Technology in Society 27 (2005) 295–313 www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc

Science, technology and international relations Charles Weiss* Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets, NW, Washington, DC 20057, USA

Abstract Science, technology and international affairs affect one another. The impacts of science and technology on international affairs, especially those of information and communication technologies, are particularly pervasive. The mutual influences of science, technology and international affairs are so important and pervasive that the field should be recognized as an independent sub-discipline. Its present status as a relatively esoteric topic, to be entrusted to specialists and kept more or less isolated from the main body of international relations, is a dangerous anachronism. These impacts may be classified as operating through one of four main mechanisms: (1) changing the architecture of the international system: its structure, its key organizing concepts, and the relations among its actors; (2) changing the processes by which the international system operates, including diplomacy, war, administration, policy formation, commerce, trade, finance, communications, and the gathering of intelligence; (3) creating new issue areas, new constraints and trade-offs in the operational environment of foreign policy, a term which includes not only political constraints on international action, but also constraints imposed by the laws of natural and social science; and (4) providing a source of changed perceptions, of information and transparency for the operation of the international system, and of new concepts and ideas for international relations theory. q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: International affairs; Typology; Technological innovation; International science and technology policy; Globalization; Sovereignty; Co-evolution; Security; International; Impact of technology; Information technology; International system; International processes

Issues with important elements of science and technology are at or near the top of today’s international agenda: nuclear proliferation, bioterrorism, the vulnerability of national physical and information infrastructure, national missile defense, genetically modified crops, the governance of the Internet, global warming, AIDS, and mad cow

* Tel.: C1 202 687 9184; fax: C1 202 687 5528. E-mail address: [email protected]

0160-791X/$ - see front matter q 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.techsoc.2005.04.004

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disease, to name but a few. Scientific and technological information is also a critical element of global governance: in the setting of international norms of behavior, in the implementation of treaties, and in the operation of the specialized agencies of the United Nations [1]. More broadly, science and technology have had a fundamental and pervasive influence on international affairs throughout recent history. Nuclear weapons have revolutionized warfare and geopolitics. Globalization would have been impossible without the revolutions in information and communications technology [2]. The rise of Japan and the Pacific Rim is in large part due to these countries’ ability to manage technology. Even human rights and refugees, issues seemingly far removed from technology, have been affected by the new ease of global communication, and by new methods of remote sensing and forensic anthropology that make it difficult to hide evidence of past atrocities [3]. Low technology can have as important an impact as ‘high-tech’—as was illustrated by the events of September 11. The academic literature specifically concerned with the impact of science and technology on international relations is relatively limited, considering the importance of the topic. The most complete recent study of the impact of science and technology on international affairs is that by Skolnikoff [4]. After reviewing the major science- and technology-intensive issues of international policy at the time of his writing, Skolnikoff considered the overall impact of science and technology on a number of traditional concepts: sovereignty, which he defined as autonomy and authority in economic and political affairs, competition and dependency, and military force. He also examined their impact on the importance of geography, population, and the quality of governance to geopolitical assessments of a nation’s international power and influence [5]. Skolnikoff concluded that the evolution [due to the impact of science and technology] in international affairs has been [substantial but] incremental, posing only limited challenges to traditional assumptions and concepts [6]. The most important changes, he found, were the impact of nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles on the traditional role of military force, and the impact of information technology (this in the days before the Internet and the World Wide Web) on the viability over time of centralized political power and on the competitiveness of centralized economic systems [7]. Of the new international issues tied to science and technology, Skolnikoff saw only global warming as possibly leading to a fundamental reordering of interstate relationships, although it could just as well ‘lead to a reassertion of traditional patterns of state behavior’ [8]. In this paper, we go beyond the Skolnikoff treatment and survey the many and diverse impacts of science and technology, and the mechanisms by which science and technology influence and are influenced by international relations. We propose a comprehensive framework in the form of an empirical classification or typology that provides a systematic way to think about these mutual influences and a more precise vocabulary to assist analysis. The objective of this analysis is to make it easier for students and practitioners of international relations to recognize and distinguish typical patterns of interaction of science, technology and international affairs, and in this way to understand better and perhaps to anticipate the implications of new technology for global governance and for international relations, on the one hand, and the implications of developments in politics, economics and culture for science and technology, on the other.

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1. The mutual influence of science, technology and international relations For purposes of this paper, we shall define ‘science’ (by which we mean natural science) as ‘knowledge obtained by the systematic study of the structure and behavior of the natural world’, and technology as ‘the practical application of technical knowledge’ [9]. Our definition of technology includes hardware, software and some aspects of management, and is hence, more general than those implicit in a number of common usages of the term. It includes, but is much broader than information technology. Science and technology are distinct, but interrelated concepts. For this reason, this article consistently refers to science and technology in the plural. The distinction between science and technology remains valid in principle, even though the relationship between the two has become increasingly close with the decrease in the time elapsed between laboratory and production line. Despite their importance, science and technology do not fit well within the traditional framework of international relations research and practice, in part because they do not lend themselves to arguments based on single causation. First, science and technology are not independent instruments, but are social processes that respond to a variety of economic, social, cultural and political influences. The same is true of the diffusion of scientific knowledge and technological capabilities from their country of origin to the rest of the world, a process that gives rise to a variety of policy issues in its own right. Second, scientific knowledge and technological capability often enter into the social and political arena in a highly contested and politicized context, as is evident from the history of international efforts to deal with climate change, and most recently from the execution of an American engineer by Saudi Arabian militants for the stated reason, that he was working on Apache helicopters. Even so, science and technology do retain an objective or ‘instrumentalist’ characteristic. Whatever may have been the role of social construction, communications and transportation technologies really do operate a lot faster than they used to, and this fact has had a profound effect on the practical conduct of international relations. Whatever the controversies surrounding the politics of environment, the Earth is in fact getting warmer, exotic species are invading ecosystems, important fisheries are under stress or even collapsing, and so on. Third, many technological revolutions—those in information and biotechnology are clear examples—arise from the confluence of many individual advances over an extended period. It is therefore, difficult to predict, when these individual advances will coalesce into a revolution with broad social or economic impact. Finally, science and technology are usually not in themselves the decisive consideration in any given situation, but in most cases work in concert with politics, economics, culture and even religion. Not only do science and technology have a critical influence on international affairs, then, but science and technology are also influenced by international affairs, both directly and indirectly. The interdependence of science, technology and international affairs is expressed in different words in different disciplines. In the language of political science, science and technology are both independent and dependent variables; in that of economics, they are ‘endogenous variables’; in that of science studies, they are often ‘socially constructed’; in that of biology, they ‘co-evolve’ [10]. We shall for the sake of simplicity speak of science and technology as if they were a unified, independent

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Fig. 1. The triangular relationship.

instrument, trusting the reader to carry in his or her mind the qualifications implicit in the above discussion. The mutual influences of science, technology and international relations are thus described by a triangle of double-headed arrows, as is shown in Fig. 1. Each of these influences arises through different mechanisms. Increases in scientific knowledge, organized and applied for practical purposes, can lead to advances in technology (arrow #1 in Fig. 1) [11]. For example, basic research on microwave radiation led to the invention of the laser, which eventually made possible the compact disc and the automated supermarket checkout stand, neither of which was on the minds of the original inventors [12]. Conversely, advances in technology lead to advances in science (arrow #2 in Fig. 1). They do so, first, by providing new means of observation and measurement, as when the Hubble telescope, the product of space technology, made possible advances in the understanding of the origins of the universe [13]. Second, advances in technology create new things to measure and observe, as when the invention of the tokamak gave rise to new phenomena in plasma physics [14]. The effects of science on international relations (arrow #3 in Fig. 1) are manifested in two ways. First, increases in scientific knowledge about the natural world make people aware of new phenomena, putting such new policy issues as climate change on the international agenda. Second, the processes of scientific cooperation, competition and communication, in and of themselves and more or less independent of their substance, may on occasion affect international relations, as for example when agreements on scientific cooperation are a first step toward broader bilateral relations between states. Technology affects international relations (arrow #4 in Fig. 1) in four ways. First, technological innovation enables people to do new things, as for example when the development of nuclear weapons and inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM) changed the nature of warfare and of geopolitics. Second, international relations may be affected by the diffusion of a technology, a process exemplified both by the ‘offshoring’ of manufacturing and service industries and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Third, international relations are affected by direct technological competition among nation-states, as in the arms and space races. Fourth, international relations are affected by the development of the capacity to manage technology and to carry out technological innovation, whether in a firm, a region, or a nation. This innovative capacity is an important determinant of economic and political power, and is itself affected by a broad range of economic, political, social and cultural variables, over and above the state of a country’s scientific and technological institutions and the policies explicitly affecting them [15].

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We turn now to the converse influence, namely, the influence of international relations on science and technology (arrows #5 and 6 in Fig. 1). This influence may be direct or indirect. Direct effects are felt in four ways. First, the climate of public opinion affects the strength of public support to the financing of all kinds of scientific and technological advance, including basic and applied scientific research and the education of scientists and engineers [16]. Second, foreign policy objectives directly affect national priorities, agendas and relative budget allocations for scientific and technological research, development, education and training in different fields. Third, the state of relations among countries affects the international migration of scientists and engineers, their freedom to communicate, to enroll and teach in schools and universities outside their home countries, to collaborate and to attend meetings outside of their home countries, and to gain access to areas and objects of research [17]. It also affects their freedom to accept international awards, up to and including the Nobel Prize. Fourth, international agreements determine the strength of the global system for the protection of intellectual property, a prerequisite to most innovation (the widespread use of invention) based on research [18]. The indirect effects of international relations on the development and evolution of science and technology operate through mechanisms of economics, law, politics and culture. Both technology and the applied science that supports it respond to the demands of the marketplace, and hence to anything that influences the domestic or global market for technologically based goods and services: economic conditions or policies, regulations, income levels and distribution, and cultural or religious preferences [19]. The development and commercialization of genetically modified crops, for example, illustrate all four of these indirect mechanisms. The future of this science-based technology was strongly influenced by a de facto moratorium on the import of these crops by the European Community, a development with strong economic implications for American agricultural products. This series of events is in turn fed by strong religious and philosophical reactions in Europe against mixing the genetic materials of different species, by deep cultural attachment to the purity of food, and by political and diplomatic efforts to delay the worldwide commercialization of these crops long enough to allow European scientists to catch up with their American counterparts [20].

2. Effects of science and technology on international relations Our classification of the impacts of science and technology distinguishes the effects of science and technology, acting along with other factors, on four different aspects of the international system: its operational processes, its substance, its architecture, and the information, ideas and perceptions on which it is based. 2.1. Changing operational processes The first main effect of science and technology on international relations is on the operational processes of the international system: those carried out predominantly by governments—diplomacy, war, administration, policy formation, crisis management,

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and the gathering of intelligence, and those carried out predominantly by the private sector—commerce, trade, economic competition, finance, communications, and most directly from the point of view of science and technology, the management and financing of research and innovation. Advances in weaponry, in communications and in information technology have vastly increased the speed, the scale, the efficiency, and the geographic scope of each of these processes. They have forced diplomats and policy makers to respond to events with ‘Internet speed’ if they wish to frame how a given issue is perceived by the public [21]. Space and time, insofar as they affect international processes, are now defined as much by access to communications and transportation facilities as by geography in the ordinary sense of the word [22]. Technological change affects the relations among opposing actors in many of these processes: between attacker and defender in warfare, between intelligence gatherer and guardian of secrets, between buyer and seller in commercial transactions, between regulator and regulated, between governments and non-state actors, between government and ‘civil society’, between the opinions of technical experts and those of the general public, between small states and major powers, and between the participants of diplomatic and commercial negotiations. Technological change has blurred distinctions that have previously played an important role in regulating the conduct of international relations: between domestic and foreign issues in peacetime, between combatant and non-combatant in wartime, and even between winner and loser in strategic nuclear warfare. Science and technology are explicit elements of the operations of multilateral organizations: in the transfer of technology and technical assistance functions of various technical agencies and in the international management of scientific research and innovation, as for example that financed by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research or that managed by the Tropical Disease Program of the World Health Organization [23]. 2.2. Affecting the substance of international relations The second main effect of science and technology on international relations is on the substance of international affairs: by (1) creating new issue areas, (2) by creating new constraints and trade-offs in the operational environment of foreign policy, (3) by creating issues in which domestic and international issues penetrate each other, and (4) by changing the scope and domain of different paradigms of international relations theory. We consider each of these in turn. (1) Climate change, genetically modified crops, stem cell research, and endangered species, are all examples of new issue areas that have gained their place on the international agenda through advances in scientific knowledge. Many issues of this type have given rise to new treaties, such as those protecting endangered species and new international regimes, such as that established by the Montreal Protocol to protect the stratospheric ozone layer. Advances in technology have led to new international organizations, such as the European Space Agency, and to pressure for major changes

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in existing organizations, such as the International Telecommunications Union [24]. The processes of scientific research, technological innovation and technology transfer have also given rise to new international issues, especially in the realm of intellectual property, but also in efforts to control research on stem cells and genetically modified organisms. (2) Failure to act on the international issues placed on the international agenda by increases in scientific understanding carries short- or long-run costs imposed by the laws of Nature. These create constraints and trade-offs on the operational environment of the international system that are analogous to other constraints and trade-offs in decision making and the implementation of foreign policy [25]. To cite an extreme case, failure to control the emission of greenhouse gases, if prolonged over centuries, is likely to result in the flooding of Florida and many other coastal areas (due to melting of the Antarctic ice caps and the consequent greatly increased rise in sea level) or the freezing of Western Europe (due to the weakening of the thermohaline circulation) [26]. (3) Science and technology are elements of a large class of ‘intermestic’ issues, in which domestic and international considerations interpenetrate, blurring the previously distinct boundary between domestic and international issues. These include the fight against terrorism, arms sales, exports of dual use technology, energy policy, public health, pollution control in border locations, and a variety of other regional and global environmental concerns [27]. (4) The emergence of these issues, driven by advances in health and environmental science, meteorology and other branches of science, has enlarged the scope and domain of non-realist paradigms of international relations theory, most notably interdependence, for the explanation of the international response to increased linkages and connections among sovereign states, [28] functionalism, for the explanation of regimes based on common technical functions born of science and technology, [29] and constructivism, for the explanation of the role of the media and other means of communication in forming national identity and other perceptions [30]. These non-realist paradigms are important intellectual underpinnings of the multilateral approach to international relations. 2.3. Changing the architecture of the international system The third main mechanism by which science and technology influence international relations is by helping to change key aspects of the architecture of the international system, which we define as an umbrella term encompassing (1) its structure, (2) its key organizing concepts, and (3) the relations among its constituent states and other actors [31]. (1) Advances in science and technology can change the structure of the international system by: (i) Changing the pattern of distribution of power among states. The inability of the Soviet empire to manage technological innovation was an important element in its collapse, and in this way helped to change the structure of the international system from a bipolar system to the present American hegemony [32].

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(ii) Helping to shift the balance of power between states, on the one hand, and networks, international organizations, private firms, non-governmental organizations, individuals, and other non-state actors, on the other. Advances in information technology have increased the power of non-state actors to influence events by making it easier for them to gather and exchange information and to coordinate their activities, most dramatically in the case of Al Qaeda. Even before September 11, the spread of the mass media and the Internet limited the control of governments over the flow of information across their borders and enabled political movements in remote areas to bring their case to the attention of world public opinion, most notably in the case of the Zapatistas in Mexico [33]. Within states, the spread of information technology has created pressures on governance in the direction of a more open society and decentralized political power and economic structures [34]. These pressures are being resisted by a number of authoritarian states, and the final balance is still evolving [35]. (2) Advances in science and technology have altered the meaning and significance of key organizing concepts of international relations theory, including security, sovereignty, power, and anarchy [36]. These advances have: (i) Altered notions of security. Nuclear weapons have created a situation, where someone else’s actions can harm or even destroy a country independent of its own actions. Missiles have eliminated the security once afforded by geography. Epidemic disease and environmental pollution (including sea level rise due to carbon dioxide emissions) have created new, non-military threats to security [37]. And the nuclear arms race and the inter-continental ballistic missile have created an anomalous situation, whereby an increase in weaponry may actually decrease security. (ii) Altered the significance of sovereignty by creating multiple means of penetrating hitherto relatively impermeable states. The worldwide diffusion of information, communications, and transport technology, for example, has made it difficult for states to control the movement of money, people, information, knowledge, technology, diseases, pests, seeds, drugs, and even nuclear materials across their borders [38]. The availability of real-time information from the far corners of the globe has eroded the monopoly of governments on information, resulting in pressures for increased transparency and accountability on the part of government officials to the citizenry they are supposed to serve [39] (See below.). (iii) Altered the meaning of power by increasing the importance of the ‘soft’ power that creates pressure on states to take decisions they would otherwise not have taken by virtue of changed public perceptions [40]. Globalization—itself in part the result of advances in information and communications technology—has limited the power of states to make independent decisions by making it virtually impossible to maintain a command economy or a totalitarian polity without suffering enormous economic costs, regardless of the desires of the government [41]. (iv) Lessened the scope of international anarchy. Advances in environmental science have placed numerous issues on the international agenda that are suited to governance by regimes that reward cooperation and conformity to international norms [42].

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(3) Innovations in science and technology and increases in the ability to manage technology, have changed the bilateral and multilateral relationships among the constituent states (international relations, in the strict sense of the term) and between them and the other actors of the international system, by (i) reordering hierarchies of military power, (ii) reordering hierarchies of economic power, (iii) redefining international economic relations, (iv) creating or resolving international problems, (v) creating new resources, (vi) creating new coalitions, (vii) creating new tools for international collaboration and (viii) creating new arenas for cooperation and competition. (ix) The relations among nations may also be influenced by the processes of professional cooperation and communication among scientists in different countries. Examples of each of these phenomena follow. (i) Superior ability to manage technology has been an important factor in reordering the hierarchy of military power. (ii) The capacity to manage science and technology has reordered the hierarchy of economic power among nation-states, contributing importantly to the demise of the Soviet Union and to the rise of Japan and the Asian Pacific Rim [43]. Comparative advantage is now dynamic and can be created by investments of money and personnel in science and technology [44]. (iii) Post-World War II patterns of technology transfer have contributed to changes in the international division of labor, and hence in the economic relations among states, especially in the more advanced developing countries. Conversely, it has also created new vehicles for technological dependency. (iv) Science and technology can both create cross-border, regional and global problems and help resolve them through voluntary initiatives. (a) The invention of crack cocaine—an important ‘low’ technology—has greatly exacerbated the problem of international drug trafficking. (b) Water resources development and desalination plants have helped to resolve bilateral water disputes, as between India and Pakistan after Partition, and between the US and Mexico in the 1960s [45]. (v) Technological innovation has also created new strategic natural resources. Uranium became a strategic resource only after the invention of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy, with a consequent increase in the strategic importance of countries with uranium reserves. (vi) Increased scientific knowledge concerning the threat of sea level rise due to global warming has given rise to a new international coalition, the Alliance of Small Island States, a vigorous proponent of an international regime to limit the emission of greenhouse gases [46]. (vii) Technology-based humanitarian works such as locust control, the vaccination of Third World children or the rescue of refugees have provided a subject for constructive international collaboration. (viii) Scientific and technological collaboration, communication and competition have created new arenas for international cooperation and competition. Both of these phenomena are illustrated by the Space Race between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Competition in technology became a symbol for the broader

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competition between the two political and economic systems. Once the Cold War was over, the US space program was justified to Congress as a vehicle for bilateral cooperation with Russia [47]. (ix) The ordinary processes of technical communication among scientists in different countries can have an important impact on international relations. (a) Professional communication among Russian and American scientists via the Pugwash movement during the Cold War, played an important role in developing trust between individual Russians and Americans during periods of hostility, and later in developing shared concepts of arms control, and helping to thaw relations and establish formal channels of communication when these were deemed desirable [48]. (b) Even the prospect of scientific cooperation on topics of shared interest is an important tool of bilateral relations, for example, as a symbolic prelude or as an inducement to the establishment of diplomatic relations between formerly hostile states. 2.4. Affecting the information, ideas and perceptions on which the international system is based The fourth main effect of science and technology on the international system is on the information, perception and ideas on which it is based: altering perceptions, providing a source of information, and serving as a source of new concepts and metaphors for the study of international relations. 1. Mass media and other means of worldwide communications have altered perceptions of issues, power relations, identities, norms, interests, and the state of bilateral relations. (i) The mass media have altered popular perceptions of issues and led to foreign policy decisions that might not otherwise have been taken, as for example in the US decision to end its intervention in Somalia [49]. Prolonged media exposure has also changed public attitudes on numerous environmental and public health issues. (ii) The space race altered worldwide perceptions of the relative power of the US and the former Soviet Union, at first (after Sputnik) in favor of the latter, later (after the moon landing) in favor of the US. (iii) The mass media have reinforced the sense of shared identity among geographically dispersed peoples, such as the Arabs across North Africa and West Asia, the Inuit across northern Canada and any number of other ethnic diasporas or other groups spread across state boundaries in the US [50]. (iv) Scientific advice and information are critical inputs to the setting of international technical norms, such as those set by the International Standards Organization, the World Trade Organization, and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, as well as the guidelines and standards of international regimes such as that established by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) or the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer [51];

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(v) Especially in the developing world, the media have stimulated the popular desire for modernization and forced governments to regard this as a matter of national interest; (vi) Publicity given to examples of bilateral scientific and technological cooperation (or of its absence) has formed popular perceptions of the state of bilateral relations, as between the US and Russia and China. 2. Remote sensing technology provides essential information in support of the monitoring, assessment and reporting functions associated with treaty regimes. Remote sensing has also provided evidence justifying action in international crises, as in the quarantine of Cuba during the missile crisis [52]. 3. Science and technology are rich sources of concepts and metaphors that have enriched the theory of international relations: co-evolution, game theory, chaos theory, self-organizing systems, and feedback loops are but a few examples. The idea that international relations constitute a system is borrowed from the discipline of systems analysis, and even the idea of a model is itself borrowed from natural science.

3. International relations in the information age The revolution in information, communications and remote sensing technology exemplifies the impact of a single technological revolution on virtually every aspect of international relations [53] and provides a test of the proposed classification [54]. The first of these four, the operational processes of the international system, sustains the clearest and most direct impact of information technology. The Internet has empowered individuals and non-governmental organizations, ranging from environmental advocacy groups to terrorists, drug traffickers and other criminal networks, enabling them to concert their actions, as well as to share information and coordinate their activities. Economic and political power has come to be defined in large part by a country’s degree of connectivity and by its ability to carry out technological innovation [55]. New technology has made the gathering and communication of information much faster and more efficient, and has allowed information to be gathered in previously inaccessible regions and communicated to previously inaccessible audiences [56]. Advances in information technology have vastly expanded public access to information. Except in hermetically sealed countries like North Korea and Myanmar, it has become virtually impossible to prevent ordinary people from learning how the rest of the world lives and thinks. The mass media and the Internet have greatly accelerated the pace of international events. Political or financial crises that used to take months to develop now unfold in days. Ordinary people now learn of world events at about the same time as their governments, giving officials little time to analyze, to frame issues and to shape agendas before they spin out of control [57]. This has dramatically altered the conduct of war, diplomacy, policy formation, propaganda, and crisis management. The new information technology has also made fundamental changes in warfare. In combat situations, new information technology now makes it possible to dissipate much of the ‘fog of war’ by integrating vast amounts of information as events unfold [58].

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The potential use of hacking technology to disable key military and civilian infrastructure has made the protection of communications and transportation networks a major security concern, a consideration that has gained new prominence after September 11 [59]. Second, innovations in information technology have had an important impact on the substance of international relations. They have introduced a variety of new issues into international fora: technical standards of telecommunications equipment, control of global positioning satellites, privacy, censorship and content control, hacking, computer viruses, intellectual property, taxation, and trade regulation, to name but a few [60]. Third, the impact of these issues and process changes on the architecture of the international system (defined earlier as its structure, its organizing concepts, and the relations among its states) is more subtle but potentially equally far-reaching. As regards structure, it is still not clear whether the new technology will on balance tilt the international system towards unilateral or multilateral approaches to governance. Many of the issues cited earlier derive from the global scope of telecommunications and cyberspace, and seem better suited to a multilateral approach, especially given that the statistics on the geographic growth and diffusion of the Net indicate that Americans and indeed English speakers will soon become a decreasing proportion of Internet users [61]. Some of these issues have already surfaced in diplomatic arenas or in cases before national courts, in which Net-based activities that are entirely legal in one country—gambling, pornography, the sale of Nazi propaganda and paraphernalia, and the spreading of democratic propaganda—have resulted in civil or criminal actions in another. These conflicts of laws raise complicated issues of coordination and harmonization that are likely to take many years to resolve [62]. On the other hand, many of the new issues presented by the Information Revolution point in the opposite direction, away from multilateral solutions. First of all, the alternatives provided by wireless telecommunications technology have undermined much of the basis for the century-old multilateral regime centered on the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a system designed to facilitate and perpetuate the control of government monopolies over post and telecommunications [63]. Second of all, the dominance of the United States in many areas of information technology has led to substantial unilateral American control over many aspects of information technology, especially those relating to the technical standards and governance of the Internet. Despite the apparent independence of cyberspace from geography and the nation-state, the Internet Corporation for the Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which controls the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) directory, is a creation of the US government [64]. The new information technology also has many implications for the organizing concepts that form part of the architecture of the international system. It has continued the erosion of the significance of sovereignty by increasing the permeability of sovereign states to information. This freer access to information and communication technology has contributed to the shift of power away from states and toward a variety of networks and other non-state actors [65]. It has also increased the importance of ‘soft power’: the power of ideas to press or even to force governments to take decisions they would rather not take—whether these ideas are those of democracy and freedom of expression, or those of religious and ethnic hatred [66].

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These developments have inspired counter-pressures on the part of governments seeking to restore some of the traditional aspects of sovereignty. The problem facing such efforts is that information and communication technology is embodied in commercially available, user friendly and relatively inexpensive equipment. To be sure, government can maintain their control over communications and information, but only at some cost in hindering—or in extreme cases, cutting-off—the flow of information to and from the country. This tension between the simultaneous but conflicting desires to control the flow of political information, and to gain the economic benefits of the free flow of economic information, is being played out in different forms in different countries. Perhaps the most important case is that of China, which has taken advantage of the huge size of its population, its economy and its geographic area, to use Western technology to funnel Internet and telecommunications traffic through a relatively few nodes that it hopes to monitor and control [67]. The same conflict is being played out in Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, with the difference that government efforts to control the free inflow of information is hindered by the relatively small size of the countries, their relative affluence, and the availability of alternative means of communication, ranging from dialup connections to Internet Service Providers in other countries to the Qatar-based television network of Al-Jazeera [68]. Fourth, the information revolution has had a major impact on the information, ideas, and perceptions on which the international system is based. For example, the application of remote sensing technology has facilitated the monitoring and enforcement of a variety of international treaty regimes, including environment, arms control and human rights. Satellites have photographed mass grave sites in the Balkans, nuclear facilities in North Korea, and pollution plumes in a variety of international bodies of water. Modern communications media, fed by improvements in technology, have provided a flow of information that has altered popular perceptions of international issues ranging from terrorism to environment to the wisdom of the US intervention in Somalia. On the negative side, the media have also been used to spread messages of ethnic hatred in the former Yugoslavia and of genocide in Rwanda [69]. To be sure, only a minority of these effects result from technology acting alone. Even the development or diffusion of the technologies themselves frequently owes a great deal to the action of external forces. For example, the freedom of Al-Jazeera to broadcast is the direct result of the desire of the Emirate of Qatar to open itself up to globalization to a much greater extent than its neighbors [70]. The free rein of remote sensing satellites is traceable to the international regime reserving outer space for peaceful purposes. Many of the unique characteristics of the Internet—especially its relative immunity from censorship—derive from its origin as a military communication network that could survive a strategic nuclear attack [71].

4. Science and technology as a bridge between competing paradigms of international relations theory The effect of science and technology on such basic concepts as power, sovereignty, and national interest is independent of whether these concepts have an objective existence, or

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whether they are human constructs. For example, as we have seen, they affect, not only the objective reality of military and economic power, as expressed in divisions and equipment, but also the perception of power, as influenced by the mass media and by technological stunts like Sputnik. For this reason, the proposed classification is independent of the various epistemological and ontological questions that divide realists, liberals, constructivists, and the other schools and sub-schools of international relations scholarship [72]. The debates among these schools provide the theoretical context for discussions among policy makers favoring multilateral or unilateral action, respectively, whether as a general approach or in a particular circumstance. To justify this pragmatic epistemological pluralism, we take the view that realist, interdependence and (by extension) other theories of international relations are not complete theories but are rather ideal types [73]. Each such paradigm has its own domain of primary or even exclusive validity and a larger domain in which it has useful but not necessarily predominant explanatory power. Science and technology can alter the boundaries between the domain in which realistic theory applies in pure form, and those in which it offers insights synergistic with those offered by interdependence, liberal institutionalism, constructivism, functionalism, idealism, and other paradigms. The pervasiveness of the impact of science and technology raises the possibility that it can serve as a bridge between the competing paradigms of international relations theory. For some purposes it is simpler to treat the impact of science and technology on the international system as an exogenous perturbation, treating such concepts as power, security, and national interest as objective and real, and science and technology as an external influence on them. This kind of analysis fits firmly in the realist tradition. In other cases, however, science and technology are best treated as a dimension of international affairs, and the scientific and technological system as an endogenous actor in the international system—one that both influences and is influenced by the many other actors in the system. This approach is consistent with the methodology of the liberal internationalist school of international relations, and is appropriate to the exploration of the impact of science and technology on environment, health, arms control and other issues calling for international cooperation and regime formation. In addition, science and technology affect the information flows that influence the perceptions and discourse that are of major interest to social constructivists.

5. ‘Mainstreaming’ science and technology in the study and practice of international affairs The pervasive mutual influences of science, technology and international relations, and their importance to global governance, make the isolation of science and technology from the ‘mainstream’ of international relations a curious anomaly in the 21st century. For example, science and technology occupy a peripheral position in the curricula of most undergraduate and graduate schools of international relations, and are absent from the entrance examination to the US Foreign Service. The survey and classification scheme set forth in this paper is intended to guide generalists in recognizing recurrent patterns of mutual impact among science, technology

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and international relations. It emerges from the author’s twenty years of experience teaching overview courses in science, technology and international affairs to students and practitioners whose major training is in the social sciences, and who often have limited exposure to technical topics and some trepidation in dealing with them. It responds to their frequent requests for a framework within which to organize their knowledge of the subject. The underlying difficulty lies in the fact that the mutual influences of science, technology and international affairs are pervasive, and yet are largely ignored in treatments of international relations, or at best are subsumed in larger topics like proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, globalization, environment, or the rise of the mass media. Science and technology thus becomes a sort of ubiquitous residual, a vast and sometimes forbidding collection of special topics without apparent structure. This has unfortunate effects on the discipline of political science. Scholars and practitioners in this field are too often socialized to believe that natural science is unimportant. This attitude is often transmitted to diplomats and officials of international secretariats, who as a result may tend to neglect the scientific and technological dimension of their work. It is time that science, technology and international affairs be recognized as an independent sub-discipline, analogous to political economics, which has firmly established its place within the discipline of international relations. After all, the impact of science and technology on international affairs is arguably more diverse and pervasive than the impact of economics or indeed of any single social science. This diversity of impact should hardly be surprising. The natural sciences extend from geophysics to biology, whereas economics is only one of the many social sciences. Their impact on international affairs and the technologies derived therefrom, is therefore, analogous to the aggregate impact of all the social sciences, including economics, history, political science, psychology, sociology, and linguistics, plus that of all of the technologies derived from those social sciences, including polls, focus groups, food stamps, and techniques of propaganda and psychological warfare. The diverse impact of international relations on science and technology, and the even more manifold and diverse effects of science and technology on international relations, have thus far defied classification and systematic analysis. The very variety of these effects has contributed to the difficulties of integrating scientific and technological considerations into the conceptual framework of international relations. The present status of science and technology as a relatively esoteric topic, to be entrusted to specialists and kept more or less isolated from the main body of international relations, is a dangerous anachronism. Science and technology not only pervade the issues with which the international system must deal, but have a fundamental influence on the overall architecture of the system itself. For this reason, it is of critical importance that the impacts of science and technology become part of the mainstream of the teaching, research and practice of international relations. The classification and framework proposed in this paper may make it easier for generalists to come to terms with what is certain to become an even more important dimension of international affairs and global governance.

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[67] Kalathil S, Boas T. Open networks, closed regimes: the impact of the internet on authoritarian rule. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; 2003. [68] Higgins J. Al-Jazeera—Media Pariah or Pioneer? Satellite Broadband, April 2002. [69] Weiss C. Information technology and international relations. Georgetown J Int Affairs 2003;4(2). [70] Higgins J. Al-Jazeera—Media Pariah or Pioneer? Satellite Broadband, April 2002. Available at http:// thebroadbandeconomy.com/ar/broadband_aljazeera_media_pariah/index.htm. [71] Abbate J. Inventing the internet. Cambridge MA: MIT Press; 2000. [72] For a brief exposition of the basic tenets of these schools, see Arend AC. Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and International Politics. Virginia J Int Law 1998;38(2):107–53. [73] This is an extension of the argument made by Keohane R, Nye J. Power and interdependence. New York, NY: Longmans; 2001. p. 22.

Charles Weiss is Distinguished Professor and Chair of Science, Technology and International Affairs at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. He has a BA in chemistry and physics (summa cum laude) and a PhD in biochemistry and chemical physics from Harvard University, and served as the first Science and Technology Adviser to the World Bank from 1971 to 1986. He is the author of numerous publications on international science and technology policy.

Science, technology and international relations

Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, 37th and O Streets, NW, Washington, DC ... Science, technology and international affairs affect one another. ... including diplomacy, war, administration, policy formation, commerce, trade, finance, communi- ...... It emerges from the author's twenty years of experience.

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