Penultimate Draft (Oct 21, 2013) Please cite the published version, IEICE Technical Report 113, no. 283, HCS2013-59: 53-57.

The Philosophy of the Feeling of Presence Masashi KASAKI†

Abstract The current state of the art development of human-shaped robots is partly motivated by an aspiration to produce efficient telepresence devices. The question of what it is like for a person to be present, however, has not received the attention it should deserve. Recent philosophical research on this question is fueled by psychiatric and neuropsychological studies of delusional misidentification syndromes. This paper reviews such philosophical research and articulates its significance for the development of telepresence devices. Keyword Telepresence, Presence, Delusional Misidentification Syndromes, Capgras Delusion, Philosophy Lee’s

1. Introduction

typology

is

conceptual,

and

may

not

be

The term ‘presence’ is of increasing importance for

substantial; it does not imply that the feelings of physical,

designing and developing media products and computer

social, and self presence are different mental states. The

interfaces. The term no doubt has a broad application to

conceptual distinctions have practical merits for designing

different

and programming telepresence devices. More substantially,

fields

concerning

media

in

general

and

interaction between human and machine in particular (it is

it might be possible to separate different kinds of feelings

a perfectly ordinary term anyway). At the same time,

of presence and measure them when a user operates a

however, ‘presence’ has different connotations in different

telepresence device in which she interacts with artificial

fields or even within a field. Serious attempts have been

environments. It is more difficult to separate different

made to clarify and define the connotations of the term,

kinds of feelings of presence when a user operates a

and to specify the precise measures for presence or the

telepresence

feeling of presence.

para-authentic environments (i.e., objects or persons at a

device

in

which

she

interacts

with

scholarship

and

remote place). For, if a user communicates and interacts

interchangeably

with

with actual humans via a telepresence device, their

‘telepresense,’ the term first coined by M. Minsky [1] to

reactions may affect how the user finds herself in the

refer to an operator ’s feeling of being at a remote place.

para-authentic environments, and vice versa.

In

the

technology,

context

of

telepresence

‘presence’ is

used

After an extensive review and scrutiny of the existing

First, the interlocutors may not find the avatar of the

literature on telepresence, K. M. Lee [2] proposes to

user humanlike

distinguish three subtypes of presence (for other reviews,

movements and voice. This may lead the interlocutors to

or

real,

say,

due

to

its

unnatural

see [3], [4], [5], [6]):

react to the avatar differently than they do to normal humans. As a result, the user’s feeling of social presence

Physical Presence: A psychological state in which

may decrease. Second, once this happens, the user may not

virtual (para-authentic or artificial) physical objects are

find herself immersed in the quasi-authentic environment,

experienced as actual physical objects in either sensory

resulting in a decrease in the feeling of self presence. It

or nonsensory ways.

seems plain that our feeling of social presence is tightly

Social Presence: A psychological state in which vir tual

connected to our feeling of self presence. Third, if the user

(para-authentic

are

only has decreased feeling of social presence (and thereby

experienced as actual social actors in either sensory or

decreased feeling of self presence), this may affect her

nonsensory ways.

avatar ’s reactions to the interlocutors. As a result, the

Self Presence: A psychological state in which virtual

degree

(para-authentic or artificial) self/selves are experienced

humanlike or real may decrease. In sum, a user ’s

as the actual self in either sensory or nonsensory ways.

feeling(s)

or

artificial)

social

actors

to

which of

the

presence

interlocutors are

find

the

inter-connected

avatar to

an

interlocutor ’s feeling(s) of presence toward the avatar of

the user.

unrecognized faces, whereas they exhibit a decrease in

This consideration suggests that it is important to take

SCR to unfamiliar faces. In contrast, patients with

account of both the user ’s and the interlocut or ’s feelings

Capgras delusion do not show any difference in SCR to

of presence in conceptualizing and designing telepresence

familiar

devices. The current research on telepresence mainly

hyporesponsiveness, [15]). Partly on the basis of these

focuses on the user ’s feeling(s) of presence, whereas

findings, the two-route model of facial recognition posits

philosophical research on presence often targets one’s

two different neural pathways responsible for overt and

feeling(s) of other ’s presence. Philosophical research on

covert

this score is motivated and fueled by psychiatric and

visual-limbic pathway (identifying faces) and the dorsal

neuropsychological studies of delusional misidentification

visual-limbic

syndromes. This paper aims to provide a review of

significance of faces) ([14], [16], [17], [18], [19], [20],

philosophical and psychological perspectives into the

but also see [21]). Prosopagnosia is regarded to stem from

feeling(s) of presence, and to articulate their significance

a defect in the former, and Capgras delusion from a defect

for the development of telepresence devices .

in the latter.

and

face

unfamiliar

recognition, pathway

faces

respectively:

(detecting

the

(emotional

the

ventral

valence

or

A fully adequate explanation of Capgras delusion needs to explain (1) what neurological mechanism underlies the

2. Delusional Misidentification Syndromes With a notable exception of A. Noë [7], recent

delusion, (2) what content and character the anomalous

philosophical research on presence has been advanced by

experience of the patient with the delusion has, and (3)

theorizing

delusional

why the patient forms and maintains the delusional belief.

misidentification syndromes ([8], [9], [10], [11], [12],

The two-route model is an important contribution to (1),

[13]).

and also involves particular answers to (2) and (3).

on

the

Delusional

symptoms

of

misidentification

syndromes

are

psychiatric disorders the symptoms of which involve

Different views on (2) and (3) have been proposed. On

monothematic, circumscribed delusions. Prominent ones

one-stage models of Capgras delusion, the anomalous

are Capgras, Frégoli, and Cotard delusions. The three

experience produced by the neurological disruption is

delusions

sufficient for eliciting the delusional belief ([22], [23],

are

different

in

the

thematic

content

of

[24]). One-stage models typically have it that the content

delusional belief as follows:

of the anomalous perceptual experience is thematically Capgras Delusion: At least one close person (a family

rich, e.g., ‘the [perceived] woman is not the [remembered]

member or friend) is replaced by an imposter (e.g., an

woman,’ ‘the [perceived] woman is not the person I think

alien or robot).

of as my wife,’ or even strongly ‘the [perceived] woman is

Frégoli Delusion: Different strangers are the same

not

person in disguise.

responsible for the patient’s pathology is in her experience,

Cotard Delusion: The patient herself is dead or does not

not in her cognitive process of forming or revising beliefs;

exist.

rather, the delusional belief is an outcome of the rational

my

wife but

an

imposter.’ The primal

defect

response to the anomalous experience. Although the three delusions are often discussed

On two-stage models of Capgras delusion, not only the

together, the main focus of the paper is on C apgras

anomalous experience but also some sort of cognitive

delusion, simply for lack of space. Patients with Capgras

impairment are necessary (and sufficient) for eliciting the

delusion have relatively unimpaired abilities to identify

delusional belief ([25], [26], [27]). Although many

and discern familiar faces. According to Ellis and Young

proponents of one or another form of the two-stage model

[14],

of

agree that the content of the anomalous experience is

prosopagnosia—a disorder of face recognition typically

thematically rich, some hold that it is relatively thin, e.g.,

associated

ventral

‘the [perceived] woman looks different.’ The delusional

occipitotemporal cortex. Prosopagnosic patients have a

belief that the [perceived] woman is an imposter is formed

selectively impaired ability to recognize faces, while

as an explanation of the anomalous experience. But the

having relatively unimpaired abilities to recognize other

explanation is an outcome of the irrational process of

objects. They nevertheless exhibit an increase in skin

forming and maintaining beliefs due to a cognitive defect

conductance response (SCR) to familiar but consciously

or bias. ([26], [28], [29], [30], [31]). R. McKay ([30], p.

Capgras with

delusion

is

bilateral

a

mirror

lesions

image in

345) argues that patients with Capgras delusion have a

most prominently, (i) how the contents of perceptual

bias toward explanatory adequacy and thereby “update

experience are rationally related to the contents of belief,

belief as if ignoring the relevant prior probabilities of

and (ii) what presence or the feeling of presence consist s

candidate hypotheses.”

in. These may be just different forms of the same problem.

Let o be the content of the anomalous experience, and h w and h s be two alternative hypotheses:

Philosophical work on (i) and (ii) both refer s to and is referred to in the literature on delusional misidentification syndromes in other fields.

h w : the [perceived] woman is in fact my wife. h s : the [perceived] woman is an stranger.

Two views are distinguished with regard to (i): the top-down account and the bottom-up account ([33]). The top-down account has it that the cont ent of the anomalous

P(h w ) and P(h s ) are subjective probabilities the patient

experience is at least in part dependent on or determined

assigns to h w and h s , prior to perceiving the woman, i.e.,

by a defect in the belief system. The bottom-up account

obtaining data o. After obtaining o, the patient needs to

has it that the anomalous experience distorts the belief

update her beliefs on o. Insofar as she obeys Bayes’

system. The two accounts are highly relevant to the debate

theorem, the posterior probabilities of h w and h s are

between empiricism and rationalism ([34]) (or to use

specified as follows:

different terminology, the debate between inferentialism and liberalism ([8])). Empiricism is the view that th e

P(ℎ𝑤 ⁄𝑜) =

P(ℎ𝑤 ) × P(𝑜⁄ℎ𝑤 ) 𝑃(𝑜)

contents of experience are rich, and thereby they alone are

P(ℎ𝑠 ⁄𝑜) =

P(ℎ𝑠 ) × P(𝑜⁄ℎ𝑠 ) 𝑃(𝑜)

the other hand, is the view that the content s of experience

sufficient to rationalize or justify beliefs. Rationalism, on are

relatively

thin,

and

thereby

they

need

some

background belief to rationalize or justify other beliefs. Even though the likelihood of o under h s , P(𝑜⁄ℎ𝑠 ), is

Rationalism is more closely associated with the two -factor

much higher than that under h w , P(𝑜⁄ℎ𝑤 ) (h s explains the

model than empiricism is; if the delusional belief is

occurrence of o much better than h w does), a normal

irrational, it must be accounted for by a cognitive defect in

person assigns to a much lower prior probability to h s than

the patient’s belief system, and the defect may be the lack

to h w . So the posterior probability of h s is not higher than

of one or another background belief.

that of h w for a normal person. The patient with Capgras

The patient with Capgras delusion is able to visually

delusion, due to the bias toward explanatory adequacy,

identify and discriminate familiar faces. It has been

ignores the priors of h w and h s , and hence the posterior

assumed that the visual content of the patient’s face

probability of h s is higher than that of h w for her.

perception

An advantage of the two-stage model over the one-stage

is

relatively

unchanged

by

the

neural

disruption. What is changed is the affective aspect of the

model is that the former can explain why patients with

perceptual

damage to ventromedial frontal regions of the brain do not

philosophers identify this affective aspect with the fee ling

form delusional beliefs, while they show symptoms

of (human) presence in one or another sense ([8], [9], [10],

similar to Capgras delusion, such as the reported feeling

[11], [12], [13]; also see [35], [36]). It should be

of unfamiliarity and emotional hyporesponsiveness ([32]).

emphasized that they define the feeling of presence in

They suffer from a defect in the first, experimental stage,

similar but importantly different fashions. But for lack of

but keep the second, cognitive stage of belief formation

space, only M. Ratcliffe’s account ([11], [12], [13]) is

and revision intact.

discussed here. Ratcliffe,

3. Philosophy and Delusional Misidentification

experience

by

relying

of

familiar

on

the

faces.

Many

phenomenological

considerations by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, espouses a kind of enactivism:

Syndromes Delusional misidentification syndromes are important for many fields; not to mention psychiatry, they are

Perceptual

studied

recognition

dynamic set of correspondences between what is

mechanism. In addition, philosophers hold that they may

actually perceived and how potential activities will alter

shed light on several perennial philosophical problems:

that perception ([12], p. 208)

in

neuroscience

to

reveal

face

experience

involves

an

elaborate

and

another mirror image of Capgras delusion: the interlocutor On Ratcliffe’s view, the patient with Capgras delusion undergoes a change in the structure of experience; how a

does not believe that it is a human, but may feel the presence of a human.

person experiences an object is determined by a set of

Even if this is not close to being achieved, the

dynamic possibilities concerning that object. The patient

realization of human presence is a leading motivation for

still associates a set of possibilities with familiar persons

developing

(e.g., how they will look like if the patient changes her

engineering. Philosophical inquiry into presence and

position or they move), but lack the possibilities of

related problems has been motivated and fueled by

communication and affective relatedness. This lack of the

psychiatric and neuropsychological studies of delusional

possibilities results in the patient experiencing familiar

misidentification syndromes. Robotics and engineering

persons in a distinctively impersonal way. Ratcliffe’s

can provide further fuel. On the other hand, philosophy

account, unlike orthodoxy, implies that the content s of

and those fields can help to develop telepresence devices

visual experience are in part constituted by affects.

by offering a rich set of frameworks in which presence or

Noë ([7]; also see [37]) develops an account of presence

telepresence

devices

in

robotics

and

the feeling of presence is conceptualized and investigated.

in general on the basis of his own variant of enactivism. He argues that there are varieties of presence, and how an

References

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the

visual

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and

character

of

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but

they

experience.

are They

disconfirmed respond

to

by

their

aberrant

prediction error signaling by forming delusions. The feeling of presence may be the result of successful suppression of prediction error signals ([42]).

4. Concluding Remarks An interesting new model of telepresence device is a realistic humanlike android by which the operator and the interlocutor can adequately communicate and interact ([43]). Such an android, if advanced, may be treated as

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The Philosophy of the Feeling of Presence

The term no doubt has a broad application to different fields concerning media in general and interaction between human and machine in particular (it is ..... [14] H. D. Ellis and A. W. Young, “Accounting for. Delusional Misidentification,” British Journal of. Psychiatry, 157, pp. 239-248, 1990. [15] C. Fine, J. Craigie, and I. Gold, ...

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