine—tends to be a drug of frequent purchase, generating violence-prone patterns of illicit retail trade (Kleiman and Young 1995). The sedative effect of the opiates, including heroin, may reduce psycho-pharmacological violence among those currently under their influence, but the strong drug seeking generated by withdrawal symptoms generates considerable income-producing crime (some of it violent). In the United States, heroin dealing, but not apparently dealing in diverted pharmaceutical opiates, is associated with retail-level violence, perhaps because of the flagrancy of open heroin dealing compared with discreet dealing in pills (SAMHSA 2007). Cannabis, now probably the largest illicit drug market in the United States, does not seem to generate much violence by users or dealers; while a large share of U.S.  arrestees test positive for recent cannabis use, that appears to reflect the demographics of its user population rather than any pharmacological effect. In part because it is relatively inexpensive, cannabis tends to be purchased in bulk, and thus usually does not support the sort of violence-prone open markets characteristic of crack or heroin. With the exception of illicit drug production and trafficking in Mexico, the largest effects of cannabis on violence may be indirect, through its effects on the consumption of other drugs. The substitution of cannabis for alcohol or the stimulants would tend to decrease violence. However, there is no theoretical reason why cannabis should be a substitute for alcohol rather than a complement to it, and current empirical evidence is mixed and equivocal. If cannabis were to prove to be a complement, then increasing cannabis use might be violence increasing through its impact on drinking. The actual relationships might well vary over time and across populations, based on social as well as purely pharmacological factors. The question of ‘cross-elasticity of demand’ across drugs—broadly construed to include lagged, and not just contemporaneous, effects –deserves more research attention.

International Drug-Trafficking Violence The most dramatic drug-related violence takes place in some lowand middle-income countries where illicit drugs are produced, processed, and exported as well as being consumed, and where the

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combination of large illicit economies and weak states can make drug trafficking a serious threat to public authority. That problem is an artefact of drug prohibition, and ill-designed drug enforcement can make it worse (Caulkins et al. 2010). Mexico has drawn much attention in recent years for the ghastly violence perpetrated by its drug trafficking organizations. Some of those groups have been around for decades, at least since Mexico first began producing marijuana and heroin for U.S.  consumption. But their dramatic rise in wealth and violence occurred after Mexico became the primary corridor for South American cocaine passing into the U.S. market, which in turn came after U.S. law enforcement succeeded in clamping down on the old Caribbean cocaine smuggling routes in the 1980s and early 1990s (Paul et al. 2011). The current spike in drug violence in Mexico is at least partially correlated with the crackdown that began with former President Calderon sending federal troops into several Mexican states to suppress drug trafficking and violence in 2006. The period from 2006 to 2012 saw a massive increase in dealer-on-dealer, dealer-on-official, and dealer-on-citizen violence, leading to the creation of an estimated 1.6 million refugees from the bloodshed. A harm reduction or realpolitik approach might consider the ways in which different enforcement tactics could shift trafficking routes to minimize violence. A policy that tacitly allowed the traffic to flow via sea routes and through smaller, less-populated countries might lead to less total violence, but there is obvious difficulty in writing off some smaller countries, even if in a cold-hearted calculus that might reduce the body count. Even within a given country, drug-trafficking enterprises vary widely in their propensity for violence. Law enforcement can modulate its efforts with an eye toward eliminating the most violent actors, thus both creating disincentives for violence and exerting selective pressure to reduce, over time, the average violence propensity of surviving organizations and individuals. This would extend to the international arena the successful violence reduction strategies typified by the Boston Gun Project and the High Point intervention (Kennedy 2011). One approach that has been speculated about, but not yet put into practice, would be to selectively focus enforcement on the distributors in consumer countries supplied by the most violent organizations in source and transit countries. For example, the United States might thus make a policy of attacking U.S. wholesale and retail dealers buying from the one or a few of the most violent organizations. By announcing such a strategy, it might be possible to induce a ‘race to the bottom’ in Mexican gangs’ use of violence, with each seeking to appear less violent than its rivals (Kleiman 2011). Such an approach has great theoretical appeal but faces formidable operational obstacles (Chi et al. 2013).

Demand Reduction As mentioned, suppressing the supply of violence-linked drugs has ambiguous effects on violence levels. By contrast, reducing demand is purely violence reducing: less intoxication, less money spent by users, and less money made by dealers means less violence, without much in the way of caveats or offsetting effects. However, the validity of the oft-repeated claim that ‘demand reduction’ is generically superior to ‘supply reduction’ depends in part on the efficacy of demand-reduction measures. Success

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at preventing or delaying drug initiation—the usual measure of efficacy for prevention programmes—may or may not translate into genuine value in reducing drug abuse. Only a minority of those who use any drug become habitual or problematic users, and those few account for the vast bulk of drug consumption, revenues of the illicit-drug industries, and drug-related harm. Thus a prevention programme could dramatically reduce the prevalence of drug consumption without having great social benefit if it prevented use only by those who would not have used much anyhow. Alternatively, prevention may reduce consumption and violence by a greater proportion than it reduces prevalence if it reduces the conditional probability of progressing to abuse. Community-based prevention is an entirely distinct intervention, with far fewer high-quality evaluations; it may offer still-untapped opportunities to reduce demand, but the scale of those benefits is hard to estimate with any confidence. A variety of drug treatment programmes have been shown to improve outcomes for participants who remain in them for a period of months. That is grounds for expanding treatment funding, but the effective demand for treatment—meaning the willingness of persons suffering from substance abuse disorder to enter treatment, remain in treatment, and adhere to therapeutic guidance—may pose a stronger constraint than the supply of paid treatment programmes. The federal Centre for Substance Abuse Treatment routinely reports that the ‘need for’ treatment greatly exceeds the supply, but the mere fact that someone is in clinical need of treatment does not necessarily mean he or she will seek treatment, or even accept it if offered. Indeed, some findings suggest that group self-help on the model of the Twelve-Step fellowships (Alcoholics Anonymous and groups based on similar principles) may be as beneficial to those who continue in them as are professional counselling and other interventions, but this is not generally taken to have solved the ‘treatment gap’ (Kaskutas 2009). This issue of insufficient demand despite widespread need may become more acute as recent policy changes (mental health parity legislation and the Affordable Care Act) make treatment more available. With treatment, as with prevention, it is important to distinguish two questions: whether the programmes are beneficial, or even have benefits in excess of their costs, and whether they are highly effective in the sense of dramatically reducing drug use. Relapse is the norm, and the reduction in consumption achieved by making community-based treatment more readily available relative to a no-treatment baseline is not overwhelmingly large. (NIDA 1999; Ritchie et al. 2011). Both treatment and prevention tend to be cost-justified because the problems they ameliorate are so costly, rather than because they are highly effective. Opiate substitution therapy seems to be an exception in three respects. First, the evidence concerning its effectiveness, including effectiveness at reducing crime and violence, is much stronger than for other forms of treatment. Second, opiate substitution treatment slots are in short supply. Third, it is only relevant for opiate dependence; there are no comparably effective pharmacotherapies for other drugs—and the vast bulk of illicit drug-related violence comes from stimulants, notably cocaine and methamphetamine. One answer to the problem of inadequate treatment demand is to make treatment mandatory. The evidence suggests that, other things being equal, a spell of coerced treatment is as likely to prove beneficial as is a spell of voluntary treatment. And a large fraction

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of people with serious substance abuse problems comes into frequent contact with the criminal justice system, making criminal justice referral a potential means of getting treatment to those most in need, even when that need is not accompanied by desire. But in addition to concerns about civil liberty and personal autonomy, actually coercing people into drug treatment turns out to be difficult. Even in semi-voluntary ‘drug diversion’ programmes, where offenders elect to undergo treatment in lieu of criminal punishment, actual attendance often falls far short of nominal requirements, with typical completion rates of 50 per cent or lower (Belenko 2001). In principle, those who fail to complete are subject to sanctions, including incarceration, but in practice overworked probation officers and judges tend to let violations slide, even when the treatment provider reports a subject’s non-attendance. A programme can thus easily find itself in a ‘death spiral’, with high non-compliance rates swamping the capacity of the criminal justice system to enforce the mandate and low sanctions probabilities fostering high non-compliance rates (Kleiman 2009). Coerced treatment can also put a strain on treatment resources, leading to dilution of effort and loss of efficacy, and potentially demoralize treatment staff who confront unwilling, and even hostile, clients (Urada et al. 2008). Mandated treatment is not the only option. The same authority that imposes a treatment mandate could also impose a mandate to desist from the use of drugs, without specifying treatment as a means to that end. If it were true that persons with substance abuse disorders act involuntarily—in the sense that their behaviour does not respond to contingencies—then such an approach would be bound to fail. However, the empirical evidence, both in experimental settings and in practical experience, shows otherwise. Seriously drug-involved criminal offenders dramatically reduce drug use, new arrests, and days behind bars if subjected to properly administered programmes of frequent random drug testing backed by swift, certain, and proportionate sanctions—typically, starting with a few days behind bars and escalating with repeated violations—even without a treatment mandate (Hawken et  al. 2013). Sobriety 24/7, a programme pioneered in South Dakota for drunken drivers which requires two alcohol breath tests per day for a few months, with the threat that any non-zero result will lead to an immediate overnight jail stay, has been demonstrated to substantially reduce driving under the influence recidivism even after offenders are no longer subject to testing, and, as an unexpected side-benefit, to reduce domestic violence to an extent observable in county-wide crime data (Kilmer et al. 2012). It appears that— just as Caesare Beccaria claimed in the eighteenth century— swiftness and certainty make punishments effective even without severity (Beccaria 1764/1767), and that principle holds as much for drug-involved offenders as for others (Hawken et al. 2013).

Conclusion Most of the money now spent on drug abuse control is devoted to constraining supply. Unfortunately, untargeted supply control often finds itself at cross-purposes with violence control. That has led to calls for shifting resources from supply to demand control programmes. That might represent an improvement for countries, such as the United States, that have pushed supply control efforts into the region of diminishing returns. But it is not a panacea. Even treatment on demand does not ‘solve’ the drug problem;

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some European countries have been offering more or less unlimited access to treatment for decades. With the notable exception of opiate substitution therapies such as methadone, conventional treatment does more to reduce the misery of those treated than it does to reduce their drug consumption. Likewise, exposing young people to prevention messages does not protect them from drug use to anywhere near the degree that vaccination protects them from mumps or measles. There are, however, more promising approaches. Enforcement could recognize and exploit the heterogeneity across individuals, markets, and dealing practices in tendency to produce violence. Drug dealers collectively commit horrific amounts of deadly violence, but when one remembers that well in excess of a million people participate in drug dealing in the United States each year, while drug-related homicides are in the thousands, it becomes clear that the majority of dealers do not. Focusing enforcement on the people, organizations, and market practices that are most violence-prone, putting them at a competitive

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disadvantage, might displace the market into less destructive forms. Charging drug law enforcement with the manageable task of enhancing public safety by mitigating the collateral damage—and especially the violence—created by drug markets would make more sense than asking it to pursue the Quixotic goal of greatly reducing the use of drugs with well-established mass markets by making them more expensive or less available. On the demand side, the most promising option seems to be coercive demand reduction among drug-using offenders. Drug testing, with swift and certain sanctions for detected drug use, can reduce consumption more dramatically than can any currently available drug-treatment regimen. If such programmes can be successfully operated at full scale, their use in consumer countries could put a significant dent in the demand for drugs which— unlike constraining supply in ways that drive up price—reduce all the varieties of drug-related violence, in consumer, transit, and source countries alike.

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References ADAM II (Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring Program) (2012). Annual Report. Washington, D.C.:  United States Office of National Drug Control Policy. Atkinson, A., Anderson, Z., Hughes, K., Bellis, M. A., Sumnall, H., and Syed, Q. (2009). Interpersonal Violence and Illicit Drugs. Liverpool: Centre for Public Health, Liverpool John Moores University, WHO Collaborating Centre for Violence Prevention. Balko, R. (2006). Overkill, The Rise of Paramilitary Police Raids in America. Washington, D.C. The Cato Institute. Belenko, S. (2001) Research on Drug Courts: A Critical Review, 2001 Update. Columbia: The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CASA), Colombia University. Beccaria, C. (1764). Dei Delitti e Delle Pene. English trans. (1767): An_Essay_ on_Crimes_and_Punishments. Available at:  http://en.wikisource. org/wiki/An_Essay_on_Crimes_and_Punishments [Accessed 19 December 2013]. Beittel, J.  S. (2012). Mexico’s Drug Trafficking Organizations:  Source and Scope of the Rising Violence. Washington, D.C.:  Congressional Research Service. Caulkins, J. (1992). Thinking about displacement in drug markets:  why observing change of venue isn’t enough. Journal of Drug Issues, 22, 17–30. Caulkins, J. (2000). Do drug prohibition and enforcement work? What Works? White Paper Series. Arlington, VA: Lexington Institute. Caulkins, J. (2013). Drug Control and Reductions in Drug-attributable Crime. Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. Caulkins, J., and Kleiman, M. (2013). How Much Crime is Drug-related? History, Limitations and Potential Improvements of Estimation Methods. Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. Caulkins, J., Kleiman, M., and Kulick, J. (2010). Drug Production and Trafficking, Counterdrug Policies, and Security and Governance in Afghanistan. New  York:  Center on International Cooperation, New York University. Caulkins, J., and Chandler, S. (2005). Long-run trends in incarceration of drug offenders in the U.S. Pittsburgh, PA:  Heinz College Research. Paper 21. Caulkins, J., and Reuter, P. (2009). Towards a harm-reduction approach to enforcement. Safer Communities, 8, 9–23. Chi, J., Hayatdavoudi, L., Kruszona, S., and Rowe, B. (2013). Reducing Drug Violence in Mexico: Options for Implementing Targeted Enforcement. Los Angeles: Luskin School of Public Affairs, University of California Los Angeles. Cook, P. (2007). Paying the Tab: The Costs and Benefits of Alcohol Control. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Goldstein, P. (1985). The drugs/violence nexus:  a tripartite conceptual framework. Journal of Drug Issues, 15, 493–506.

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Hawken, A., Davenport, S., and Kleiman, M. (2013). Managing Drug-involved Offenders. Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. Kaskutas, L.A. (2009) Alcoholics Anonymous Effectiveness:  Faith Meets Science. Washington, D.C.: NIH Public Access. Kennedy, D. (2011). Don’t Shoot: One Man, a Street Fellowship, and the End of Violence in Inner-City America. New York: Bloomsbury. Kilmer, B., Nicosia, N., Heaton, P., and Midgette, G. (2012). Efficacy of frequent monitoring with swift, certain, and modest sanctions for violations: insights from South Dakota’s 24/7 Sobriety project. American Journal of Public Health, 103, e37–e43. Kleiman, M., and Young, Y. (1995). Factors of production in retail drug dealing. Urban Affairs Review, 30, 730–48. Kleiman, M., Caulkins, J., and Gehred, P. (2013). Measuring the Costs of Crime. Washington, D.C.:  U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice. Kleiman, M. (2009). When Brute Force Fails: How to Have Less Crime and Less Punishment. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Kleiman, M. (2011). Surgical strikes in the drug wars: smarter policies for both sides of the border. Foreign Affairs. Available at:  http://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/68131/mark-kleiman/surgical-strikes-inthe-drug-wars [Accessed 19 December 2013]. National Institute on Drug Abuse (1999),Principles of Drug Addiction Treatment. Washington, D.C.: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Office of National Drug Control Policy (2013). Improving the Measurement of Drug- Related Crime. Washington, D.C.:  Executive Office of the President. Parry, C. D. H., Plüddemann, A., Louw, A., and Leggett, T. (2004). The 3-metros study of drugs and crime in South Africa: findings and policy implications. The American Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse, 30, 167–85. Paul, C., Gereben Schaefer, A., and Clarke, C. (2011). The Challenge of Violent Drug-Trafficking Organizations:  An Assessment of Mexican Security Based on Existing RAND Research on Urban Unrest, Insurgency and Defense-Sector Reform. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. Pennings, E. J. M., Leccese, A. P., and Wolff, F. A. D. (2002). Effects of concurrent use of alcohol and cocaine. Addiction, 97. 773–83. Ritchie, L., Martin, S.S., Wexler, H.K., and Dillard, D.L. (2011). Program Profile: Delaware KEY / Crest Substance Abuse Programs. Washington, D.C.:  National Institutes of Justice. Available at http://www. CrimeSolutions.gov. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). (2007). Results from the 2006 National Survey on Drug Use and Health:  National Findings. Washington, D.C.:  Office of Applied Studies, NSDUH Series H-32, DHHS Publication No. SMA 07-4293. Rockville, MD. Urada, D., Hawken, A., and Bradley, T. et  al. (2008). Evaluation of Proposition 36: The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000. Los Angeles: Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs, California Health and Human Services Agency. University of California Los Angeles. Integrated Substance Abuse Programs.

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National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) Act.pdf. National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC) ...

Reducing Drug Violence in Mexico.Options for Implementing Targeted ...
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... the U.S. Department of Justice. Page 3 of 66. Reducing Drug Violence in Mexico.Options for Imple ... _Brad Rowe_Mark Kleiman_for DOJ-NIJ_April 2014.pdf.

To Hal Rogers and Mikulski - Drug Policy Alliance
Dec 12, 2013 - As members of Congress work to draft legislation to fund the government ... and good for public health, something well-documented in scientific.

Cartel warfare, drug supply, and policy
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Student Drug Testing Policy PDF.pdf
Virginia law. "lllegal drugs" includes, but is not limited to, all scheduled. drugs as defined by the west virginia Uniform controlled substances. Act, all prescription ...

Public-health-and-international-drug- policy-thelancet-drugs-2016.pdf ...
Mar 24, 2016 - Ministry of Health, Lisbon,. Portugal (J Goulão MD);. University of British Columbia,. Center of Excellence in HIV/. AIDS, Vancouver, BC, Canada. (Prof T Kerr PhD); Centro de. Investigación y Docencia. Económicas, Mexico City,. Mexi

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