Main Findings The Social Cost of Near-Rational Investment Tarek A. Hassan1 , Thomas M. Mertens2 1 University 2 New

of Chicago - Booth School of Business

1

The stock market may fail to aggregate information even if it appears to be efficient.

2

The resulting collapse in the dissemination of information may drastically reduce welfare even if there is an observed disconnect between the stock market and the real economy.

York University - Stern School of Business

Stanford GSB October 13, 2010

1 / 45

2 / 45

Motivation

Agenda

• Financial markets aggregate information that is dispersed

across market participants. • Stock prices reflect the information held by countless investors

and direct resources to their most efficient use. → Investors should learn from equilibrium prices and update their expectations accordingly. ⇒ Anything that moves stock prices impacts the expectations held by all market participants. What are the implications of this dynamic if people make small mistakes when investing their wealth?

3 / 45

1

Introduce dispersed information about future productivity into a standard macroeconomic model.

2

Solve for equilibrium expectations and show that small correlated errors in investor behavior may result in a large rise in the volatility of stock returns.

3

Show that a rise in the volatility in stock returns distorts capital accumulation in the long run and has a first-order effect on the level of consumption.

4

Quantify welfare losses due to near-rational behavior in a simple experiment.

4 / 45

Intuition

Related Literature Model • Real Business Cycles: Mendoza (1991), Jaimovich & Rebelo (2009) • Noisy Rational Expectations: Hellwig (1980), Grossman &

Small, correlated errors in investor behavior may result in large amounts of financial risk. • Externality: If errors are correlated across investors they move

Stiglitz (1980)

• Solution method: Judd & Guu (2000); Mertens (2009)

the equilibrium price and change the expectations of all market participants.

Idea

A rise in financial risk may cause large aggregate welfare losses.

• Near-Rationality: Akerlof & Yellen (1985); Mankiw (1985) • “Economic standard errors”: Chochrane (1989); Chetty (2009)

• A rise in the volatility of stock returns distorts the level of

capital accumulation, output and consumption.

Implications • Real effects of pathologies in the stock market:

Morck, Shleifer &

Vishny (1990); Blanchard, Rhee & Summers (1993); Baker, Stein &

The private value of making diligent investment decisions is lower than the social value.

Wurgler (2003); Farhi & Panageas (2006)

• Social value of information: Morris & Shin (2002); Amador & Weill (2007); Angeletos, Lorenzoni & Pavan (2007)

• Noise traders: DeLong et al. (1989) 6 / 45

5 / 45

Modeling Strategy

Modeling Strategy

De-centralization of a standard Real Business Cycle model

De-centralization of a standard Real Business Cycle model of a small open economy

• Households consume, work, and invest in stocks and bonds.

• Workers consume, work; Capitalists consume, invest;

• Representative Firm rents capital and labor services from

• Representative Firm rents capital and labor services from

households and produces a single consumption good.

households and produces a single consumption good.

• Investment goods sector transforms the consumption good

• Investment goods sector transforms the consumption good

into capital goods.

into capital goods.

We add:

We add:

• Dispersed information about future fundamentals.

• Dispersed information about future fundamentals.

8 / 45

9 / 45

Setup

Capitalists (1/2): • Continuum of capitalists invests in stocks and bonds. • Each capitalist receives a private signal about next period’s

productivity

Technology

st (i) = ηt+1 + νt (i),  where νt (i) ∼ N 0, σν2 .

• Small open economy.

 • Yt = e ηt F (Kt , L), η ∼ N − 21 ση2 , ση2 , • Kt+1 = (1 − δ)Kt + It • Capital adjustment costs: AC = 12 χ • A risk-free asset pays r .

Choose portfolio weights and consumption path to solve (∞ ) X s−t max ∞ Uit = Eit β log(Cis ) ∞

It2 Kt

{Cit }t=0 ,{ωit }t=0

• World market price of consumption good normalized to one.

s=t

subject to

• No foreign direct investment.

Wi,t+1 = ((1 − ωit )(1 + r ) + ωit (1 + ˜rt+1 ))(Wit − Cit ) ∀t

10 / 45

11 / 45

Capitalists (2/2) All capitalists make the same small “mistake” when forming their expectations of ηt+1 :

Workers

Eit (ηt+1 ) = Eit (ηt+1 ) + ˜t .

• Offer a total of L units of labor.

where they know the structure of the economy.

• Have no access to stock market.

Representative Firm

Eit (ηt+1 ) = E (ηt+1 |Qt , st (i))

• Perfect Competition, zero profits.

Details

• Rent capital and labor services.

Envelope theorem: Small errors around the optimal policy have little impact on individual welfare. Many possible interpretations of near-rational behavior: • Investors think that an uninformative public signal contains a tiny bit of information (Dumas et al. (2006)). • Animal spirits, behavioral biases, menu costs (Mankiw (1985)). • Evolutionary regime.

• Produce the final good according to:

max e ηt F (Kt , Lt ) − wt L − Dt Kt

Kt ,Lt

1h 12 / 45

13 / 45

Solving for Equilibrium Expectations Investment Goods Industry

How large is the error in market expectations resulting from ˜?

• Buy units of output and transform them into capital. • Maximize arbitrage profits:

• Solve for equilibrium expectations • This is tricky in a general equilibrium model because returns

1 I2 max Qt It − It − χ t It 2 Kt

and prices are complicated non-linear functions of ηt+1 . • Mertens (2009): Use perturbation methods with a non-linear

• This gives us the capital supply:

It =

change of variables. • Trick: find a monotonic transformation of Q that is linear in

Kt (Qt − 1) χ

market expectations. • This gets us the familiar linear equilibrium condition of a

• Owned by workers.

standard noisy rational expectations model. Z qˆt = E (ηt+1 |ˆ qt , st (i)) di + ˜t

16 / 45

14 / 45

Rational Expectations Eq. Near-Rational Expectations Eq.

Conditional Variance of ηt+1 Proposition

Eit (ηt+1 ) = A00 + A01 st (i) + A02 qˆt +˜t Capitalist i

trades in stock market @ I @ @ R @

The conditional variance of ηt+1 is strictly larger in the N-REE than in the REE:

6

A0

A1 qˆt = , Stock π0 + market η +˜t 1 02 ˜t 1−A02 t+1 1−A 2

Capitalist j

1. The more weight households place on the stock price when forming their expectations of ηt+1 the larger is the error in market expectations relative to ˜:

2



=

trades in stock market

1 ˜ 1 − A02

2. The absolute amount of information aggregated in the stock price decreases with σ˜,  0  A ∂ 1−A1 0 2 < 0. ∂σ˜

?

Ejt (ηt+1 ) = A00 + A01 st (j) + A02 qˆt +˜t 1 Small errors are amplified as investors inform on the equilibrium stock price. - Amplification larger the more households rely on q ˆt . 2 Information content of equilibrium price falls as investors adjust A0 , A1 and A2 . 17 / 45

18 / 45

3. Any given σ˜, may completely destroy the market’s capacity to aggregate information if information is sufficiently dispersed in the economy,

3. Any given σ˜, may completely destroy the market’s capacity to aggregate information if information is sufficiently dispersed in the economy,

var ( )  0 t  = ∞. A σν →∞ var 1−A1 0 ηt+1

var ( )  0 t  = ∞. A σν →∞ var 1−A1 0 ηt+1

lim

lim

2

2

` Var JΗt+1 st HiL, qt N

` Var JΗt+1 st HiL, qt N

ΣΗ 2

ΣΗ 2 ΣŎ

1.0

ΣŎ

1.0

=0

ΣΗ 0.8

ΣŎ

0.8

ΣŎ ΣŎ

0.2 0.0

ΣŎ

=0.001

20

30

40

50

0.2

=0.001

ΣΗ

0.0

ΣΗ

=0.01

ΣΗ

0.4

ΣΝ 10

ΣŎ

=0.01

ΣΗ

=0.1

ΣΗ

0.6

ΣΗ

0.4

ΣŎ

=0.1

ΣΗ

0.6

=0

ΣΗ

ΣΝ 10

20

30

40

Alternative Information Structures

50

ΣΗ

Alternative Information Structures 20 / 45

19 / 45

Decomposing the conditional variance of ηt+1 

Conditional Variance of 1 + ˜rt+1



- The conditional variance of ηt+1 is higher in the N-REE than in the REE. → Investors have less information about future dividends in the N-REE. ⇒ The conditional variance of stock returns, σ, must be higher: A failure in the aggregation of information causes a rise in financial risk.

  2  2   1  1 A1 Var (ηt+1 |st (i) , q ˆt ) 2  A2 σν2 + = − 1 σ + 1 − ση2  1 ε ˜  ση2 ση2  1 − A 1 − A 2 2  | {z } | {z } | {z } Noise νi Amplified ε˜ Less Info ` Var JΗt+1 st HiL, qt N ΣΗ 2

N-REE

1.0 REE

Definition

Noise Νi

Excess volatility in stock returns is the percentage amount by which the conditional standard deviation of stock returns is lower in the rational expectations equilibrium (σ ∗ ) relative to the near-rational expectations equilibrium (σ),

0.8 0.6 Ž Amplified Ε 0.4 Less Info 0.2 0.0

σ − σ∗ 100. σ

ΣΝ 5

10

15

20

25

30

ΣΗ

21 / 45

22 / 45

Macroeconomic Effects of Financial Risk

Stochastic Steady State (1/3)

Proposition: Level effects

• Capitalists make small near-rational errors, σ˜ > 0. • Conditional variance of stock returns rises → capitalists ask

A rise in the conditional variance of stock returns unambiguously depresses the stochastic steady state level of capital stock and output. ∂KSS <0 ∂σ

higher risk premium, σ 2 > σ ∗2 → The stochastic steady state capital stock is determined by (for δ = 0)  r + ωSS σ 2 = FK (KSS , L)

• Financial risk determines the level of economic activity:

Details

capital accumulation, output, and consumption!

24 / 45

25 / 45

Stochastic steady state (2/3)

Stochastic steady state (3/3)

 r + ωSS σ 2 = FK (KSS , L)

 r + ωSS σ 2 = FK (KSS , L)

Corollary 1: Irrelevance of sensitivity

Corollary 2: Distributional effect

Excess volatility depresses the stochastic steady state level of capital stock and output even if the sensitivity of physical investment with respect to stock prices is low.

Excess volatility in stock returns unambiguously lowers wages and raises dividends in the stochastic steady state. • Capital stock at the stochastic steady state is lower than in

• If χ is large, investment is insensitive to changes in the stock

the REE.

price, and the stock market may appear as a “sideshow”.

• This drives up the equilibrium dividends and lowers the

• Excess volatility may nevertheless cause a large depression of

equilibrium wage.

output.

26 / 45

27 / 45

Standard Deviation of 1 + ˜rt+1

Calibration

Conditional and unconditional standard deviation of stock returns over varying levels of σν .

Baseline specification Parameter Near-rational error Risk-free rate Capital share (Cobb-Douglas) Depreciation Adjustment Cost Parameter Steady state portfolio share (β) Standard deviation of returns (ση ) Predictability of GDP growth (σν )

σ˜/ση = 0.01 r = 0.04 0.33 δ = 0.15 χ=2 1 0.18

29 / 45

30 / 45

Excess Volatility

Results

Excess Volatility in stock returns over varying levels of σν . Thought Experiment • Begin at the stochastic steady state of the N-REE. • Get all households to commit to behave perfectly rationally.

⇒ Conditional standard deviation of stock returns falls. ⇒ Economy transitions to a higher steady state level of capital accumulation. How much would you pay to get everyone else to behave perfectly rationally?

31 / 45

32 / 45

Aggregate Welfare Losses

Calibrating σν

Compensating variation for varying levels of dispersion of information (σν ). Λ@%D

Moment

3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 1.5 1.0

Data

N-REE

σ˜/ση σν /ση Cond.  returns  std. dev. of stock Qt −Qt−1 Yt+1 −Yt corr Qt−1 , Yt σ(Average Forecast)/σ( Y+1Y−Y ) σ(Av. Forecast error)/σ( Y+1Y−Y ) Excess Volatility Compensating Variation

0.5

“RBC”

≈ 0.17

0.01 35 0.17

“News Shock” 0.01 0 0.13

≈ 0.50

0.42

0.99

0.07

0.62 0.88

0.73 0.70 25.67 3.76

1.00 0.01 0.01 0.00

0.73 0.70

0.01 ∞ 0.17

ΣΝ 10

20

30

40

50

ΣΗ

34 / 45

33 / 45

Decomposition of Losses

Extensions

for standard specification with σν /ση = 35 1

λ λσ λ∆

Total Compensating Variation (% of lifetime consumption) Changes in volatility of consumption Distortion of level of consumption

3.76 % 0.17 % 3.58 %

Households (full model) • Non-traded labor income complicates analysis. → Quantitative and qualitative results remain unchanged.

2

Closed Economy • Capital stock at the stochastic steady state may be higher or

lower than in REE due to precautionary savings motive. • Nevertheless any distortion in the level of consumption causes

Welfare losses almost exclusively due to distortion of level of consumption.

first-order welfare losses. → Aggregate welfare losses remain large (3.32% in our preferred calibration).

Details

35 / 45

36 / 45

Conclusion

Appendix

• Small correlated errors in investor behavior may result in a

collapse the stock market’s capacity to aggregate information and in a significant rise in the conditional and unconditional volatility of stock returns. • Such a rise in the financial risk faced by investors distorts

capital accumulation and consumption in the long-run and may cause large aggregate welfare losses. • This is true even if the stock market appears to be efficient

and if physical investment appears to be insensitive to changes in stock prices.

38 / 45

37 / 45

Alternative Information Structures

1

Households observe a public signal in addition to their private signal.

2

There is aggregate noise in the private signals received by households.

• The conditional probability density function of ηt+1 is shifted

by ˜t . • Households have the correct perception of all higher moments of the conditional distribution of ηt+1 . Back

39 / 45

40 / 45

Households Observe a Public Signal gt = ηt+1 + ζt , ζt ∼ N 0, σζ2

Aggregate Noise in Private Signal st (i) = ηt+1 + νt (i) + ζt , ζt ∼ N 0, σζ2



Near-rational errors affect the aggregation of the subset of information which is dispersed.



Near-rational errors affect the aggregation of the subset of information which is dispersed. Back

Back 41 / 45

Definition

42 / 45

Workers

The stochastic steady-state is the level of capital, bonds, and prices at which those quantities do not change in unconditional expectation.

• Offer a total of L units of labor. • Have no access to stock market.

Representative Firm

Proposition

• Perfect Competition, zero profits.

1 The equilibrium has a unique stochastic steady state iff β ≤ 1+r . At the stochastic steady state the aggregate degree of leverage is s   1 1−β −r ; ωSS = σ2 β

• Rent capital and labor services.

Investment Goods Industry • Buy units of output and transform them into capital. • This gives us the capital supply:

and the stochastic steady state capital stock is characterized by  (1 + δχ) r + ωSS σ 2 + δ = FK (KSS , L) .

It =

Kt (Qt − 1) χ

• Owned by workers. Continue

Back

43 / 45

44 / 45

Compensating Variation and upper bound for losses attributable to changes in the variability of consumption.

Back 45 / 45

The Social Cost of Near-Rational Investment

Oct 13, 2010 - the equilibrium price and change the expectations of all market participants. ... Social value of information: Morris & Shin (2002); Amador &.

710KB Sizes 3 Downloads 211 Views

Recommend Documents

The Problem of Social Cost
Page 1 .... be solved in a completely satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has. *Coase. ...... the timber. Then it would have been the wall-builder ...

The Problem of Social Cost - Agricultural & Applied Economics
satisfactory manner: when the damaging business has. *Coase. ... aeroplanes, mobile radio and other means, the amount of damage ...... trative agency) may, to deal with the problem of ..... have been satisfied; interfercnce with a telephone or.

Joint Comments to Department of Energy on the use of the Social Cost ...
Nov 7, 2016 - The IWG's analytic process was science-based, open, and transparent. ... 2010); Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and .... while the record shows that there is a range of values, the value of carbon ...

Joint Comments to Department of Energy on the use of the Social Cost ...
Nov 7, 2016 - The Interagency Working Group's (IWG) analytic process was science-based, open, and ..... “take into account benefits and costs, both quantitative and .... http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2014/01/the- ..... First, typic

Joint Comments on the Use of the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases ...
Apr 24, 2017 - withdrew its technical support documents that underpinned the range of .... of the social cost of carbon based on the best available science and economics, ...... Blog, June 29, 2016 (summarizing the North American Leader's ...

Joint Comments on the Use of the Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases ...
Apr 24, 2017 - and benefits, then, although developed specifically for regulatory impact ...... compliance efforts over 30 years, all the consumer savings over 30 ...

Housing Productivity and the Social Cost of Land-Use ... - David Albouy
Jun 21, 2016 - land-use regulations by examining how these constraints drive a wedge between output ... be small at best, and is dwarfed by increased housing costs. ...... Table A2 shows that the highest WRLURI index in our sample is in Boulder, CO,

Housing Productivity and the Social Cost of Land-Use ...
Jul 16, 2017 - ... Housing-Urban-Labor-Macro Conference (Atlanta), Hunter College, ... Many commentators blame land-use restrictions for declining ...... housing prices, pjt, normalized to have mean zero, across years for display. ... the lowest is i

Housing Productivity and the Social Cost of Land-Use ... - David Albouy
Jun 21, 2016 - Rochester, the University of Toronto, the Urban Economics Association Annual Meetings .... sessed land values from tax rolls in 25 Florida counties, and finds that land-use regulations ...... Los Angeles-Long Beach, CA PMSA.

The Welfare Cost of Retirement Uncertainty∗
Jun 21, 2016 - ‡Cal State Fullerton. [email protected]. ... hedge retirement timing risk, and we characterize first-best insurance arrangements as well.

The cost of corruption
(first and foremost criminal justice) which, in countries like Italy where prosecutors and judges .... ent upon the differential between a high degree of transparency ...... labor market, tax regime and infrastructure rank as a second crit- ical set.

The high cost of mis-hires - Topgrading
view, you'll get the hang of it and do a great job in the next one. Dr. Brad Smart is ... www.smarttopgrading.com. WORKFORCE. 36. Paper360º January 2008. T.

The Welfare Cost of Retirement Uncertainty∗
Jun 21, 2016 - At a very basic level, the objective of Social Security is to prevent poverty ... for non-stationary risk departs from standard dynamic programming, ...

THE INSTITUTE OF COST & WORKS ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA THE ...
system, which will enable seamless flow of information to the centralized database of students, located at the Headquarters. Details of the system with operating manuals will be made available shortly. With the introduction of this new format, the st

THE INSTITUTE OF COST & WORKS ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA THE INSTITUTE ...
THE INSTITUTE OF COST & WORKS ACCOUNTANTS OF INDIA. THE INSTITUTE OF ... the time of admission to Foundation or Intermediate Course. ... Training programmes will be conducted at the Regional Councils and major Chapters.

pdf-1836\the-theory-of-investment-value-reprints-of-economic ...
Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. pdf-1836\the-theory-of-investment-value-reprints-of-economic-classics-by-john-burr-williams.pdf.

The Revision of Catalog of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment ...
The Revision of Catalog of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment.pdf. The Revision of Catalog of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment.pdf. Open. Extract.

pdf-1836\the-theory-of-investment-value-reprints-of-economic ...
Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. pdf-1836\the-theory-of-investment-value-reprints-of-economic-classics-by-john-burr-williams.pdf.