Self-Fulfilling Runs: Evidence from the U.S. Life Insurance Industry∗ Nathan Foley-Fisher

Borghan Narajabad

Stéphane Verani†

June 2017

APPENDIX FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION ONLY

A

Model appendix

The model in Section 1 discusses a new link between a firm’s liability structure and the existence of self-fulfilling runs. In this appendix, we explore this link further using a special version of the model with the following two additional assumptions: A1. ρ + θ < r < ρ + φ A2.

r−(ρ+θ) ρ+φ+θ−r

·A<π <

r−ρ ρ+φ−r

· A , where A = ρ + φ + θ + ε + δ.

These assumptions are helpful to illustrate how concerns about bad fundamentals may trigger a self-fulfilling run when a large enough fraction of securities becomes puttable. These assumptions are also helpful to discuss the connection between this model and that of He & Xiong (2012).1 We begin by establishing the basic properties of the run and no run equilibria. Assumption A1 guarantees that no run is the unique symmetric equilibrium in the good fundamental state if the probability of switching from the good to bad state is zero. That ∗

The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or of any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System. † [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] (corresponding author), (202) 912-7972, 20th & C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20551. 1 It is straightforward to show that the set of parameters for which these assumptions hold is not empty.

1

is, if π = 0 then V g∗ (e) ≥ 1 ∀e ∈ [0, 1]. To see this, note that if the good state is absorbing (π = 0) and investors never withdraw in the good state, then the value of an extendible security is r + φ + εη V g∗ (e) = V¯ g ≡ ρ + φ + εη

∀e ∈ [0, 1] .

Since investors’ discount rate is ρ < r, it follows that V¯ g > 1, and it is optimal for investors to never exercise their put option. Moreover, with π = 0, for all e ∈ [0, 1] and V¯ , V g (e; V¯ ) ≥ V g (1; V¯ ) =

r + φ + εη >1, ρ + θ + φ + εη

which implies that extending the security is the dominant strategy in the good fundamental state if π = 0 and no run is the unique equilibrium. Assumption A1 also yields a sufficient condition for a unique run equilibrium in the bad fundamental state—namely, V b∗ (e) < 1 ∀e ∈ [0, 1]. To see this, note that V b (e; V¯ ) ≤ V b (e; 1) ≤

r + εη . ρ + φ + εη

Thus, if assumption A1 holds, V b (e; V¯ ) < 1 and withdrawing (exercising the put) is the dominant strategy in the bad state for a positive measure of investors. For a low enough e, extending the maturity of a security is always the dominant strategy in the good fundamental state. This follows from the upper bound of π in assumption A2, which guarantees that V g (0; 0) > 1. Moreover, the lower bound of π implies that V g (1; 1) < 1. That is, investors run in the good state when e is high enough and the probability of switching to the bad state is sufficiently large. To explore the differences between this model and the dynamic debt run model of He & Xiong (2012), it is instructive to fix the firm’s liability structure by setting ε = 0. In this special case, switching between the good and the bad fundamental states in our model is similar to the fluctuating asset fundamental value in He & Xiong (2012). And although run is the dominant strategy for investors in the bad state, the optimality of a run in the good state depends on the persistence of the good state. That is, investors run in the good state only when there is a high enough probability of switching to the bad state. In contrast, the analysis above and in Section 1 of the main text emphasized the link between variations in the firm’s liability structure and self-fulfilling runs. In our model, a run occurs in the good state when the externality of asset liquidation due to 2

investors’ run is high. And the size of the liquidation cost depends on the amount of securities that is subject to rollover.

B

FABS database

Our FABS database was compiled from multiple sources, covering the period beginning when FABS were first introduced in the mid-1990s to early 2014. To construct our dataset on FABS issuers, we combined information from various market observers and participants on FABS conduits and their issuance. We then collected data on contractual terms, outstanding amounts, and ratings for each FABS issue to obtain a complete picture of the supply of FABS at any point in time. Finally, we added data on individual conduits and insurance companies, as well as aggregate information about the insurance sector and the broader macroeconomy. FABS are issued under various terms to cater to different investors demand. The most common type of FABS are funding agreement-backed notes (FABN), which account for more than 97 percent of all U.S. FABS. We first identify all individual FABN issuance programs using market reports and other information from A.M. Best, Fitch, and Moody’s. FABN conduits are used only to issue FABN. This FA originator-FABN conduit structure falls somewhere between the more familiar standalone trust and master trust structures used for traditional asset-backed securities, such as auto loan, credit card, and mortgage ABS.2 Importantly, the FABS issuing SPVs are never fully bankruptcy remote, as the FA remains a liability on the balance sheet of the insurer. A substantial fraction of FABN are issued with different types of embedded put options, including Puttable FABN and Extendible FABN. Extendible FABN gives investors the option to extend the maturity of their FABN at regular intervals and are designed to appeal to short-term investors such as MMMFs subject to Rule 2a-7. A closely related type of short-term FABS is funding agreement backed commercial paper (FABCP). FABCP programs have an explicit liquidity guarantee from the sponsoring insurer or its holding company, as the underlying FAs typically have a longer maturity than the associated CP. 2

While a standalone trust issues a single ABS deal (with multiple classes) based on a fixed pool of receivables assigned to the SPV, the master trust allows the issuer/SPV to issue multiple securities and to alter the assigned pool of collateral. Although the FABN conduit may issue multiple securities, similar to a master trust, the terms of each security are shared with the unalterable FA backing the asset, similar to the fixed pool of collateral for a standalone trust.

3

We link these FABS programs to the insurance companies originating the FAs used as collateral. In total, as shown in Table B.1, we find that FABS programs are associated with over 130 conduits, backed by FAs from 30 life insurers in the United States. Of these, there are four FABCP conduits (two of which are currently active) operated by two insurance conglomerates using FAs from five different insurers. We then use our list of FABS conduits to search Bloomberg and gather information on every FABN issue. For each FABN, we collected Bloomberg and prospectus data on contractual terms and amount outstanding to construct a complete panel of new FABN issuances and amount outstanding at a daily frequency. We have records of 2,040 individual FABN issues, with the first issuance recorded in 1996 and about 70 new issues recorded in the first half of 2014. FABN issuance grew rapidly during the early 2000s, peaking at over $47 billion in 2006. We also collected data on FABCP, relying on end of quarter data from Moody’s ABCP Program Review, as individual security information is not available.3 Total FABCP outstanding was less than $3 billion until 2008, growing to just under $10 billion at the end of 2013 after MetLife entered the market in late 2007. As described in the introduction, at its peak in 2007, the total outstanding value of the FABS market collateralized with FA from U.S. based life insurers reached almost $150 billion, or more than 80 percent of the auto ABS market (Figure 1 in the main text). Lastly, we match our data to a wide variety of firm-level, sector-level, and broader economic environment data. Since these data are usually available only at a quarterly frequency, we aggregate our data for most of the analysis in this paper. We include several data series about the FA-sponsoring life insurers, including balance sheet and statutory filings information from SNL Financial and AM Best, CDS spreads from Markit, credit ratings from S&P, and expected default frequencies (EDF) from Moody’s KMV.

3

Individual issuance data on FABCP are available from DTCC but are confidential and unavailable to us.

4

5 51

3 3 5 . 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 4 1 2 2 2 5 3 1 2 2 1 2 . . 1 . 132

15 . . 10 40 5 . . . . . . 2 . . 1 . 2 1 . 2 . . . . 23 31

No. of FABN conduits Multiple issue Single issueb

4

3i

1h

No. of FABCP conduits

b

c Source: numerous industry reports from Moody’s Analytics, A.M. Best Company, 2015 Standard & Poor’s Financial Services LLC (“S&P”), Fitch Research. Includes Premium Asset Trust Series and Structured Repackaged Asset Trust Series issuing structures. c Merged with General American Life in 2013, which is part of AIG Life and Retirement Group. d Formerly GE Capital Assurance Company; IPO-ed as Genworth on May 24, 2004. e Formelry ING U.S.; IPO-ed in 2013, renamed Voya Financial on April 11, 2014. f Formelry ING U.S.; IPO-ed in 2013, renamed Voya Financial on April 11, 2014. g Formerly Travelers Life and Annuity; aquired by MetLife on July 1, 2005. h FABCP collaterized by FA from Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and MetLife Insurance Company of Connecticut. i FABCP collaterized by FA from Transamerica Life Insurance Company and Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company. j Merged with Transamerica Life Insurance Company on October 1, 2008. k Includes Beneficial Life, Federal Kemper, Hanover Insurance Group, MBIA, Mutual of Omaha, Scottish Annuity & Life Insurance Co., and XL Life. l Unmatched series issued under Premium Asset Trust and Structured Repackaged Asset Trust structure.

a

AIG/SunAmerica Aegon Allstate Ge Capital Genworth Hartford Voya Financiale Voya Financialf Jackson National John Hancock MassMutual MetLife MetLife Nationwide New York Life Pacific Life Principal Life Protective Life Prudential Reliance Sun Life Financial TIAA Travelers Aegon Aegon

AIG SunAmerica Life Insurance Companyc Monumental Life Insurance Company Allstate Life Insurance Company GE Capital Assurance Company Genworth Life Insurance Companyd Hartford Life Insurance Company ING USA Annuity and Life Insurance Company Security Life of Denver Insurance Company Jackson National Life Insurance Company John Hancock Life Insurance Company Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company MetLife Insurance Company of Connecticutg Metropolitan Life Insurance Company Nationwide Life Insurance Company New York Life Insurance Company Pacific Life Insurance Company Principal Life Insurance Company Protective Life Insurance Company Prudential Insurance Company of America Reliance Standard Life Insurance Company Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada (USA) Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America Travelers Life and Annuity Transamerica Life Insurance Company Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Companyj Otherk Unknownl

Total

Parent company name

Funding agreement issuer name

This table shows the number and type of conduits used by U.S. life insurers to issue FABS and and their ultimate parent company.a

Table B.1: U.S. Issuers of Funding Agreement-Backed Securities (FABS)

C

Implementation of the IV-GMM procedure

This appendix describes the model estimation procedure used to measure the size of the self-fulfilling component to the run, summarized in Section 6. We use a combination of calibration and structural estimation to obtain the values of eight model parameters. We first calibrate six parameters by measuring them directly from the data. We assume that the coupon rate r on the underlying asset and the rate at which investors discount the future ρ are common across issuers. We calibrate r to 5.4 percent, which we measure by taking a weighted average of the coupon rates over all available XFABS prospectuses from June 2007, where the weights are the nominal issuance amounts. Following the discussion in Schroth, Suarez & Taylor (2014), we calibrate ρ to 4.9 percent, which is the annualized yield of one-month T-bills at the beginning of 2007. We allow for some degree of heterogeneity across insurance companies by calibrating the remaining four parameters individually for each issuer indexed by j. These parameters are the arrival rate of the underlying asset maturity, φj ; the arrival rate of the put option, δj ; the arrival rate of a change in the issuers’ liability structure, j ; and the fraction of puttable securities that mature in a period, j × ηj . The maturity arrival rate of the underlying asset is set to the inverse of the issuing vehicle’s age as of June 2007, under the assumption that new vehicles are created at a constant rate. The arrival rate of the put option is set to the weighted average election period of outstanding XFABN as of June 2007. The maturity arrival rate of the puttable securities is set to the rate of election date arrival from June 2007 to June 2008. Lastly, the fraction of puttable securities that matures in one period is set to the inverse of the weighted average residual maturity of the outstanding XFABN as of June 2007. Table C.1 summarizes the calibration of the issuer-level parameters. We assume the distribution of withdrawal costs, Ω, is uniform. As a robustness check, we allow Ω to have a beta distribution with shape parameters α and β = 1 and estimate α. We find that the estimated value of α is not statistically different from one, suggesting that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the distribution of Ω is uniform. The results are available on request. Given these six calibrated parameters and the Ω distribution, we use the instrumental generalized method of moments (IV-GMM) of Hansen & Singleton (1982) to estimate the parameters π, which captures investors’ concerns about assets fundamentals, and θ, which 6

Table C.1: Issuer level parameter estimates δj

φj

j × ηj

j

weighted avg. election period

1/age in days

1 /wt. avg. residual maturity

# of elections per period 2007 Run period

Parameters

Issuers Aegon 90 0.0025 Allstate 30 0.0008 Genworth 30 0.0038 The Hartford 108.75 0.0010 Jackson 65.71 0.0005 MetLife 30 0.0006 Nationwide 30 0.0048 New York Life 180 0.0016 Pacific Life 65 0.0009 Prudential 62.73 0.0017 Note: XFABN weights and age calculated as of

0.00087 0.00168 0.00191 0.00102 0.00139 0.00148 0.00203 0.00108 0.00114 0.00162 6/1/2007.

0.036 0.222 0.064 0.117 0.142 0.094 0.050 0.014 0.089 0.056

0.017 0.147 0.031 0.117 0.106 0.072 0.031 0.011 0.075 0.017

reflects strategic complementarity among investors. Specifically, π is the arrival rate of a switch from a good to a bad asset fundamental state and θ is the coefficient governing ˆ The IV-GMM procedure finds a pair of values the arrival of asset liquidation, θ · e · Ω. ˆ that minimizes the weighted sum of squares of the interactions of the difference {ˆ π , θ} between data and model-predicted withdrawal rates and four instrumental variables. We map the model quantities to the data as follows. The model solution yields the   expected rate of investors’ withdrawal from puttable securities, Ω 1 − Vˆj (e) . Using the firm-specific optimal value function, Vˆj (·), we calculate the model predicted withdrawal   ˆ ijt = Ω 1 − Vˆj (REijt+1 ) for each election date based on an issuer’s liability rate D structure on that election date, REijt+1 . Our theoretical model implies that the expected value of the difference between the actual withdrawal rate and the model-predicted h i ˆ ijt , is zero. Moreover, under the assumptions of the withdrawal rate, E Dijt − D model, this difference is orthogonal to the current and lagged values of the fraction of securities that become puttable, REijt+1 and REijt , as well as the lagged withdrawals rate, Dijt . This implies that the relevant moment condition for the IV-GMM procedure h  i ˆ is E Dijt − Dijt · (1, REijt+1 , REijt , Dijt−1 ) = 0, where (1, REijt+1 , REijt , Dijt−1 ) is the vector of instruments. The IV-GMM procedure requires solving the model as a function of {π, θ} for each issuer at each iteration step. We implement the IV-GMM estimation procedure using

7

T = 207 observation from June 1, 2007, to June 30, 2008, in two steps.4 In the first step, we use the identity matrix as the weighting matrix and solve the model for each issuer as follows. Given the six parameters values discussed above and values for {π, θ}, we solve for 10 issuer-specific value functions. When solving for these value function for a given {π, θ}, we exploit the contraction mapping properties derived in Propositions 1 and 2 and parallel processing to solve the 10 different value functions—one for each issuer—simultaneously. The time to solve for the value functions can be considerably reduced by first solving for the value functions with an invariant liability structure, e, and then using this value function as starting point to solve for the issuer-specific value function Vˆj (e) with variable e. The computational efficiency gains are significant because solving for the value function with invariant e is much faster than with variable e, and the two values functions are similar. The objective function that is minimized in the first step of the IV-GMM procedure is constructed as gT ({π, θ})0 I4 gT ({π, θ}), where gT ({π, θ}) is a 4 × 1 vector of the average difference between data and model-predicted withdrawal rates interacted with the four instruments, and I4 is a 4 × 4 identity matrix. Minimizing this objective function yields a consistent estimate of {π, θ}.5 To obtain an efficient estimate of {π, θ} in the second step of the IV-GMM procedure, we use the first-step estimate of {π, θ} to calculate the efficient weighting matrix and use it to construct the objective function. We obtain the efficient weighting matrix by calculating the difference between the data and the model-predicted withdrawal rates using the first-step estimate of {π, θ} and interacting the moments with the four instruments. We then use the outer product of the 4 × 1 vector of interacted values to construct a 4 × 4 matrix for each observation. Calculating the average of these 4 × 4 matrices across the T = 207 observations and taking the inverse yields WT , which is a consistent estimate of the optimal weighting matrix. We use WT to construct the objective function of the second step in a way that is similar to the process we used in the first step. The pair of values {ˆ πIV GM M , θˆIV GM M } that minimizes the second-step 4

We lose 16 observations from June 1, 2008, to June 30, 2008, because our instruments include the lagged variables. 5 To accelerate the minimization process, we first minimize the objective function attained by assuming an invariant liability structure, e. The solution to this minimization problem is then used as the starting point for the minimization of the first-step IV-GMM objective function.

8

objective function is a consistent and efficient estimator of {π, θ}. Moreover, two steps are sufficient because the estimated values in the second step of the IV-GMM procedure are relatively close to the first-step values. Lastly, we estimate the variance-covariance of the IV-GMM estimates {ˆ πIV GM M , θˆIV GM M }. We do this by calculating the partial derivatives of the model-predicted withdrawal rates ˆ ijt with respect to π and θ evaluated at {ˆ D πIV GM M , θˆIV GM M }. We calculate these partial derivatives numerically using the five-point stencil method. That is, for a given function f , we calculate f 0 (x) =

1 12h

{−f (x + 2h) + 8 · f (x + h) − 8 · f (x − h) + f (x − 2h)} + O(h4 ).

Setting the perturbation value, h, to 0.1% of the corresponding parameter estimate, we solve the model for alternative parameter values corresponding to x + 2h, x + h, x − h and x − 2h, where x ∈ {ˆ πIV GM M , θˆIV GM M }. Using this collection of value functions, we calculate the partial derivative of the model-predicted withdrawal rates with respect to π and θ evaluated at {ˆ πIV GM M , θˆIV GM M }. Because the actual withdrawal rates Dijt are independent of the model-generated withdrawal rates, these partial derivatives are equal to the partial derivative of the difference between actual and model-generated withdrawal rates. We obtain the 4 × 2 matrix DT by interacting the two estimated partial derivatives with the four instruments and averaging over the T = 207 observations. The two columns of DT correspond to the partial derivatives taken with respect to the two estimated parameters {ˆ πIV GM M , θˆIV GM M } and the four rows correspond to the four instruments. It follows that the 2 × 2 matrix DT0 WT DT is a consistent estimate of the variance-covariance of the IV-GMM estimates {ˆ πIV GM M , θˆIV GM M }. Moreover, standard results imply that the IV-GMM estimates are asymptotically normally distributed such  √  ˆ that T π ˆIV GM M − π, θIV GM M − θ → N (0, DT0 WT DT ). We use this property to test the statistical significance of {ˆ πIV GM M , θˆIV GM M }. The minimized value of the secondstep objective function times T = 207 is asymptotically distributed as a χ2 (2), because we use four instruments to estimate two parameters.

9

D

XFABN Prospectus (first three pages)

FINAL TERMS Final Terms No. 2011-5 dated June 7, 2011 Metropolitan Life Global Funding I Issue of $800,000,000 Extendible Notes due 2017 secured by a Funding Agreement FA-32515S issued by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company under the $25,000,000,000 Global Note Issuance Program This Final Terms should be read in conjunction with the accompanying Offering Circular dated September 8, 2010 as supplemented by (i) a first base prospectus supplement dated as of November 24, 2010 (the “First Base Prospectus Supplement”), (ii) a second base prospectus supplement dated as of April 5, 2011 (the “Second Base Prospectus Supplement”) and (iii) a third base prospectus supplement dated as of May 27, 2011 (the “Third Base Prospectus Supplement”) (as so supplemented, the “Offering Circular”) relating to the $25,000,000,000 Global Note Issuance Program of Metropolitan Life Global Funding I (the “Issuer”). PART A — CONTRACTUAL TERMS Terms used herein and not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed in the Offering Circular, which constitutes a base prospectus for the purposes of the Prospectus Directive (Directive 2003/71/EC) (the “Prospectus Directive”). This document constitutes the Final Terms of the Notes described herein for the purposes of Article 5.4 of the Prospectus Directive and must be read in conjunction with the Offering Circular. Full information regarding the Issuer and the offer of the Notes is only available on the basis of the combination of these Final Terms and the Offering Circular. The Offering Circular is available for viewing in physical format during normal business hours at the registered office of the Issuer located at c/o U.S. Bank Trust National Association, 300 Delaware Avenue, 9th Floor, Wilmington, DE 19801. In addition, copies of the Offering Circular and these Final Terms will be available in physical format free of charge from the principal office of the Irish Paying Agent for Notes listed on the Irish Stock Exchange and from the Paying Agent with respect to Notes not listed on any securities exchange. In addition, the Offering Circular is published on the website of the Central Bank of Ireland at www.centralbank.ie. 1.

(i) Issuer:

Metropolitan Life Global Funding I

(ii) Funding Agreement Provider:

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Metropolitan Life”)

2.

Series Number:

2011-5

3.

Tranche Number:

1

4.

Specified Currency or Currencies:

U.S. Dollar (“$” or “USD”)

5.

Aggregate Principal Amount:

$800,000,000

6.

(i) Issue Price:

100.00% of the Aggregate Principal Amount

(ii) Net proceeds:

$798,400,000 (after payment of underwriting commissions and before payment of certain expenses)

(iii) Estimated Expenses of the Issuer:

$55,000

7.

Specified Denominations:

$100,000 and integral multiples of $1,000 in excess thereof

8.

(i)

June 14, 2011

Issue Date:

10

(ii) Interest Commencement Date (if different from the Issue Date):

Not Applicable

Maturity Date: — Initial Maturity Date:

July 6, 2012, or, if such day is not a Business Day, the immediately preceding Business Day, except for those Extendible Notes the maturity of which is extended on the initial Election Date in accordance with the procedures described under “Extendible Notes” below.

— Extended Maturity Dates:

If a holder of any Extendible Notes does not make an election to extend the maturity of all or any portion of the principal amount of such holder’s Extendible Notes during the notice period for any Election Date, the principal amount of the Extendible Notes for which such holder has failed to make such an election will become due and payable on any later date to which the maturity of such holder’s Extendible Notes has been extended as of the immediately preceding Election Date, or if such later date is not a Business Day, the immediately preceding Business Day.

— Final Maturity Date:

July 6, 2017, or, if such day is not a Business Day, the immediately preceding Business Day. The 6th calendar day of each month, from July 6, 2011, through, and including, June 6, 2016, whether or not any such day is a Business Day.

9.

Election Dates:

10.

Closing Date:

June 14, 2011

11.

Interest Basis:

Floating Rate

12.

Redemption/Payment Basis:

Redemption at par

13.

Change of Interest or Redemption/Payment Basis:

Not Applicable

14.

Put/Call Options:

Not Applicable

15.

Place(s) of Payment of Principal and Interest:

So long as the Notes are represented by one or more Global Certificates, through the facilities of The Depositary Trust Company (“DTC”) or Euroclear System (“Euroclear”) and Clearstream Luxembourg, société anonyme (“Clearstream”)

16.

Status of the Notes:

Secured Limited Recourse Notes

17.

Method of distribution:

Syndicated

Provisions Relating to Interest (If Any) Payable 18.

Fixed Rate Notes Provisions:

Not Applicable

19.

Floating Rate Note Provisions:

Applicable

2

11

(i)

Interest Accrual Period(s)/Interest Payment Dates:

Interest Accrual Periods will be successive periods beginning on, and including, an Interest Payment Date and ending on, but excluding, the next succeeding Interest Payment Date; provided, that the first Interest Accrual Period will commence on, and include, June 14, 2011, and the final Interest Accrual Period of any Extendible Notes will end on, but exclude, the Maturity Date of such Extendible Notes. Interest Payment Dates will be the 6th day of each January, April, July and October beginning on October 6, 2011; subject to adjustment in accordance with the Modified Following Business Day Convention, provided that the final Interest Payment Date for any Extendible Notes will be the Maturity Date of such Extendible Notes and interest for the final Interest Accrual Period will accrue from, and including, the Interest Payment Date immediately preceding such Maturity Date to, but excluding, such Maturity Date.

(ii) Business Day Convention:

Modified Following Business Day Convention, except as otherwise specified herein

(iii) Interest Rate Determination:

Condition 7.03 will be applicable

— Base Rate:

USD 3-Month LIBOR, which means that, for purposes of Condition 7.03(i), on the Interest Determination Date for an Interest Accrual Period, the Calculation Agent will determine the offered rate for deposits in USD for the Specified Duration which appears on the Relevant Screen Page as of the Relevant Time on such Interest Determination Date; provided that the fall back provisions and the rounding provisions of the Terms and Conditions will be applicable. The Base Rate for the first Interest Accrual Period will be interpolated between USD 3-Month LIBOR and USD 4-Month LIBOR.

— Relevant Margin(s):

Plus 0.125% from and including the Issue Date to but excluding July 6, 2012 Plus 0.18% from and including July 6, 2012 to but excluding July 6, 2013 Plus 0.20% from and including July 6, 2013 to but excluding July 6, 2014 Plus 0.25% from and including July 6, 2014 to but excluding July 6, 2015 Plus 0.25% from and including July 6, 2015 to but excluding July 6, 2016 Plus 0.25% from and including July 6, 2016 to but excluding July 6, 2017 (if any such day is not a Business Day the new Relevant Margin will be effective in accordance with the Modified Following Business Day Convention)

— Initial Interest Rate:

The Base Rate plus 0.125%, to be determined two Banking Days in London prior to the Issue Date

3

12

References Hansen, L. P. & Singleton, K. J. (1982), ‘Generalized Instrumental Variables Estimation of Nonlinear Rational Expectations Models’, Econometrica 50(5), 1269–1286. He, Z. & Xiong, W. (2012), ‘Dynamic debt runs’, Review of Financial Studies 25(6), 1799– 1843. Schroth, E., Suarez, G. A. & Taylor, L. A. (2014), ‘Dynamic debt runs and financial fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP crisis’, Journal of Financial Economics 112(2), 164 – 189.

13

Self-Fulfilling Runs: Evidence from the US Life ...

In contrast, the analysis above and in Section 1 of the main text emphasized ... and insurance companies, as well as aggregate information about the insurance ...

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provided home health care services and the consequences of home care for such .... excess of the limit imposed after the inpatient stay and covers visits that are ...

ShortSelling Bans Around the World: Evidence from the 200709 ... - Csef
ban on U.S. financial stocks, summarizes regulators' view during the crisis: ...... 360. The Journal of FinanceR. Table III. Bid-Ask Spreads and Short-Selling Bans: ...

Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates - Chicago
the forces driving the reallocation decision and how these forces interact with ... Chicago Booth, and Stockholm School of Economics for helpful discussions.

Evidence from Head Start - Harvard University
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/app.1.3.111 .... and local matching grants in addition to the federal funds reported on the HHS Web site. ...... To project the impact of Head Start on wages, I first take all original members of.

Evidence from evaluating mathematical strategies
For all the problems, the initial container had 2 cups of40° water. The quantity and temperature ofthe contents of the added container varied. The contents of the added container came from a 3 (added quantity) x 5 (added temperature) factorial desig

Domestic Gains from Offshoring? Evidence from TAA ...
control group firms, with greater hazard of exit 3-5 years after offshoring. We check for ... Longitudinal Business Database (LBD), which includes employment and payroll information on .... the TAA program is very small relative to other transfer pro