© 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK, and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 42, No. 5, October 2011 0026-1068

TOWARD A NEW PRAGMATIST POLITICS ROBERT B. TALISSE

Abstract: In A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, I launched a pragmatist critique of Deweyan democracy and a pragmatist defense of an alternative view of democracy, one based in C. S. Peirce’s social epistemology. In this article, I develop a more precise version of the criticism of Deweyan democracy I proposed in A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, and provide further details of the Peircean alternative. Along the way, some recent critics are addressed. Keywords: John Dewey, Deweyan democracy, Charles S. Peirce, John Rawls, democracy, pluralism, justification.

In A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy (2007), I argue for two theses: 1. Deweyan democracy is nonviable because it cannot accommodate reasonable pluralism. 2. A viable non-Deweyan alternative based upon a Peircean social epistemology is available to pragmatists. Given the failure of the leading neopragmatist options in political theory,1 my theses warrant a more general claim: 3. Pragmatists working on democratic theory must abandon Dewey and adopt the Peircean view. My work has stimulated some controversy.2 I welcome this, but the debate thus far has not been as fruitful as I had hoped. This is no doubt due in 1 I am thinking especially of the views proposed by Richard Rorty (1989; 1991) and Richard Posner (2003). I cannot here provide arguments in support of the claim that their views are nonviable; see Talisse 2001a for a criticism of Rorty’s views, and Talisse 2005 for a critique of Posner’s views. See Rondel 2009 and Hodges 2009 for defenses of Rorty against my objections. 2 See the articles in the symposium in Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1: Brooks 2009; Festenstein 2009; Koopman 2009a; Mayorga 2009a; McBride 2009; Rogers 2009a; and Van Hollebeke 2009. See also Ralston 2008; Mayorga 2008; Deen 2009; Clanton and Forcehimes 2009; Festenstein 2010; and Bacon 2010.

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large measure to imprecision on my part. Specifically, I have as yet not provided a careful enough characterization of Deweyan democracy, and I overstated the political entailments of the Peircean view. Those who have been following these debates will find the main contours of the argument that follows familiar. However, I hope in this article to present the position I’ve advanced elsewhere in a way that is more clear and, I hope, more obviously correct. First, I provide a description of the basic contours of Deweyan democracy. Here I hope to describe Dewey’s view in a way that Deweyans themselves will recognize as the view they endorse. Second, I argue that Deweyan democracy is unacceptable as an ideal for contemporary democratic societies. Here the argument turns on a crucial insight proposed by John Rawls, but, as it turns out, it does not require or presuppose any great degree of sympathy with Rawls’s overall view; in fact, the argument presents an objection that is pragmatic in nature and thus should be recognizable by pragmatists as significant. Third, I sketch a view of democracy based in Peirce’s social epistemology and argue that it is viable. I conclude with some general remarks about pragmatism and political theory. Before beginning, though, I want to preempt one popular line of criticism. Contemporary Deweyans tend to be protective of Dewey in ways that I cannot understand, and in fact strike me as unbecoming. I’d go so far as to say that in certain quarters, Dewey is idolized. And the idolaters operate on the view that Dewey’s philosophy is never really criticized, only misunderstood. Accordingly, I have been accused of misinterpreting Dewey (Van Hollebeke 2009, 81; Rogers 2009a, 77); yet no one has yet pointed to an instance where I attribute to Dewey a view he does not hold. The charge is frequently accompanied by the complaint that my depiction of Deweyan democracy proceeds from an incomplete presentation of Dewey’s philosophy. Criticisms of this kind catalogue philosophical commitments of Deweyan democracy that I do not attribute to him (Deen 2009, 140ff.; Eldridge 2008, 30). This is not a winning strategy in responding to an objection that charges Deweyan democracy with being too philosophically controversial. To say that Deweyan democracy requires us to adopt, for example, a particular conception of the relation between means and ends does not deflect the objection that Deweyan democracy is too philosophically committed to serve as a political ideal for a society marked by reasonable pluralism. It simply confirms the objection. This tendency to idolize Dewey is sometimes manifested in a slightly different tendency to recognize only internal criticisms as genuine. Hence Shane Ralston objects that, in raising the problem of reasonable pluralism, I have read Dewey through an inappropriate “prism” and employed a “foreign” standard in assessing Deweyan democracy (2008, 630). Stuart Rosenbaum represents an extreme case of this unfortunate inclination, arguing that pragmatists must “refuse to engage” with nonpragmatist philosophers (2004, 169). A less overt, but nonetheless troubling, instan© 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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tiation of this tendency is to proceed as if the only legitimate criticisms one can raise against Dewey are criticisms to the effect that Dewey didn’t go far enough in developing his ideas. Richard Bernstein provides a good example of the trend; in his recent assessment of Dewey’s politics, his sole criticisms stem from the claim that “there is too little emphasis on institutional analysis” (2010, 305) in Dewey’s political writings. In order to meet these criticisms, one needs simply to add such analyses to what Dewey wrote.3 Could there be a worse fate for a pragmatist philosopher than to be held by one’s champions to be beyond external criticism, or to be treated as if one’s only faults are sins of omission? One further preliminary must be addressed before turning to the argument. My present topic is democratic theory. I am not arguing that John Dewey was a bad man or an incompetent thinker; nor am I disparaging his actions as a public figure and activist. One can accept my argument but still think that there is much to admire about Dewey. The claim is that his democratic theory is nonviable. Alas, even great philosophers can be dead wrong. This should come as no surprise to philosophers of any stripe; moreover, pragmatist philosophers should be especially ready to embrace the idea that Dewey could be wrong and yet nonetheless a great philosopher, as this is directly entailed by fallibilism. 1. Four Theses of Deweyan Democracy So, let us begin. The core of Deweyan democracy is composed of four theses. I do not claim that these four theses are sufficient to express Deweyan democracy in full. I am ready to concede that Dewey thought that democracy was more than what is identified in these theses. My point is that whatever else Dewey thought about the nature of democracy, he held at least these four theses, and saw them as central to democracy. Here are the theses: 1. The Continuity Thesis: The democratic political order is a moral order characterized by a distinctive conception of human flourishing. 2. The Transformative Thesis: The democratic process is one in which individual preferences, attitudes, and opinions are informed and transformed rather than simply aggregated. 3. The Way of Life Thesis: Democracy is not simply a kind of state or a mode of government but a way of life. 4. The Perfectionist Thesis: Democratic states may enact legislation and design institutions for the expressed purpose of fostering the values and attitudes necessary for human flourishing. I’ll explicate these in order. 3

See Stuhr (2003, 163) for another example of this defect.

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First, Deweyan democracy rejects the “old-time separation between politics and morals” (MW 12:192)4 common to liberal theory.5 For Dewey, democracy is the political manifestation of his social conception of the self and his corresponding ethic of self-realization. On Dewey’s view, individuals are not “given”; they emerge (EW 1:231; LW 7:227).6 Hence Dewey identifies a “moral criterion” for evaluating “social institutions and political measures”: “The test is whether a given custom or law sets free individual capacities in such a way as to make them available for the development of the general happiness or the common good” (MW 5:431).7 Dewey claims that only a democratic order can fare favorably on such a test, for democracy is the “clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its implications” (LW 2:328). It is through participation in democratic community that individuals can develop their capacities in ways that enrich the life of the whole (MW 10:233); for democratic community “is the endeavor to unite” the “liberation of individuals on the one hand” and the “promotion of a common good on the other” (LW 7:349). Since we are inherently social, our flourishing can be achieved only in community with others (LW 2:331); accordingly, democracy is necessary “to achieve a truly human way of living” (LW 11:218). Insofar as democracy needs a justification at all, its justification lies in its ability to facilitate human flourishing, what Dewey called “growth” (LW 7:306). Thus Dewey held that “democracy and the one, ultimate, ethical ideal of humanity are . . . synonyms” (EW 1:248).8 Second, Deweyan democracy holds that participation in a democratic community is not simply a matter of voting and campaigning in service of one’s preferences; rather, it requires citizens to engage in activities by 4 References to Dewey’s work are keyed to the Collected Works (Dewey 1969–1991), which are divided into Early Works (EW), Middle Works (MW), and Later Works (LW). Citations employ the standard formula of short title plus volume number and page number. 5 Hence Festenstein, “The contours of Dewey’s liberal democratic thought follow his account of ethics” (1997, 98). Compare Pappas, “[Dewey’s] notion of democracy is an outgrowth of his views about moral experience” (2008, 166). 6 Cf. MW 12:193; LW 11:31. “What an individual actually is depends upon the nature and movement of associated life” (LW 6:5); the “human being is an individual because of and in relation to others” (LW 7:227; cf. MW 12:191). Dewey also holds that “society and individuals are correlative, organic, to one another” (MW 12:187). Contemporary Deweyans uphold this commitment; see Boisvert 1998, 54; Green 1999, 6; Stuhr 1998, 85; Fesmire 2003, 11; and Colapietro 2006, 25. 7 Cf. MW 9:88ff.; MW 12:186. 8 Eldridge (2008, 30) criticizes my appeal to this quotation on the grounds that it was written when Dewey was still a young man caught in the grip of Hegel. I agree with Bernstein (2010) that the early essay from which this quotation derives (“The Ethics of Democracy,” EW 1:227–49) contains articulations—in Hegelian language—of key commitments that Dewey sustained throughout his political writings. Here, Dewey is expressing the idea that the democratic way of life is the culmination of the moral life more generally. And it is clear that he did not abandon this principle. It should be mentioned in addition that there is an open question whether Dewey ever really got beyond his early Hegelianism. Richard Gale (2010) has argued compellingly that Dewey remained a Hegelian throughout his career.

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which they may “convince and be convinced by reason” (MW 10:404). Deweyan democracy hence rejects adversary democracy (Mansbridge 1980) and favors a transformative view according to which democratic participation consists in applications of shared intelligence (LW 11:37). When shared intelligence is enacted, conflicts are addressed in ways in which opposing claims can be brought “out into the open” where “they can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests” (LW 11:56); intelligence brings into relief “values prized in common” (LW 13:71; LW 2:328).9 Therefore the “give and take” (LW 2:332) that is constitutive of democratic participation results in transformed and enlarged perspectives. Democratic citizens engage in social processes of collective intelligence, and in so doing, they grow. Third, the Deweyan democrat is committed to the view that democracy is a way of life—a matrix of social norms, political processes, and personal habits, all aimed at growth and thus fit to govern “all modes of human association” (LW 2:325). This third thesis follows neatly from the first two. If we concede that “growth itself is the only moral ‘end’ ” (MW 12:181) and accept the Continuity Thesis, we will evaluate all forms of human sociality by their capacity to foster growth. If in addition we mean by democracy those social and personal norms that explicitly aim at fostering growth, we will then follow Dewey in rejecting the idea that democracy is simply a kind of state or system of government (LW 2:325). Democracy, rather, is the name of the political and personal aspiration to achieve “the all around growth of every member of society” (MW 12:186); democracy “arranges life to optimize meaningful growth” (Hildebrand 2008, 121), it seeks an “organic and nurturing relation between all individuals and the social wholes . . . to which they belong” (Pappas 2008, 248). Accordingly, the Deweyan democrat sees democracy as an ideal of sociality that should inform “all areas and ways of living” (LW 11:25) and “must affect all modes of human association, the family, the school, industry, religion” (LW 2:325).10 Fourth, Deweyan democracy is perfectionist. By perfectionism I do not mean the view that there is a fixed human nature to be perfected; rather, it is the view that political institutions should aim to foster within citizens the habits requisite for human flourishing.11 Dewey holds that political institutions “are not means for obtaining something for individuals” but “are means of creating individuals” (MW 12:191). Again, growth requires 9 Hence the “heart and guarantee of democracy is in free gatherings of neighbors on the street corner to discuss back and forth what is read in uncensored news of the day” (LW 14:227). 10 Hence Pappas, “[To] appreciate the deeper possibilities of democracy, we must extend its meaning to include how to make collective decisions, how to treat and experience others, how to communicate, how to confront problems and disagreements, how groups must interact, how to engage in rituals, and how to attend to experience in general” (2008, 220). 11 Consequently, Eldridge’s remarks (2008, 30–31) are off target.

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that individuals adopt and practice certain habits; accordingly, democracy is a “personal way of individual life,” one involving the “possession and continual use of certain attitudes, forming personal character and determining desire and purpose in all the relations of life” (LW 14:226). A democratic society hence must aim to create individuals by instituting policies and building institutions designed to call forth growth. In fact, Dewey contends that possession and exercise of the attitudes requisite for growth is necessary for freedom (LW 3:111): “freedom for an individual means growth” (MW 12:198). Thus it is not sufficient for a democratic state to simply protect individuals from interference; it must strive to cultivate in citizens the habits constitutive of freedom.12 With these theses in place, two observations can be made. First, the Continuity Thesis and the Way of Life Thesis combine to generate a uniquely muscular perfectionism. Whereas contemporary perfectionists hold that the task of cultivating citizens is a task for the state alone, Dewey holds that “the struggle for democracy has to be maintained on as many fronts as culture has aspects: political, economic, international, educational, scientific and artistic, and religious” (LW 13:186).13 Dewey saw the task of democracy to be that of “making our own politics, industry, education, our culture generally . . . an evolving manifestation of democratic ideals” (LW 13:197). For Dewey, then, all social association should be aimed at realizing his distinctive vision of flourishing. Second, the theses taken together not only suggest a distinction between democracy as a form of government and a way of life (LW 2:325), they imply in addition that the democratic way of life is normatively prior to political democracy. The structures and practices of political democracy—frequent elections, universal suffrage, fair procedures, and the rule of law, for example—are “but a mechanism” for “securing” the “channels” by which the democratic social ideal could be realized (LW 2:325).14 “There is no sanctity” (LW 2:326) in the institutions of political democracy, they are “devices” for achieving democracy as a way of life (LW 2:326); “democracy is a form of government only because it is a form of moral and spiritual association” (EW 1:240). 2. The Problem of Pluralism In the early 1990s, John Rawls saw something that no previous political philosopher had fully appreciated. Rawls’s fundamental insight in Political Liberalism (1996) is now well known: the liberties secured in a constitutional democracy give rise to a pluralism of reasonable comprehensive 12

Cf. MW 5:392; LW 2:340; LW 11:220. For contemporary perfectionism, see Raz 1986, Sher 1997, and Wall 1998. 14 “Majority rule,” he says, “is as foolish as its critics charge it with being” if understood apart from the social conditions that would render it an effective instrument for growth (LW 2:365). 13

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doctrines. This means that there is no comprehensive philosophical, religious, or moral doctrine upon which human reason converges. Consequently, despite our best efforts (1996, 55), agreement at the level of fundamental matters is elusive. Importantly, Rawls contends that this reasonable pluralism is no accident (1996, 36); it is “the long-run outcome of the work of human reason under enduring free institutions” (1996, 129). The flip side of reasonable pluralism is the “fact of oppression” (1996, 36). If reasonable pluralism is “the inevitable outcome” of freedom, then “a continuing shared understanding on one comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of state power” (1996, 36). Where minds are free, pluralism prevails; where pluralism does not prevail, minds are not free. When these considerations are combined with the core democratic commitment that the exercise of coercive political power is legitimate only when it is justifiable, at least in principle, “to every last individual” (Waldron 1993, 37), the crucial upshot of Rawls’s later thought comes into focus: a political order premised on the truth of any comprehensive doctrine—even a fully democratic one—is oppressive. It is oppressive because it would allow the coercion of citizens in the service of a comprehensive ideal that they could reasonably reject. As an example, consider Joe. Joe thinks with John Stuart Mill that the Greatest Happiness Principle (GHP) is “the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions” (Mill 1859, 15). Consequently, he thinks that any question of public policy is decisively answered by the GHP. Suppose he also thinks, with Mill, that a system of weighted voting, in which “graduates of universities” are given “two or more votes” (Mill 1861, 336), best satisfies the GHP. Suppose that Joe is correct about this. The fact of reasonable pluralism is the fact that utilitarianism is not the only reasonable doctrine that citizens might adopt; one may reject utilitarianism without thereby revoking one’s fitness for democratic citizenship. In a democracy, public policy must be justifiable to all, including those who reject utilitarianism. Consequently, Joe’s reasons could be reasonably rejected; they are hence insufficient to publicly justify weighted voting. Crucially, Joe’s reasons are insufficient even if utilitarianism is true. Public policy must be justifiable by reasons that meet a standard higher than truth; publicly justifying reasons must be not reasonably rejectable. Reasonable pluralism means that no comprehensive doctrine is beyond reasonable rejection; therefore, Joe’s reasons cannot publicly justify. In order to publicly justify his policy, Joe must provide reasons that could be accepted by nonutilitarians. The point holds a fortiori for states: “No comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception for a constitutional regime” (Rawls 1996, 135); hence, a “well-ordered democratic society” is not a community, if by “community” we mean “a special kind of association, one united by a comprehensive doctrine” (1996, 40). © 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Deweyan democracy fails because it claims that proper democracy is a community precisely in this sense.15 Dewey held that democracy requires the transformation of society into a Great Community (LW 2:350), a social association composed of “vital, steady, and deep relationships” (LW 2:369), based in shared “signs and symbols” (LW 2:330) and “conjoint experience” (LW 2:331), all aimed at growth. Accordingly, Deweyan democrats see democracy as a matter not simply of how a society makes its collective decisions but also of what it decides. Social policy shapes the habits of citizens, and democracy is the project of creating a certain kind of individual. Collective decision hence should increasingly reflect the aim of furthering growth; consequently, a society that is not directed toward growth is a society that is failing at democracy.16 My argument is not that Deweyan democrats long for a monochrome society of Dewey enthusiasts (though I suspect that some do harbor such longings). The point is more subtle. Deweyan democracy requires community in the Rawlsian sense because it takes its own conception of human flourishing to be sufficient for deciding how public institutions should be designed and what policies must be enacted. That is, Deweyans hold that to show that some public policy P is the best among available options for promoting growth is to provide a conclusive reason for enacting P. Crucially, Deweyans also hold that for a society to not enact P even after it has been determined to most likely further growth is for that society to fail at democracy; for growth provides the “criterion” (MW 5:431), “standard” (MW 9:89), or “supreme test” (MW 12:186) for democracy. Deweyan democrats thus hold that the truth of the claim “P best promotes growth among the available options” is sufficient to publicly justify the enactment of P; to fail to enact the policy that would best promote growth is not only to choose a suboptimal policy, it is also to fail at democracy. This is confirmed in the work of Dewey’s contemporary commentators. Thomas Alexander describes Deweyan democracy as “the culture of a whole society”; he claims that “if democracy is to have a future, it must embrace an understanding of the deepest needs of human beings and the means of fulfilling them” (1998, 17). John Stuhr claims that Deweyan democracy is a “demand” for “different personal conduct and farreaching cultural reconstruction”; he contends that “we must realize in thought and action that democracy is a personal way of individual life . . . and we must rededicate our lives to its realization—now” (2003, 64). James Gouinlock describes Deweyan democracy as a “specific ordering of personal dispositions and modes of conduct that would be operative in all forms of interpersonal experience”; he continues: “Political democracy, when it is real, is but an instance of this more generic form of life” (1999, 15 See Pappas, “Dewey’s views about democracy cannot be separated from his plea that we accept a certain metaphysics” (2008, 267). 16 Hence Boisvert, “A democracy should be judged by the way all of its citizens are able to develop their capacities and thus grow” (1998, 71–72).

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235). Judith Green characterizes Deweyan democracy as “ultimately a quality of social living . . . so attractive that, once people begin to see its potential, the longing for such a life in their own social context becomes contagious” (2008, 2). I could easily go on. The quasi-fanatical resonance of these statements is unmistakable: only Deweyans can be genuine democrats, true democracy must be Deweyan, non-Deweyans are not only philosophically misguided but ipso facto failing at citizenship and perhaps undermining democracy itself. To be sure, the rhetorical extravagance is difficult to take seriously, and one has to wonder about a conception of democracy that is so commonly formulated as a series of commands.17 But let us not be distracted. For the Deweyan, “democracy requires reconception of what it means to be an individual, a community, a public; it requires the reconstruction of those cultural institutions responsible for shaping character” (Hildebrand 2008, 122). The problem is not that Dewey’s ideal of human flourishing is false; indeed, it could be true. The problem is rather that it can be reasonably rejected; one can reject growth as an ideal and yet not revoke one’s fitness for democratic citizenship. Insofar as the Deweyan democrat seeks to reconstruct the whole of social association so that it is directed toward realizing her own conception of human flourishing, she seeks to create social and political institutions that are explicitly designed to cultivate norms and realize civic ideals that her fellow citizens could reasonably reject. Insofar as she takes the moral reasons supplied by her own vision of human flourishing to be sufficient to justify policy affecting her fellow citizens, she favors political conditions under which the state coerces its citizens solely on the basis of reasons that they could reasonably reject. For this reason, Deweyan democracy is oppressive. It is an inappropriate ideal for democratic society. This is a startling conclusion, to be sure. In order to get a clearer sense of what it means, it might prove helpful to address an instructive criticism advanced by Richard Gale (forthcoming). In his refreshingly forthright style, Gale contends that the success of my argument against Deweyan democracy entails that all forms of democracy are oppressive and thus illegitimate. His argument has it that governments are oppressive whenever they coerce, that is, act against the will of any citizen.18 Accordingly, Gale argues that “our society can and will have abortion, stem cell research, euthanasia, etc., which is anathema to the theist, being a type of society in which they would not want to live and raise children” (forthcoming). Gale is mistaken about the relation between coercion and oppression, and thus his objection does not succeed. To put the point succinctly: not all coercion is oppressive. It is the essence of political power to be coercive. 17 Koopman (2009b, n. 48) seems to agree. He asserts but does not argue that, unlike “certain contemporary Deweyans,” Dewey himself is not vulnerable to the criticism that his conception of democracy is unable to countenance reasonable pluralism. The claim is accompanied by a citation to Koopman 2009a, yet, so far as I can tell, no supporting argument is provided there. 18 See Eldridge (2008, 31–32) for a similar response.

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When the state acts, it forces some to do what they otherwise would not do or do not want to do. It is the philosophical anarchist’s position that coercion is always oppressive and therefore morally objectionable. The democrat, by contrast, holds that that coercion is nonoppressive when it is consistent with the fundamental equality of all citizens. Coercion is consistent with equality when it is exercised on the basis of reasons that no citizen could reasonably reject. That is, the justificatory task of the state is not to convince all citizens to agree with or endorse its actions, it is to demonstrate to each citizen that it acts on the basis of reasons that are of the right kind, that is, the kind that cannot be reasonably rejected. Accordingly, that the Christian citizens Gale envisions object to the state’s policy regarding abortion does not entail that the policy is oppressive. Oppression exists where there is unjustifiable coercion, coercion that can be supported only by reasonably rejectable reasons. A lot turns on the question of how we are to determine what kinds of reasons are reasonably rejectable. This is a very difficult matter, which we cannot try to settle here.19 But we get some traction on the issue by considering our earlier example of Joe the Utilitarian. Joe seeks to coerce others solely on the basis of the Greatest Happiness Principle. But in a free society, citizens are not required to be utilitarians; indeed, citizens may reject utilitarianism and yet still be members in good standing of a democracy. Hence Joe’s utilitarian reasons are insufficient to justify coercive policy. Contrast Jane with Joe. Jane proposes a federal policy requiring public buildings to make accommodations for the disabled. When asked why the state should adopt this policy, she replies that equality demands such measures. Now, there is a difference in kind between Joe’s reason and Jane’s. In response to Joe, one can simply say, “Who cares about the Greatest Happiness Principle?” and move on. But one who says to Jane, “Who cares about equality?” has called into question one’s fitness for citizenship. In a modern democracy, equality is something citizens (and states) must care about in deciding public policy. Following Rawls, we might say that reasons that reference concepts like equality are public reasons, whereas reasons that employ concepts like the Greatest Happiness Principle are nonpublic (1996, 220ff.). Put simply, coercion is oppressive when it cannot be justified by means of public reasons. We now can see why Gale’s objection fails. The question of whether a given policy is oppressive does not turn on whether it is endorsed by all citizens; rather, it turns on the kind of reason that is available to support the policy. Assuming for the sake of argument that current policies regarding, say, abortion are justifiable by means of public reasons, Gale’s Christian citizens have no grounds for claiming to be oppressed, even though they may vehemently oppose the policy. 19 See my “Religion, Respect, and Eberle’s Agapic Pacifist” (forthcoming) for the beginning of an account.

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This way of distinguishing coercion from oppression helps us to see more clearly why Deweyan democracy fails. Recall that according to the Deweyan, it is the purpose of all modes of human association to promote growth, and this purpose provides the “moral criterion” (MW 5:431) for evaluating all social and political institutions. Consequently, on Dewey’s view, the truth of the claim that some policy or institution promotes growth is a reason for enacting that policy or establishing that institution. But “x promotes growth” is not a public reason for the same reason that “x is required by the Greatest Happiness Principle” is not a public reason. As with the GHP, one can reject growth as a moral ideal without thereby revoking one’s fitness for democratic citizenship. So, Deweyan democracy is oppressive, not because it would coerce people (every conception of democracy involves coercion), but because it would allow the state to coerce on the basis of nonpublic reasons. To be forced to do something one does not want to do solely on the basis of reasons that one cannot regard as reasons of one’s own is the essence of oppression. And Deweyan democracy not only would allow this; in a society marked by reasonable pluralism, it requires it. Indeed, Deweyan democrats hold that a democracy is not proper, genuine, or “real” if it does not oppress people. There’s the objection to Deweyan democracy. The next task is to formulate a pragmatist conception of democracy that can accommodate reasonable pluralism. My thesis is that the social epistemology proposed by Peirce provides the raw materials for such a conception. 3. A Pragmatist Alternative It is notoriously difficult to tease a coherent argument out of Peirce’s essay “Fixation of Belief.” I’ve argued elsewhere (2001b; 2004; 2007, chap. 3) that the key to the essay is the thesis that there are norms internal to belief, norms that govern our doxastic practices simply in virtue of what believing is. On my account, Peirce sees that in order to assess oneself as believing that p, one must assess oneself as being properly responsive to the relevant evidence, arguments, and reasons. To recognize of oneself that one is in the habit of behaving as if p, but is not appropriately responsive to the relevant reasons, is to no longer be able to assess oneself as believing that p; rather, one must see one’s commitment to p as a kind of symptom—an affliction or an obsession. This is why the first three of the four methods of belief fixation fail. They’re unsustainable once one assesses oneself as employing them. In order to succeed with the nonscientific methods, one must take oneself to be practicing roughly what Peirce described as the scientific method. This is because only the scientific method satisfies the cognitive norms governing belief, from the inside. I think this insight, which I attribute to Peirce, provides the basis for a compelling defense of democracy. Some critics seem to hold that would be an objection to my view if it could be shown that a proper interpretation © 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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of Peirce would not allow it. Hence Rosa Mayorga contends that the view I propose “is not truly Peircean” (2009b, 1) and should be reclassified as “Peirceanist” (2009a, 69). Andrew Smith argues that my account turns on a “critical equivocation” on the Peircean conception of belief (2011, 77); according to Smith, this “sleight of hand” renders my view “incorrect when regarded on Peircean grounds” (2011, 11). I think that both Mayorga and Smith are wrong on the interpretative points, but, in the end, my concern is not with Peirce exegesis, but with democracy. So I’ll state the argument in my own voice. There are two features of belief that are of special relevance. The first can be stated in a way owing to G. E. Moore (1993). Moore called attention to the fact that statements of a particular form, when understood as first-personal assessments, are paradoxical. To wit: I believe that it’s raining, but it’s not. What’s paradoxical about this statement is that although it may, of course, be true of you, you can’t believe it. To assess as false a belief that you hold is (typically) to dissolve the belief. When we believe, we aim at truth. To come to regard a belief as false is (typically) to defeat the belief. As Bernard Williams put it, the falsity of p is (typically) a fatal objection to the belief that p (2002, 67). The second feature is the impossibility of what Williams called “deciding to believe” (1973). Try to believe that at this moment I have exactly $27 in my left pants pocket. Try. Notice: you’re trying to give yourself a reason for thinking that I have exactly $27 in my pocket. That is, you’re trying to convince yourself that in believing that I right now have exactly $27 in my pocket, you’d be appropriately responding to reasons. In short, when we believe, we aspire to be responsive to our reasons. We can’t take ourselves to believe willy-nilly. Of course, many of our beliefs are formed willy-nilly. But we do not assess them as such. And when we come to realize that a belief was derived willy-nilly, we (typically) see it as a clear symptom of epistemic failure; we see fit to take epistemic action: we revise, withdraw, suspend judgment, selfdeceive, or confabulate. These two features of belief can be pulled together as follows. When we believe, we aim to believe what is true; and the way we aim to believe what is true is by being responsive to reasons. We may say, then, that as epistemic agents we are bound by two norms: truth and responsiveness. Now, a lot needs to be said here about famous results concerning the irrationality of human beings; a full account would need to address cognitive biases, attribution error, framing effects, tendencies to confabulation, and the like. I cannot examine these matters here. For now, let me emphasize that the norms of truth and responsiveness are internal to our practices of believing. They are not parachuted in from some theory. They inhere in what we do, how we think, and how we communicate. They specify what it takes to be cognitively above board, and form our conception of epistemic responsibility. © 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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An epistemic argument for democracy follows intuitively. One should endorse a democratic political order because only under democratic conditions can one satisfy one’s first-personal epistemic commitments. If being a believer commits one to aspiring to truth, and if one aspires to truth by responding to reasons, then responsible believing calls us to the social enterprise of examining, exchanging, and challenging reasons. Hence one can satisfy one’s commitments qua believer only within a political context in which it is possible to inquire. In order for inquiry to commence, familiar Millian Open Society norms must be in place. There must be norms of equality, liberty, free speech, protected dissent, and so on. Crucially, these norms are intrinsically self-reflexive—they must not only be satisfied but also be seen to be satisfied; consequently, they open the possibility of their own critique. That is, part of what it is to endorse these norms is to be prepared to entertain the possibility that they are not in fact being satisfied under present conditions. Accordingly, Open Society norms entail political mechanisms by means of which social institutions can be monitored, examined, challenged, and held accountable. Hence the formal infrastructure of democracy must be in place, including a constitution, courts, accountable bodies of representation, regular elections, universal suffrage, and a free press. In addition, there must be, minimally, a system of public schooling, and institutions of distributive justice to eliminate as far as possible material obstructions to democratic citizenship. In summary, the view I favor begins from a view of our most generic doxastic practices, identifies in these a set of internal norms, and then argues that these norms can be satisfied only under democratic political conditions. The resulting view is identifiably deliberative and epistemic. I also contend that it is identifiably Peircean, but I need not fight for the label. The picture of democracy just sketched may seem no different from Deweyan democracy. Indeed, both hold the Transformative Thesis. However, there are crucial differences. First, I reject the Continuity Thesis. Whereas on the Deweyan view the democratic order is justified by an ideal of human flourishing, the view I propose invokes no such moral vision. I model democratic institutions and norms strictly in terms of a set of epistemic commitments that are internal to belief. Again, the point is first-personal: no matter what you believe about the good life, the nature of the self, or the purpose of human existence, you take yourself to believe those things responsibly; thus you have a reason to endorse a democratic political order of the sort described above.20 The epistemic 20 For example, to believe, with Dewey, that “shared experience is the greatest of human goods” (LW 1:157) is to take it to be true that shared experience is the greatest of human goods, and to take this to be true is to be committed to the idea that the best reasons, arguments, and evidence would confirm it. The Peircean insists that this is something that can be established only by actually examining reasons, arguments, and evidence. And in order to do that, one must inquire. But inquiry can be engaged only within a social order governed by the epistemic and institutional norms identified above.

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commitments that are internal to belief are sufficient. No moral doctrine is presupposed. Further, the view I propose recognizes that there are many distinct and epistemically responsible moral doctrines that are compatible with democracy. Accordingly, I reject the Way of Life Thesis; democracy is not the project of achieving “all around growth” for “every member of society” (MW 12:186). Rather, it is the project of making collective decisions in ways that are driven more by reasons and arguments than by money and power. Questions of how our communities, schools, workplaces, homes, and churches should be organized are not questions that can be settled by building our preferred answers into our conception of democracy itself. In a democratic society, not all human associations need to be governed by the same norms; indeed, democracy must permit—and in some cases protect and sustain—modes of association whose internal norms are not at all democratic. Although there is a perfectionist element in the view of democracy I endorse, it is far more modest than Deweyan perfectionism. I reject Deweyan perfectionism. Deweyans hold that growth supplies the “moral criterion” (MW 5:431) for democracy. Consequently, what counts is the proximity of standing policies to a substantive moral ideal; a policy that does not aim at growth is democratically deficient, regardless of how it might have been instituted. Hence, for the Deweyan, social institutions must be built that foster in citizens the habits that will enable them to discern what is necessary for growth and dispose them to favor growthenabling policies. By contrast, what counts on the view I hold is whether outcomes are reached under social conditions that enable epistemically responsible processes of reasoning. Thus my view acknowledges that there are many institutional and social forms that democracy may take, and that democracies are home to many different ways of life. More important, my view can acknowledge that the fact that a collective decision is morally suboptional does not render it democratically deficient. The perfectionist element in the view I propose is strictly epistemic. It requires the state to contribute to the development of the epistemic capacities necessary for responsible believing. As I said above, minimally, this calls for an effective system of public education; it may require Sunsteinstyle provisions for the preservation of public spaces and deliberative forums.21 But this kind of perfectionism keeps open the question of the “ultimate, ethical ideal of humanity” (EW 1:248) and offers no view about the “greatest of human goods” (LW 1:157). Thus it is far less extreme than Deweyan perfectionism; in fact, it is consistent with many forms of liberal neutralism. Someone might object that just as Deweyans would govern on the basis of a reasonably rejectable moral doctrine, my view proposes to base public policy on a reasonably rejectable pragmatist epistemology. Both views 21

See Sunstein 1996; 2001; 2003; and Ackerman and Fishkin 2004.

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commit the same error: Deweyan democracy denies the reasonable pluralism of moral commitments, and my view denies it with respect to epistemic commitments. This objection fails. The norms of truth and responsiveness do not constitute a comprehensive epistemology; rather, they state commitments that are consistent with any well-developed epistemology. Internalists, externalists, foundationalists, coherentists, and so on all agree that beliefs aim at truth, and that when we believe, we take ourselves to be responding to reasons. The social epistemology to which I appeal simply makes explicit the norms that are implicit in our existing epistemic practice, including the practices of professional epistemologists. Furthermore, since contestation itself presupposes these very norms, the epistemic commitments are not subject to reasonable rejection. Thus the conception I favor does not allow for political coercion on the basis of a reasonably rejectable ideal, and does not run afoul of reasonable pluralism. Hence my view can offer what the Deweyan cannot: a conception of democracy that is consistent with reasonable pluralism. 4. Concluding Remarks The view I have proposed is far more modest than Deweyan democracy. It takes no stand on the “ultimate ethical ideal of humanity” (EW 1:248), it does not attempt to identify “the greatest of human goods” (LW 1:157), and it for good reason accepts the “old-time separation between politics and morals” (MW 12:192). Accordingly, it is closely related to views proposed recently by other epistemic democrats, including those expressly influenced by the later Rawls, such as Joshua Cohen (2009) and David Estlund (2008; 2009). Hence I happily accept Matthew Festenstein’s (2009) description of my view as “pragmatist political liberalism.” As I mentioned earlier, some have taken the fact that my view comports well with current nonpragmatist views as grounds for criticism. They have said that my view is not properly pragmatist because it attends to problems of mainstream philosophy; others have claimed that by bringing Rawlsian concerns against Dewey, I illicitly judge Dewey according to a foreign standard. Not long ago I received an e-mail from a well-known Dewey scholar contending that my arguments against Deweyan democracy fail because they “make Dewey into a conventional political philosopher.” Alas, by “conventional,” I suspect my interlocutor meant “non-Deweyan,” thereby rendering it analytically true that all noninternal criticism of Dewey is misguided. Again, there is no better way to secure the irrelevance and demise of pragmatism than this insistence upon insularity and the corresponding resentment of nonpragmatist philosophy. To put the point more pointedly: contemporary pragmatists working in the “classical” idiom need to acknowledge that since Dewey’s heyday, the political landscape has changed and philosophy has progressed; this requires us to © 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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propose new views and make new arguments. More important, it shows that many of the thoughts and claims that were dear to Dewey’s heart are now simply unsustainable and must be abandoned. No pragmatist should be surprised to find that philosophy books written in the 1920s and 1930s should now be unable to meet new challenges. We should not try to sustain Dewey’s political philosophy by reworking it so that it resembles some more current and viable position, nor should we take some small but significant element of Dewey’s political philosophy and regard it as the whole of Deweyan democracy.22 We should just get over it. We should begin working on a new pragmatist politics. I have argued that current conditions call for a more philosophically modest conception of democracy than Dewey’s. I sketched the main contours of an alternative social epistemic conception of democracy that is in certain respects substantive and yet able to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism. By Deweyan standards, my alternative view will seem thin, perhaps even emaciated. Yet the modesty of the view I propose is precisely what makes it pragmatically potent. It simply cuts no ice with our fellow citizens to advocate public policy on the basis of a controversial moral ideal like growth, any more than it would be effective for Joe to advocate solely on the basis of the GHP. Proposals for reinvigorating our public schools that appeal to Deweyan growth as the only or ultimate democratic ideal simply push the argument away from educational policy and into the philosophy seminar. Similarly, books that start with sentences like “What America and the world need now is a multifacteted, context-sensitive, open-ended, constantly evolving, inquiry-guiding story, vision, and process of deepening democracy that can foster and educate widely shared social hope” (Green 2008, 1–2) not only make no advance in achieving any identifiable political results, they actually obstruct political progress; once again, attention is placed on the controversial and reasonably rejectable moral commitments of Deweyan philosophers. While Green is proselytizing for global adoption of her Deweyan worldview, people in America and beyond stand in need of clean water, food, medication, clothing, and protection from abuse, torture, humiliation, and tyranny. The case for taking the actions necessary to satisfy these needs had better not depend on large numbers of people coming to endorse a philosophically controversial, and in the end arguably false, “story, vision, and process” about democratic politics. 22 I read Melvin Rogers’s recent book (2009b) as an instantiation of the first approach, and Elizabeth Anderson (2006) as taking the second approach. I address Anderson in my 2010. As for Rogers, it seems to me that he reads Dewey as if he held Philip Pettit’s view. I of course cannot launch an argument for this here, but it is worth noting that Rogers’s book contains no sustained discussion of shared experience, growth, or democracy as a “way of life.” Instead, Rogers holds that Deweyan democracy is mainly about counteracting arbitrary power. As an examination of the index of Dewey’s complete works suggests, political power is not a central theme in the corpus.

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It would be far better from the pragmatic point of view of actually achieving desperately needed results to make the case for such changes in a way that rests on what people already believe, or at least what they cannot reasonably reject. Again, most of our fellow reasonable citizens reject Deweyanism, and they do so for compelling reasons. Of course, one may argue that they are wrong to reject Dewey’s moral ideal, and that their lives are less good for that fact; but that does not make them any less one’s fellow citizens or any less entitled to justification for coercive public policy. And when we are trying to reach democratically acceptable resolutions to current problems, we must be looking for resolutions that are justifiable to all citizens, given the fact of reasonable pluralism. The view I have sketched here is aimed precisely at this. It identifies a kind of reason that can be accepted by all citizens, regardless of their fundamental moral commitments. Roughly, it claims that a democratic society must not only protect basic rights and preserve equal liberty but also sustain a reliable social epistemic system. It hence affirms that statements of the form “Policy X is necessary in order to encourage reasoned public debate” and “Unless we enact X, already powerful interests will have an undue influence over the news media” count as public reasons in favor of X. Accordingly, the view I have sketched enables us to advocate more effectively on behalf of the progressive and radically democratic measures that pragmatists like Dewey have traditionally supported. Department of Philosophy Vanderbilt University 111 Furman Hall Nashville, TN 37240 USA [email protected] References Ackerman, Bruce, and James Fishkin. 2004. Deliberation Day. New Haven: Yale University Press. Alexander, Thomas. 1998. “The Art of Life: Dewey’s Aesthetics.” In Reading Dewey, ed. Larry Hickman, 1–22. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Anderson, Elizabeth. 2006. “The Epistemology of Democracy.” Episteme 3:9–23. Bacon, Michael. 2010. “The Politics of Truth: A Critique of Peircean Deliberative Democracy.” Philosophy and Social Criticism 36, no. 9: 1075–91. Bernstein, Richard J. 2010. “Dewey’s Vision of Radical Democracy.” In The Cambridge Companion to Dewey, ed. Molly Cocharan, 228–308. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. © 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Boisvert, Raymond. 1998. John Dewey. Albany: State University of New York Press. Brooks, Thom. 2009. “A Critique of Pragmatism and Deliberative Democracy.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1: 50–54. Clanton, J. Caleb, and Andrew Forcehimes. 2009. “Can Peircean Epistemic Perfectionists Bid Farewell to Deweyan Democracy?” Contemporary Pragmatism 6, no. 2:165–83. Cohen, Joshua. 2009. “Truth and Political Liberalism.” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37, no. 1:2–42. Colapietro, Vincent. 2006. “Democracy as a Moral Ideal.” Kettering Review 24, no. 3:21–31. Deen, Phillip. 2009. “A Call for Inclusion in the Pragmatic Justification of Democracy.” Contemporary Pragmatism 6, no. 1:131–51. Dewey, John. 1969–91. The Collected Works of John Dewey: The Early Works, The Middle Works, The Later Works. 37 vols. Ed. Jo Ann Boydston. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. Eldridge, Michael. 2008. “No Need for a Farewell.” Southwest Philosophy Review 24, no. 2:29–33. Estlund, David. 2008. Democratic Authority. Princeton: Princeton University Press. . 2009. “The Truth in Political Liberalism.” In Truth and Democratic Society, ed. Andrew Norris and Jeremy Elkins, 8–30. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. Fesmire, Steven. 2003. John Dewey and Moral Imagination. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Festenstein, Matthew. 1997. Pragmatism and Political Theory. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. . 2009. “Unraveling the Reasonable: Comment on Talisse.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1:55–59. . 2010. “Pragmatism, Inquiry, and Political Liberalism.” Contemporary Political Theory 9, no. 1:25–44. Gale, Richard. 2010. John Dewey’s Quest for Unity. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. . Forthcoming. “Review of Robert B. Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Gouinlock, James. 1999. “Dewey: Creative Intelligence and Emergent Reality.” In Classical American Pragmatism, ed. Sandra Rosenthal, Carl Hausman, and Douglas Anderson, 224–36. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Green, Judith. 1999. Deep Democracy. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. . 2008. Pragmatism and Social Hope. New York: Columbia University Press. Hildebrand, David. 2008. Dewey: A Beginner’s Guide. Oxford: Oneworld. © 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Hodges, Michael. 2009. “Rorty on Democracy and Justification.” In International Perspectives on Pragmatism, ed. Peter Hare, Michel Weber, J. K. Swindler, and Oana-Maria Pastae, 181–92. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Koopman, Colin. 2009a. “Good Questions and Bad Answers in Talisse’s A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1:60–64. . 2009b. “Morals and Markets: Liberal Democracy Through Dewey and Hayek.” Journal of Speculative Philosophy 23, no. 3:151–79. Mansbridge, Jane. 1980. Beyond Adversary Democracy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mayorga, Rosa. 2008. “Rethinking Democratic Ideals in Light of Charles Peirce,” Contemporary Pragmatism 5, no. 2:1–10. . 2009a. “On Talisse’s Peirceanist Theory,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1:65–70. . 2009b. “Review of Robert B. Talisse, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy.” Social Theory and Practice 35, no. 1:133–40. McBride, Cillian. 2009. “Communities of Inquiry and Democratic Politics.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1:71– 74. Mill, John Stuart. 1859. On Liberty. In On Liberty and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. . 1861. Considerations on Representative Government. In On Liberty and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. Moore, G. E. 1993. “Moore’s Paradox.” In G. E. Moore: Selected Writings, ed. Thomas Baldwin, 207–12. New York: Routledge. Pappas, Gregory. 2008. John Dewey’s Ethics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Posner, Richard. 2003. Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Ralston, Shane. 2008. “In Defense of Democracy as a Way of Life.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44, no. 4:629–59. Rawls, John. 1996. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press. Raz, Joseph. 1986. The Morality of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press. Rogers, Melvin. 2009a. “Dewey, Pluralism, and Democracy: A Response to Robert Talisse.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1:75–79. . 2009b. The Undiscovered Dewey. New York: Columbia University Press. Rondel, David. 2009. “Liberalism, Ethnocentrism, and Solidarity.” Journal of Philosophical Research 34:55–68. Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, Irony, Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. © 2011 The Author Metaphilosophy © 2011 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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. 1991. “The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy.” In Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, 175–96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rosenbaum, Stuart. 2004. “Pragmatism’s Deliberation.” Southwest Philosophy Review 20, no. 1:165–72. Sher, George. 1997. Beyond Neutrality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Smith, Andrew. 2011. The Deliberative Impulse. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books. Stuhr, John. 1998. “Dewey’s Social and Political Philosophy.” In Reading Dewey, ed. Larry Hickman, 82–99. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. . 2003. Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and the Future of Philosophy. New York: Routledge. Sunstein, Cass. 1996. Democracy and Problem of Free Speech. New York: Free Press. . 2001. Republic.com. Princeton: Princeton University Press. . 2003. Why Societies Need Dissent. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Talisse, Robert. 2001a. “A Pragmatist Critique of Rorty’s Hopeless Politics.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 39, no. 4:611–26. . 2001b. “On the Supposed Tension in Peirce’s ‘Fixation of Belief.’ ” Journal of Philosophical Research XXVI:561–69. . 2004. “Towards a Peircean Politics of Inquiry.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 40, no. 1:21–38. . 2005. “Deliberative Democracy Defended,” Res Publica 11, no. 2:185–99. . 2007. A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy. New York: Routledge. . Forthcoming. “Religion, Respect, and Eberle’s Agapic Pacifist.” Philosophy and Social Criticism. Van Hollebeke, Mark. 2009. “Through ‘Thick’ and ‘Thin’: Concerns About Talisse’s Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy.” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45, no. 1:80–89. Waldron, Jeremy. 1993. Liberal Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wall, Steven. 1998. Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Williams, Bernard. 1973. “Deciding to Believe.” In Problems of the Self, 136–51. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . 2002. Truth and Truthfulness. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Toward a New Pragmatist Politics - Wiley Online Library

Abstract: In A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, I launched a pragmatist critique of Deweyan democracy and a pragmatist defense of an alternative view.

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