EVALUATION OF DISASTER RESPONSE AGENCIES OF PAKISTAN By OCHA
NATIONAL DISASTER RESPONSE ADVISOR ISLAMABAD DECEMBER 2006
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Table of Contents Introductory Portion Acronyms Executive Summary Introduction
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Chapter 1- Disaster Hazards and Response Preparedness Preparedness for Flood hazard Combating Drought Dengue Virus Management Disaster Specific Early Warning Status
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4 6 8 10 12
Chapter II – Governance and Disaster Management Legal Framework Federal, provincial, district and sub-district governments
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14 14 17
Chapter III – Key Disaster Response Agencies Civil Defence Services of Pakistan Pakistan Red Crescent Society
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22 22 26
Chapter IV – Emergency Response Services Fire Fighting Services Police Emergency Services Punjab Emergency Services Eidhi Ambulance Service National Volunteer Movement Port Oil Hazard Disaster management
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30 30 32 33 35 37 38
Chapter V - Disaster Early Warning Agencies Pakistan Metrological Department SUPARCO
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40 40 45
Chapter VI – Evaluation of Vulnerable Communities and Schools Community Evaluations School Evaluations District based Integrated Disaster Preparedness and Response Intervention
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47 47 50 52
Summary of Recommendations
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54
Annexure A – Governance and Disaster Management Review Matrix Emergency Relief Cell NWFP Disaster management Review
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60 60 61
II Disaster Response Evaluation matrix of District Mansehra Punjab Disaster Management in Punjab Evaluation of Tehsil Forezwala, Punjab Disaster Management in Sindh Disaster Response Evaluation of District Badin, Sindh Annexure B – Disaster Response Agencies-Civil Defence and PRCS Evaluation of Civil Defence Services of Punjab Evaluation of Civil Defence Services of NWFP Civil Defence Academy, Lahore National Institute of Fire Technology, Islamabad Evaluation of Pakistan Red Crescent Society – National HQ Punjab Red Crescent Society Sindh Red Crescent Society
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63 66 68 72 74 78 78 81 83 85 87 90 93
Annexure C – Emergency Response Services Islamabad Fire Fighting Department Lahore Municipal Government Fire Fighting Department Karachi Fire Services Police Emergency Services Punjab Emergency Services Eidhi Ambulance Services Port Oil Pollution Hazard Management Volunteerism- National Volunteer Movement
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97 97 99 100 102 104 106 107 109
Annexure C – Drought, Dengue Virus Epidemic and Flood Management Drought Management Dengue Virus Epidemic Management in Punjab Dengue Virus in Sindh Flood Control Mechanisms
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111 111 114 115 116
Annexure E – Case Studies of Disaster Vulnerable Communities and Schools Community # 1 - Village Karli, Muzzafarabad, AJK Community # 2 - Village Gul Dehri – Mansehra, NWFP Community # 3 - Village Khana Labana, Shiekhupura, Punjab Community # 4 - Village Bhakuo, Tharparkar, Sindh School # 1 – Government Girls Middle School, Chikar, AJK School # 2, Government Girls Higher Secondary School, Garhi Habibullah, NWFP Schools # 3, Government Primary and Secondary Schools, Gizri, Karachi Annexure F – Evaluation Criterion
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119 119 124 128 133 138 141 144 147
III Organograms Floods and Excessive Rains Forecasting Drought Management Dengue Epidemic Management Emergency Relief Cell District Government Tehsil Government Civil Defence Services Pakistan Red Crescent Society Information Management for Rain Prediction Flood and Excessive Rain Forecasting
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7 9 11 18 19 21 22 26 40 42
IV Acronyms ADB AJK CD CDA DCO DDMA DDRO Deptt DERA DEWS DM DPO DRO DSP EEZ ERC ERRA EQ GoP HFA IGP INGO IT LGO LBOD Met MOH MOI NDMA NDMS NRB OCHA PDMA PMD SOPs SUPARCO WAPDA
Asian Development Bank Azad Jammu & Kashmir Civil Defence Capital Development Authority District Coordination Officer District Disaster Management Authority Deputy District Revenue Officer Department Drought Emergency Relief Assistance Disease Early Warning System Disaster Management District Police Officer District Revenue Officer Deputy Superintendent Police Exclusive Economic Zone Emergency Relief Cell Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction Authority Earthquake Government of Pakistan Hyogo Framework for Action Inspector General Police International Non Governmental Organisation Information Technology Local Government Ordinance Left Bank Outfall Drain Metrological Ministry of Health Ministry of Interior National Disaster Management Authority National Disaster Management System National Reconstruction Bureau Organisation for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Provincial Disaster Management Authority Pakistan Meteorological Department Standard Operating Procedures Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Committee Water and Power Authority
V Executive Summary Located in a region that is yet to mature in geological terms with the Indian plate on collision course with Eurasian plate, Pakistan is an earthquake vulnerable country. Its aesthetic landscape featuring mountains, river plains, desert tracts and a 960 kilometres coastline masks a vulnerability to disaster cycles. Floods figure prominently, though their intensity has receded while droughts tend to persist. Vulnerability exists against sea based hazards, cyclones and tsunamis and against unusually high intensity rain spells. Then there are the new generation eradication resistant diseases which make Pakistan vulnerable with a rudimentary health system. Social vulnerabilities and a complex access denying geography are the challenges that must be overcome in configuring response to disasters. Pakistan has a traditional relief and response oriented disaster management system baring defences that have been erected over the years against the flood hazard. It is a wide ranging evaluation of disaster and emergency response agencies of Pakistan, which compares their institutional attributes and mandates with performance and operational practices. Evaluating the two primary disaster response agencies, the district government and vulnerable communities, turned out to be most engaging. Assessments led to recommendations, including possible OCHA’s contributions. It is essentially a primary source based study, relying on focused group discussions, semi-structured interviews, personal observation and multiple inputs on targeted agencies. Secondary sources were consulted for developing contextual understanding. In scope, it views disaster response holistically and agency specific, ranging from vulnerable communities to the Federal Government. Government is unmatched in its reach, presence and resources to respond to disasters. All other agencies normally route their inputs through the government structures. It has systems in place to handle disasters which though need capacity up gradation and policy realignment. This explains the primary focus of the newly created National Disaster Management Authority in making the multi-tiered governance system more capable of holistic disaster management. District government assumes centrality in disaster response in a local setting. However, Local Government Ordinance (LGO) 2001 in a bid to devolve governance has rendered it weak for articulating disaster response. While National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) framework proposes a cohesive response structure for the district government, but can it make the devolved governance culture responsive to a crisis situation? Then there are responder agencies that are intrinsic to the government like the massive Civil Defence services, fire fighting and police emergency response agencies which, like the government line departments, defy reform baring cosmetics. Their graver flaws are structural with outdated legislative and policy guidance causing diffused focus. Infusion of resources without addressing the deeper malaise would be counter productive. . Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) has a national character but draws from a global reservoir of experience and expertise. Confronted with the scale of October 2005 earthquake, PRCS channelled vast resource and capacity infusion from the global Red Cross network. Its outcomes reflect energy and contemporary relevance though
VI lacking in scale. It also needs to connect them with governance structures to emerge as a major disaster response player. Then one comes across a very disconnected area of emergency response with inputs of so many actors in a setting where outdated laws and policies neither offer guidance nor are they fully implemented. The problems also relate to functional overlaps, absence of a lead agency in a local setting and of poor government ownership. Demand for quality services has brought numerous contributions to the fore, some voluntary and others market driven. All operate in the absence of an integrated framework. Punjab government, though, has initiated quality and well resourced emergency service, known as ‘Rescue 1122’. However, existing services have been left resource starved, whereas all capacities MUST be integrated for efficiency and sustainability. There seems to be a concerted emphasis on up scaling the capacity of Pakistan Meteorological Department in a bid to improve early warning for multiple disasters. Glaring weaknesses, however, exist with regards to forewarning vulnerable communities against sea borne hazards and flash floods in mountainous regions. The bigger question, however, is of orchestrating a timely response through our ponderous governance system even when forewarned. In keeping with Hyogo Framework of Action (HFA) emphasis areas, following thrust lines must sustain efforts aimed at building capacities for disaster response. The issues seem intractable but are resolvable. What must sustain efforts that aim for betterment is an unflinching leadership resolve that prefers systems based solutions over innovations. This is a leadership function that must be dispensed with matching conviction. Far from encouraging a do-it-alone approach, leaders must prefer a stakeholder’s inclusive one, with a multi-hazard focus given the complex set of challenges. This also calls for aggressive advocacy preceding and accompanying corrective efforts for implementing common strategies over a wide compass. Evaluations identified systems delivery weaknesses in disaster response at the community end, be it timely early warning, relief or compensation. Corrective efforts must, therefore, be framed with this perspective. Systems must be corrected first at the roots by framing legislations and rules of business that promote sustainability and clarity in purpose and deliverables. For economy and for instilling functional efficiency such efforts must deliver the cumulative potential. There is no substitute to building capacities to recognised standards. Disaster response employs multiple disciplines, some of which lie outside the realm of common competencies. This requires developing a competent incountry education and training base, aligned to internationally accepted standards. Most evaluations probing shortfalls in delivery identified absence of proactive planning and timely access to early warning. Operational contingency planning must, therefore, be refined in disaster vulnerable districts. Finally disaster response agencies have their strengths and weaknesses. They can benefit mutually by developing functional linkages, for enhanced reach and sharing better practices.
VII Communities are the basic disaster response units. Configuring the first line of defence against disasters, they are lacking in skills, resource and social organisation. They need support in building capacities and hazard coping mechanisms. The vulnerable schools need to be targeted for a bigger reason. This is where you can instil socially responsible mindsets, in making the next generation more hazard management aware. These thoughts prompted seven grass root evaluations, four of disaster vulnerable communities and three schools to identify their vulnerabilities and actions that can make them more capable of managing hazard situations District and the community are the two key entities in articulating disaster response on impact. Recent experiences have adequately highlighted their striking limitations. In the district situation it is the near absence of warning and planning instruments and a feeble outreach, while for the communities are weak in social organisation and disaster coping mechanisms. An integrated intervention is, therefore, proposed, for building their disaster management capacities by drawing synergies. The proposed intervention aims at up grading the disaster management capacity in one disaster vulnerable district, part of which deals with energising the response mechanisms meant to protect vulnerable communities. On the other hand a parallel input would go in creating community hazard coping mechanisms. A synergy would be drawn by connecting the community with the strengthened local government institutions. School intervention is conceived to be implemented as part of the community intervention. 50 hazard vulnerable communities and schools will be selected for the intervention from within the same district. The inspiration for the proposed intervention comes from Action Points 4 & 5 of HFA and from Action Points 4.5 and 4.8 of Priorities for Risk Reduction and Response outlined in NDMA framework for action. A Proposal will be submitted following the approval of the concept. Summary of Recommendations Lying within competence of the Federal Government:¾ Promote legislation to facilitate development of fire fighting and emergency response services, guided by uniform rules of business. ¾ Support Pakistan Meteorological Department’s initiatives to up grade its multi hazard early warning capacity, especially for sea borne hazards. ¾ Support drought impact mitigation initiatives as they constitute the best response to the hazard. ¾ Support creation of flash floods early warning and response mechanisms in NWFP, Baluchistan and Northern Areas. ¾ Promote creation of health disaster management capacity for fighting dengue fever and other viral epidemics. ¾ Support up gradation of Civil Defence’s training capacity compatible with international standards. ¾ Support creation of two SAR units under the aegis of Civil Defence Directorate. ¾ Support up gradation of Pakistan Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Committee ( SUPARCO) applications for the benefit of disaster response and management in general. Its disaster early warning potential should be mainstreamed in the operational response mechanisms.
VIII Provincial Government ¾ Promote horizontal connectivity of line ministries and key responder agencies for integrated disaster management. ¾ Combine disaster and emergency response management under the Office of Director Provincial Disaster Management Authority (present Relief Commissioner) ¾ Promote integration of emergency response forces by emphasising functional clarity, making them responsive to a lead agency, and by drawing on positive attributes of the existing services. ¾ Introduce quality information management systems for prompt transmission of disaster or hazard early warning. ¾ Create a hazard/disaster situation monitoring capacity for promoting proactive management. ¾ Promote capacity for crisis epidemic management with particular attention to operationalisation of Disease Early Warning System and information management. District Government ¾ Strengthen vertical disaster response reach to vulnerable communities. ¾ Promote proactive disaster contingency planning. ¾ Promote integration of emergency services. Recommended OCHA’s Contributions. In the stated priority. District based Integrated Disaster Management intervention ¾ Support creation of institutionalised disaster management capacity in a disaster vulnerable district. ¾ By creating functional linkages with the district intervention, institutionalise disaster coping mechanisms in 50 disaster vulnerable communities and schools. Civil Defence and Fire Fighting Services ¾ Support capacity building of National institute for Fire Technology through material assistance. ¾ Support creation of fire vehicle tracking operational rooms for six fire services of Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar & Quetta. Common to all Disaster and Emergency Response Units. Facilitate access to function specific capacity building trainings through OCHA/ISDR supported/affiliated training institutions.
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Assessment of Disaster Response Capacity in Pakistan
Pakistan has generally followed a reactive approach to disaster management which is apparent from October 2005 earthquake experience. The 1958 National Calamities Act focuses on relief and compensation. Key disaster management agencies like Emergency Relief Cell working under the Federal Cabinet Division, proved woefully inadequate when confronted with a major disaster. It is only for the flood hazards that frequent the central and southern plains that the country has a comprehensive disaster management system in place This then prompted creation of the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA). The process is well underway with its concept being discussed by various stakeholders and the NDMA Ordinance about to assume legal status. It envisages creation of policy making committees and planning and implementing authorities at the national, provincial and district levels. In terms of action emphasis NDMA will work in nine priority areas, consistent with the thrust lines enshrined in Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). These span hazard and vulnerability mapping, promoting multi- hazard early warning systems, strengthening institutional arrangements for risk reduction and response, emphasis on local risk reduction, on awareness and capacity building and strengthening emergency response mechanism. In articulating the action points the Framework endorses multi-stakeholder, multi-sectoral and multi-disciplinary approaches in formulating risk reduction strategies, aiming at reducing vulnerability of disadvantaged social groups and strengthening communities’ resilience in disaster management. Much work lies ahead in institutionalising disaster management in Pakistan, but a promising start has been made with UNDP, ISDR, and hopefully OCHA support. Over the last two months OCHA has reviewed disaster responder agencies in Pakistan. On one hand the review makes a macro assessment of various disaster response mechanisms in Pakistan but then goes in critical details in assessing the governance tiers and emergency response agencies capacity with regards to disaster management. The underlying idea being to facilitate shift from one paradigm that focuses on response to unmitigated disasters to another that creates a framework to identify hazards, generate awareness, reduce risks, forewarns on their occurrence and then responds. The assessment also evaluates some disaster vulnerable communities to identify possible introduction of disaster coping mechanisms and capacities to reduce their vulnerabilities as the above defined paradigm applies equally, in a micro-cosmic way, to their environment. Building a culture of understanding disaster risks and being aware of reducing them needs to be instilled in the younger generation, more than any one else, if Pakistan is to handle them any better tomorrow. With this in mind an assessment of vulnerabilities in schools has also been made in varying hazard environments, again to introduce vital but missing hazard mitigating capacities. Communities and schools are sub-organs of the larger society and governance structures. They function within the reach of the local government, though governments are not known for being sensitive to communities’ vulnerabilities. However, LGO 2001 has created community friendly governance structures, which have yet to fully embed themselves, but they represent a potent grass root governance capacity. Therefore, as part of a cohesive framework, concurrent to the communities focus, district government’s disaster response capacity must be enhanced, through a community inclusive process.
2 The evaluation adopts an all inclusive approach in identifying the strengths and weaknesses of important disaster management (DM) and emergency response entities. It also looks at the very important aspects of early warning and community inclusiveness in response parameters, emphasised in HFA. It also identifies priority areas where OCHA can possibly contribute in enhancing the response capacity of the proposed responder agencies and units, communities and schools. Deliverables (1) Assessments of governance and responder agencies with regards to disaster preparedness and response. (2) Recommended measures to improve upon their functional performance. (3) Recommendation for a cohesive intervention aimed at improving the disaster response capacity of a district government, and making vulnerable communities and schools more disaster resilient. (4) OCHA’s contributions to serials 2 and 3. Contents The key areas that are addressed in the evaluation, therefore, are:x x x x x x x
Disaster hazard profile of Pakistan and a reality check assessment of the response capacity to the floods, drought and dengue virus epidemic along with a summary of disasters early warning status. Evaluation of the governance tiers: federal, provincial, district and sub-district levels and federal institutions for articulating disaster response. Salient aspects of newly created National Disaster Management Services are also included. The two key responder agencies: Civil Defence and Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) Emergency services: fire fighting agencies, police emergency response, Emergency 1122 service, Eidhi Ambulance service, National Volunteer Movement and port oil spill disaster management capacity. Key Early Warning agencies: Pakistan Meteorological Department (PMD) and SUPARCO. Communities and schools based hazard/disaster preparedness and response assessments and a suggested integrating intervention focusing on them and the district government. Summary of recommendations
All agencies and organisations have been evaluated for their organisational strengths and weaknesses, for their legislative support, clarity of mandate, for functional coherence and human resource capacity, for what they have, or failed to achieve in consistence with their mandate. Evaluation criterion is reflected in Annexure F. Method To arrive at a better understanding disaster specific systemic evaluations and individual responder agency assessments are made. Where possible, practices in vogue are compared with better ones and community perspective is retained in assessing delivery potential of the targeted entity. The evaluations involved semi-structured interviews with key persons of targeted responder units and personal inspections of their facilities. Interaction with members of the targeted organisation gave an insight into the quality of human resource. To the extent possible multi stake holder input was solicited on the targeted agencies and within the agency views of more than one individual were sought for a more comprehensive understanding of their working. Community and school evaluation were carried out through a facilitation agency for functional ease and for better understanding of their contextual environment. Focused group discussions with community or school members and
3 personal inspections gave a valuable insight into their working. Secondary sources were consulted for pre-evaluation background understanding. Post evaluation queries were clarified through discussions with relevant stakeholders. Views of local influential were solicited where possible.
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Chapter 1 - Disaster Hazards and Response Preparedness Pakistan is known to be vulnerable to a wide array of natural and man instigated disasters, but October 2005 earthquake is the worst natural disaster that the nation has experienced in the recent history. Earthquakes normally occur along the Himalayas, Karakorums and partly Hindu Kush ranges in the north, Koh-e-Sulaiman range in the west with Chaman fault line along Quetta, and Mekran fault line along the sea coast. Their occurrence is normally associated with the dynamics associated with the Indian plate exerting continuous pressure on the Eurasian land mass. In 1935 an earthquake of above 6.5 on Richter Scale intensity rocked Quetta leaving 35,000 dead. Post October 2005 earthquake studies confirm country’s continued vulnerability to the hazard in these regions. Past history also shows vulnerability to tsunami and other sea based hazards along its long coastline. Infact in 1935 an earthquake of 8.5 on Richter Scale triggered a tsunami along the Baluchistan coastline, killing nearly 4000 along the fishing town of Pasni. Karachi and Gwador were also threatened. The Indian peninsula, luckily shielded Pakistan’s coastline from the disastrous impact of 2004 tsunami. Talking of sea borne hazards, the 960 kms costal belt, particularly along Sindh, is occasionally battered by cyclones. In 1999 a cyclone ravaged large tracts in coastal districts of Thatta and Badin causing widespread loss to life and property. These coastal areas are also inundated by torrential rains, as in 2003 with a similar impact. The alluvial plains of the Indus river system have been traditionally vulnerable to recurring floods. The last floods causing considerable damage to life and property occurred in 1992. However, this is one hazard against which an effective protection network of dykes and flood water regulatory infrastructure has been built over the years. Contingency plans and early warning mechanisms have been developed and are refined every year. However, these mechanisms have not been seriously tested over the recent past. Concomitant with the riverine floods during the summer monsoons, flash floods and land slide hazards occur frequently in the mountainous north along watersheds. Flash floods also occur in upper plains adjacent to river catchment areas. Rising incidence of loss of life and property indicates relative un-preparedness to such hazards. Fewer occurrences of floods seem to be linked, owing to changing regional weather patterns, with prolonged incidence of droughts in the poverty ridden arid regions of the country. The drought phenomenon was most pronounced during 2000-2003 period when it spread across 68 districts in the four provinces. That was the period when an institutional capacity to deal with hazard was created in the country. However, the drought hazard has taken a massive toll in environment and economic loss dimensions1. One of the negative fallouts of the globalisation phenomenon means vulnerability to a vast array of viral diseases, be it bird avian flu or the dengue virus. We are presently witnessing a widespread occurrence of the latter in the country and efforts to combat the disease are included in this evaluation. Incidence of dengue fever has affected about 4100, mostly in Karachi but also in other parts of the country including some cities of Punjab. About 46 have died so far. While an effective media campaign has generated awareness against the disease but vector eradication efforts have been inconclusive. It poses a severe public safety hazard.
1
Pakistan Metrological Department and Norstar Norway, Seismic hazard analysis for the Cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, pp16-18, 2006.
5 Gaining much prominence are hazards associated with the rising incidence of fire, traffic and industrial accidents. These are those hazards which cause the maximum harm and against which we have shown little corrective resolve be it in terms of societal awareness, legislative support or quality functional practices. Emergency services require much reorganisation and capacity building. Pakistan is also a nuclear capable country though it claims enforcement of satisfactory nuclear safety standards. It is our basic fault lines or dynamic pressure exerted by socio-economic poverty, rising population stress on finite resources, poor state of environmental health, unplanned development multiplying hazard impact and a poor awareness of hazard prevention that enhance our vulnerabilities. The chart produced below profiles losses to natural hazards2. TOP 10 NATURAL DISASTERS IN PAKISTAN3 In terms of loss of human lives
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Disaster
Date
Died
Earthquake Earthquake (tsunami) Earthquake Earthquake Earthquake Total Flood Flood Flood Flood Flood Flood Flood Flood Flood Flood Flood Total Drought Windstorm Windstorm Grand Total
31 May 1935 27 Nov 1945
35,000 4,000
28 Dec 1974 31 Jan 1991 8 Oct 2005
4,700
1950 Aug 1976 Jul 1978 Jul 1992 1994 Aug 1996 Jun 1997 Mar 1998 Feb 2005 Jul 2001 Jul 2003
73,338 117,038 2,900 1334
Affected
Damage $ (ooo)
3,255 2,869, 142 5,556,000 2,246,000 12,324,024
5,000,000 10,000 505,000 1,000,000 92,000
1,300,000 848 1000 7,000,450 246,000 1,266,223 6082
2000-2002 15 Dec 1965 14 Nov 1993
2,200,000 10,000 609 133,728
National Disaster Management Authority, Draft National Disaster Management Framework, pp 14-17. 2006.
: EM – DAT Emergency database. http//www.em.net/disasters/pr
247,000 4100
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Preparedness for Flood Hazard4 Disaster Management Cycle Hazard Mitigation
Preparedness
Response
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What is Supposed to be Done
The Present Status
x Flood protection dykes prepared along vulnerable points along major rivers x Flood water regulatory network through a system of dams, barrages and canal water regulators in place. x Infrastructure inspected and repaired where required. x Protective infrastructure against flash floods lacking x Protective arrangements institutionalised x Awareness to the hazard among key stakeholders All arrangements put in place for x Post flood season conference held where a combating the hazard before review of arrangement s for the past flood commencement of the flood season season is carried out and policy direction and macro-coordination for the coming season carried out. All stakeholders attend. x Another stakeholder’s conference held in April, before commencement of flood season to review arrangements. Seasonal weather forecasts accessed. x This process is held at the national and provincial level (Sindh and Punjab). x It is repeated if required as the flood season approaches x Protective infrastructure inspected. x Weather updates and flood forecasts compiled by FFD and disseminated x Owing to non-occurrence of floods over the years, laxity observed in preparedness. x However, no hazard assessment and coordination mechanisms in place for flash floods in NWFP, Baluchistan and Northern Areas x Timely Early Warning communicated x Radar coverage over the river catchment to all stakeholders including areas, flood gauging observatories along river vulnerable communities. rim areas and other EW assets allow timely early warning to all stakeholders. x Placements of relief stores in time at vulnerable locations x Early warning is communicated to the grass root level. x Timely dislocation of vulnerable x Communities have also devised their own EW populations. mechanisms. x If required breaches affected in x Arrangement are in place for timely relocation protective infrastructure without political bias. of vulnerable populations.
Flood protection infrastructure prepared
Information ascertained in meetings with DG FFC, provincial relief commissioners NWFP, Punjab and Sindh. Also consulted Shaukat Ali Awan, Pakistan, Flood Management, River Chenab from Marala to Khanki, www.apfm.info/pdf/case_studies/pakitan_chenab PDF search
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Recovery and Rehabilitation
Flood Management Agencies
x Critical relief stores not always placed in vulnerable locations x Bias shown in breaching protective infrastructure to save major towns at the cost of rural areas. x EW arrangements lacking against the flash flood hazard, and vulnerable communities generally ill prepared. x Equitable flood damage compensatio x District Revenue staff does damage assessment. Sends it to the province for mechanism in place approval. Time consuming and local biases x Filling gaps in the flood protection influenced process. infrastructure or undertaking repair x Compensation criterion decided by the work province to address loss of life, livestock and houses. Generally the amount is inadequate. x Agri tax absolved if the area is declared calamity hit. x Time consuming, somewhat inequitable but an institutionalised process Federal Flood Commission (FFC), WAPDA, Pakistan Meteorological Department, Pakistan Army, Provincial Irrigation Departments, Provincial Relief Commissioners
Conclusions ¾ Flash Floods preparedness to include building EW capacity, and planning and implementation mechanisms. ¾ There should be no let-up in emphasis on river plains flood preparedness. ¾ Timely placement of relief stores. ¾ Political will to curb biases in managing flood hazard situations. ¾ Compensation of victims should be timely and equitable. Flood Management Chart
8 Combating the Drought Hazard5 Disaster Management Cycle Disaster Impact Mitigation
Preparedness
What is Supposed to be Done Long term measures aimed at overall socio-economic uplift of the targeted region by investments in communications, health infrastructure and livelihood support
Drought impact coping measures like rain water harvesting, soil conservation and cash support. Early Warning mechanisms should be effective for timely provision of relief.
Drought Response
Contributions at the grass roots
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While response should be immediate but in case of drought it is normally delayed as drought impact settles with time and does not facilitate early decision making.
The Present Status x As a consequence of 2000-2003 drought Rs 10.4 billion Drought Emergency Relief Assistance (DERA) Programme was launched with WB, ADB and GOP funding. It was completed by 2004/5 and targeted 68 drought affected districts in Pakistan. x Above 70% funding went in building communication infrastructure, 18% in making water supply schemes and remaining in water conservation, poverty alleviation and soil conservation. x The programme had a 20% impact in reducing drought impact. x Another Rs 35 billion programme (DERA 2 ) is planned but not cleared for implementation. x Contributions are being made by NGOs in water harvesting and poverty alleviation. TRDP in Tharpakar district of Sindh x Much more needs to be done in this area. x Drought Monitoring and Early Warning mechanism is being put in place comprising:x Drought EW Centre being established in Karachi to cover Sindh and Baluchistan. x Comparison with rainfall weighted average (RWA) of each province and affected district. x Rain gauges established widely in all drought vulnerable districts for data accumulation & comparison with RWA. x Other indicators are population dislocations, depletion of storage water, occurrence of human or livelihood mortality etc. x Needs to be further refined in the light of DERA 1 impact analysis that is being evaluated. x In Sindh, Federal government gave a drought relief grant of Rs 1 billion which was used in advancing cash to buy food and for livelihood support. and emergency aid. x However, relief was not timely and there are complaints of inequitable distribution x District level mechanism has suffered quality loss, Baluchistan in particular. Programme being monitored by DERA units, both federal and provincial. x Positive contributions by NGOs but on a small scale.
Information ascertained through meetings with DG Federal DERA Cell and with Director Provincial DERA Cell Sindh and through THARDEEP (NGO) sponsored visit of district Tharparkar, Sindh. They also provided me with secondary material for consultation. . Drought Management, www.gov.pk/divisons/envrionment_divisions/media/chapter 6_6_napchp.pdf
9 Conclusions ¾ Long term mitigation emphasis should continue to so as to be prepared for the next drought cycle ¾ There should be more emphasis on drought impact preparedness by provincial and local governments. ¾ There is a need for capacity building of district government on drought management ¾ Drought EW mechanisms should be refined through impact assessment study of DERA 1. Drought Management Matrix Disaster Cycle
Inputs
By Whom
Impact Mitigation
Long term socio-economic uplift
x Federal Government (DERA 1) x Provincial governments
Preparedness
x Developing Early Warning Mechanisms x Building local capacities for drought hazard management
Response and recovery
x Relief aid and support x Population relocation support
Cross cutting actions
Awareness and advocacy
x x x x x x x
PMD DERA 1 management Provincial government s NGOs Provincial governments District governments NGOs NGOs
Please refer to Annexure D for accessing evaluation matrix of drought, dengue virus and flood management
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Dengue Virus Management67
DM Cycle
What is Supposed to be Done
Disease Impact Mitigation & preparedness
x Vector eradication from earlier epidemic(s) to pre-empt recurrence. x Early disease detection through DEWs/ alternative mechanism. x Establishment of national/ provincial emergency response health units x Networking of all health facilities for implementation of common disease control strategies. x Resource allocation for emergency response mobilisation x Public awareness and advocacy.
ResponseEpidemic Control
x Prompt Virus incidence reporting x Stakeholders inclusive planning x Coordinated implementation involving governmental and non governmental actors x Launching of effective public awareness campaign x Capacity building of doctors and health operators. x Focused vector eradication x Subsidised provision of virus detection kits. x Technical support from UN agencies
The Present Status x Dengue virus has been prevalent in Sindh since 1994 and 1995 but has not been fully eradicated. The disease is also present in the region and tends to recur. Failed in vector eradication from earlier epidemics. x In Sindh, Karachi is the epicentre and it travelled to Punjab during the population mass migration that occurred before Eid-ul-Azha 2006, mainly in urban areas of northern Punjab. x In Sindh, more than 4000 affected and around 100 in Punjab. x DEWS non-functional in both the provinces. Sindh using EPI network for dengue incidence reporting. x Crisis response units established when the epidemic conflagrated. x All health facilities not networked to facilitate epidemic crisis management. x Legislative loopholes with regards to registration of private health operators. x Delayed virus incidence reporting. x Difficulties in coordinating implementation of vector eradication strategies across a mega-city like Karachi. x Vector eradication patchy all over. x Media campaign launched successfully and made the anti dengue campaign transparent and helped in panic eradication. x Technical support solicited from WHO, Unicef.
Issues ¾ Non-functioning DEWS. ¾ Poor outcomes of vector eradication efforts. ¾ There is a need for capacity building of health operators and epidemic control managers ¾ There is also a need to build capacity for crisis epidemic management at all levels 6
Information ascertained through meetings with Director Health Punjab and DG Health Sindh and their key staff members dealing with dengue fever epidemic. 7 Dr Sania Nishtar, Why We Need to think Beyond Dengue , News, November 5, 2005 ed.
11 ¾ Registration of private health operators through legislation should be undertaken to facilitate common strategy implementation. ¾ Post virus study should be conducted for realistic policy making for the future. ¾ Limited epidemic control capacity exists for rural areas
Federal Ministry of Health x Policy making - capacity building x Resource mobilization x Media advocacy x External support Provincial Health Ministries x Operational management x Capacity building x Information management x Coordinated implementation x Stake holders management x Impact monitoring x Media management Please refer to Annexure D for accessing evaluation matrix of drought, dengue virus and flood management
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Disaster Specific Early Warning and Vulnerability Status8 Besides risk knowledge, Bonn Protocol on Early Warning emphasises upon the presence of a viable disaster early warning capability, that the system should have the means to communicate early warning to those who must be warned, that the recipients should ACT in time. EW capacities that exist in terms of time in Pakistan with regards to the major natural disasters in the light of what the Bonn Protocol stresses upon are summarised. Floods There is a well developed system in place based on multiple inputs of PMD, WAPDA and Indus Water Commission for floods early warning. FFD (PMD) serves as the nerve centre for collecting, collating, interpreting and timely dissemination of EW. All the stakeholders receive timely information and it is disseminated to their representatives in the vulnerable districts through governance line channels The information is passed down to vulnerable communities through the district and tehsil channels. Vulnerable communities were at times not forewarned when breach(es) were affected in the protective dykes in earlier floods as a measure of larger damage control. Communities keep abreast of flood hazard progression through extensive media coverage and they have developed their own EW mechanisms over the years. Flash Floods There is no system in place to warn vulnerable communities or urban areas from the flash flood hazard. Recent examples have shown a very poor awareness to the threat and delayed relief response on part of government and relief agencies Vulnerability Status. Low to high against flash floods Excessive Rains and Sea Based Hazards. These hazards normally occur along the Sindh and Baluchistan coast. Excessive Rains PMD systems provide adequate early warning against excessive rains in the coastal regions or lower Sindh, Karachi included. Information not communicated to the vulnerable urban and rural communities in time allowing evasive actions. Hazard upgraded into disaster due to (1) poor government response mechanisms and over reliance on Army to deal with such situations, (2) urban development blocking flood water escapes (3) disaster insensitive development like
8
Government of Pakistan Cabinet Division, Strengthening National Capacities for Multi Hazard Early Warning and Response System,pp. 14,15, Qamar-uz-Zaman Chaudhary, May 2006.
13 LBOD which either experiences extensive breaching as it blocks natural drainage (4) relative political intensity to rural regions hazards Vulnerability Status. Medium to High Cyclones Despite some gaps in the PMD’s indigenous capacity viz cyclone hazard, its regional networking allows minimum 3-4 days of cyclone early warning with fairly accurate prediction of likely impact area. The response to this hazard has traditionally been poor and outcomes disastrous for the reasons that apply to excessive rain hazard. Vulnerability Status. High to very high Tsunami Despite the present limited indigenous EW capacity, regional networking allows up to 2 hour EW and a fairly accurate prediction of likely impact area. However, capacity up gradation is occurring under the Clinton Initiative which will allow 4-6 hours EW. Vulnerability Status. Extremely high with the present level of preparedness, Earthquake No EW capacity, at present or in the foreseeable future. However, October 05 EQ has raised awareness and vulnerable regions have been identified through follow-up studies. Vulnerability Status. Extremely high given non-adherence to EQ resistant building codes. At many places such codes do not exist amid challenging terrain environment in most EQ vulnerable regions. Drought. Systems in place, and being further up graded to warn against onset of drought9. However, vulnerability arises due to relative socio-economic poverty of drought vulnerable regions. Long term drought mitigation programmes like DERA 1 or planned DERA II can reduce latent vulnerabilities.
9
Information on this Section gleaned through number and meetings with PMD officials: Dr Qamar-uz-Zaman Chaudhary, DG PMD, Mr Naeem, Director PMD, Sindh and Mr Sarfraz, Director Met Services, Karachi.
14
Chapter II – Governance and Disaster Management Government in its national, provincial, district and sub-district resolutions remains the most significant actor in disaster management and response. Managing natural disasters, emergency hazard management and law and order situations constantly occupies governance at all levels. It has dedicated institutions for this purpose though there is a dire need for capacity upgrading. The scale of disasters as indicated by the October 2005 EQ, their variety spanning natural and man instigated disasters, and frequency of occurrence, has created an incompatibility between the existing institutions and the challenges that loom. Steps being taken for creation of NDMA and the realisation of this inadequacy have prompted most provincial governments to take meaningful DM capacity building measures, though much more needs to be done. The significance of legislative framework in this context remains very significant. The Legal Framework for Disaster Management National Calamities (Prevention and Relief Act) 195810. It appoints Provincial Relief Commissioner (also member of provincial Board of Revenue) who provides for maintenance and restoration of law and order in areas affected by calamities and for extending relief to the affected population. It essentially allows for:x Resource mobilisation for handling calamites: hiring of vehicles, earthmoving machinery, requisition of premises or maintenance of relief camps etc. x Survey of damages and losses occurred as a consequence of a calamity and compensate those affected by the calamities. x Ensure preparedness for emergencies by setting up a system of alarm and undertake situation specific preventive measures. Conclusion. It has a relief and compensation orientation and does not look at disaster management beyond that. The Act essentially caters for recurring damages occurring from the flood hazard. It is implemented by the revenue staff, from province to district and down to tehsils (sub-district). Emergency Services Ordinance 2002. It allows creation of emergency services to deal with threats to the public from modern forms of warfare grouped under the term ‘terrorism’. A national council has been set up to deal with and to guide and monitor the performance of these services. Roles of provincial and district governments have been defined in implementing the Ordinance. Local Government Ordinance 200111. It provides governance guidelines for the devolved district government, headed by the Zilla (district) Nazim. It is reviewed from DM context, as follows:District Governance x District Nazim is entrusted with organising relief activities and with land use zoning, and in ensuring implementation of bye laws dealing with public and private housing and construction standards. x DCO has coordination functions to perform, which includes those for disaster management. x Village/neighbourhood council deals with water supply, sanitation, watch and ward, tree plantation, care of handicapped and destitute. 10 11
Disaster Management policies and Systems in Pakistan, for WDCR 2005, pp. 26,27. Jan 2005 Sifted from Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001, compiled by NRB, 2005.
15 x x
DPO is subordinated to the Nazim but he functions fairly independent of the district government. Governance at all levels is entrusted with land zoning, storm water drainage, sanitation and solid waste disposal
Governance at Tehsil (sub-district) x Tehsil Municipal Authority (TMA) has been made an independent entity. x Tehsil must work in 3 areas: water supply, sanitation and drainage and provision of fire services, independent of the District and receives budget direct from the province. x Tehsil Nazim has no clear disaster response and management functions. x Tehsil Revenue Department responds to disasters under the district framework. x DSP Police works independently under DPO. x Tehsil governance structure is ill suited for DM Conclusion. One, LGO 2001 does not cover DM comprehensively though it alludes to its various components. Secondly, the devolved governance structure that emerges is poorly suited for cohesive governance and quick decision making, both essential requisites for handling emergency situations. Thirdly, the Tehsil government is compartmentalised for routine functioning: Municipal functions under the Nazim, revenue and emergency response under Deputy District Revenue Officer (DDRO) and police functions under ASP. It is, by disposition, ill suited to handle emergency situations requiring a cohesive response. Draft National Disaster Management System Ordinance12. The Ordinance is about to assume legal status and its salient features are: National Disaster Management Commission. Composition. Prime Minister, Leader of Opposition, key line ministers, Chief Minsters of provinces and Chief Executive of Northern Areas, Chairman Joint Chief of Services Staff and one representative of civil society Functions. Lays down policies on DM, approves national and line ministries plans, issues guidelines for all levels of governance, provides funds and constitutes advisory committees as and when required. National Disaster Management Authority. Headed by a Director General, its key functions are:x It is the implementing, coordinating and monitoring body for DM x Prepares national plan for approval by NDMC x Coordinates implementation of national DM policies x Lays down guidelines for different ministries for preparation of their DM plans. x Coordinates disaster response x Promote general education and awareness on DM issues.
12
Draft Ordinance for National Disaster Management System, prepared by National Disaster Management Authority, 2006.
16
Provincial Disaster Management Authorities The Federal structure will be replicated in provinces with Provincial Disaster Management Committees, headed by their respective Chief Ministers responsible for policy making and Provincial Disaster Management Authorities (PDMA) headed by the Provincial Relief Commissioner, subsuming current relief and compensation functions. PDMA functions. It coordinates and monitors implementation of the national policy, national plan and provincial plan, prepare provincial DM plan, lay down guidelines for making of provincial line departments and district DM plan and be responsible for managing disasters in the province. Key Features of National and Provincial DM Plans. They include measures to be taken for prevention and mitigation of disasters, for integrating mitigation measures in development plans, upgrading preparedness to disasters and defining roles and responsibilities of line ministries. District Disaster Management Authority It will be headed by the Nazim and comprise DCO, DPO and EDO (Health). x It is entrusted with making district DM Plan. x Coordinates monitoring of national and provincial DM polices as they relate to the district. x Identification and mitigation of disaster risks. x Lays down guideline for making DM plans by respective departments and monitor their implementation. x Reviews and upgrades local early warning systems. Guidance is included for disaster mitigation functions and for capacity building of district staff. National institute of Disaster Management. It will be created for planning and promoting training and research and developing core competencies in DM, for documentation and development of national data base on relating to DM policies, prevention mechanisms and mitigation measures. It will also have a strong advocacy function. Miscellaneous Aspects. The Ordinance enables:x The Federal Government to call for armed forces for DM. x For establishing requisite mechanisms for interaction with UN agencies , INGOs and donors in disaster relief and response x For taking measures for resource mobilisation for natural disasters. x To hire expertise where required to create deficient competencies. x It also provides for creation of a National Disaster Response Force whose mandate is quite unclear. Conclusion. The DM Ordinance is likely to have a very positive impact in institutionalising DM in the Federal and provincial governments as there is no entity at the moment which deals with DM comprehensively. However, while the DM Ordinance provides for a cohesive district DM framework, but can it instil coherence in the devolved and somewhat non-integrative governance culture of the district government that has been introduced by the LGO 2001? This is vital as lower tiers of governance must be made capable of bringing vulnerable communities into their protective fold.
17 Federal, Provincial, District and Sub-District governments and Disaster Management13 The evaluation focuses on the role of Emergency Relief Cell in the federal government and disaster management arrangements in three provinces: NWFP, Punjab and Sindh. The district evaluations gauge quality of disaster response in two disaster prone districts, Mansehra viz October 2005 EQ and Badin, Sindh which periodically experiences sea borne hazards, though its response to the torrential rains in July 2003 is reviewed. One evaluation relates to the sub-district level in Tehsil Ferozwala, District Sheihkupura in Punjab, pertaining to the flood hazard setting. Governance evaluations were thus conducted in multi-disaster scenarios, across a good part of the country, spanning federal to sub-district resolutions. Before discussing specifics, let us acquaint ourselves with the functional responsibilities across governance tiers with regards to disaster and emergency response. Governance DM Evaluation Matrix covering the above mentioned individual evaluations is reproduced in Annexure A. How are Disasters Managed (pre-NDMA). Within the Federal government, disaster response is dealt by the Cabinet Division through Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) while emergency response by the Ministry of Interior with National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC) as the point agency dealing with terrorism and law and order situations. In the provincial governments, Relief Commissioner manages disaster relief and compensation while the Home Secretary deals with emergency response. In the districts, though, the EDO Revenue and his revenue staff respond to disasters while the District police Officer responds to crisis situations. Pre – NDMA Disaster and Crisis Management Matrix Governance Federal Govt
Long Term Disaster Mitigation Planning Commission
Disaster Relief and Compensation Cabinet Division Emergency Relief Cell
Provincial Govt
P & D Department
Relief Commissioner
Ministry of Interior National Crisis Management Cell Home Secretary
Nazim and DCO
Nazim and DPO
District Govt
13
Emergency Response
Information, conclusions and recommendations discerned through meetings with, and secondary material provided by, DG ERC, provincial Relief Commissioners NWFP, Punjab and Sindh, DCO Mansehra and MirpurKhas (ex-DCO Badin) and DDRO Tehsil Ferozwala, District Sheikhupra.
18
Federal Government Till NDMA becomes a reality, there is no lead agency in the Federal government for coordinating prosecution of disaster response across line ministries, with provinces and external donors and agencies. DM is vertically configured with little lateral coordination. Line ministries administer function specific response right across the governance tiers. However, ERC works as a conduit for channelling federal government’s relief and compensation support to disasters that fall outside the response capacity of a provincial government. The Planning Commission through Federal DERA unit manages the long term drought mitigation programmes. Emergency Relief Cell. While its mandate makes it responsible for disasters monitoring and proactive management, in practice it constitutes federal government disaster support organ for the provinces. It stockpiles a limited amount of relief stores, some earmarked to support overseas disasters on government’s determination. ERC also has an aviation squadron on its inventory for disaster impact assessment and emergency response. It is configured and staffed more for bureaucratic mode of working and certainly not as rapid acting emergency response entity. ERC would have no meaningful role after NDMA comes in force and it should be suitably subsumed in it. Please refer to ERC evaluation matrix14 (Annexure A)
Provincial Disaster Management Arrangements (NWFP, Punjab and Sindh Assessment Matrix appear in Annexure A) Structure. The traditional Relief Commissioner based provincial DM set-ups are now being conformed to the NDMA process, though province specific modes. For example in the draft Provincial DM document of NWFP, Home Secretary heads the provincial disaster management committee while the Relief Commissioner looks after disaster response. In Punjab, Relief Commissioner is entrusted with disaster response and compensation and emergency response, while in Sindh the envisaged DM set up is akin to the one stipulated in the NDMA concept paper. However, while functionally mirroring the federal government, DM follows a vertical path with little horizontal connectivity.
14
Also consulted, Disaster Management Policies and Systems in Pakistan, pp. 9,10. for WCDR 2005, Jan 2005, Islamabad
19 Provinces have also initiated the legislative process for comprehensive DM legislation, closer in substance to the NDMA draft Ordinance as it pertains to the provinces. Evaluation Absence of Multi-disaster Approach. Provinces are seen to focus more on traditional disasters: for NWFP earthquake and flash floods hazard, Punjab on floods both river and hill torrent borne and Sindh on floods, rains and cyclones in the coastal regions. However, matching sensitivity was missing with regards to drought hazard and dengue fever epidemic whose incidence is prominent in Sindh and Punjab. Early Warning. There is much awareness to bridge EW gaps for major hazards faced by the provinces, like flash floods in NWFP and sea borne hazards in Sindh. This aspect is discussed in Chapter V. Quality of Disaster Response in 2006. Judging by how flash floods hazard in Mardan and Mansehra districts in NWFP and the unusually high monsoons rainfall in lower Sindh was handled, the response was poor for a number of reasons. Generally response followed a reactive and not a proactive path. For example in Sindh nothing was done to relocate the vulnerable population despite PMD’s warning on unusually high rains. Manifestation of political bias was discernable as there was much focus on politically sensitive Hyderabad and neglecting worse affected rural distracts. In NWFP, the response occurred rather late despite close proximity of flash floods hit regions to the provincial capital. Integration of Emergency Response Services. None of the reviewed provinces have proceeded meaningfully towards integrating emergency response services in cities and districts. Meagre fire fighting, civil defence and police emergency response capacities that exist are not integrated and there is no one lead agency. Punjab government has created ‘Emergency 1122’ service for this purpose while leaving the existing services in the ‘cold’. For reasons of functional efficiency, service quality and economy, there is a very strong case for integrating emergency response services in an institutionalised manner. This aspect is dealt with in Chapter IV. The District Government’s Evaluation
It is headed by the District Nazim while the DCO coordinates functioning of the district government which comprises the above reflected departments. Police services are headed by the District Police Officer who functions under the Nazim and but he has no formal functional inter face with the DCO. Flaws in the district governance structure in a DM perspective have been discussed earlier. In Punjab and Sindh, Revenue Department with it grass root reach are entrusted with DM in the district.
20
Disaster Management the District –An Evaluation (Annexure A refers for Mansehra and Badin evaluations) Grass Root Reach (for EW and Information Management). DCOs extensively employ Revenue department, police local network (with DPO’s cooperation) and allied departments with grass root reach like Forest Department in Mansehra and Irrigation Department in the Badin’s situation. However, only police department has dedicated communications. Moreover, their capacities need to be enhanced for provision of early warning to vulnerable communities and timely passage of critical information. Key Issues in Disaster Situations and their Response. Mansehra and Badin examples highlight the significance of an integrated district response to disaster situations. In Manehra, as per the DCO following the October 2005 EQ, and with the coming winters (2005), it was important to minimise population dislocations. Therefore, role of Public Services and Water supply Department was critical in keeping lines of communication to vulnerable communities open and to keep their local water sources running. The Badin situation required an emergent response to save a significant marooned population in the coastal region, to feed them and to extricate affected people to safer locations. This called for emergency resource mobilisation for provision of food and arranging transport for affecting population relocation, and for establishing emergency relief camps. Contingency Planning. This probably is the most vital but deficient area where in both districts, no cohesive contingency plans exist for possible disasters that can be encountered. Disaster contingency planning is an ongoing exercise that should address various disaster contingencies. It should include vulnerability assessments and resource mapping and multi-agency response guidelines along with ‘triggers’ defining their activation. Contingency plans should specify responsibilities of all line departments. District governments, however, have a very limited capacity for undertaking comprehensive disaster contingency planning. They certainly require capacity building support. Role of District Nazim. District Nazims have shown a limited capacity for providing leadership in disaster situations for reasons of competence, of not being fully accountable to the governance chain, and for shirking decision making due to political considerations in critical situations. Capacity Building. There is a strong case for building capacities of the district line departments and key stakeholders for DM. Stakeholders Management. Disaster response focuses excessively on banking on government machinery without fully involving other stakeholders like the social sector, religious leaders etc. Community Outreach. It is generally weak for deficiencies stemming from a weak Tehsil government as earlier explained. However, UC Nazims (with a 20,000-30,000 population constituency) have been supportive of DCOs in reaching the grass roots. LGO 2001 has allowed creation of Village Committees which though rarely are functional. To sum up, in practice community reach is weak but LGO 2001 has provided for structures that can be employed gainfully for this purpose. . Media Handling. Handling media amid disaster situations was instructive for both the districts and now media management figures prominently in their plans.
21 Support from Province in Disaster Situations. It materialised but was mostly delayed. Early warning received in the Badin situation of torrential rains allowed an impractical 24 hours response time. Functional integration of UN Agencies and INGOs. The post earthquake ‘cluster model’ is well suited for affecting functional integrating international and UN agencies within their functional spheres. Evaluation of Governance at Tehsil (sub-district) Level (Tehsil Ferzwala Evaluation in Annexure A refers)
Following issues surfaced:x The structure is ill sited for DM which involves cohesive employment and quick decision making. x Poor disaster awareness within the Tehsil government, which assumes it to be a district function x Tehsil government must improve upon their planning capacity to deal with disasters within district framework x Implementation coordination mechanisms involving all stakeholders should be developed and refined yearly Conclusion - Governance and DM Cycle In characterising contributions to the ingredients of the DM cycle, you cannot configure contributions in water tight compartments as there are always overlaps and there will be that gap between conception and practice. However, the below illustration is indicative of a trend as seen through practice which may not occur as a rule. x In the Federal Government the Planning Commission is the long term disaster impact Disaster Mitigation
mitigation planning agency. x The Federal Line Ministries work in disaster mitigation within the overall national framework. Traditionally the emphasis was restricted to the flood hazard, but now drought and even earthquake figures.
Disaster Preparedness
x Federal line ministries x However, provincial line ministries have a greater role to play in province specific disaster preparedness x District governments also have a role to play within the provincial framework
Response
x Federal line ministries are involved to the extent of monitoring response x Provincial line ministries and Relief commissioners are involved in both monitoring and even managing response, depending on the gravity of the disaster and relative vulnerability. x However, district and sub-district governments are the key response players
Recovery & Rehabilitation
x Provincial and district governments play role in recovery by implementing the policies in vogue. x However, Federal government supported by provincial governments are the key rehabilitation players where it comes to handling a major disaster like the October 2005 EQ. Otherwise, provincial governments handle rehabilitation within the policy framework.
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Chapter III – Key Disaster Response Agencies This chapter evaluates Civil Defence services and Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) as they figure prominently as agencies with both national and grass root and in case of Civil Defence services, it is integral to the governance structure. Civil Defence Services of Pakistan15 Like elsewhere, Civil Defence services in Pakistan have their origins in vulnerabilities arising from armed conflicts. Pakistan did inherit a Civil Defence service created by the British administration in World War 2. In the 1950s these services were organised on country wide basis. The 1952 Civil Defence Act made civil defence organisation responsible for all measures involved in defending the general population against hostile attack, less active combat. It was amended in 1993 and the scope of work was enhanced to include remedial measures against natural or manmade disasters in peace time. What did not happen with the changed emphasis was a review and reorganisation of civil defence services as an emergency service provider or as a serious player for responding to major disasters. The structure once created for war time role has been overtaken by events and despite some of its strengths, recent disasters have shown its relative irrelevance. Before talking specifics let us view the civil defence structure in the country to gauge some of its institutional strengths. The field evaluation covered the Federal Directorate of Civil Defence in Islamabad, operations in NWFP which includes provincial and district (Mansehra) evaluation, operations in Punjab and evaluation of Institute of Fire Technology in Islamabad and Civil Defence Academy Lahore. Individual evaluation matrix appear in Annexure B
15
Civil evaluations were made through meetings with the DG in Islamabad and provincial representatives in Peshawar, Mansehra and Lahore. In the process I accessed significant secondary material which I also reviewed.
23
Structure Civil Defence services are constituted in two parts, the Federal Directorate which works under the Ministry of Interior and is headed by a Director General (currently an Air Force two star). It is mandated to work in (1) policy making, (2) responsible for the Civil Defence training institutions, and (3) coordination with civil defence provincial establishments. The Federal Directorate is in Islamabad and the training institutions are located as follows:¾ Civil Defence Academy in Lahore ¾ Institute of Fire Technology in Islamabad ¾ Bomb disposal school in Lahore ¾ 5 regional training centres in the four provinces and in AJK. ¾ A PC -1 for creation of 2 state of the art SAR units costing US $ 7.5 million is under review with the Planning Commission. The field services of Civil Defence extend beyond the four provinces and AJK, and are embedded in major public enterprises like Railways and WADPA. However, the evaluation will focus on civil defence services in the provinces that are mandated to create a volunteer based grass roots capacity in the urban areas in (1) first aid administration, (2) fire fighting, and (3) search and rescue. Salient aspects of the devolved field operations are:¾ Provincial services function under their respective provinces with provincial director as overall in charge. ¾ DCO is in charge of the district civil defence. Under LGO 2001, 1% of the district budget is supposed to be earmarked for the district civil defence entity. ¾ The mainstay of civil defence in the field is the warden post. One post is embedded within 20,000-40,000 population. It has a nucleus training staff of 5-7 and it trains local volunteers in first aid, fire fighting and local SAR. Following strengths emerge from the way civil defence services are organised:¾ First and foremost, it has a country wide grass roots urban presence through the warden post institution. ¾ Secondly, it had a large cadre of volunteers, approximately 160,000 in strength who come from a variety of backgrounds. ¾ The warden posts, despite being poorly equipped, represent a basic community based capacity in administering first aid, SAR and fire fighting. ¾ Civil defence services have been involved in advocacy functions, with a gender focus particularly on basic women rights. ¾ The training infrastructure, despite its inadequacies, builds capacities in disciplines like fire services and bomb disposal which have a limited in-country expertise.
24
Field Evaluations. Please refer to Annexure B. Salient aspects gathered from the field evaluations with regards to Civil Defence field units and training institutions are summarised below:Field Operations16 ¾ There seems to be an operational disconnect in civil defence operations in the province and district. There is no enforcement of common policy emphasis, monitoring, standard setting or capacity building to affect an overall operational coherence. ¾ Paucity of resources is apparent. The funding at all tiers barely meets the mandatory operational expenses, leaving practically nothing for capacity development or CAPEX. ¾ Quality of human resource is poor, well past their prime and following antiquated work practise and training methods. ¾ Worst, the staff suffers from a poor self esteem and very poor peer rating. Hardly any one takes them as a serious emergency response contributors. ¾ There is apparent neglect on part of the local and provincial governments in terms of giving a clear policy direction or building their capacity. District governments are not even giving 1% of their budget to the local civil defence entities. ¾ There is a functional overlap in fire fighting and bomb disposal between Civil Defence and the local fire fighting departments and relevant police agencies.. ¾ Grass root reach of field units do not extend to the rural areas. ¾ Up scaling of operations is curtailed due to limited stake holders connectivity. Training Institutions ¾ Presently housed in poor premises and grossly under resourced. However, two institutions will be relocated shortly to new premises in H-9 Islamabad. ¾ The quality of human resource is generally poor and lacking in inspiration. ¾ They follow antiquated syllabus and owing to resource paucity trainings mostly occur in theory. ¾ However, Civil Services Academy is affiliated to Civil Defence Organisation in Geneva and runs courses for regional students. ¾ Much of the training focus lacks contemporary relevance Conclusions Civil Defence services of Pakistan must be reorganised and without much delay if they are to maintain their relevance amid the efforts that are underway across the country to improve disaster and emergency response. Otherwise they will be overtaken by events and made irrelevant. Example of Punjab Emergency 1122 is a case in point. While the provincial services fall within the purview of their respective provinces and they must be made viable under their stewardship. NWFP government plans to revamp their Civil Defence set-up for emergency response17. The Federal Directorate, however, must focus in three areas. First, bring the training institutes compatible with international standards. This is doable, in phases, and it would have an across the board capacity building benefit for 16
Dr Rizwan Naseer, Report in Emergency Response Services in Pakistan, pp.5-8, UNDP in collaboration with Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan. This was one of the secondary sources consulted. 17 Home and Tribal Affairs Department NWFP, Provincial Disaster Management Strategy, p.22.
25 all emergency service providers. Secondly, play an effective role in bridging the legislative and policy making gaps that undermine the functioning of emergency response services. Absence of a fire policy and legislation with contemporary relevance is a case in point. Thirdly, play a proactive role in capacity building and operational standard setting of Civil Defence services in the country. Another important issue for emphasis is affecting functional mergers with agencies having common interest. For example for better performance of national defence related tasks, an operational merger with Janabaz Force (third line operational entity in war) would be of mutual benefit. So would be a merger with National Volunteer Movement to benefit volunteerism in both organisations. Lastly DG Civil Defence must vigorously pursue creation of two state of the art SAR units. To conclude on a positive note and with reference to Hyogo Framework for Action, Civil Defence in Pakistan can make major contributions in implementing Action Points 3 (build understanding and awareness of disasters) and Action Point 5 (be prepared and ready to act) with selective restructuring and capacity building, government ownership and proactive policy emphasis.
26 Pakistan Red Crescent Society18 Origin of Pakistan Red Crescent Society (PRCS) goes back to its earlier appellation ‘Red Cross Society’ in prepartition India. Its Lahore chapter was created as far back as 1914. In 1948 it was re-christened as the ‘Red Cross Society of West Pakistan’, in 1953 as ‘Pakistan Red Cross Society’, and in 1973 as ‘Red Crescent Society”, through an act of Parliament. PRCS draws much strength from the International Federation of Red Cross (IFRC) and the International Committee for Red Crescent (ICRC) and its associations with numerous countries societies. Presently it is working in all the four provinces and AJK, in 80 districts, and has a core staff of nearly 1,000. It claims adherence of 50,000 volunteers Contributions to October 2005 Earthquake Victims PRCS has contributed widely to natural disasters response in the country and even outside, like the 2004 tsunami. However, with the support of IFRC and ICRC and other national societies, it contributed very significantly in providing relief, shelter, livelihoods, water and sanitation, reconstruction and capacity building activities. Field hospitals in AlShifa Hospital, Rawalpindi and in Muzzafarabd, Bagh, and Mansehra provided base medical services. PRCS donated blood and united separated families. Cumulatively the Red Cross and crescent societies reached 1.5 million beneficiaries and provided emergency service worth Rs 3.5 billion. Mandate. PRCS works primarily in:¾ Disaster preparedness and response ¾ First aid and public health care (first aid, emergency ambulance service and maintaining blood banks). ¾ Dissemination of human rights values. ¾ Humanitarian services in armed conflict.
Structure PRCS is headquartered in Islamabad, which lays down common policy emphasis, remains the point of contact with ICRC and IFRC and other national societies, key in-country stakeholders, and contributes in resource mobilisation and intervention planning. It has a Board of Governors which decides policies and strategic priorities. 18
Pakistan Red Crescent Society, National Headquarters, Islamabad. January 2006. Gives basic information and statistics.
27
The provinces have their own Red Crescent Society chapters, who while following the priorities and policies set by the Directorate General, do their own resource mobilisation and implement interventions. The District Red Crescent societies similarly undertake their own resource mobilisation. In short, PRCS has a fairly devolved and autonomous structure and functioning but adheres to a common policy and strategic priority emphasis. Evaluations (Please refer to Annexure B for evaluations of PRCS national HQ, and provincial Directorates in Punjab and Sindh) Disaster Management In terms of capacity and institutional strength PRCS has a core expertise in disaster response and the earthquake experience has helped in refining it. To strengthen the response potential, relief stores warehouse capacity is being created for 25,000 families: for 10,000 in Islamabad, 2000 each in the four provinces, 1000 each in AJK and Northern Areas and 200 in 20 disaster vulnerable districts. Disaster resilience capacities in vulnerable communities are being strengthened. The methodology followed involves selecting a Union Council (with 8-10 villages) and train a core of 20-25 dedicated volunteers and provide them with disaster management kits. The volunteers then impart further trainings in their villages and create a network of volunteers. Health activities like first aid and emergency blood supply are built in to DM interventions. Refresher trainings are conducted periodically. A volunteer DM capacity ‘in being’ is thus embedded in the targeted villages. PRSC is gradually enhancing its reach in 30 rural districts in the country. Provincial chapters have plans for adding 23 disaster vulnerable districts every year. In Sindh local government’s ownership of such initiatives is sought. Health As a follow-up of the EQ experience PRCS plans launching a 50 bed hospital and two mobile basic health units for emergency response. However, first aid training constitutes an essential part of its field interventions. It has developed a base form which it can expand preventive health interventions and advocacy. PRCS also maintains blood banks in all its provincial branches. Moreover, PRCS has an institutionalised access to schools and colleges for blood donations, which also furnishes a potent advocacy platform. Volunteerism All urban and rural interventions are modelled towards building a national potential in volunteerism. For every intervention volunteers are identified and trained and their skills are honed through refresher trainings. Volunteers constitute PRCS’ grass roots reach. In Karachi, Sindh Red Crescent Society has 150 trained emergency medical services volunteers. Therefore, volunteer capacity is also created consistent with local needs. Volunteer camps and refresher trainings are periodically organised. Quality of Human Resource is generally of a modest level though investments are made in building capacity in disaster management and for health interventions through in-country and international networking, particularly with affiliate organisations.
28 The earthquake experience manifested PRCS capacity to upscale its operations through global networking with affiliate organisations. However, PRCS needs to connect with the government more widely both to enhance and institutionalise its grass root reach. Summary of Strengths and Opportunities ¾ PRCS has a core expertise in disaster relief which is now being extended into creating DM capacities in vulnerable communities. ¾ In health services, PRCS is known for providing emergency healthcare. ¾ It can launch wider preventive health interventions as part of its field interventions in rural areas. ¾ It has institutionalised access to schools and colleges which provides a potent advocacy platform . ¾ It draws much strength from the international patron organisation like ICRC and IFRC in terms of up scaling of operations, capacity building, and standard setting. ¾ PRCS volunteer base and its grass root connectivity is an asset which though requires more investment. Weaknesses ¾ While there is much emphasis on drawing advantage form its global connectivity, PRCS has failed to develop institutionalised cooperation with the government at multiple levels for being recognised as a major in-country disaster and even local emergency response entity. Such an approach would allow larger access to government resources. ¾ Its human resource base seems motivated but lacks experience. Perhaps PRCS should consider offering better service incentives to limit rapid staff turnover. ¾ It must widen its rural areas presence Conclusions19 PRCS is an emergency and disaster response organisation with a large footprint across the country. Its institutional strength comes from years of experience, from its connectivity with the Red Cross movement and interaction with other national societies. The earthquake experience manifested the virtue of employing their cumulative potential to significant outcomes. There is much that PRCS gains in operational standard setting and in benefiting from this vast reservoir of disaster related experiences. Disaster management figures prominently in PRCS’ post earthquake operations. However, it needs to work more closely with various governance tiers for the sustainability of its grass root contributions. With the creation of NDMA and its sub structures, PRCS should also endeavour to contribute stridently in enhancing district and sub-district government’s DM capacities. It should also expand its advocacy focus in preventive health. However, PRCS in the final reckoning should be known as the premiere disaster response agency in the country for which it should aim at significantly enhancing its capacity. It is certainly deserving of much support from government for this purpose.
19
Conclusions drawn from meetings with PRCS Director in the National Headquarters and in provinces of Punjab and Sindh.
29
Contributions of Civil Defence and PRCS in DM Cycle Mitigation Preparedness
Response and early Recovery
x Policy making (Civil Defence) x Advocacy (Civil Defence and PRCS) x x x x x
Emergency response (not institutionalised) DM capacity building at the grass roots Capacity building in many DM disciplines through training institutions (Civil Defence) PRCS more suited for response and early recovery as seen in its EQ region contributions. Civil Defence warden post institutions can assist in generating local community based response.
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Chapter IV - Emergency Response Services of Pakistan The issues associated with emergency services go much beyond adequacy in resources, be they ambulances or fire tenders. They sprout from severe failings in urban development where multi-storeyed buildings are raised by flouting fire prevention bye laws. Major cities like Karachi are expanding without earmarking space for fire stations and there is hardly any dedicated road space for emergency services operations. It is a story of utter neglect and institutionalised corruption. In such a situation even the most efficient emergency services will fail to deliver. Therefore, performance of emergency services is linked to urban development issues as much as it relates to the merit of individual services. Then there is also the question of integrating the emergency services locally to cut duplicity, to introduce functional efficiency and an overall economy in effort This matter is being debated by policy makers without visible results. Perhaps every province or major city will eventually come out with its own solution in the absence of a uniform policy, which points towards the legal inadequacy and absence of rules of business governing both integration and development of emergency services. For example the legislation that governs fire services is outdated and all services are operating and expanding in a policy void. Resultantly some of the solutions that are emerging to make emergency services work better despite their merits, have little institutional grounding. Given this context, the evaluation will focus on fire fighting, police emergency services, Punjab Emergency Services and Eidhi Ambulance service. Evaluation matrix of each service appears in Annexure C. Fire Fighting Services Fire fighting services have been devolved under the LGO 2001 as a Tehsil Municipal function. The Ordinance was later amended to place fire services under the city government in major cities. In Pakistan fire fighting has been traditionally a civil defence function. Even today, civil defence warden posts have community fire fighting as one of the tasks. However, there are dedicated fire services in cities, with human resource largely coming form the Civil Defence services. Frequent occurrence of fire in urban areas, like the famous Shaheed-e-Millat Secretariat (16 storeys) fire in Islamabad, where it was beyond the capacity of fire tenders to respond, have brought efficacy of fire services in sharp focus. Lately some local governments are paying attention towards upgrading them, though much more needs to be done. Fire services of Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi were evaluated. Following observations have emerged as a consequence. Please consult individual evaluations matrix at Annexure C. Evaluation Mandates of fire services seem to have developed consistent with local imperatives. For example in Islamabad the focus remains solidly towards fire fighting and concomitant SAR, and to some extend on fire prevention. Karachi Fire services have, on the contrary, taken on flood relief, coastal region rescue and even HAZMAT. Most of these tasks are beyond their capacity and it causes diffusion of focus. Flowing from the national policy fire prevention should be handled by Fire Fighting Departments and not by the Civil Defence. This must also be corrected through national and local governance policy emphasis. Ideally fire prevention should entail the following, which is rarely being enforced:-
31 ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾
Enforcing fire prevention laws Electronic or manual monitoring of public buildings and fire vulnerable points. Operation of a local alarm on fire incidence and prompt transmission of information to the nearest fire station. Preventive actions to be reduced to SOPs and enforced.
. Performance of the three fire services largely hinges on road space access which is generally poor. Karachi Fire services respond to 20-25 emergencies a day, some requiring a response from more than one station. In 2005, 4200 fire emergencies were satisfactorily addressed. In Islamabad, 789 fire emergencies were attended to in the same year. However, while the in-station response is extremely prompt but factors like lack of road access and water availability at the site of fire incidence largely degrade quality of response. Resource Inadequacy. Fire response delays also occur due to cities expanding much beyond the capacity of existing fire stations. Ideally it should be one fire station to 100,000 population. In Karachi it comes to one station for approx 750,000 population. Some of the new fire stations are being developed under flyovers due to non-availability of space. Fire fighting resources of evaluated locations are summarised as follows:Karachi. The city of nearly 16 million has only 21 fire stations and 35 fire tenders of varying configurations. One has a snorkel capability for reaching 8-10 storey building. However, 18 more are being procured. Lahore. It has 13 fire stations for a population of nearly 2.5 million and has 17 fire tenders out of which only 7 are reliable. 35 more are urgently needed but the funds have been diverted to support the newly created ‘Recue 1122”. Short and long term development plans require infusion of nearly Rs 750 million. Islamabad. It is relatively better off with 3 fire stations and 10 fire tenders with one having snorkel capability to reach 16 storey building. However, CDA is investing in up gradation of fire services and 34 fire tenders are being inducted and 3 new fire stations are being made to improve fire response. For early warning, fire services either receive information in their operations room, or from Police 15 Emergency service. SAR capacity was quite inadequate in all fire stations. Karachi Fire Services has one SAR vehicle with standard equipment Quality of Human resource varies for the 3 services, though their basic recruitment standards follow the government service regulations, matriculation for fire fighters and fire officers are graduates. The average employee age is about 40 years for the Lahore Fire Services. Most have learned through experience as the in-country training focus is inadequate. Very few fire officers have availed foreign training opportunities. Standard setting is widely neglected as there is no institutionalised in-country sharing of professional experiences. Only Karachi Fire Service is maintaining liaison with the Houston Fire Department for up gradation of profession standards. Conclusions In terms of quality, Karachi Fire Service stands out prominently. Despite resource inadequacy it is more professionally organised, with a dynamic Fire Chief and SOPs and institutional memory recorded. This is followed by Islamabad Fire Services as being the federal capital its performance is critically monitored. Fire fighting services, though, are clearly neglected in terms of their legislative grounding, ambiguous rules of business and functional capacity. They also typify the disadvantages that flow from a non-integrative approach to
32 emergency management, functional overlaps being the primary one. While efforts are being made to improve upon their quality, not much is done in terms of emphasis on fire prevention. This is as much a function of public education through aggressive advocacy, as factoring it in town planning and in enforcing relevant laws. Police Emergency Services These services have come up in number of cities over the last couple of years. In concept they promote public friendly policing through (1) rapid police response while extending (2) emergency medical services (3) and some other need based services like provision of professional legal advice, even assistance in accessing provision of home utilities services. These concepts were studied in countries where they are in vogue, applied and evolved with functional variations. The assessment examined emergency police services in Islamabad and Peshawar. In the latter case the subject was reviewed in discussions with Inspector General of Police NWFP, Riffat Pasha, who pioneered introduction of these services in Peshawar and in other cities of NWFP. A field evaluation of ‘Police Rescue 15’ in Islamabad was also carried out and secondary material covering earlier evaluations was consulted. These services are easily accessible through user friendly names like Rescue 15, Rescue 115, Madadgar 15 etc. Please refer to Annexure C. Performance Evaluation While creation of these services attracted much media attention and in most cases they delivered also, but aspects like institutionalising budgetary provisions for long term sustainability and capacity building were neglected. Therefore, after performing well for some time, the scope of services started to shrink, from many functions to policing and medical emergencies at places. Even emergency medical services are not normally professionally managed due to paucity of ambulances and paramedics, or their maintenance budget. The training focus has been largely restricted to regular police training and those employed in such services tend to learn through experience. Many efforts have gone into creating institutions or forums for public consultation, both to educate a common man on such services and to solicit feedback that would contribute in improving upon their quality. A positive aspect about Police Emergency Services, however, is a wide public awareness of their presence and they enjoy public confidence in terms of being responsive to their concerns. Whatever be their capacity, they respond to emergencies. They attend emergencies relating to police functions and refer those lying outside their competence to the relevant agencies, fire or Eidhi Ambulance services. Police Emergency services also promote social causes through media advocacy. They have also done much to change the public image of police services from being coercive to responsive to public concerns. However, it is vital to affect a more cohesive functional integration between police and other emergency services for reasons of functional efficiency and economy of effort.
33 Punjab Emergency Services Created in October 2004 and better known as ‘Rescue 1122, Punjab Emergency Services (PES) has earned a quick reputation for performance by providing quality emergency services. It claims to have rescued 24,000 victims from emergency situations by providing effective and quick response, rescue, emergency medical treatment and safe transportation. Dr Rizwan Naseer, a trauma surgeon, has pioneered its creation. He seems to enjoy much confidence of the decision makers in the province and has managed considerable funding support for expansion of PES. Punjab Emergency Service Act was passed in June 2006. Its salient features are: ¾ Provides for time sensitive emergency response in SAR and emergency medevac. ¾ Maintain connectivity with important stakeholders for disaster response. ¾ Allow public access through toll free connectivity. ¾ It also requires PES to play a lead role in coordinating emergency response. ¾ Undertake capacity building of service providers. ¾ Monitor disaster and response trends to facilitate competent policy making. Human resource development has been accorded much importance. A quality training institution in Ichra Lahore, provides basic trainings. Many employees have been trained from foreign schools. They are generally young and motivated and exude positive energy. Standards are being set to international standards. The management is working for affecting an institutional connectivity with Leicestershire Fire College, UK. While the Service is fully operative in Lahore at six locations, work for expansion to 12 other cities of Punjab with a budget of Rs 3.5 billion is underway. A visit to PES main station at Ferozpur Road indicated quality and performance compared to other services, and of course a very solid resource base. PES enjoys the confidence of Punjab government which funded development of specific emergency response capacities in Rescue 1122 as a pilot project. After ensuring veracity of outcomes through third party evaluation, further funding support was provided for both expansion and for integration of existing fire fighting services.
Merits ¾ In comparison to other emergency services, Rescue 1122 leaves a very positive impact of competence and access to state of the art hardware. ¾ It is capable of offering a wide array of integrated emergency services to include medevac, SAR, HAZMAT and fire fighting. ¾ The operational control room tracks ongoing operations through satellite based navigation systems and it also has data recording and trend analysis capability. ¾ There is emphasis on following internationally accepted standards in trainings and operational response. ¾ PES is following an institutionalised approach in development of the service with a supporting legal instrument and following a project development approach in expanding.
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Demerits ¾ With the advent of PES, traditional responder agencies have been sidelined in terms of resource allocation and official patronage. An institutionalised approach would require integrating strengths of all responder agencies: Fire fighting Department and Civil Defence warden services, into one cohesive entity. Inaction on this account would tend to undermine institution building. ¾ Some key stakeholder consensuses are missing. Many are critical for being left out of the consultative process. ¾ Opinions are sharply divided upon the relative sudden introduction of a massively funded emergency response service. Much of the criticism though is subjective Conclusion. Integration of the existing emergency response services of Lahore must occur with PES in a considered manner by imbibing their strengths and experience. This must also happen without much delay. Otherwise creation of a new high profile service by ignoring existing ones will generate strong opposition which may be detrimental to PES’ sustainability. However, creation of PES indicates a healthy contemporary trend in emergency service provision in the country. If the Punjab government follows up this initiative by affecting a functional integration of emergency services under one lead agency, then this example certainly will be worth emulating elsewhere.
35 Eidhi Ambulance Service20 Abdul Sattar Eidh is a household name in Pakistan for his humanitarian services, particularly in emergency relief. He has over 30 years of result oriented contributions to his credit which includes responding to 17 major overseas emergency situations including during the recent Lebanon conflict. He communicates through his deeds more than words. Edhi humanitarian services are networked across the four provinces and AJK. They are organised in 8 zones, every zone having 2-3 circles and one circle in turn controls 4-10 centres depending on the service needs and management imperatives. While financial control is centralised, operational control is decentralised on a common work method basis. Eidhi receives enormous contributions from all parts of country and from Pakistanis living abroad. From a pure humanitarian focus Eidhi has expanded into health capacity building programmes. His main forte, however, remains Eidhi emergency ambulance service. His humanitarian services, though, span following functions:x x x x x x x x x x
Eidhi welfare centres provide capacity building for livelihood generation and also function as social advocacy platforms. Eidhi destitute homes house 35,000 for shelter and food and for capacity building for seeking self enablement. Maternity homes provide reproductive health care. Nursing centres build capacities of female paramedics Health consultancy services have commenced functioning in Karachi 16 free dispensaries function across the country. Air ambulance service Marine Rescue service Free primary education for the under privileged in Karachi Coffin, bath service and mortuaries.
Eidhi Ambulance Service is being run by his son Faisal Eidhi and comprises a vast network employing 1200 ambulances across the country. It is structured a follows;x One centre houses 8-10 ambulances x It is connected on wireless and telephone with Police and all emergency services. x For ease of public access ambulance service has a UAN # 115. x About 60-70 persons staff one centre. x Ambulance services control rooms are computerised with recording facilities (perhaps in Karachi at present). x Emergency services are provided free of cost to the needy, however, it can be hired on nominal charges that meet about 45% operational costs.
20
Assessment made through personal meeting with Abdul Sattar Eidhi, Bilquis Eidhi and key functionaries managing operations in Karachi, on 20 November 2006.
36 x x x x
Taking into account the earnings, one ambulance’s operations monthly cost range between Rs 10,000-15,000 – extremely economical. They cover nearly all the main highways of the country. The service is being gradually upgraded with Basic Life Support system manned by one trained paramedic. It has been introduced in Karachi but is being extended elsewhere. Thereafter, advance cardiac life support system is being installed at selective locations. Response Time. It is common knowledge in Pakistan that Eidhi Emergency Ambulance services are the first ones to respond to an emergency, be it an air crash or train accident or even a terrorist attack
Conclusions Eidhi Ambulance service is an excellent private sector initiative in humanitarian services provision in Pakistan where government services are grossly inadequate and comparatively inefficient. Guinness book of world record (2000) places Eidhi ambulance service as the largest philanthropic services in the world. Its quality is being improved with introduction of life saving skills and equipment during emergency evacuation. Through its multiple humanitarian contributions, Eidhi Foundation has endowed a new meaning to volunteerism, as it is the volunteer contributions which essentially endow quality and a high rate of return on low investments. Volunteerism combined with a non-compromising work ethics constitutes two sterling qualities of the organisation.
37 Volunteerism – Some Observations National Volunteer movement (NVM) Following was discerned about NVM in a meeting that I had with its DG Mr Khalid Mahmood Chaudhry. NVM is headed by Mr Mohammad Ali Durrani, Minister for Information and it has many eminent people on its Board of Directors. The purpose of its creation was to tap the national volunteer sentiment that rose in the aftermath of October 2005 earthquake. However, despite official patronage, NVM has failed to articulate a conceptual framework and an operational method that would endow it with a clear purpose and set of achievable deliverables. Nonetheless, NVM has engaged itself in need based activities in the EQ Zone by merging local volunteer capacity with the resource and technical skill base of partner INGOs. A parallel effort has gone into engaging college and university students in volunteer activities with a social purpose and in advocacy of social issues. However, these initiatives lack a common method and an underlying integrative objective. NVM also expends much efforts and resources into arranging media events with political overtones. Volunteerism in PRCS, Civil Defence and Eidhi Foundation In the course of the evaluation one gets an insight into purposeful and structured activities that steer local volunteer sentiment into clear deliverables. Contributions of PRCS, Civil Defence and Eidhi Foundation are worth consideration. Some of the attributes of these organisations are:¾ Volunteer contributions are built around grass root structures. In case of PRCS volunteer network is created in rural areas for sustaining DM and first aid/health awareness interventions. ¾ For Civil defence services the institution of urban warden posts attracts volunteers for capacity building in community DM functions. It has a purpose and linked to it are clear set of activities. ¾ Then there is the example of Eidhi Foundation whose visible purpose and contributions have won much support form across the country both in the shape of volunteer inputs for diverse set of activities and contributions in kind. ¾ It transpires that a sustainable purpose and method that links deliverables to the purpose attracts volunteer contributions. ¾ More than anything else, perhaps visible and sustainable outcomes attract volunteer contributions. ¾ The volunteer spirit must be periodically re-energised through recurring activities and refresher trainings as it happens in all the three organisations. To conclude, volunteers emerge, and are nourished from grass root connectivity, linked to an understandable purpose and set of activities meant to achieve the purpose. This applies to PRCS, Civil Defence and Eidhi Foundation. NVM, on the contrary, is a top down initiative whose contributions would remain temporary in impact despite significant investment of resources. .
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Port Oil Hazard Disaster Management Geographically Pakistan is located in a region where 80% of world’s oil passes through its Economic Exclusive Zone. Moreover Pakistan itself is a net importer of oil. A major oil spill along its coasts would, therefore, be disastrous for the country and for its oil import dependent economy In 2003, an oil tanker, Tasman Spirit spilled 50,000 tons of oil. The incident could not be averted for over 15 days when the ship stood stranded close to Karachi Port. Logistics associated with its recovery could not be arranged and the matter remained deadlocked over legal wrangling with the ship owner. Besides inept operational management, the institutional basis for handling such incidents was missing. Consequences of the oil spill over were disastrous for the marine environment; it seriously impeded port operations and posed a serious health hazard to the local residents. Key Stakeholders for Maritime Environmental DM. Ministry of Ports and shipping, port authorities of the three ports: Karachi, Port Qasim and Gwadar, ship operators, ship agents, waste contractors and key on-shore agencies like for Karachi, City government, Sindh government, Defence Housing Authority (adjoins Karachi beach). Issues. While the concerned port authority is responsible to handle on and off store oil spills relating to their areas, no comprehensive legislation exists to handle a problem which must be dealt in the light of international, maritime and maritime corporate law. Besides legal inadequacy, there is the issue of timely access to resources like salvage tugs through pre-disaster contractual agreements. Finally, operational efficiency in handling port operations comes into play in a bid to avert such disasters. Conclusions --The Way Forward Policy. Set up clear guidelines to combat pollution in the marine environment while affixing clear responsibilities and lines of control and foolproof logistic support arrangements, and also securing of critical expertise through contractual arrangements. Operational Issues. Identification of chain of command for each port, availability of trained/skilled persons for on and off shore operations, SOPs for all phases of the operation, communication networking, involving key stake holders in all phases of the operation, availability of sensitivity maps and necessary planning data, and most important, availability of tugs for salvage operation. Handling of Port Waste. Ports should carry out a periodic review of their facilities to ensure that they meet users needs. Treatment of port waste in keeping with international best practices and national environmental laws must be attended to. On Shore Disaster Management. It should include plans for timely evacuation of population adjacent to the contaminated area and measures for pre-empting onset of health epidemic and beach pollution. Maritime Oil Pollution Control Capability. Equipment that should be made available are oil booms and absorbents, skimmers for oil surface cleaning, oil chemical dispersants and oil spill containment methods
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Conclusion of Emergency Response Services Emergency Response Agencies and DM DM Cycle Mitigation
Preparedness
Response
Comments x Urban development policies that reduce risks to fire hazards and facilitate operations of emergency response services. Policy enforcement is even more critical. x Legislations that set standards, optimise efficiency and cut functional duplicity must be enacted. Its early promulgation is critical to give direction to development of fire services x Strategic capacity to pre-empt sea or shore based oil spills or allow its efficient management x A strong advocacy and public awareness focus on hazard prevention. x Integration of emergency response services for reasons of efficiency and economy x Critical resource must be made available to enhance preparedness x Performance standards should be set consistent with international best practices x Preparedness for managing maritime disasters should be enhanced through a multistake holder approach x Concept of activity and need based volunteerism to be strengthened to make emergency response automatic at the grass roots. The volunteer capacity should be steered to a purpose, set of deliverables and have an institutional linkage. x Emphasis on task performing SOPs, service pride and recognition to enhance response quality. x Public friendly approach to emergency management should be encouraged and institutional linkage to be created with public forums for better understanding of mutual concerns.
40 Chapter V – Disaster Early Warning This chapter reviews the capacity, information management channels and capacity up gradation plans with regards to Pakistan Meteorological Department. It also briefly evaluates Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPACO) viz its disaster specific capacities. Evaluation of Pakistan Meteorological Department Considering the centrality of PMD in disaster EW in Pakistan, a fairly detailed assessment was carried out that involved a meeting with DG Met Dr Qamar-uz-Zaman, Director Met Sindh, Mr Naeem and Director Karachi Met Station, Mr Sarfraz. Secondary material was also consulted. I will reproduce the gist, disaster specific EW capacity, reporting tools and important information recipients. Routine Rains
Met Early Warning Reporting Seasonal Forecast ¾ These are long term forecasts covering up to 4 – 5 months. ¾ For monsoons, first forecast is issued in June and then updated. ¾ It involves study of monsoon rain bearing systems in the Indian Ocean, using Asian metrological networking, by interpreting ground and upper atmospheric data. ¾ It is comparatively less accurate but gives a general picture. Medium Term Forecasting ¾ Normally it has one week Early Warning value. ¾ It is generated through national and Asian meteorological platforms. ¾ It is relatively more accurate.
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Short Range Forecast ¾ It employs national and local meteorological platforms and it is quite accurate. ¾ It has a Early Warning value of up to 3 days. Now Casting ¾ It is very accurate and employs national and local meteorological platforms. ¾ It has 3-4 to 24 hours Early Warning value. Floods and Excessive Rains Input sources 10 cm Doppler Radar at Lahore and 5 cm radars at Sialkot and Mangla (being installed). ¾ These radars record cloud cover and projecting expected rain in the catchment areas (Jammu district/India). ¾ They provide quantitative forecasting essentially by observing cloud formation. ¾ Provide 3-4 hours accurate, and up to 12 hours fairly accurate Early Warning. Meteorological Observation Stations close to Catchment areas. ¾ They record rain input which is interpreted and disseminated. They do not have much Early Warning value. ¾ These are linked with WAPDA water level observation stations along river rim for recording and disseminating water level. Moreover, rain quantum detection radars working in Karachi, RY Khan, DI Khan and Islamabad also furnish input. These radars cover cloud formations up to 300 kms. Satellite imagery and local met stations also used for this purpose. Flood Forecasting Division (FFD) at Lahore. All information is passed on to FFC and to multiple flood information users.
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Sea Based Cyclone Warning Limitations ¾ There is no real time data collection monitoring capacity employing sea based observatories and buoys. ¾ Coastal radar coverage is inadequate – Karachi has only one meteorological radar station. Baluchistan and eastern Sindh sea board is not covered. ¾ There are plans to install radars in Chhor, Sindh and in Panjgur, Baluchistan. ¾ No aerial live storm or cyclone monitoring platforms are available. ¾ Note. Cyclone vulnerability is enhanced in summers as winds travel from sea to land.
How Early Warning is Provided ¾ Karachi based radar and four land based observatories give a synoptic view of the sea weather picture. ¾ It is interpreted with input received from the Asian meteorological coverage of the Indian Ocean cloud picture and it yields 3-4 days cyclone EW with regular updates. Tsunami ¾ EQ can be detected on occurrence with location and intensity. ¾ No system is in place as yet for tsunami surge and flow detection, though with basic inputs from tsunami computer simulated warning techniques or numerical weather forecasting techniques, fairly accurate forecasting of the likely impact time and location is possible. ¾ PMD is networked with Japan Meteorological Agency for Early Warning on approaching tsunami surge. ¾ If EQ occurs within 200 kms of the coast, lead time available is likely to be is 2 hours.
43 Tsunami EW Project (Clinton Initiative) ¾ System of buoys is being installed along the coast with sensors; they provide information on wave height and velocity and the likely point and time of impact. The Project likely to be completed by 2008. Cost $ 200 Million with GOP funding. ¾ It will be linked with Indian Ocean rim countries as part of regional Early Warning framework. ¾ National Seismic Monitoring Centre being created in Karachi. Drought. Forecasting Centre is established in Karachi for Sindh and Baluchistan. Input Sources. ¾ Existing weather systems for rain forecasting. ¾ Rain gauge stations are being placed in all drought vulnerable districts, up to tehsil level. They are being installed in Sindh and Baluchistan for empirical data based drought vulnerability determination. ¾ Timely assessments will be passed on to the concerned agencies. ¾ The system is being refined. ¾ Drought forecasting also includes using long term Seasonal Forecasts. Earthquake. Earthquake Centre being created in National Centre of Physics.
Summary of Pakistan Meteorological Department Disaster EW Capacity Up gradation Plans21 National Tsunami Centre Support Agency – intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC) and UNESCO Cost: 11.16 M US $ Work in Progress Earthquake Prediction Study Group Lead National Organisation: National Centre of Physics Cost 0.35 M US $ Project Duration: 2 years Monitoring of Sea Level Variations Lead National Organisation: National Institute of Oceanography Purpose. 960 Km of coastal monitoring for EW for low lying regions. Cost: 2 M US $ Duration: 3 years Strengthening of Operational 2/47 national warning services through National Metrological Services as part of multi-hazard approach to national warning system Support Agency: World Metrological Organisation (WMO) To up grade the quality of national EW services through real time global/regional linkage. 21
Government of Pakistan Cabinet Division, Strengthening National Capacities for Multi Hazard Early Warning and Response System. ,pp. 41-52, Qamar-uz-Zaman Chaudhary, May 2006.
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Establishment of Tropical Warning Centre Lead agency: Pakistan Metrological Department Support Agency. World Metrological Department Cost: 1.7 M US $ Flood Forecasting System for NWFP Involves creation of flood forecasting centre at Peshawar and installation of 10 cm Doppler radar at Chirat. Cost : 6.5 M US $ Work in progress Drought Monitoring and Warning System Creation of 500 rainfall monitoring stations in drought prone areas Lead agency PMD Supported by WMD Cost: 0.2 M US $ Duration: 24 months Warning Response Plan for Coastal Regions Recommended to be supported by OCHA To be developed in phase 2 of national plan Raising Awareness and Education Campaign on Tsunami Risks and setting Coastal warning system Supported by IFRC
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Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) I met Air Commodore ® Arshad Siraj, Chief Manager and DG SAR in SUPARCO HQ and also reviewed secondary data on SUPARCO in Karachi and we discussed SUPARCO’s contributions and possible roles in DM SUPARCO was created in 1962 and made great strides in enhancing Pakistan’s space programme with military and non-military applications. The Organisation was much neglected during the 1980s and 1990s which caused a brain drain as many talented scientists chose to leave. However, it is being recreated in recent years and presently it works under National Command Authority. SUPARCO is also a signatory to numerous international protocols governing space usage and it shares information and fulfils its obligations that arise thereof. Mandate. Use of space for national defence purposes, mainly in missile development applications. Other Applications. SUPARCO is also employed as a planning tool for economic and infrastructure development, for disaster mitigation in support post EQ ERRA operations and for assisting emergencies. Operational Capacity. ¾ 3 French satellites with 10X2.5 M resolution ¾ Imagery up to 2500 KMs around Islamabad can be monitored. ¾ However, these are optical satellites that cannot see through clouds ¾ SUPARCO is in the process of acquiring synthetic aperture radars Contributions in DM SUPARCO’s capacity is more suited for providing early warning for disaster mitigation and for preparedness. It has limited applications for disaster response and immediate relief as it does not have continuous satellite coverage capacity over a target area. However with reference to October 05 EQ, SUPARCO took images one hour after its occurrence and undertook continuous monitoring of the EQ zone for 15-20 days. Information was passed to Federal Relief Cell and to other decision makers. Later, it is supporting ERRA by providing satellite imageries to facilitate rehabilitation and reconstruction operations. With regards to flash floods, SUPARCO monitored and forecasted occurrence of flash floods in NWFP during early summers of 2005. it also monitored filling of Shadikot Dam to dangerous levels in Pasni, Baluchistan and its bursting that triggered a local catastrophe in early 2005. Coming to floods, SUPRACO is capable of providing early warning of monsoon intensity through sea temperature monitoring. SUPARCO undertook crop estimation on World Bank demand with positive results. It can thus apply its potential with regards to droughts EW and impact assessments. Long term predictions on rainfall shortage can be generated. SUPRACO can also monitor shrinkage in surface and sub soil water reservoirs.
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Through satellite applications, disaster response operations can be facilitated through following capacities:¾ Application in SAR through insertion of satellite transmitting beacon signal instruments. ¾ Assist in communication through V set antennae. ¾ Applications in telemedicine. ¾ It can also monitor occurrence of industrial and environmental disasters Conclusions SUPARCO represents an effective capability that can be widely employed for disaster Early Warning and impact mitigation assessment. There are some satellite based applications that can be effectively employed during disaster response, for SAR and in telemedicine. Plans are at hand to improve upon these capacities. However, there is not much demand for SUPARCO services in DM as there is no dedicated capacity within SUPARCO associated with DM. With some support it can much enhance its capacity in above identified DM applications. Concurrently, SUPARCO must be networked with the existing disaster EW framework and linked to national and provincial DM authorities.
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Chapter VI - Evaluation of Vulnerable Communities and Schools Community Evaluations Vulnerable communities stand at the front line of disasters. They are rarely forewarned, are deficient in DM skills, resources and social organisation to face disasters or to reduce their vulnerabilities collectively. On impacting, hazards blow into disasters with a much amplified impact. There is, therefore, a very strong case for interventions that introduce disaster coping mechanisms in such communities. Communities are also located within local governance structures. The local revenue officer, known as patwari, is a reality of their functional life. The Union Council Nazim, an elected representative for a population of 20,000 or so, works to resolve local problems. He has a voice in the district being a member of the District Assembly. LGO 2001 provides for a Village and Neighbourhood Council, whose work is supervised by the UC Nazim and it has a local development and watch and ward focus. In short local governance through its institutions and representatives provides another life line to rescue communities in hazard or disaster prone conditions. Though, this does not happen as a norm as the communities are not fully integrated in the local government DM mechanisms. Four disaster vulnerable community assessments document disaster risks they face, their vulnerabilities and suggest both structural and non-structural coping measures. Previous chapters have assessed failings in governance for not doing enough to support vulnerable communities in disaster situations, be it their timely relocation or relief aid. However, the NDMA initiatives and recent disasters are having an effect of energising governments on DM account. Focusing on disaster vulnerable communities, there is, therefore, a need to affect synergy in the efforts of the two external agencies: local government and social interventions agency for above referred reasons, while recognising that they work from different stand points and not necessarily for the same ends. . Please refer to Annexure E for accessing individual vulnerable communities and schools evaluations. The assessments were made in four distinct disaster environments of Pakistan. First relates to the worst October 05 EQ affected area of District Muzzafarabad, AJK ( Annexure E, Community Evaluation # 1). Second assessment focuses on a flash flood destroyed village, an EQ secondary hazard, in District Mansehra, NWFP (Evaluation # 2). The third focuses on a village which sustained much loss in Dsitrict Sheikhupura, Punjab, by monsoon instigated rain water channel floods in 2006 (Evaluation # 3). Moving extreme south to the drought hit Tharparkar district in Sindh, the fourth study chronicles contributions of a local NGO, Thardeep, in building effective disaster coping mechanisms of a vulnerable village (Evolution # 4). Purpose. To identify action oriented strategies that contribute towards making communities disaster resilient. Method. Assessments were made through focused group discussions with community members representing different social groups, through personal observation, soliciting opinions of village influential, by understanding the overall context which tends to either reduce or enhance community vulnerability through local facilitation agency, and study of secondary material for back ground sensitisation with the subject and for formulating evaluation tools. Process Following steps were generally followed:-
48 ¾ Social profiling of the village to identify communities’ latent vulnerabilities and vulnerable groups. ¾ Hazard risks identification, relating to (1) vulnerability to external hazards like EQ, flash floods etc, and (2) latent socio-economic inadequacies and lack of livelihood opportunities etc and (3) determining risks level after factoring as to what has been done to reduce them. ¾ Identification of vulnerabilities ¾ What can be done to reduce the vulnerabilities? This can be sub-categorised in to structural measures that can be undertaken by the communities normally through external facilitation and non-structural measures that can enhance disaster resilience, in terms of building capacities and building social organisation etc.. Evaluation Outcomes Social profile of the targeted communities revealed following latent vulnerabilities:Vulnerable segments are disadvantageously placed in terms of access to productive assets, to livelihood opportunities, to healthcare or even in terms of quality of habitat. With no productive assets like land the vulnerable segments mostly work as daily wage earners, considering that remote regions offer scarce livelihood opportunities. Socially vulnerable were worst hit by disasters, in terms of recovering from disaster impact like loss of habitat or through lost livelihood opportunities. Community based social mobilisation institutions were largely missing. In the EQ zone, donor agencies had created village committees for the limited purpose of dispensing relief goods. Infact dependence on massive relief input hindered instilling self reliance. Village Bakuo in Tharpakar, though, was an exception where Thardeep (NGO) had facilitated creation of credible local social mobilisation community based institutions which oversaw numerous work on numerous need based interventions (Evaluation # 4). Non-EQ zone assessments in Punjab and Sindh revealed much post disaster reliance of vulnerable groups on debts on exacting terms, in the absence of social safety nets. Access to very poor quality of state sponsored health facilities. This was observed across the board. Poor literacy levels outside AJK, particularly female literacy. Female access to social services was poor. Disaster Vulnerabilities that were identified, flowing from above are :¾ Vulnerability to EQ or area specific natural hazards, particularly loss of human lives including bread earners. ¾ Vulnerability to EQ generated secondary hazard. In village Karli, close to Chikar (Muzzafarabad), a massive land slide has blocked a natural water way to create an artificial lake. Some 35 houses and precious land belonging to vulnerable groups came under water (Evluation # 1) ¾ Vulnerabilities arising from loss of productive assets and shelter. ¾ Psychological stresses specially from loss of shelter in EQ zone and delays experienced in their reconstruction.
49 ¾ Vulnerabilities arising from poor the very poor socio-economic environment, particularly access to health services. ¾ Those arising from environmental degradation like land sliding and deterioration in soil compactness due to EQ created ruptures or loss of fertile land due to desertification in Tharparkar, Sindh. ¾ Absence of social mobilisation mechanisms that would make communities work towards self reliance. ¾ Poor role of local government in community focused DM, like absence of viable EW tools for flood forewarning, poor relief response in drought vulnerable areas, inability to reopen roads in winter snow conditions. ¾ Vulnerabilities generated by not factoring local communities concerns in government sponsored development schemes. Case in point being delays in widening of Degh Nullah project, causing amplification in flood impact in district Sheihkupra in 2006 (Evaluation # 3). Introduction of Disaster coping mechanisms Structural Measures. These include measures that can be addressed by the government like providing alternative land for rebuilding village Gul Dehri in Mansehra or to lower the lake level in Muzzafarabad for locals to recover their lost land. Prompt ERRA support in house reconstruction in the EQ zone. (Evaluations 3 & 4) Structural disaster mitigation measures can also be executed by communities with external facilitation. There is the example of village Bakuo in Tharpaprkar where a flood protection wall was made following their 2003 experience. The same wall saved the village in 2006 floods. (Evaluation # 4) Non Structural Measures that must be addressed by the government relate to: ¾ Disaster planning, enforcing SOPs related to flood EW, timely provision of relief in drought prone regions. It should involve communities through their local representatives. ¾ Disaster contingency planning is another area where community input and cooperation should be sought. Again the governance grass root institutions can play an important role. ¾ Through external facilitation, hazard coping capacities can be introduced and institutionalised in vulnerable communities. Again the example of village Bakuo is cited where significant rain water harvesting and local livelihood generation capacities have been created through Thardeep support. (Evaluation # 4) ¾ In other evaluations, many actions have been recommended for specific situations. These include, installing lightening conductors to reduce the vulnerability in mountainous regions, local measures to guard against the slide hazard, ¾ Creating community survival capacities and local EW mechanisms against flash flood hazard. ¾ Creating ambient DM capacities in general as done by PRCS in vulnerable communities across the country. This involves creating volunteer based capacities, providing them with DM kits and engage them in refresher trainings or other DM exercises. ¾ Capacity building for livelihood generation interventions with a gender focus like buying livestock, facilitate running of local business initiatives by extending micro-credit. Again Thardeep’s example stands out in village Bhakuo. ¾ Setting up village first aid posts owing to near absence of viable medical facilities in remote regions ¾ Administering psycho-social therapies. ¾ Building community social mobilisation institutions to galvanise productive potential to make vulnerable communities disaster resilient.
50
Conclusion Local government and social intervention agency must work in making vulnerable communities resilient to disasters by developing vulnerabilities specific coping mechanisms and by bringing them firmly in the loop of local government situation specific response mechanisms.
School Evaluations It is the death of thousand of innocent children in the October 2005 earthquake in their fallen schools that prompted me to carry out this evaluation. They died in schools constructed to very poor standards. It was common to see fallen schools but intact private buildings close by. There is not much that the school authorities could have done to save lives. However, as to what blows hazards in to disasters and how can this be prevented, should be ingrained indelibly in the minds of the younger generation if we are to be any better prepared for tomorrow’s disasters Considering schools to be social sub organs of communities, therefore, school focused DM intervention is conceived to be part of the community intervention and it is recommended to be implemented as part of it, by involving the local communities, Education Department and the social intervention agency. Purpose. To generate hazards and hazard management awareness in schools by engaging students in situation specific sustainable activities. Method The assignment was attempted through semi-structured interviews with the school principal and other staff members, through a detailed personal observation of the school premises and its immediate environment. In the Karachi evaluation I visited those places from where the children come to understand their home environment and the hazards that flow thereof. Process Followed ¾ Identify the hazards to student’s physical security. This includes threats to life or physical well being either through external danger or through disease and threats to his emotional stability which may be arising from attitude of the school administration or parents. ¾ What is being done to guard the students against hazards so identified. Define vulnerabilities as a consequence. ¾ Identify mechanisms and activities that will allow students to cope with the vulnerabilities. ¾ Identify academic measures that can be institutionalised to enhance awareness of hazards and their management. ¾ Identify structural measures that lie within the realm of Education Department authorities for eradication or management of external threat to student’s physical security. The evaluation focused on three schools, two in earthquake disaster situation in Muzzafarabad and Mandsehra districts of AJK and NWFP (School Evaluations # 1 & 2) and one very interesting study focuses on two schools located in common premises in Karachi City (Evaluation # 3).
51 Disaster Vulnerabilities Foremost is absence of disaster or hazard awareness and management in schools. Despite the earthquake experience, school authorities seem oblivious of fire risk or other hazards that seem to be accepted as ‘occupational hazards’. For example fumigation for the eradication of dengue fever vector never occurred in the Karachi schools despite wide epidemic prevalence in the city and it did not seem to be an issue with the school authorities. Evaluating EQ losses in one school hemmed in a busy market place in Chikar, Muzzafarabad, it was revealed that many students who could possibly have escaped during the tremors, but could not, as there was only one entry and exit and no adjoining open spaces. Safety considerations rarely figure in school site selection and premises planning. Some of the vulnerabilities identified are:¾ ¾ ¾ ¾ ¾
Students suffering from post-trauma psycho-social stresses. Students suffering from post trauma stress from physical abuse at school or at home. Vulnerability to fire and injury hazards from in-school activities. . Play areas not configured to safety standards. Unhygienic latrines, poor cleanliness in schools and for many students, disease vulnerability stemming from unhygienic living environments, is at times introduced in schools
Suggested Contents of School DM intervention Structural Measures ¾ Set and enforce school building safety codes which should include site selection considerations, allowance for emergency exits and quality construction, safe playing areas. This falls in the domain of local government and Education Department and requires a national policy emphasis. ¾ ¾ Similarly maintenance standards of school buildings should be defined for quality and safety considerations to eradicate hazards stemming from leaking water sources and sub-standard electrical wiring. ¾ Fire fighting equipment and infrastructure should be appropriately installed. Non-Structural ¾ Formation of a school Fire Committee which should institutionalise routine fire drill practice. ¾ Similarly school safety committee should be formed which should be monitor and ensure/pursue eradication of safety hazards stemming from structural inadequacies or from external sources, either by the school administration or Education Department. ¾ School health screening programme in Sindh has for some reasons been suspended. None of the schools that I frequented had a students’ routine health screening programme. This must be re-introduced or included in the proposed intervention. Doctors should also be capable of administering psychological counselling to students. ¾ First Aid administration capacity should be institutionalised in schools both among students and teachers. ¾ Introduction of debates and essay writing on common hazards, and their management.
52 ¾ Health or physical abuse issues relating to the students’ home environment should be taken up with their parents in Parents Teachers Meetings forum. Conclusion. Local Education Department, community and social intervention agency must work in unison to build disaster coping mechanisms in vulnerable communities. The bigger purpose, however, is to instil hazard management awareness through institutionalised practice.
District based Integrated Disaster Preparedness and Response Interventions Rationale. Communities are vulnerable to external disasters and are deficient in their capacities to address their vulnerabilities. School students and administration lack hazard awareness and are vulnerable to external and within premises hazards. District governments are grossly deficient in their capacities to protect vulnerabilities in disaster situations. These aspects have been amply highlighted in the evaluation, for communities and schools in Chapter VI and District government in Chapter II. Beneficiaries ¾ Disaster vulnerable district government ¾ 20 disaster vulnerable communities within the sleeted district ¾ 20 vulnerable schools within the selected communities Location. District Badin in Sindh (tentative). Disaster Risks. Cyclones, excessive rains in low lying coastal regions, and tsunami hazard. Purpose. ¾ To improve the disaster response planning capacity of the district government. NDMA framework for Action priorities 4.4 and 4.8 refers. ¾ To make local communities disaster resilient. NDMA framework for Action priority 4.5 refers. ¾ To improve schools disaster preparedness capacities of schools. NDMA framework for Action priority 4.5 refers ¾ All three will be addressed through one integrated intervention which will include creating functional links through emphasis on common application areas. Deliverables Districts. The contingency planning should address the following ¾ District hazard profiling ¾ Resource profiling ¾ Prepare likely disaster/hazard scenarios ¾ Identify ‘triggers’ that would activate each scenario ¾ Response for each scenario to include provision of timely Early Warning, tasks of departments, coordinating measures, logistic support measures etc.
53 ¾ With regards to the 20 vulnerable communities selected for the intervention, the district plan should address disaster preparedness measures like improving road access, provision of timely EW, possible relocation to a safe site, define logistics support Vulnerable Communities ¾ Introduce social mobilisation capacity ¾ Assessment of hazard threats and vulnerabilities ¾ Vulnerability and resource mapping ¾ Identification and Introduction of structural and non-structural coping measures by the intervention partner to make them disaster resilient ¾ Linking coping mechanism with community institutions for suitability. ¾ Linking the communities with the district plan as it applies to their situation through the local functionaries: UC Nazim, local Revenue staff etc. Vulnerable Schools Creating school hazard management capacity ¾ Assessment of hazard threats and vulnerabilities ¾ Identification and introduction of situation specific school hazard management measures through the intervention partner. ¾ Identification and implementation of academic activities intended to enhance hazard and management awareness. ¾ Introduction of school health screening and psychological therapy based programme ¾ Linking the school DM intervention with the local community in terms of monitoring and support ¾ Linking the school DM intervention with the Education Department in terms of support and addressing the structural measures that lie outside the scope of school administration to manage. . Cross cutting themes ¾ Capacity building ¾ Advocacy on disaster awareness and response ¾ Community and stakeholder inclusive contingency planning Process ¾ Confirm project location in keep with its purpose ¾ Develop project proposal ¾ Identification of implementation partner ¾ Data collection and problem statement by intervention partners on district government, communities and schools interventions viz intervention deliverables. . ¾ Hold stakeholders workshop for district government, communities and schools for evolving possible solutions to the problems identified. ¾ Hold planning sessions with the stakeholders for district government, communities and schools for crystallisation of detailed implementation plans (DIP). ¾ Project implementing and monitoring ¾ Correcting implementation strategies and activities by benefited from objective feedback linking outputs to intended outcomes. ¾ Project conclusion.
54
Summary of Recommendations
Recommendations Chapters 1 and IV - Disaster EW and Management Management of Flood Hazard in Pakistan (Preparedness and response) 10 cm Doppler Radar EW System for Flash Early Warning for NWFP installed at Chirat Flood Management System for NWFP, including construction of protective dykes and setting up coordination and implementation mechanisms, operationalised High quality Flood Preparation status maintained in Punjab and Sindh Early Warning System along seasonal channels maintained in Punjab and Sindh Flood victims compensated in time and equitably Sea Based Hazards Cyclone EW system installed and made operationalised. Includes of installation of radars at Chhor and Panjgur and integrating inputs sources into one cohesive system Tsunami EW system installed and operationalised. It involves deployment of sea based sensors and integrating multiple inputs into one cohesive system. Provincial and district government capacity to response enhanced. Involves real time EW inputs and dissemination and proactive contingency planning Drought Management Resource mobilisation for DERA 2 in operation commenced. Project planned for launching in 2008 Drought preparedness up graded with regards vulnerable communities and regions. This involves socio-economic development of drought vulnerable regions and more inputs from provincial, district governments and NGOs in drought preparedness Drought Early Warning System refined and used for timely decision making. This means further refining the present Rainfall Weighted Aggregate based system and incorporating other factors based on DERA 1 impact analysis. Dengue Virus Epidemic Management DEW and operational management systems operationalised in all provinces Crisis management capacity enhanced in provinces and vulnerable districts Crisis management capacity enhanced in provinces and vulnerable districts Legislation passed for registration of private health operators to enable common disease eradication strategies Capacity building of health operators for epidemic eradication undertaken Pronounced public awareness campaigns conducted Information management systems for disaster EW for provincial governments
Responsibility
Timeframe
PWD, NWFP govt and NA Administration FFC, NWFP govt
Dec 2008
FFC, PMD, provincial govts PMD, Provincial Relief Commissioners Respective Provincial Relief Commissioners and district govts
May 2007
PMD, Sindh and Baluchistan govts PMD, Sindh and Baluchistan govts
Dec 2007
Concerned provincial and district govts
Dec 2007
Planning Commission, Fed Govt, DERA Cell Federal Government, provisional government , NGOs PMD, affected provincial and district governments
March 2007
Federal and provincial governments
Dec 2007
Federal and provincial governments Ministry of Health
Dec 2007
Sindh, Punjab and NWFP governments Sindh, Punjab and NWFP govts PMD, SUPRACO and
Mar 2007
June 2009
May 2007 Oct 2007
Dec 2008
Dec 2007 March 2008
Jun 2007
May 2007 Sep 2007
55 streamlined under the NDMA initiative
provincial government s
District EW capacity enhanced through timely inputs and dissemination and energising t relevant channels SUPARCO initiates disaster specific EW programme with Federal govt support and its inputs built into governance decision making mechanisms. Chapter II – Governance and Disaster Management Legislative Issue NDMS legislation to define Disaster Management structure at the Tehsil government to improve upon grass root reach of DDMA.
PMD, SUPRACO and provincial government s SUPARCO, Ministry of Defence NDMA and NRB
Dec 2007
Structural Issues PDMAs made effective in all four provinces and its AJK and Northern Areas derivatives
NDMA
June 2007
DDMA created and made effective in the light of LGO 2001 unsuitability for DM. Implementation to occur in phases, focusing on 20 most disaster vulnerable districts in phase 1. LGO 2001 to be made fully, and uniformally effective in all districts and provinces of the country with regards to devolved subjects under the district government
NDMA, PDMA and provincial governments
Dec 2007
NRB and provincial governments
June 2007
ERC subsumed under NDMA Governance Zila Nazim in particular, Tehsil Nazim and UC Nazims made fully responsible and accountable for DM within their respective spheres Capacity Building District governments capacities built on disaster management, by focusing on the following:x Capacity building of key functionaries. x All Stakeholders inclusive contingency planning.
Cabinet Division, NDMA Respective provincial chief minsters
June 2007
Facilitation Agency and PDMA
Dec 2007
Ministry of Interior, Civil Defence Directorate
June 2007
CD Directorate, provincial governments and provincial directorates Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior and CD Directorate CD Directorate, DG NVM and their principles CD Directorate, provincial services Ministry of Interior & CD Directorate
End - 2008
Chapter III – Disaster Response Agencies in Pakistan Civil Defence Services of Pakistan Policy Making
All stakeholder inclusive national policy for fire fighting assumes legal status. Civil Defence grass root reach incrementally extended to rural areas
Formal operational linkage drawn between Civil Defence and Janbaz Forces (third line forces for war like situations) for better performance of war functions. Institutional link created between CD and National Volunteer Movement for mutual benefit Civil Defence services district configuration structured on disaster threat
Functional overlaps between civil defence and fire and police services eradicated.
Sep 2007 Dec 2007
End 2007 Mid - 2007 Dec 2007 June 2007
56
CD Directorate, provincial services
Dec 2007
Efficiency in financial management of Civil Defence services introduced:x Accessing budgetary allocations for district services consistent with the policy x Introduce proactive financial management practices and avoid budgetary lapses. x CD Directorate to recommend access for funds to up gradation of training institutions
CD Directorate, provincial services and local governments
Dec 2007
CD field units actively involved in advocacy emphasis though their warden post, district and provincial presence. Capacity building improved through upgrading institutions and much emphasis 2 SAR units rated and made functional under CD Directorate
CD Directorate, provincial services
Jun 2007
CD Directorate and Ministry of Interior
End 2007
National and provincial directorates
End 2007
National and provincial directorates
June 2008
National and provincial directorates
June 2007
Operational Issues
Operational standard setting of Civil Defence up graded through the following process:Internal review. Capacity building of CD training institutes Imbibing international best practices while retaining strengths of existing system.
Pakistan Red Crescent Society Policy Emerge as a leading disaster response entity, especially in vulnerable regions of the country through institutionalising connectivity with government at multiples levels. DM Contributions x Build its emergency response capacity substantially in terms of relief goods for minimum 100,000 households and a cumulative emergency hospital capacity for 500 patients. x Widen the scope of its rural DM interventions Advocacy Enhance the scope of health and DM advocacy in schools and colleges and throu grass root presence. Chapter IV – Emergency Services of Pakistan Fire Fighting Services
CD Directorate, Ministry June 2007 Policy Emphasis of Interior Functional overlap eliminated between fire fighting departments and CD in fire prevention. It must be advocated and enforced by the Fire fighting Department CD Directorate, Ministry June 2007 Clear rules of business, including work mandate identified through a of Interior consultative process culminating in promulgation of Fire Fighting Ordinance. Mandate must include fire fighting, enforcing fire prevention standards, SAR and proactive advocacy on fire prevention. Provincial Dec 2007 Fire fighting infrastructural capacity included in town planning. It is a local
57 legislation and enforcement issue Multi storey building, rising beyond 6 floors, have an integral mandatory fire prevention and Mandatory road space capacity kept to facilitate operations of emergency response vehicles.
Public autonomous bodies, corporations and the industrial sector must maintain a need based fire services, having fighting and prevention capacity. Local Fire Fighting Department to monitor compliance. . Local Fire Fighting departments to maintain a strong fire prevention advocacy focus in concert with education department, social sector and city governments
Governments, city administrations, local fire fighting departments Local Fire Fighting Department, City government Provincial Governments, city administrations, local emergency service providers CD Directorate, local fire fighting departments, relevant autonomous bodies Local Fire Fighting and Education departments, city governments and NGOs CD and Fire Fighting Departments
Dec 2007 Dec 2007
Dec 2007
Commencing June 2007
Human resource policies of Fire Department and Civil Defence reviewed for encouraging younger and better educated entrants Police Emergency Services Regulatory mechanism installed for Police Emergency Services through a broad b Ministry of Interior, Federal and provincial consultative process. It must address the following:and local police x Mandate of work defined by avoiding functional overlap with other departments emergency service providers. x Budgetary provision earmarked for sustainability of services x Capacity building for community friendly services x Institutionalising police – communities local liaison mechanism x Proactive advocacy of social causes
May 2007
Integration of Emergency services to be affected within the following proposed framework:x Fire services to solely deal with fire fighting and implementation of rules governing fire prevention in concert with city government. x Dedicated emergency response force should be created in all provinces to deal with SAR and medical emergencies. x Emergency medical support capacity of PRCS and its provincial and districts chapters should be incorporated. x Police Emergency Services to deal with community friendly policing issues and facilitate information management through its existing capacities. x Civil Defence should reinforce its emphasis on community level fire fighting, fire prevention, first aid and SAR capacity building. This must be integrated in the overall response framework. x Voluntary emergency service providers like Eidhi Ambulance service, and other philanthropist services should be incorporated locally. x Private emergency health service providers should also be functionally
Dec 2007
Provincial governments through P&D Deptts, district governments, CD provincial services and all emergency service providers.
Dec 2007
58
x x x x
networked Local governments MUST identify one lead agency to head emergency response force. The integrated service must function within local legislative framework which identifies functional responsibilities, cuts overlaps, sets standards, and allows for creation of public friendly local liaison institutions. In Punjab, fire services should be subsumed within ‘Rescue 1122’. Local governments should support a strong advocacy focus on fire prevention through its fire services.
Volunteer initiatives to support emergency and disaster management, as follows:x Urban regions volunteer capacities employed in emergency medical services, SAR and fire fighting integrated in the proposed integrated local emergency services. x Volunteer capacity building in DM should be factored as an ambient potential for disaster preparedness and response on situation specific basis. Institutionalise functional cooperation between various volunteer based agencies for mutual benefit through sharing of best practices and strengths. Port Based Oil Spill Hazard/Disaster Legislation enacted to define:x Policy parameters governing hazard management x Mandate and functional responsibilities of key stakeholders. x Legal basis for crisis management duly factoring relevant provisions of maritime corporate laws Ports crisis management capacity up graded by streamlining management strategise for averting such hazards and for pre-disaster resource and expertise access through contractual arrangements.
CD services, PRCS, NVM and other agencies supporting volunteerism
June 2008
Ministry of Shipping and Ports, Ports
Dec 2007
59
Recommended OCHA’s Contributions District based Integrated Disaster Management intervention ¾ Support creation of institutionalised disaster management capacity in a disaster vulnerable district. ¾ By creating functional linkages with the district intervention, institutionalise disaster coping mechanisms in 50 disaster vulnerable communities and schools. Civil Defence and Fire Fighting Services ¾ Support capacity building of National institute for Fire Technology through material assistance. ¾ Support creation of fire vehicle tracking operational rooms for six fire services of Islamabad, Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar & Quetta fire. Common to all Disaster and Emergency Response Units. Facilitate access to function specific capacity building trainings through OCHA/ISDR supported/affiliated training institutions.
. : .
.
Timelines and Implementation responsibilities will be defined on before projects their implementation
60
. Annexure A Governance and DM –Review Matrix
Emergency Relief Cell, Cabinet Division Subject
Present Functions
Comments/Proposed
I visited ERC on 31 Oct 06 and met the DG ERC Mr Khalid Khan Toru, a seasoned bureaucrat. Summary of my observations on ERC as the key disaster responder agency is reproduced based on the meeting and my review of secondary source opinions on ERC. Origin Created as a Federal disaster relief Not suited even to manage disaster response in a (response) entity following devastating 1970 major disaster situation like Oct 05 EQ. cyclone in the erstwhile East Pak (Bangladesh) Structure 1. Located under the Cabinet Secretary, ERC should be subsumed under NDMA. With up Cabinet Division GOP. It has Plans and gradation it can act as the Operations Centre of NDMA stores sections with an Aviation Squadron for orchestrating response. and warehouses. 2. Interacts with Provincial Relief Commissioners. Policy making No role in disaster related policy making In its present shape, ERC is not suited for policy making input . The only planning document that it refers to In its present shape ERC has no short or long- term Disaster is ‘National Disaster Plan’ prepared by a UN disaster planning capacity. Response consultant in 1974. Planning 1. This must continue till NDMA set-up is effective. Tasks 1. Provide cash assistance to supplement 2. in its present shape, ERC is incapable of managing resources of provincial govt in disasters. operational. Can function more as a bureaucratic 2. Maintain control room for constant liaison channel. with government . 3. It cannot coordinate disaster response, within the 3. Coordination functions. Fed govt and with affected provinces. 4.Coordinate foreign training programmes. 4. Is not capable of carrying out training need 5. Maintain contact with international aid assessments. agencies. 5. Possible for dispensing routine issues. 6. To stockpile disaster relief related stores. 6. It does in 2 warehouses in Isd and Karachi in limited 7. Provide assistance to calamity stricken quantities. countries. 7. Performs this task on Fed govt instructions. Disaster ERC claims to have effectively contributed in 1. Contributions restricted to channel Fed govt Contributions all major disasters including Oct 05 EQ support in cash and kind to provinces on latter’s request. Not capable of carrying out disaster need assessments and recommending support to Fed govt. 2. Managed flow of Fed funds in Oct 05 EQ. Nothing more. Legal Framework Works within the context of National Its new role should flow from the relevant disaster Calamities Prevention Act 1958 which preparedness and response related provisions of the confers powers to Relief Commissioners for National Disaster Management act which is being managing emergency situations. processed .
61 Employment of Aviation Squadron Recommendation
Supposed to be employed for emergency duties for disasters and crisis
The Squadron is excessively employed for VIP duties ERC should be merged in to NDMA for management of operational response. It would, however , require selective capacity up gradation and a fresh employment concept consistent with NDMA’s disaster response framework.
NWFP Disaster Management Review (10 Oct 06) Outcomes
Subject
x Disaster/hazard threats and vulnerability profile of NEFP identified. x Disaster management capacity in the Province within its peculiar environment identified x Provincial draft DM plan analysed Weak areas in the provincial DM capacity identified for bridging resource and capacity gaps..
Facts as Explained by the Resource Persons
Resource Persons
Mr Badshah Gul Wazir, Home Secretary NWFP and Mr Fazle Rabbi Provincial Relief Commissioner. Both officials are instrumental in shaping the NWFP initiatives in institutionalising disaster management within governance tiers. This exercise draws much support from compatible UNDP initiatives.
History
Like other provinces, disaster relief operations in NWFP were being handled by the Relief Commissioner Member of Board of Revenue under National Calamities Act 1958. However, the current relief Commissio been absolved of his judicial functions to focus fully on disaster response.
Disaster Profile
Earthquake Vulnerable districts. Mansehra, Abbotabad, Chitral, Kohistan, Shangla, Buner, Upper and Lower Dir. Flash Floods Vulnerable: Mansehra, Abbotabad, Mardan, Charsada, DI Khan, Karak, Bannu, Chitral, all 7 FATA agencies River Flood Vulnerable. Nowshera, Charsadda and Peshawar Drought Vulnerable. Tank, Lakki Marwat, Bannu, DI Khan, Karak. Note. To improve upon early warning against flash and river floods in NWFP, a met radar is planned to be installed at Chirat. Industrial Accidents Environmental Hazards Comments. Vulnerable to flash floods, droughts, management of industrial accidents and secondary hazards due environmental degradation in the EQ Zone. Contributions The Relief Commissioner and the Home Secretary were the provincial focal persons in managing he in Disaster response to the Oct 05 EQ and the subsequent disaster situations stemming from torrential summer Response monsoon rains during 2006. While the former focuses on coordination functions within the government, the latter on actual handling of relief operations.
62 Focus of Evaluation
The focus of my evaluation is the draft NWFP Disaster Management Strategy which is more of a generic document that addresses broad guidelines and is lacking in specifics that would serve as a practical guide for the disaster vulnerable districts to prepare their plans
Explanation and Evaluation of NWFP Draft Disaster Management Plan Proposed (1) Structure. Council of Ministers (for policy making under the Chief Minister), Provincial disaster DM Management Committee (for affecting coordination within the government, headed by Home Secretary), Structure Emergency Disaster Response Committee (led by the Provincial Relief Commissioner) (2) Multi- Tiered DM Capacity. Provided in the shape of DM Committees going down to Tehsil level. Main functions are disaster risk assessments, making DM plans, SOPs to guide response, linkage of response with EW mechanisms, provide for horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms, preparedness, capacity building functions including hard and soft ware components, resource mapping?, awareness. (3) Coordination Mechanisms. Vertical and horizontal mechanisms linking the governance channels, but not wider stakeholders like NGOs, religious organisations and other professional bodies dealing with disasters. (4) Creation of Regional DM Infrastructure. Regional hubs will be created in Kohat, Mansehara, Malakand and DI Khan. Does not relate to disaster risk response. Operational (1) . Four Regional Relief Commissioners will be deployed at Mansehra, Malakand, Kohat and DI Management Khan. Relief Commissioner will perform their functions as per Provincial Relief Plan of 1977.
(2) Supporting Communities for DM. Not included. (3) Disaster Prevention and Mitigation Strategy. Does relate to the major hazards in the province and evolution of land use plans and up grading flood EW infrastructure in the province. But generally it remains generic and does not convey clearly as to how the vision will be put in practice. (4) Disaster Preparedness and Response. It is more of expression of intent in terms of creating SAR teams, upgrading Civil Defence and emergency health cover etc but does not give out a definite plan of action. An Annexure gives out some generic pre-disaster task for line departments. These must evolve from brainstorming DM plans for various contingencies to make them more specific. (5) Disaster Risk Assessment, Mapping & Monitoring. The process should be identified (6) Resource Mapping and its Updating. The process should be identified (7) Disaster Contingency Planning. The process should be identified. Preference for a bottom-up approach. (8) Preparation of Sectoral Plan. No guidelines. Policy Making Weak as composition and role of Council of Minsters not defined. No role for the Governor as he administratively controls the Tribal Areas. Legal Framework Area Coverage Emergency Response
. Being created. The proposed DM Act while drawing from National Calamities (Prevention and Relief) Ac 1958 and the Civil Defence Act of 1952. Does not address disaster management in 7 tribal agencies, source of much human instigated crises/disasters Civil Defence will be the focal point for crisis management and will undertake trainings, preparedness
63 and response. NWFP intends to upgrade the quality of Civil Defence services in the province. Linkage with NDMA. Capacity Building
There is conceptual relevance with NDMA creation process. However, the proposed DM structure in the province is more seems to be an outcome of a province centred exercise, supported by UNDP. Should evolve as a consequence of an interactive process with the Federal government. No guidelines except for vague references.
Community DM Support Media Management Planned Budget Conclusion
No reference No reference Rs 250 million for implementing the provincial disaster management plan. Government will be seeking donor support. The draft NWFP government draft document is generic and needs much refinement through intense interaction with all stakeholders particularly district governments
Disaster Response Evaluation Matrix of District Mansehra (11 Oct 06)
Outcomes
x x x
Governance structure at the District analysed from DM perspective Key elements of the District’s Oct 05 EQ response outlined. Gaps in district government’s capacity to plan and manage future disaster situations identified with a view to strengthening disaster response capacity
. DCO Mansehra, Mr Shakeel and EDOs Works and Services, Health and Social Welfare. These members of the d governance team were instrumental in articulating response to Oct 05 EQ. (1) District governance structure from disaster management viewpoint evaluated. (2) Key elements of district Mansehra;s response to the Oct 05 EQ identified. (focus only on the district administra (3) Shortfalls in district administration’s capability to respond to a major disaster identified (4) OCHA’s contributions in making these shortfalls identified Basic Area. Information Pop on the Administrative subunits District Literacy Rate District Administration’s structural evaluation viz disaster response Resource Persons Outcomes
Subject
Facts as explained by Resource Persons and through secondary sources consultation
Policy Making As per LGO 2001 and the proposed Disaster management (DM ) framework, District Nazim is responsible for DM policy making assisted by the DCO. Legislation Following limitations of LGO 2001 must be addressed in DM context:(1) Does not cover disaster management comprehensively. (2) Nazim is entrusted with organising relief activities. (3) DCO has coordination functions to perform, which includes for disaster management. (4) Tehsil structure lacks administrative coherence in articulating disaster response.
Comments/Recommendations (1) Lack of substantive such input from the District Nazim in disaster response. There is a need to build capacities of Nazims in disaster vulnerable districts. (2) First option is to amend LGO 2001 to make DM executive functions more specific, particularly for Nazim and DCO, in disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and rehabilitation context. (3) Second recommended option is for the DM Ordinance to supplant LGO 2001 in making these functions more specific. (4) Fundamental review of the administrative structure at the Tehsil level should be undertaken to make it more capable for disaster response.
64 (5) Village/neighbourhood council deals with water supply, sanitation, ward and ward, tree plantation, care of handicapped and destitute. (6) Risk Minimisation. Governance at all levels are entrusted with land zoning, storm water drainage, sanitation and solid waste disposal How EQ Oct 05 response was managed. Facts stated as explained by the resource persons, DCO in particular District Standard district management structure with Nazim as the administrative head, DCO performing the executive Structure coordination functions and respective EDOs managing their sectoral responsibilities. . For damage assessment and Information Comments Initial management, specially in the immediate post-disaster (1) Administrative Integrity. All three entities disaster period, the DCO relied on following agencies for function as parallel structures and not strictly under impact the DCO. However, in Mansehra situation they assessments information, as they have a grass root reach with variations. responded to the DCO.. and (2) Reach. All three are represented below tehsils information x The Revenue Staff. or UC, consistent with their scope of work management x The Police Department. (3) Connectivity . Except for police who have x Forest Department. wireless, rest are not effectively connected with DCO. Provincial govt/DCO What Was (1) Keep the lines of communication open as possibility of relief support reaching distant locations deters most Important communities from out migrating to towns and valleys. (2) Secondly, keep local water supply sources running. Water shortage again triggers internal displacements. Restoration of A strategy that minimises internal population dislocations helps in the relevant line department: WAPDA, Essential Telephone Department and Education Department in early restoration of their respective services. Services Response by (1) Works and Services Department in Disaster Management Line Keeping Roads Open Departments a. There are 100 vulnerable slide sites in the district and 15 dozers are required to keep the routes open b. Emergency funds should be made available by relaxing relevant rules. Water and Sanitation a. Out of 232 water schemes in the district, 135 were damaged during the EQ, mostly minor damages. 4 major schemes were seriously damaged. b. Many water sources dried up or new appeared, close to the fault line, making number of water sup[ply schemes redundant. About 100 schemes were affected to a varying degree. (2) Health Department a. Biggest challenge - lack of information on health related damage assessment and poor access to remote locations. This hampered deployment of national and international assistance to where it was most required. b. Poor tertiary health services in the field not capable in most cases of providing first aid. c. Lack of central coordination in the initial critical days following EQ. d. There should be provision of emergency funding by relaxing the rules. e. 50 bed mobile hospital should be made available for emergency situations. f. In health sector, available of human resource was the key issue, not medicines and other essential emergency health support hardware. (3) EDO (Social Welfare) – Vulnerability assessments, community mobilisation through CBOs (40 working CBOs in Mansehra) & CCBs (200 functional), management of IDP camps. (4) DOR (District Officer Revenue) – Fund and information management through a grass root reach of patwaris (community based revenue staff) (5) DPO (Police) Law and order and traffic control, protection of camps and displaced/vulnerable population (6) EDO (Works and Services) Keeping lines of communication open and water and sanitation
65
(7) DFC (District Food Controller)– Food management, ware housing and inventory control.
Disaster planning
(8) EDO (Education) - Minimise/eradicate education related disruption due to crisis or disasters, employment of teachers as human resource in emergency situations, employment of boys scouts and girls guides for local crisis management. An assessment of District Government Mansehra,s capacity for disaster contingency planning for future.
(1)There is no set format or procedure for undertaking disaster planning but following emerged as a consequence of a discussion with DCO (2) It must emerge from multi-stake holder inputs in following steps:x Disaster Risk, Vulnerability Assessments and hazard mapping. x Based on which define all possible disaster scenarios in the district. x Resource mapping; and identification of resource gaps for each scenario. x What exactly constitutes the trigger to set in motion response to a scenario? x Response to all scenarios must be worked out which must articulate SOPs for action of the key departments, and of the governance tiers, Union Council, Tehsil and District, as may be applicable to a particular scenario. . x The plans must then be reviewed at the province for its integration in the provincial and regional plans. x The province must also earmark additional resources that may be required for in responding to certain district contingencies. (4) The DCO admitted that he does not have the means to undertake disaster planning on proposed lines a recommended building the capacity of Civil Defence Department for this purpose. Requires deliberation The (1) Social mobilisation and building communities resilience to disasters must be undertaken by the social sector. Community (2) Disaster management must figure out in all community based development programmes. (3) School based disaster management must also be addressed either as part of community focused programme End or as a distinct intervention. (4) Possible involvement of traditional religious rural institutions in disaster management was discussed without reaching a conclusion. Coordination (1) Sector based cluster system is an example to be followed for future disasters.. Mechanisms (2) UN agencies have well developed practices of working with the government agencies. However, other NGOs with NGOs, UNhave to be brought into cluster system. agencies and INGOs Media Policy
None exists
Linkage with Provincial DM set-up Important Issues requiring attention
None at the moment. DCO considers the draft provincial government DM strategy as too generic which requires much refinement.
Assessment S&W
Strengths Legal basis in the shape of LGO 2001. Strong institutional capacity built due to EQ experience, particularly for affecting sectoral coordination. Can draw strength from provincial and national disaster response resource base. Mechanisms developed for integrating interantoinal DM agencies. . Has grass root governance and information management/ early warning mechanisms Alll key functional sectors represented. Geernaly positive in stake holder management.
(1) No capacity building capability exists in the district for development DM skills. (2) There is no agency to be the focal point for disaster planning, monitoring and updating. DCO recommended capacity building of Civil Defence Department for this purpose. (3) There is a need to develop a strategy for resource mobilisation within the district.
Weaknesses
66 Weak Lateral coordination mechanism, particularly at he Tehsil level. Nazim not accountable to the provincial governance mechanism. LGO does not address DM concertedly. Absence of a viable and integrated crisis response mechanisms at the district. Poor capacity for hazard and resource mapping and for disaster contingency planning Poor grass root connectivity Smaller NGOs not particularly well integrated in the government response mechanisms. Resource paucity in keeping lines of communication open in disaster situations. Rules of business not conducive for emergency resource mobilisation. How OCHA can support
Capacity building for disaster planning Creation of operational command and control facility to facilitate emergency response
Punjab Disaster Management in Punjab (7 Nov 06)
Outcomes Issues
x x x
Disaster/hazard threats and vulnerability profile of Punjab identified. Disaster management capacity in the Province within its peculiar environment identified Weak areas in the provincial DM capacity identified for bridging resource and capacity gaps.
Facts as explained by Resource Person
Resource Person Brief History
Brig ® S Ghazanfar Ali, Secretary Relief and Crisis Management, Punjab Like other provinces relief operations were managed by Senior Member Board of Revenue (SMBR) flowing from 1958 National Calamities Act. However, following Oct 05 EQ, SMBR functions were merged in the office of Relief Commissioner and Crisis Management who is Secretary to the government of Punjab.
Legislative Support
Still functioning under the 1958 Calamities Act.
Disaster History
Disaster Vulnerabilities
x Major riverine floods along the Indus Basin rivers floods in 1974, 1977, 1988. x Flash floods during monsoon season in Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Narowal districts in central Punjab. In Rajanpur and DG Khan in the south and in Sargodha and Mianwali in the northwest. x Droughts in districts in Rahim Yar Khan, Bahawalpur, DG Khan, Rajanppur, Bhakar and Mianwali x Oct 05 EQ in the north and NE in Galliat/Rawalpidi district. x Fire hazards in urban areas. x Floods. DG Khan, Rajanpur and Leiah in southern Punjab. Flash Floods. Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Sialkot, Narowal, DG Khan and Rajanpur.
Comments The Crisis management functions have yet to be streamlined at the province level and integrated with the disaster vulnerable distts Legislative support base will be enacted when PDMA is created under the NDMA initiative x
x Cohesive flood protection plan in place with its risk minimisation
67 Earthquake. Rawalpindi district and adjoining hilly Galliat region. Droughts. Relatively poor capacity to manage drought hazard. Industrial Hazards. Lahore, Gujranwala and Faislabad. More vulnerable are areas adjoining chemical industries in district Lahore (Kala Shah Kaku).. x . Hazards emanating from industrial accidents, particularly chemical industries x Nuclear facilites in Disitrts Mianwali, Attock and Rawalpindi x Road Accidents. Along the Main GT and Lahore-Karachi road and Motorway. The former has much more vehicle density but little crisis response capacity Flood Management Planning and Coordination mechanisms
component. x Vulnerable to other hazards, particularly industrial and nuclear accidents.
National planning and Coordination Mechanisms x Engineering-in-Chief of Paksitan Army holds two flood planning an d coordinaton, one in November each year to review the past flood season and to plan for the coming year. The other conference is convened in April every year to review preprations for the flood season. x All important national stakeholders participate in these conference which includes all provinces, Army, FFC, ERC, WAPDA, irrigation, health, Met Deptt and other important national stakeholders. Punjab Planning, Coordination and Implementation Mechanisms x Following the national conference, similar conferences are held in the province which include mainly provincial governmental stakeholders. x Similar panning and coordination is done at the district level. x Flood response plans define triggers for activating all sets of response, which includes affecting population dislocations, breaches protective dykes etc. Provincial Flood Early Warning Assets x Met Department Radar Coverage. Radars in Lahore and Sialkot focus on the rivers catchment areas. However, a high resolution radar is being installed in Mangla for a better transfrontier catchment area coverage. x Drawback – poor EW from India. Radio broadcastds from Jammu or intimation by India as per Indus Water Treaty. Once on our side, travelling time downstream to all locations is calculated. No problem. x Besides Met Deptt other elements of EW system are:x Irrigation Departmensts physical inspection of vulnerable areas. x Police telecommunication coverge of the vulnerable areas. x Grass root monitoring of the vulnerable staff through district revenue staff. x Community vigils developed through past experiences. Key Elements of Flood and post-flood Operational Management x All key departments like Irrigation Flood, Army (in case employed), provincial government maintain operational updates based on input from Met Department. x Breaching sites along the flood protection infrastructure prepared. x Flood situation monitoring at district and Tehsils x Vulnerable population evacuation plans prepared by local governments. x Departments related to emergency response like Health, Food, Livestock and dairy, Army and Police prepare emergency response. x Vulnerable population informed of emergency situations. x Carrying out flood damage assessments by the local revenue staff and its provincial verification. x Damage of more than 45% of estimated crop value qualifies the district to be called calamity hit. x Damage compensation paid as per provincial policy.
Disaster Response –
x Limited/poor capacity of flood affected districts to launch immediate response to the flood hazard, due to paucity in resources and weak response mechanism, particularly at sub-district level. Essential
68 Weak areas
Analysis S&W
flood response stores should be pre-located and grass implementation capacity requires refining. x Information management at sub-district level needs improvement. x Being an elected representative, district Nazims fall outside the provincial response mechanisms. Province works through the DCO. x Being an elected representative, district Nazims fall outside the provincial response mechanisms. Province works through the DCO. x Poor quality in central coordination at the province before onset of the flood season. x Flood response system is reactive and not proactive in terms of risk minimisation to the flash food hazards. x Crisis management needs to be institutionalised at all levels. x Strengths Weaknesses x Well developed flood management system x Absence of multi hazard DM approach and coordination mechanisms. x Absence of capacity for disaster contingency x Integrated disaster and emergency response planning to include vulnerability assessments, in one Office in the province. resource mapping and contingency planning. x In the process of being integrated in NDMA x Absence of lateral coordination mechanisms framework. under one provincial DM authority. x Weak drought management x Not prone to a multi stakeholder approach in integrating non-governmental NGOs in disaster planning. .
Case Study Tehsil Ferozwala, Distt Shekhupaura (8 Nov 06) General. Case of Tehsil Ferozwala indicates a poor level of flood preparedness in a situation where river based major flood threat has not materialised for the last 18 years. With the present state of readiness, Tehisl Ferozwala is very vulnerable to a major flood hazard. Deputy Disitrct Officer Revenue (DDOR) is the point person for DM in the Tehsil and he was not fully aware of the local flood plan. In fact he relied more on the input of old Revenue Department Staff members in response to my queries. Even their memory seems to be fading as indicated by their response on some issues. Tehsil Ferozwala in its present shape is in a poor state in handling a major flood. The local administration has no plans in place to deal with the rain water channel hazard that tends to recur with varying impact. Neither is the local administration any capable to undertake contingency planning for other hazards like industrial accidents or major road accidents along the GT road. Moreover, the non-integrative administrative structure at the Tehsil does not lend itself to coordinated actions before the advent of floods, which defines the quality of response. Tehsil as an administrative unit is very less capable to handle a serious flood situation. Infact the district will have to handle the situation from the outset with Tehsil staff augmenting district’s capacity.
Basic Facts and Hazard Profile Outcomes
x Efficacy of the governance mechanisms at the Tehsil level from DM perspective reviewed. x Flood hazard profiled in the Tehsil x DM capacity in flood situation analysed with its sensitivity to the concerns of vulnerable communities. x Conceptual, resource and capacity gaps identified in the DM perspective.
69
Subject Resource Persons Basic Information Flood Hazard
Other Hazards
Facts Muhamamd Usman Moazzam, Deputy District Officer Revenue (DDOR) Tehsil Ferozwala and some members of his Revenue Department team. Ferozwala is one of the four tehsils of district Sheihkupura. It is located across River Ravi, 30 minutes drive from Lahore. It has a population of 2,05,000 and has 21 Union Councils (UCs), including 8 urban UCs. 100 industries are located within its administrative boundaries. Adjoining River Ravi, Tehsil Ferozwala experienced exceptionally high floods in 1973, 1974 and in 1988. In the latter two situations, flood protection dykes were breached to save Lahore, but it caused much damage within the Tehsil. However, Ferozwala has not experienced serious floods ever since. However, some areas experience floods emanating from rain water channels emanating from District Jammu, India, about 70 KMs to the east. x Out of 100 industries in the Tehsil, there are 15 highly hazardous chemical industries. Tehsil Administration has no capacity to face emergencies accruing form industrial accidents. x Road accidents occurring on the extremely busy Grant Trunk Road, passing through the Tehsil, linking Lahore with Rawalpindi. Emergency response services form Lahore attend to the accidents as the Tehsil Administration is not capable of providing emergency services less routine police cover.
Efficacy of Tehsil Governance for Disaster Management Subject Legislation Who is In charge
Issues
Facts/Comments Local Government Ordinance 2001 Tehsil Nazim sits over a triad based governance pattern. x Tehisl Municipal Organisation works under the Nazim with Tehsil Municipal Officer handling the Municipal functions x DDOR deals with revenue and general administration functions and he is the DCO’s representative in the Tehisl. Flood management falls within his functions, which he implements through his revenue staff. x DSP (Police) deals with police functions in a fairly autonomous manner working directly under the District Police Offcier (DPO). x Tehsil Nazim, like the District Nazim, being an elected representative is not answerable to the administrative chain emanating from the province and running through the district to the Tehsil. x Tehsil Nazims rarely involve themselves in operational issues like flood planning. Many do not have the education to undertake such functions. x The traid shaped administrative structure, therefore, does not lend itself to cohesive governance. For example DSP may or may not extend willing cooperation in an emergency situation. x Removal of executive magistrate at the district and tehsil levels while restructuring the local governance has much reduced the executive forte of the administration at districts and Tehsils. x As per DDOR, past experience in emergencies indicate that TMO and DSP rarely support DDOR, who handles emergency situations
70 Preparedness for the Flood Situation in Tehsil Ferozwala Salient Features of District Shekhupura Flood Plan (Ferozwala Tehsil is part of the Distinct) Action Points
Comments
x List of vulnerable points x Flood discharge guidelines – flood history, flood categorisation, medium, high, very high and exceptionally high flood (when 180,000 cusecs flow from Shahdara), flood water lag statement. x District Flood Fighting Committee -27 stakeholders x Flood sectors – location of relief camps x Flood warning system – flood evacuation plan x Roles of key departments and officials x Flood bund protection arrangements including breaching guidelines x Miscellaneous information including possible role of NGOs
x It was surprising to learn that Tehsil Ferozwala did not have a flood plan of its own. DDOR felt that the District (Sheihkupura) plan meets their planning needs, whereas I impressed the need for a Tehsil plan defining activation of its early warning, coordination and emergency response mechanisms including timely vulnerable population displacement x The flood plan no mention of monitoring flood waters in rain water channels like Degh which are a source of recurrent local flooding in rainy season. x It is essentially government agencies centred flood plan with no mention of any institutional mechanism to integrate vulnerable communities in early warning and response
Flood Fighting Planned Activities in Tehsil Sheikhupura Subject
Pre-flood Activities
Activities
Proposed Activities
x Tehsil divided into 4-6 sectors. Sectors created as per flood vulnerability with Naib Tehsildar/Qanoongo made in charge. x Key stakeholders at Tehsil Level: .Irrigation, , Revenue, Food, Health. Livestock, Education, Works and Services, Police, Army, Civil Defence x Coordination meeting held 15 days before onset of flood season. x Inspections of vulnerable areas and flood protection dyke breaching sites. x For Early Warning, Tehsil is dependent on DCO’s input. No coherent plan at Tehsil level x Evacuation plans are made for 10 flood vulnerable villages with about 50,000 population. x Revenue Deptt staff forewarns the flood vulnerable districts for possible relocation. x Tehsil has no resources for arranging emergency food, camps etc. Medical camps and Livestock centres established under District arrangements
x The flood early warning system must integrate vulnerable communities through perhaps relevant Union Council based coordination mechanism. x Tehsil Nazim to be play a key role in ensuring flood preparedness. x Vulnerable communities joint action committees prepared at the affected Union Councils x Emergency rescue and relief resources should be warehoused in the Tehsil and deployed at the planned locations before onset of floods.
Responsibility Long term(L) Medium (M) Short (S) Tehsil Administration (S) Tehsil Nazim (M) Tehsil Administration (S) District and Tehsil Administration (M)
71 During the floods
x Pop evacuations as per the situation. x Immediate relief activities. x Experience suggests that limited support arrives from the district.
x Coordination mechanisms established and joint planning undertaken with important stakeholders: local Irrigation, food, water and sanitation, health, livestock departments and Army. These two aspects define the quality of flood response. x Setting of Tehsi flood monitoring command post where timely information is received in terms of early warning and on damage incurred is vital for timely decisions making. x Timely deployment of essential rescue and relief stores in keeping with vulnerability assessment .
Post-Flood
x Camp management, health and food. x Compensation. Revenue staff estimates the local damages. Loss of life, livestock, habitat and crops. x Compensation criterion decided at the province and implemented.
The post flood situation will be managed under District and provincial arrangements with Tehsil’s capacity employed to execute the agreed priority.
Analysis S&W
Strengths x Institutional mechanism in place for the flood threat x Can draw/benefit from DM/crisis management resource of Lahore. x Governance structure has an effective grass root reach through the Revenue and Police staff/deployments.
Tehsil Administration (S/M)
District Administration
Weaknesses x Weak governance structure for effective DM. x Absence of multi hazard approach. x Poor disaster awareness within governance owing to absence of flood threat for the last 18 years. x Poor stakeholders approach for DM owing to reliance on governance mechanism.
72
Disaster Management in Sindh (20 Nov 06) Statement of Facts Outcomes Issues Resource Person Disaster Profile in the Province
Subject Legislative Support How is DM organised in the Province?
x x x
Disaster/hazard threats and vulnerability profile of Punjab identified. Disaster management capacity in the Province within its peculiar environment identified Weak areas in the provincial DM capacity identified for bridging resource and capacity gaps.
Facts as explained by Resource Person Mr Syed Anwar Haider, Relief Commissioner Sindh Disaster in Sindh province occur in the following scenarios: x Floods. The most common hazard along the Indus Basin. Though owing to the changing weather patterns, last serous floods occurred in 1988. Accompanying floods, at times, are breaches in the canal network and along protective embankments which cause excessive damage. x Vulnerability. Largely curtailed as an elaborate flood protection and response system is in place, though not seriously tested for number of years. x Cyclones/tsunamis. x Cyclones occur along -------KMs Sindh coastline. In 1999, a cyclone ravaged the two coastal districts of Thatta and Badin causing about 150 deaths and very significant socio-economic losses. These districts bear very poor social indicators. x .In 1945, a 8.2 scale EQ triggered a tsunami along Sindh/Baluchistan coast causing nearly 4000 deaths in Baluchistan coastal town of Pasni. Karachi barely escaped. x Vulnerability to these hazards stand enhanced in the absence of a viable sea borne hazard early warning system and ill preparedness of the coastal communities to deal with them. x Rains. In 2006 excessive rains were experienced in July-Sep in soutern Sindh causing much havoc to Mirpurkhas, Sanghar, Karachi and Hyderbad and moderate damage to 3 other contiguous districts. Excessive flooding brought urban centres of a standstill and rural regions suffered much economic loss, particularly to the cotton crop. It brought rural economy to a stop, thus enhancing poverty. Much damage occurred due to ingress of habitations in storm water drainage areas. x Earlier in 2003 heavy rains accompanied by breaches in LBOD and irrigation channels caused heavy flooding in the coastal districts of Badin and Thatta causing widespread damage to livestock and standing crops and about 150 human deaths. The local and provincial DM mechanisms proved quite inadequate to deal with such unprecedented hazards. x Drought. Very severe drought visited large tracts of Sindh, particularly the arid eastern belt lying outside the Indus Basin comprising eastern portions of districts Sanghar and Tharapkar and Dadu and Jacobabad to the west. It is a cyclic phenomenon which occurs after 5-7 years. Poor socioeconomic indicators of these regions served to accentuate the drought impact. x Other hazards. Industrial hazards, close to Karachi mostly, locust, EQ vulnerability in the coastal regions due to proximity to the Mekran fault line. x Disaster Prone Districts. Mostly in south Sindh, to include Thatta, Badin, Mirpur Khas, Hydrabad, Sanghar, Karachi and Tharpakar. Facts Still functioning under the 1958 Calamities Act. . Province x Provincial Relief Commissioner is responsible for disaster response including relief. Respective line departments are responsible for disaster management in their respective areas, for example, provincial health department is currently engaged in
Comments Legislative support base will be enacted when PDMA is created under the NDMA initiative The present system is structured for one single flood disaster for which it has structural and non-structural disaster mitigation and
73 combating the dengue virus. x Crisis management is handled by the Home Department under Home Secretary. x District Level. The Revenue Department under District Officer Revenue (DOR) is primarily entrusted with DM functions under the coordination and supervision of DCO and Nazim. x Early Warning. Through various agencies, Met Department, Irrigation Department and IRSA for floods. Met Deptt for cyclones. x Poor articulation of drought management in the province. Planned Improvements in the system
x In keeping with DM initiatives being taken in the Federal government and other provinces, Sindh plans to create a provincial DM Authority with following ingredients:x DM Commission headed by the CM and including relevant line Ministers for policy making. x DM Committee headed by Chief Secretary for affecting functional coordination between various line departments. x DM Cell integrating disaster relief and criiss management under the provincial relief commissioner. x An ambitious Rs 1097 million ‘Sindh Disaster Management Project’ is in the planning stage with PC-1 prepared and sent to the Federal government, which is being requested for 50% funding. It is essentially aimed to:x Put in place disaster mitigation measures against seaborne hazards like vulnerable communities protection dykes. x Improve the Early warning system against sea borne hazards. x Create a much improved disaster response capacity particularly pre-positioning relief stores in vulnerable areas. x Improve the disaster response articulation capacity at the provincial HQ and in vulnerable districts. x Capacity building for vulnerability assessment and contingency planning against disasters, again in the province and in vulnerable districts. x Networking with the international disaster management agencies and the in-country social sector. x Create a commensurate legal framework. x Purchase of 2 helicopters for improving disaster response,
preparedness measures in place, though the system has not been seriously tested for some time. Poor lateral coordination between various departments and line ministries at the province. It is disaster relief and not management oriented with heavy dependence on the Army for disaster relief. . Intentions are good but resource mobilisation will be an issue. The proposed plan needs much deliberations and refining in the light of Federal DM initiatives. The problem relates to enforcing legal frameworks and not in creating them. The province needs to address an integrated approach with regards to local crisis management which includes the fire, SAR and emergence medical response, primarily.
Disaster Response – Weak areas
x Inability to deal with unforeseen hazards like untimely excessive rains in the southern districts. x Poor EW and DM capacity for coastal region disaster hazards. x Lack of integrated crisis management capacity, particularly in the urban regions x Limited/poor capacity of flood affected districts to launch immediate response to the flood hazard, due to paucity in resources and weak response mechanism, particularly at sub-district level. Essential flood response stores should be pre-located and grass implementation capacity requires refining. x Information management at sub-district level needs improvement. x Being an elected representative, district Nazims fall outside the provincial response mechanisms. Province works through the DCO.
Analysis
Strengths x Well developed flood management system and coordination mechanisms.
S&W
Weaknesses x Absence of multi hazard DM approach x Absence of capacity for disaster contingency
74 x The province has articulated the vision to deal with DM in a comprehensive manner to include massive resource mobilisation. x In the process of being integrated in NDMA framework.
planning to include vulnerability assessments, resource mapping and contingency planning. x Weak capacity to deal with sea borne disaster threats. x Weak drought management x Not prone to a multi stakeholder approach in integrating non-governmental NGOs in disaster planning. .
Disaster Response Evaluation of District Badin, Sindh (22 Nov 06)
x District governance structure from disaster management viewpoint evaluated. x Key elements of district Badin’s response to a local disaster situation created by abnormally heavy rains in the district, particularly the coastal areas (focus only on the district administration). x Shortfalls in district administration’s capability to respond to a major disaster identified x OCHA’s contributions in making these shortfalls identified Resource Ex-DCO Badin and present DCO Mirpurkhas, Syed Mumtaz Ali Shah. He is a very experienced civil services Persons officer who is presently assigned as DCO Mirpurkhas where he handled a similar situation created by again exceptionally heavy rains during the summer monsoon period of 2006. A very experienced district administrator. Badin - Basic x Area: 6726 sq kms. Information x Pop 1.2 million x 5 Talukas x Literacy Rate 28% x District Badin is located in the coastal region on the left bank of Indus estuary. While its northern regions are well served by canal and communication network, the southern areas are relatively economically depressed with a weak reach of the irrigation network. It is vulnerable to sea and rain induced disasters. Left Bank Outfall Drain (LBOD) dissects the district north-south carrying saline water in the sea. It is in itself a source of disaster owing to a strong back flow of sea water and its limited capacity for excessive rains. District Administration’s structural evaluation viz disaster response As per LGO 2001 and the proposed Disaster Subject Comments/Recommendations Policy Making management (DM ) framework, District Nazim is x Lack of substantive such input from the District responsible for DM policy making assisted by the Nazim in disaster response. There is a need to DCO. build capacities of Nazims in disaster vulnerable Legislation District Mechanism districts x Previous district administration system more suited x First option is to amend LGO 2001 to make DM for decision making executive functions more specific, particularly for x In present system DCO is not a decision maker. Nazim and DCO, in disaster mitigation, Undefined where decision making lies. preparedness, response and rehabilitation x Nazim’s decision making curbed due to his local context. political affiliations x Second recommended option is for the DM x Major decision making requiring financial input has to Ordinance to supplant LGO 2001 in making be approved by the time consuming Zila Council these functions more specific. process. x Fundamental review of the administrative x DCO has no financial powers structure at the Tehsil level should be undertaken to make it more capable for disaster response. x Police under Zila Nazim for law and order. Outcomes
75 Governance at Tehsil (sub-district) x TMA has been made an independent entity. x Tehsil must work in 3 areas: water supply, sanitation and drainage plus fire brigade where it works independent of the District and receives budget direct from the province x Tehsil Nazim’s has no other functions x Revenue department responds to disasters under the district framework x DSP Police works independently under DPO. x Tehsil governance structure ill suited for DM Union Council x UC Nazim is a member of District Council x UC N Nazim is member of Tehsil Council x Gets funds from the district. x UC Nazim is an effective entity for DM at the grass root level. How 2005 Floods in District Badin were managed Facts stated as explained by the resource persons, DCO in particular District Structure Standard district management structure with Nazim as the administrative head, DCO performing the executive coordination functions and respective EDOs managing their sectoral responsibilities. . What happened Unprecedented heavy rains commencing 25 July 2003 in district Badin. They caused breach in LBOD. Multiple breaches were also caused to the Irrigation canals. All this happened when there is high tide in the sea. Significant portions of local communities in the coastal region were cut off and marooned in rain water. They were not even capable of lighting a fire to cook food. Had to be provided cooked ready to eat food and rescued to safer locations. Problem areas Objective. Immediate objective was to save human lives in the rain marooned population in the coastal regions in emergency of Badin. response Early Warning. Only 24 hours early warning of heavy was received from the province. The district government had no plans to deal with such an emergency. Similarly there was no effective withindistrict EW mechanism covering the coastal regions. Communication was cut off. Information Management. Extremely weak in the initial critical days as it concerns the getting updates on the vulnerable areas. Contingency Planning. There were no contingency plans to deal with the situations. Such plans must address (1) Propositioning of emergency food stocks in raised locations in the coastal region. (2) Immediate evacuation of vulnerable coastal population to safer regions. This would require (3) mobilisation of transport, (4) preparing alternative camping site and camp management, (5) provision of essential services at these camps, (6) law and order cover for the vulnerable population, (7) health cover to name some important aspects. Army Assistance. Army helicopters were employed to deliver ready to eat meals in the coastal regions. Army also sent in troops in boats for providing immediate relief and for rescuing vulnerable people. Played a crucial role in the initial days. Vulnerable population relocation. Vulnerable people were reluctant to leave their houses in time. Delays complicated the operations. Army helped in rescue and their relocation. Police Department helped in emergency hiring of vehicles for this purpose. Help from the Province. Not much in the crucial initial days but later food and other emergency support including reinforcing health cover was provided. More of an indifferent attitude. Lack of political ownership. Losses and compensation
76 350,000 people were affected and 90 died. Nearly 75% of livestock was wiped out in the affected regions. Standing crops were destroyed. 90% rural thatched roof houses were destroyed and the owners were compensated @ Rs 5000 per house and Rs 3000 per livestock lost. The region was declared calamity hit by the provincial hit and locals were absolved of agri taxes. Poverty Accentuation. The catastrophe accentuate poverty in a very depressed region. International NGOs, unicef and WFP also supported the relief efforts. Tasks of Line Departments
Line Departments Agriculture and Agri Engineering Departments. Manned flood warning centres and monitored irrigation channel flows. Worked with the dsitt govt to affect population relocations before breaches occur. . Revenue Department. Resource mobilisation and to reach out to communities for relief and for mamangign population relocations. Health Department . Generate mobile medical teams and undertake vaccinations for epidemic prevention. Education Department. Establish relief camps in schools where Revenue deptt provide food and health medical cover. Civl Defence. Employ volunteers for relief work HESCO and Telephone Departments. For early restoration of essential services. Provincial Food Department. Support emergency food supply. DPO. Mobilise transport and assist local administration in relocating vulnerable population besides law and order.
Lessons learnt from No plan was in place for relocating vulnerable population. Moreover, people were reluctant to move. Weaknesses in Response Responsibilities of line departments for emergency situation handling should be clearly identified. Capacity building of line departments, particularly Revenue Department for emergency situation management. Provincial Met Department provided only 24 hours EW which made such a massive population relocation an impossibility Essential rescue equipment like boats and vehicles should be pre-positioned. Monitoring of irrigation channel gauges LBOD, a disaster impact mitigation project with massive fund expense in the salinity context, became the cause of disaster instigation as its channel impeded storm water routes and it breached on numerous locations being unable absorb the deluge. Moreover, sea water reverse flowed in to it during high tides Arrangements for surface water drainage in populated areas. District must have resources to mobilise massive cooked food supply in such situations DM assignments of all departments should be clearly defined. There should be SOPs for managing relief camps.
77
Mobilisation of mobile medical teams and undertaking massive vaccinations for pre-empting epidemics. Vaccination of livestock and provision of animal fodder to limit losses. Media handling during emergency for making the entire operation transparent. Made coastal area evacuation plan Capacity building of Revenue department for DM. They tend to be evasive of their responsibilities in major disasters Integrated planning with armed forces Preparation of raised emergency platforms in coastal low lying areas and pre-stocking them with relief goods for emergency situations Establishment of an effective district command post and ensuring effective information management. Restoration of Essential Services Coordination OXFAM, Islamic Relief, UN agencies assisted in the relief efforts. Mechanisms withCoordination mechanisms set up by DCO to avoid duplications UN agencies and INGOs . Media Policy Linkage with Provincial DM set-up How OCHA can support
Media briefings by DCO and distt information officer. However, there was no media policy in the district. Thru provincial relief commissioner . Capacity building for disaster planning Creation of operational command and control facility to facilitate emergency response
78 Annexure B Disaster Response Agencies – Civil Defence and PRCS Civil Defence Evaluation Matrix
Evaluation of Civil Defence Provincial Services in Punjab (10 Nov 06) Brief History Created since WW 2, with the name Air Raid Precautions (ARP). This was passed on to Pakistan. Renamed Civil Defence in 1948. Civil Defence Act passed in 1951 with the task of providing early warning and undertaking damage control in urban areas in the event of war. In 1966, amended to include disaster response in urban areas.
Facts as stated by the Resource person/ Observed
Comments and Recommendations
Resource Person: LT Col ® Masood Parvaiz, Director Civil Services, Punjab - 042-9212104-5 Mandate x Capacity building of govt functionaries, students and general x Civil Defence Lahore policy document lists 16 tasks public, industrial concerns in rescue, first aid and protection relating to basic civil defence functions, policy formulation against fire hazard (preventive & fire fighting). and advisory in nature. Causes diffusion in focus. x 3500 registered volunteers capacity developed for above x In its present shape civil defence services neither geared functions and warden services and air defence related for warlike tasks or disaster management functions employment. x Recommendation. CD Directorate or Punjab government must infuse clarity in basic tasks. x Bomb disposal – presently being done by Civil Defence but supposed to be handled by Police Special Branch. x Directorate. Trainng, human resource management, no operational control. x Functioning in all districts of province. .After devolution Civil Defence falls under DCO. District government provides pays and resources. Concept Employment in urban crisis or hazard management.
Reach of civil defence organization to rural areas
x In its present shape civil defence units are neither integrated with other responder agencies nor equipped to work as an effective CRM. x Cannot provide emergency services in medical evacuation (first aid,) rescue and fire fighting. Under resourced. .Recommendations x Revamping of human resources. x Enhance the establishment in keeping with tasks. x Meet resource shortfall x Come out with new hazard management concepts x Offer better incentives x Crisis management capacity created Integrating police, rescue, ambulance services in a district through efforts of province and district government. None or very limited. Recommendation CD coverage should gradually be extended into rural areas
79 Capacity up gradation through linkage with auxiliary orgs like Janbaz Service, national scouts or volunteer movement.
Not at present. Recommendation. Reach and effectiveness of civil defence capacity enhanced through integration with Janbaz forces at multiple levels Not being done at present. Recommendation Capacities up graded consistent With risk reviews in the province and districts. Its capability should be developed local hazard specific.
Upgrading of capacity consistent with disaster threats.
Grass Root Connectivity/ It has grass root connectivity, largely in uurban areas. Civil Defnce is present in down to city circles: 30,000-40,000 population segments . Target Constituency Urban volunteer
No presence in rural areas. Policy review is recommended x They are decreasing due to lack luster CD performance No clear concept of volunteer trainings and capacity building. Difficulty in volunteer identification. x Mostly old volunteers of 1965 war. . x
Operational Issues Are Civil defence units integrated in disaster planning in districts? No. Poor peer esteem Recommendation Civl Defence services require to be revamped in employment concept and resources for being considered as a serious DM player in the district Capacity to mobilize for a major emergency No budgetary provision or resources kept For this purpose. Recommendation This aspect should be considered at the policy making level to allow mobilization of volunteer resources in a major disaster situation . Vertical or horizontal integration between within civil defence units None. District units functions under the DCO with little connectivity with the province except for training maters. Recommendation Operational connectivity should be established within the CD assts in a province for allowing efficient resource mobilization in major disaster situation. Connectivity with Local Government . Stake Holders Connectivity
Advocacy for disaster awareness
Budget All budget consumed in mandatory operational expenses. Annual Budget. 21 million. All operational budget. No CAPEX. Same in distts. Before devolution, 1% of district budget allocated to local CD unit. Now discontinued. Capacity Building
Part of Local Government Weak with non-governmental stake holders. Recommendation Functional integration with NGOs dealing with emergency response Both for capacity building and emergency response should be encouraged Very limited. Recommendation Should be emphasized upon as one of essential tasks targetin specific groups like students. No CAPEX Recommendation Budgetary provisions enhanced and minimum 30% kept for CAPEX
80 Quality of training imparted
Poor on admission of Local staff. Recommendation Training system updated on new Technologies, training methods.
Recommendations / Evaluation Points (1) Municipal Fire Department under Civil Defence. (2) Develop state of art SAR and fire fighting capability. (3) Develop viable health emergency response capability. (4) Capacity to function as an effective emergency health response centre. (5) Provision of emergency funds to facilitate volunteer’ mobilisation if required Capacities of deployed civil defence capacities should relate to local vulnerability assessment Restructuring of Civil Defence for Capacity Up gradation for war like emergencies Does institutional linkage exist with Ministry of Defence for capacity of tasks associated with active combat in war Civil defiance functions for Passive Air defence created Bomb disposal Does institutional linkage exist with Ministry of Defence for capacity of tasks associated with active combat How OCHA can help indicated in the evaluation
Not recommended till the time civil defence in NWFP is corrected for deficiencies
81
Evaluation of Civil Defence Provincial Services in NWFP (10 Oct 06)
Evaluation Criterion
Evaluation Outcome
Desired Outcome
Brief History Creacted in 1966 vide Civil Defence Act of 1951 and presently represented in 12 districts out 23 and 7 Tribal Agencies. Resource Person: Mr Maqbool Shah, Assistant Director Civil Defence Department NWFP Mandate There is lack of clarity on essential functions. In its present shape civil defence Following capacity building, Generally these include: create volunteer capacity services not geared for warlike generate effective volunteer for local crisis management by training them for functions. However, with capacity support for local disaster (1) fire fighting, building, they can create the management. (2) SAR, desired impact viz mandate. (3) warden services and (4) passive air defence in war . Concept Civil Defence functions as local crisis management Centre (CRM) .
Capacities of deployed civil defence capacities should relate to local vulnerability assessment
In its present shape civil defence units are neither integrated with other responder agencies nor equipped to work as an effective Emergency Response Unit.
Crisis management capacity created Integrating police, rescue, ambulance Services in a district
Civil defence units capacities built Consistent with local vulnerability Assessments. Protecting lives in emergencies as part of overall Civil Defence units can provide Civil Defence volunteers integrated relief response plan emergency services in a local with more organsised and effective context and cannot be effective over responder entities for emergency large areas in a district. support. Facilitating post-disaster recovery operations. Post disaster recovery operations Not part of mandate assisted through volunteer support. Reach of civil defence organization to rural areas None Coverage gradually extended into Rural areas Capacity up gradation through linkage with auxiliary No Reach and effectiveness of civil orgs like Janbaz Service, national scouts or defence capacity enhanced through volunteer movement. integration with ----- at multiple levels Upgrading of capacity consistent with disaster threats. Restructuring of Civil Defence for Capacity Up gradation for war like emergencies. war Grass Root Connectivity/Target Constituency Urban areas. Civil Defnce is present in down to city Circles: 30,000-40,000 population segments Grass root connectivity.
Deployed units have a uniform operational capacity
No
No
Capacities up graded consistent With risk reviews in the province and District Civil defiance functions for Passive Air defence created Policy review recommended
As mentioned, no presence in rural Policy review recommended areas
82 Operational Issues Are Civil defence units integrated in disaster planning No. Poor peer districts? esteem Clarity of field staff on essential tasks
Ambiguity prevails
SAR capacity
Very primitive and Not effective
Capacity to mobilize for a major emergency
No budgetary provision For this purpose
Contribution in disaster operational contingency None Planning Vertical or horizontal integration between within civil d Not discernable units Connectivity with Local Government . Stake Holders Connectivity
Advocacy for disaster awareness Budget All budget consumed in mandatory operational expenses. Annual Budget. 21 million. All operational budget. No CAPEX. Same in distts. Previously before devolution, 1% of total budget for Civl Def. Discontinued. Capacity Building Quality of training imparted Quality training exposure outside the province
Part of Local Government Weak with non-governmental stake Functional integration with NGOs Functional Association with NGOs fo Dealing with emergency response capacity building and for emergency Both for capacity building and response Emergency response Very limited Civil defence functions included in Disaster awareness efforts No CAPEX
Budgetary provisions enhanced and minimum 30% kept for CAPEX
Poor on admission of Local staff Selected staff trained In in-country CD Training institutions
Training system updated on new Technologies, training methods
Recommendations (1) Municipal Fire Department under Civil Defence. (2) Develop state of art SAR and fire fighting capability. (3) Develop viable health emergency response capability. (4) Capacity to function as an effective emergency health response centre. (5) Provision of emergency funds to facilitate volunteer’ mobilisation if required Strengths Grass root connectivity in urban areas. Volunteerism, identification and capacity development Weaknesses Poor human resource base. Mostly overaged. Outmoded employment and training focus. Resources shortage. Understaffed.
Civil defence units fully integrated in District disaster response plans after Capacity upgradation in deficient area Essential tasks debated at the appropriate forums and clarified. 3 SAR state of the art teams Created and deployed on regional In disaster prone regions. Budgetary provision created at The province for capacity Mobilization For Major disaster Capacity built for disaster contingency Planning in districts Operational integration created Within civl defence units both vertical And horizontal
83 Strategic marketing weak How OCHA can help Not recommended till the time civil defence in NWFP is corrected for deficiencies indicated above
Civil Defence Academy, Lahore – 10 Nov 06 Subject Resource Person Brief History
Facts stated by the Resource Person/ Observed Mr Maqbool Ahmad Chaudhary, Commandant. He is employed in Cviil Defence since 1973. Most of his experience relates to instructional assignments. He is Commandant of the Academy since 2004. The Academy was initially created in Rawalpindi as Civil Defence Training School in 1956. Later made into Civil Defence Staff College in 1958 and shifted in Lahore. Function under DG Civil Defence in Islamabad. x
Mission Statement
To train key civil defence staff in essential civil defence functions. x Generate public awareness in civil defence affairs.
Key Training Courses.
x
Planning, organising and operational control of civil defence functions. Disaster management course. Basic fire fighting and first aid course for ladies. 2 female instructors generate awareness in women educational and social institutions. Specialised courses like on NBC and camouflage. For foreign students: civil defence officers course for management, and disaster protection course.
x x x x x Students Graduated So Far
Standards Settings
Human Resources
Local Students – 23,000 appox Foreign Students -
For specialised courses, the Academy is affiliated with known national training facilities like for NBC, staff is trained in DESTO lab and from Military College of Engineering for bomb disposal and camouflage courses. Rarely training from abroad, only if foreign sponsored.
x x x x x
There are 5 Instructors: 3 Masters and 2 graduates. 3 instructors are deficient Only one has attended a foreign courses. Average age is between 30-58. Salaries vary from Rs 15000-20000..
Comments/Recommendations He was kind to give a formal presentation on the Academy The Academy is housed in a dilapidated building, which is under litigation, in the picturesque GOR 1 Lahore. The premises clearly require much uplifting /renovation Not much is being done about the advocacy function. x Most courses have a disaster management focus. Whereas instructors were not clear on the basic concepts. of DM. x Theoretical focus. x NBC course is for awareness only as CD fields no NBC field capability.
The Academy is affiliated with International Civil Defence Organisation, Geneva. Only for nomination of foreign students, normally from the region, and for funding for international courses. No capacity building functions x The Academy has no formal institutional linkage with any known civil defence school. x It dies not follow internationally accepted standards in the training that is imparted. x The quality of instructors is generally poor as they teach old irrelevant concepts in most cases. x There is no capacity building programme in the Academy. x No effort has been made to learn
84 DM from the earthquake experience in Pakistan. x One vibrant lady instructor who has recently undergone a 3 months disaster management course from Japan is not encouraged to contribute in improve upon the quality of instructions, Training Aids Budget
Mostly antiquated over head projectors are used. 2 VPS systems are available out of which one is used for training purpose. Rs 5 million. 90% operational expenses and 10% CAPEX. No budget for staff capacity building. Only Rs 60,000 for TA/DA.
Analysis S&W
Strength Institutional experience in providing training as the apex CD training institution
Development Priories
Following came out through discussion:x Latest equipment in NBC, cam. x Human resource development. x Foreign courses in disaster management.
OCHA Recommended Contribution
None till a serious effort is undertaken by CD Directorate to correct the fundamental flaws.
Even if a developmental grant is made available, there is no developmental plan, duly prioritised to refer to. Weaknesses. Many. Have been adequately highlighted above.
85
National Institute of Fire Technology (2 Nov 06) The Institute is housed in rented premises in Sitara Market, G-7 Markaz since its creation in 1980. It has two class rooms, a laboratory and administrative rooms in a triple storey building. The premises are grossly inadequate to meet Institute’s functional needs, though 10 acres of land has been allotted to build a new school at H-11 sector in Islamabad. It is the only school of its kind in the public sector and, therefore, its services remain much in demand. There is a case for investing in it once it is relocated in the new premises to model it as a centre of excellence. I was briefed by Mr Zafar Ali, the Commandant, who has been employed in Civil Defiance in varying capacities since 1968. Summary of the facts and my evaluation are as follows:Subject
Mandate Human Resource
Training Imparted
Standard setting
Basic Facts
Observations/Recommendations
To impart training in fire prevention and fighting disciplines 6 instructors, 3 administrative staff (1) The staff seemed committed but in some including the Commandant cases they seem to be lacking the requisite skills. For example the research lab incharge was originally hired as a drill instructor. (2) The basic education for instructors is graduation which should be raised to Masters Considering the technical nature of some courses. (3) Only 2 instructors have received training abroad. More instructors should be sent for advanced training abroad. (4) From what I saw, there seems more emphasis on theory. Practical training is imparted in the Islamabad fire Department premises. The new planned premises should have a fire station for trainees. Fire Prevention Officer’s course, Station (1)To generate resources for improving the Fire Officer course, Fire prevention for quality of courses, recommended that courses Oil installations, Fire Prevention for having application in the oil and industrial Industries, Fire Prevention Offices sectors should be offered on market rates. course, Ladies Fire Prevention Course, (2) Scope of ladies fore prevention course is School Teachers Fire Prevention being enhanced to train domestic ladies in fire Course prevention. (3) School teachers trained in fire prevention should become master trainers for wider school hazard management training. (1) Institute’s management claim that The sterile training techniques observed training standards benefit from an indicate that there is a need for more doing institutionalized collaboration much more for improving the overall quality of Leicestershire, UK, Fire College. instructions. This should include:(2) Moreover, they claim periodic (1) More rigorous internal monitoring, more internal reviews for quality assurance. interactive cooperation with the better fire
Responsibility Long-Term (L) Medium (M) Short (S) (1-3)DG Civil Def And Institute’s Administration (S/M) (4) L
(1) CD Directorate (M) (2&3) Institute Management (S)
CD Directorate and Institute’s Management. (S)
86 institutions in-country like CAA School in Hyderabad or KPT, Karachi (2) and also with training institute’s abroad. The Institute seems to suffer from a typical Collaboration None public sector insular mode of working. With NGOs (1) Public-private partnerships should be or private encouraged for resource generation and sector for capacity building. training or (2) Collaboration with NGOs/international capacity agencies having state of the art expertise building should be sought for similar ends. Budgetary (1) Annual budget comes to Rs 5 millio CD Directorate to consider hiring market expertise for Utilization 90% goes for mandatory operational (1) Streamlining procedures for identifying expenses, which does not leave much and prioritizing key areas for affecting quality for CAPEX. (3) During financial year 2005-06, out improvement. (2) Institutionalizing improved financial of grants given by Civil Defense Directorate for quality enhancement, Rs management practices for optimum funds utilization. 4 million were surrendered for nonutilization. (4) However, present DG has enacted stringent remedial measures.
CD Directorate (M)
CD Directorate (M)
87
Evaluation of Pakistan Red Crescent Society Subject
Explanation
Resource Person Brief History
Brig ® Illyas, director Operations, PRCS Secretariat, Islamabad Formed in 1947 and renamed as per present title in 1973. Principle areas of focus are disaster management, healthcare and dissemination of key humanitarian values. It is part of International Federation of the Red Cross (IFRC), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the national societies. (1) Disaster preparedness and response (2) Public health care (3) Dissemination of information on human rights. (4) Humanitarian services in armed conflict.. Created through ac act of Parliament in 1953 as Pakistan Red Cross and then renamed as Pakistan Red Crescent again through an act of parliament in 1973. Principle areas of focus are disaster management, healthcare and dissemination of key humanitarian values. Has acquired an expertise in working in disaster/crisis response situatuions.
Mandate
Legislation Policy Emphasis
Disaster Response Mandate
Contributions in Oct 05 EQ
(1) Impart community based disaster response training focusing on first aid, rescue and relief training. (2) Maintain emergency support stores for 25,000 disaster affectee families at various warehouses, in Islamabad (for 10,000), provincial capitals (for 2,000 each), in AJK, Nortthern Areas & FATA/FANA (1000 each) and 200 each for 20 vulnerable districts. (3) Mobilisng capacity for a 50 bed hospital and 2 BHUs. (4) Undertake disaster awareness/prevention advocacy in vulnerable communities. (5) With acquired resources and expertise acquired in through the EQ expericne, PRCS has also contributed/ is contributing in water and sanitation, livelihood generation and reconstruction in rehabilitation. x With support of IFRC and ICRC, cumulatively PRCS and other national societies contributed in relief, shelter, livelihoods, health, water and sanitation, psychological support, reconstruction and capacity building activities. x A tremendous logistic operation was launched to support these efforts, particularly those that were time sensitive. x A system of base hospital (in Al-Shifa Eye Trust Hosp in Rwp), field hospitals in Abotabad, Mansehra, Muzzafarabad and Bagh were set up. Mobile units provided health services in remote areas. x These activities were accompanies by psycho-social support, water and sanitation and hygiene programmes. x Also contributed in blood donations, re-establishing contact between families separated by the EQ. x Tracing and providing shelter to unaccompanied children. x Vocational training centres were also established. x Presently, working in reconstruction of education and health infrastructure. x PCRS also claims raising a volunteer corps of 50,000. x Cumulatively the Movement reached 1.5 million beneficiaries and provided services worth Rs 3.5 billion.
88
Evaluation Subject
The Situation
Comments/Recommendations
Responsibility Long-Term (L) Medium(M) Short (S)
Capacity Building
(1) PRCS has acquired in-house capacity for trainings in first aid, basic preventive health functions, dissemination of humanitarian values, relief oriented DM functions. (2) Human resource quality generally is of a moderate level. (3) Networked to the IRCS and national Red Crescent Societies capacity building programmes
(1) Has limited ability in assessing community DM related training needs. (2) Not fully aware of hazard assessments, mapping and other intricate DM functions. (3) Does not follow an objective criterion in selecting districts for disaster related interventions. (3) PRCS must create capacity building expertise in DM functions consistent with tis mandate through its global and national networking.. (4) PRCS may consider granting better service incentives for improving upon human resource intake.
PRCS (M)
Monitoring and Evaluation
No capacity for operational M&E.
(1) M&E capacity should be created both in national and provincial headquarters. (2) PRCS may consider hiring expertise in this regards (3) Self monitoring plus monitoring of donors.
PRCS, its provincial chapters
Standard Setting
IFRC in health and DM. ICRC for International Humanitarian Law. Communities are PRCS’ main focus in implementing its mandate.
Must further reinforce community focus through capacity building of deficient areas.
PRCS (M)
Connectivity with communities Connectivity with government
Stake holders connectivity Outreach
Though DCOs are supposed to be chairmen of local RC. DCOs are chairmen of district branches. Respective department facilitates interaction with govt Generally effective with IRC movement partners, INGO, NGOs and UN agencies. But relatively weak with the government In country, particularly response to in-country. Thru RCRC (Red Cross and Red
Not institutionalised However, functional connectivity with the provincial and local governments is poor in the context of reinforcing local crisis response capacity Perhaps NDMA can play a role in reinforcing government connectivity As mentioned above
PRCS, provincial and district chapters, provincial and local governments (M) ICRC
89
Target Constituency Budgetary Constraints Strengths
Crescent Movement) to global disasters. Most vulnerable in rural and also in urban areas Rs 30 million approx in Punjab. Mandatory operational costs. 33% Programme budget 60% CAPEX: (1) An organisation with institutional history. (2) Experience in disaster response. (3) Global connectivity for capacity enhancement. Volunteerism.
PRCS (M)
Weaknesses (1) Poor in-country corporate leverage for capacity building. EQ Oct 05 offers a good opportunity for revamping PRCS. (3) Not fully integrated with government for local crisis management . (3) Weak financial resource base. (4) Human resource paucity.
Immediate Priority Areas for PRCS
(1) Restructuring/reorganisation for a more proactive role in disaster preparedness and response. (2) More investment in health awareness. (3) Volunteerism to be institutionalised. (4) Capacity building thru linkages with NGOs and social sector. (5) Create emergency response units in disaster vulnerable districts. (6) Integrating in the local government institutional framework for crisis/disaster response.
How OCHA can Help
(1) Capacity building for disaster management (2) Upgrading emergency response centres
90
Punjab Red Crescent Society Subject
Facts
Resource Person Brief History Mandate
Legislation Policy Emphasis Functioning
Maj ® Javed Iqbal, Director Punjab Red Crescent Society Created in 1914 as Red Cross Depot. In 1936 it became Red Cross Provincial HQ of all Punjab and in 1948 Red Cross HQ of West Pakistan. After 1971, it was redesignated as Red Crescent HQ of Punjab. x Carry out voluntary relief services x Undertake disaster management x Preventive and curative health x Tracing of missing people. Created through ac act of Parliament in 1953 as Pakistan Red Cross and then renamed as Pakistan Red Crescent again through an act of parliament in 1973. Twin pronged emphasis on health awareness and capacity building and DM, through community participation While under the policies defined by the national HQ, provincial create own rules. Same applies to district level. Fund raising done by respective HQs. Send 10% to higher HQs. Fairly autonomous. Funding support from higher HQ is programme specific.
Evaluation Subject
The Situation
Capacity Building
x PRCS has acquired in-house capacity for trainings in first aid, basic preventive health functions, dissemination of humanitarian values, relief oriented DM functions. x Human resource quality generally is of a moderate level. x Networked to the IRCS and national Red Crescent Societies capacity building programmes
Volunteerism
x
Created an institutional capacity in tapping schools and colleges in first aid, blood donations. x Also capacitates community based volunteers
Comments/Recommendations
x Has limited ability in assessing community DM related training needs. x Not fully aware of hazard assessments, mapping and other intricate DM functions. x Does not follow an objective criterion in selecting districts for disaster related interventions. x PRCS must create capacity building expertise in DM functions consistent with tis mandate through its global and national networking.. x PRCS may consider granting better service incentives for improving upon human resource intake. x Institutionalised in academic intuitions through voluntary blood donations. Contributions formally recognised. x
However, volunteerism is urban
Responsibility Long-Term (L) Medium(M) Short (S) PRCS (M)
PRCS and its provincial chapters (M)
91 in first aid and DM trainings Disaster Management
Monitoring and Evaluation
based with identification through influential. However not fully institutionalised. Top down. x Hesitant to work thru the local govt .
x Programme Officer trained from the international system. x Preparedness – capacity building. x Response - relief capacity 400 families and Rs 2.5 million emergency budget. Core team for disaster impact assessment. x Work through the local govt. Disaster vulnerability profiling of vuln communities in district. x Plan to deploy DM teams in 10 distts over till 2010.
x Main contributions in preparedness. x Method of disaster needs assessment at community level. x Risk profiling of districts encompasses listing vulnerable communities.
No capacity for operational M&E. x x x
Standard Setting Connectivity with communities
IFRC in health and DM. ICRC for International Humanitarian Law. Communities are PRCS’ main focus in implementing its mandate.
Connectivity with government
DCOs are chairmen of district branches. Respective department facilitates interaction with govt
Stake holders connectivity
Generally effective with IRC movement partners, INGO, NGOs and UN agencies. But relatively weak with the government In country, particularly response to in-country.
Outreach
Target Constituency Budgetary Constraints
Thru RCRC (Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) to global disasters. Most vulnerable in rural and also in urban areas Rs 30 million approx in Punjab. Mandatory operational costs. 33% Programme budget 60% CAPEX:
PRCS and its provincial Chapters (M)
M&E capacity should be created both in national and provincial headquarters. PRCS may consider hiring expertise in this regards Self monitoring plus monitoring of donors.
PRCS, its provincial chapters
x Must further reinforce community focus through capacity building of deficient areas. x Not institutionalised x Limited rural coverage x However, functional connectivity with the provincial and local governments is poor in the context of reinforcing local crisis response capacity x Perhaps NDMA can play a role in reinforcing government connectivity As mentioned above
ICRC
Should enhance outreach through connectivity with other INGOs and NGOs working in common areas
PRCS and its provincial chapters (M)
PRCS and its provincial chapters(M)
PRCS, provincial and district chapters, provincial and local governments (M)
PRCS (M) More budgetary allocation for CAPEX.
PRCS and its provincial affiliates (S)
92
Analysis: S&W
Strengths x An organisation with institutional history. x Experience in disaster response. x Global connectivity for capacity enhancement. x Volunteerism.
Weaknesses x Poor in-country corporate leverage for capacity building. EQ Oct 05 offers a good opportunity for revamping PRCS. x Not fully integrated with government for local crisis management. x Weak financial resource base. x Human resource paucity.
Immediate Priority Areas for PRCS
x Restructuring/reorganisation for a more proactive role in disaster preparedness and response. x More investment in health awareness. x Volunteerism to be institutionalised. x Capacity building thru linkages with NGOs and social sector. x Create emergency response units in disaster vulnerable districts. x Integrating in the local government institutional framework for crisis/disaster response.
How OCHA can Help
x Capacity building for disaster management x Upgrading emergency response centres
93
Sindh Red Crescent Society (20 Nov 06)
Resource Person
Mr Kanwar Waseem, provincial secretary, Sindh Red Crescent Society
Subject
Facts
Brief History . x x x x x
Mandate
Legislation Policy Emphasis
Functioning
Disaster Relief Disaster management at community level. First aid training with DM focus. Prosecute major functions through volunteer support. Tracing of missing people.
Created through ac act of Parliament in 1953 as Pakistan Red Cross and then renamed as Pakistan Red Crescent again through an act of parliament in 1973. x Now tilting towards DM in the relief and preparedness/mitigation context at the community level. Working in Thatta, Badin and Khairpur districts. Will be expanding to 2 districts per year consistent with funding imperatives. x Otherwise PRCS presence in 15 districts in the province. x Pre-positioned warehouse capacity for 500 families in the province for relief operations. While under the policies defined by the national HQ, provincial create own rules. Same applies to district level. Fund raising done by respective HQs. Send 10% to higher HQs. Fairly autonomous. Funding support from higher HQ is programme specific.
Evaluation Subject Disaster Response Capacity Disaster Management
The Situation
Comments/Recommendations
Create warehouse relief capacity for 500 households Contributions in preparedness and mitigation at the community level x Community vulnerability assessments x Select a UC within a disaster vulnerable district x Creation of village organisation/institution building. x Identify volunteers and build their capacity in DM functions. x Create a core team of 20-25 volunteers at the Union Council level x Provide the core teams with disaster kits x Core team members repeat the process in their respective villages x Connect the core team with the local government mechanism.
x x Hesitant to work thru the local govt . x Main contributions in preparedness. x Method of disaster needs assessment at community level. x Risk profiling of districts encompasses listing vulnerable communities.
94
Volunteerism
Health Services
Capacity Building
Human resource
x In the process generate a volunteer base in the UC. x Undertake advocacy functions Contributions in Disaster Response at the Community level x Provide resources x Create SOPs x Prepare disaster teams x Created an institutional capacity in tapping schools and colleges in first aid, blood donations. x Also capacitates community based volunteers in first aid and DM trainings. x Created a volunteer base in first aid training in Karachi and in the programme districts. x Trained in emergency services, also imparted refreshers. x 150 trained volunteers for emergency services. x Given uniforms, ID, pick and drop and meals on duty. x Blood donations in schools and colleges. x Ambulance services in coordination with city government, Police 14 and other emergency services. 14 new ambulances indicted in Karachi. x Impart first aid training to communities in emergency management context, and to commercial organisations in emergency healthcare like PIA. x PRCS has acquired in-house capacity for trainings in first aid, basic preventive health functions, dissemination of humanitarian values, relief oriented DM functions. x Human resource quality generally is of a moderate level. x Networked to the IRCS and national Red Crescent Societies capacity building programmes
x x x
Generally motivated but poorly paid employees. Trained through the in-country PRCS training facilities. Very few foreign trained workers.
x Institutionalised in academic intuitions through voluntary blood donations. Contributions formally recognised. x However, volunteer base is being extended into disaster prone rural areas. x Volunteers identified and capacity developed for specific purpose and through capacity building.
PRCS can undertake advocacy functions through their institutionalised ingress in academic institutions.
x Has limited ability in assessing community DM related training needs. x Not fully aware of hazard assessments, mapping and other intricate DM functions. x Does not follow an objective criterion in selecting districts for disaster related interventions. x PRCS must create capacity building expertise in DM functions consistent with tis mandate through its global and national networking.. x PRCS may consider granting better service incentives for improving upon human resource intake.
95 Monitoring and Evaluation
No capacity for operational M&E.
x x x
Standard Setting Connectivity with communities
IFRC in health and DM. ICRC for International Humanitarian Law. Communities are PRCS’ main focus in implementing its mandate.
Connectivity with government Stake holders connectivity Outreach
DCOs are chairmen of district branches. Respective department facilitates interaction with govt Generally effective with IRC movement partners, INGO, NGOs and UN agencies.
Target Constituency Budgetary Constraints
Analysis: S&W
In the province through PRCS set-ups in 14 districts. Through RCRC (Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement) to global disasters. Most vulnerable in rural and also in urban areas Rs 10 million approx in Punjab. Mandatory operational costs. Rs 5 million. 50% left for CAPEX and programmes/capacity development. Strengths x An organisation with institutional history. x Experience in disaster response. x Global connectivity for capacity enhancement. x Volunteerism.
M&E capacity should be created both in national and provincial headquarters. PRCS may consider hiring expertise in this regards Self monitoring plus monitoring of donors.
x Must further reinforce community focus through capacity building of deficient areas. x Not institutionalised x Limited rural coverage
As mentioned above Should enhance outreach through connectivity with other INGOs and NGOs working in common areas
More budgetary allocation for capacity building.
Weaknesses x Poor in-country corporate leverage for capacity building. EQ Oct 05 offers a good opportunity for revamping PRCS. x Not fully integrated with government for local crisis management. x Weak financial resource base. x Human resource paucity.
Immediate Priority Areas for PRCS
x Restructuring/reorganisation for a more proactive role in disaster preparedness and response. x More investment in health awareness. x Volunteerism to be institutionalised. x Capacity building thru linkages with NGOs and social sector. x Create emergency response units in disaster vulnerable districts. x Integrating in the local government institutional framework for crisis/disaster response.
How OCHA
x Capacity building for disaster
96 can Help
management x Upgrading emergency response centres
97 Annexure C Emergency Response Services Islamabad Fire Fighting Department A combination of issues relating to policy and legislative support, resource dearth and operational management need to be addressed in up grading the quality of fire services. CDA has, nonetheless, initiated a major fire fighting services capacity up gradation programme. To get insight into these issues I met Syed Sarfaraz Haider Shirazi, Assistant Director Islamabad Fire Services, with over 25 years experience of employment in the fire services in the Federal Capital. I also inspected the Fire Station. Matters relating to policy and interface with Civil Defence Deptt were cross checked with Mr Khattak , Director Civil Defence Directorate, Islamabad. Summary of my observations are:-
Subject
What is being Done
Policy
There is no fire policy in the country that deals with the present day challenges. Therefore, fire fighting focus remains inconsistent in implementation.
Legislation
Local Government Ordinance 2001and Civil Defence Special Powers Act 1953 introduce duplicity and lack of clarity in fire fighting functions.
x Fire fighting functions are being attended to by the Fire Fighting Department but fire prevention has dual inputs: from Fire Fighting Deptt and Civil Defence. x In other words fire prevention focus is weak. How fire (1) For Early Warning Main fighting is Fire Station is linked to organised in Police 15. Isd? (2) It has a rudimentary operations room which manages information and controls response. Requires upgrading. How is Civil Def Organised In Isd
Remarks/Recommendations
Responsibility Time Frame Long Term (L) Medium (M) Short (S)
x A national fire policy must define fire fighting functions both in fire prevention and fighting realms. x Presently functions pertaining to fire prevention are being attended both by fire fighting department and Civil Defence, leading to a diffused focus. x One clear unified legislative framework must define fire fighting functions with fire fighting departments as the lead agency. SAR and medevac should be made integral to fighting functions. May require deliberations. x Fire fighting should be identified as an essential service to curb indiscipline arising out of excessive union activity. Fire Fighting Department should be made solely responsible for fire fighting and prevention. Civl defence and other agencies may support in latter function..
Ministry of Interior supported by Civil Defence Directorate (M)
Proposed ingredients of a more effective system are:(1) Fire Early Warning (EW) system with fire sensors/cameras covering vulnerable places and sensitive locations. Police and other law enforcement agencies should be part of EW network. (2) EW communicated to a central command
District govt Isd/ Fire Fighting Dpett (S/M/L)
Ministry of Interior supported by Civil Defence Directorate (M)
Ministry of Interior/Civil Defence Directorate (M)
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Quality of human resource
Past Record
Capacity Up gradation initiatives
Possible OCHA’s contributions
(3) It has 10 fire tenders with one having capacity to reach 16 storey building. (4) Two fire sub-stations exist in G-10 and Diplomatic Enclave for ease of response. (5) Within its present resources response to relatively far areas takes plus of 30 minutes. (6) There is no effective fire prevention capability in place. (7) CDA has failed to enforce fire regulations in many high rise buildings. (1) The fire fighting staff is trained in their functions. They have undergone basic training courses and a system of refresher training is organised. (2) However, there is no system of M&E in place for up gradation of operational preparedness. In 2005, 789 fire emergencies were attended. Fol weaknesses were identified:(1) Very poor fire prevention standards. (2) Fire fighting response was weak for far flung areas due to poor outer periphery coverage. The Isd administration is supporting following initiatives in short to medium term:(1) 34 fire tenders o varying configurations, one with the ability to target 23 storey building are being inducted by end-207. (2) 3 more fire stations are being built in remoter areas to reduce response time. (3) 386 personnel are being inducted to meet the capacity surge. (4) 3 SAR teams with basic capabilities are being created.
post. (3) Response initiated from the nearest fire station. (4) Fire stations should be so deployed across the city so as to reach place of incidence within 7 minutes. (5) Fire fighting department should also attend to medevac and SAR. Civil Defence mobilises volunteer support and police enforces law and order. (6) High rise buildings and important installations should have inbuilt fire prevention and fighting capability.
A M&E system should be institutionalised by the District government which should include mock emergency drills to update preparedness and reduce eliminate human errors.
CDA/Fire Fighting Deptt (S/M)
Maximum emphasis should be laid on quality control and human resource training during the capacity surge phase.
CDA/Fire Department (M/L)
(1) Training of Station Fire Officers on latest fire fighting techniques and technologies. (2) Upgradaton of Central Fire Station Operations
99 in capacity
response room, based on need assessment
Lahore Municipal Government Fire Fighting Department Raja Mohd Altaf, Fire Officer, City District t, Lahore 0333-4260896, 0345-4014726 (11 Nov) Subject Brief History Organisation. Fire Fighting Assets Legislation
Human Resources
Standard Setting How is Fire Response Organised?
Facts as Narrated by the Resource Person/Comments Earlier Fire Department was part of Lahore Municipal Corporation, after devolution it falls under the City Government . Implication: area of responsibility has doubled w/o additional resources. There are 13 stations within city. Cannot cover outlying areas effectively. Scarcity of fire stations coupled with manifold increase in traffic density makes it difficult to identify response time as a service quality parameter. 17 fire tenders out of which only 7 reliable. Others are of vintage material. Among 7, 2 are gifted by UK in used condition. Only 2 fire tenders have the capacity to access 40 feet height (3 storeys). x In 2002 LGO 2001 was amended to make city district government responsible for fire functions and not town committee as originally stipulated. x However, there are no service rules guiding fire services employment, neither there is a notional fire policy. x With staff strength of 361, 40 are deficient. Average age is 40 years. x Education. Fire fighting staff is mostly middle but supervisory staff’s qualifications range from matriculation to graduate. x All are locally trained. No one has experienced foreign training.
x x x x
Fire Response Statistics of 2005 Immediate Resource Needs
x x x x x
x
All fire fighting stations are connected through telephone and wireless. Early warning is received through Police 15 or direct from the fire incidence source. Confirmation is sought to eliminate false calls before responding. 30-60 second mob time within stations. However, access to fire site is normally delayed due to poor fire station coverage, traffic density. Placement of road dividers further impede movement.
10 more fire stations. 36 vehicles. 1 per 200,000 pop including 2 vehicles with at least 100 feet ladder for impact in 8 storey bldg. Capacity building training. Make up deficient manpower New education criterion rules for manpower induction. Managerial posts Masters and firemen graduate. Review pay structures and incentives.
Resources received
Only Rs 8 M given by Nazim Lahore for purchase of essential stores which is quite inadequate.
Future Plans
x Uplift plan for Rs 197 million for short term needs, next two years. Rs 532 M long term plan made to cater for long term needs. x However, all is struck due to creation of 1122 Emergency Services in Lahore. Presently Punjab government (P&D Department) is opposing infusion of funds in Lahore City Fire Services. Bring out positive and negative aspects
Comments Analysis S&W
100
Karachi Fire Services
: Subject Resource person Policy
Legislation
Tasks of Karachi Fire Services
Facts as explained by the Resource Person or observed City Chief Fire Officer Mr Kazim Ali x No national fire policy or rules of business framed for fire fighting . x NO SHs input in fire policy development x No lateral coordination between fire departments in country for capacity building or sharing of experiences x Poor in-country training quality. x Fire functions split between CD and Fire Departments degrading functional efficiency in fire fighting x There should be integration of all emergency services in responding to fire, medevac and SAR. x Local government legislations over the years have failed to instil clarity with regards to ownership and integration of fire services with other emergency services. x Secondly, there is a functional overlap due to existence of obsolete legal rules between the responsibilities of CD and Fire Department with regards to fire prevention and fire fighting. x x x x x x
Fire fighting within Karachi City limits Undertake fire prevention Hazardous material management (HAZMAT) Rescue functions in urban flood situation in Karachi. Rescue along Karachi sea beaches Capable of fielding one SAR team with a basic capability.
How Fire Services are organised
x There are 21 fire stations in Karachi city. x No space kept for fire services in the expanding parts of the city. Some new fire stations are planned under flyovers. x 35 fire tenders of varying capacity are in service. x Only one with a snorkel can reach 8-10 storied building. x 18 more fire tenders are being incorporated in service. Still they are vastly deficient x Other fire services like KPT, PIA are shrinking their fleet over the years, thus adding to the load on Karachi Fire Services
Response
x Excellent within fire station. However, response time enhanced due to poor coverage of fire stations, traffic snarls etc x Receive 20-25 fire calls daily. Some require response from multiple fire stations.
Comments There is on common policy thread to build capacities of fire services to internationally acknowledged standards.
Legislative loopholes need to be addressed urgently
Karachi fire services have a very limited or no capability to undertake tasks other than fire fighting and prevention. Too many tasks lead to diffusion in focus. Tasks require redefining As per international standards there should be one fire station for 100,000 population. In Karachi, one station covers approx 750,000.
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Fire Prevention
Past performance Human Resource
Standard Setting
x Loopholes in the legislation. x Poor enforcement of existing city bye-laws on fire prevention. x Overlap of functions between CD and Fire Fighting Deptt. More advocacy required on fire prevention, particularly in schools and colleges. . In 2005, responded to 4200 emergencies satisfactorily. However, in-house lesson learning conducted to quality improvement. x x x x
In touch with Houston Fire Department for quality improvement through standard setting. x x x x x
SHs approach Advocacy functions Reinforce preventive functions Building 8-10 more fire stations over the next 1-2 years Incorporating 18 more fire vehicles to make up deficiency x Restructuring work method to international standards x More emphasis on fire prevention advocacy x Advocating for legislative clarity with regards to employment of fire services.
Developmental Plans
Recommendations
How OCHA can Help Conclusion .
Officers are graduates Fire fighters are matriculates Poor training facilities Difficult to organise in-house refreshers owing to heavy commitments.
x x x x
More emphasis on fire prevention Emphasis on advocacy functions Must work to internationally accepted standards Tasks must lie within the functional capacity of the Fire Department x Develop command and control facilities in the main fire station and in 4-5 regional hubs. x Capacity building trainings Despite resource shortage, Karachi Fire services are professionally run by a vibrant Chief Fire Officer.
Weak area with institutionalised corruption and very poor enforcement standards.
102 Police Emergency Services Islamabad Police Rescue 15 (1 Nov 06) Subject
What is Happening
Resource Person Mission Statement of Islamabad Police Emergecy Servoces
IGP NWFP, Riffat Pasha and DSP Gulfam Nasir , in charge Police 15 Emergency Services, Islamabad.
Policy Emphasis
There does not seem to be policy Defining the role, functions, funding and sustainability of such services
Adhocism
The staffing, funding and resourcing of Rescue 15 seems to be occurring on adhoc basis. This has led to curtailing some services that were originally conceived. Seems to vary with resource availability. Not institutionalised.
Operational Structure Human Resource
What Needs to be Done
Responsibility Long term (L) Medium (M) Short (S)
Islamabad Police Rescue 15 was established in 2000. Its mission statement says, “To win the confidence of fellow citizens and to inculcate the spirit of public friendly policing with community participation”. The services that Rescue 15 is supposed to provide are (1) Emergency Helpline (2) Theft Reporting Counter (3) Verification of Vehicles (3) Child lost/found centre (4) ambulance coordination (5) Security alarm services, and (6) legal advice. After its creation, Rescue 15’ services were acknowledged for their performance, though sustainability of the imitative as it was conceived seems to have suffered over the years for reasons identified in the evaluation. (1) Police emergency services must function under a clearly defined policy framework articulated by the local government, defining its role, functions, organisational framework, human and material resource needs. (2) Legislation support should facilitate funding on sustainable basis. (3) Moreover, such services should be employed within an overall framework that employs agencies/services with similar mandate like Fire Deptt, Civil Defence etc, by complementing their strengths without duplicating. (4) Human resource development should be included. (5) Multi stakeholders forum should be created for making Rescue 15 services more community friendly. (6) Community volunteer participation should be sought in providing legal services or for emergency health support. Above defined policy and legislative initiatives.
Again needs defining in the policy framework
(1) The present staff of 230 odd (1) Staffing requires a human resource need seems to show little commitment review. to the job. Rescue 15 seems to (2) Specialised courses in community friendly
ICT Administration/ IGP Capital Territories (M)
ICT Administration/ IGP Capital Territories (M)
ICT Administration/ IGP Capital Territories (M) IGP Isd Police (S) ICT/ IGP Capital Territories (M)
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Present Resources Quality of services
Medical Emergencies
Provision of free legal services Community Participation
Search and Rescue Capacity Conclusion
be the employment place of left overs. (2) No training emphasis for specialised functions other than normal police training. 22 patrol vehicles linked by radio to the central control room, which is understaffed to man calls from 10 lines. While most calls are of an obnoxious nature, on the average, 25-40 crime related calls are received and responded to daily
training should be conducted in police training schools besides imparting training in legal and emergency medical services. Should be restructured based on a dedicated review.
ICT Administration/ IGP Capital Territories (M)
(1)There is no monitoring system in place to gauge efficacy of response and follow up actions. Self corrective mechanisms should be introduced. (2) There is a duality in functions in dealing with common criminal complaints between Rescue 15 and the local police station which needs streamlining. There is one ambulance without There should be budget and human resource a budget and one trained para- availability to organise a medical emergency medic w/o salary. Medical services. Requires need assessment. emergencies are handled by merely transporting victims in patrol cars to nearest hospital. Discontinued Should be provided through voluntary contributions.
IGP Isd Capital Territories (M)
No institutionalised mechanism exists as an interactive forum for making the services more community friendly
SSP Isd Police (M)
No special equipment is kept especially for tracing missing persons/children
A Citizens-Police Committee should be identified for soliciting multi stakeholder input for both, making the Rescue 15 services more community friendly and soliciting community support where needed. Staff should be trained & equipped in S&R techniques with regards to evacuation of victims from fallen premises and search of missing children and persons. (1) The Police Department of Islamabad, in concert with the local governance must restructure Rescue 15 services on sustainable basis through policy and legislative articulation on the lines suggested above by adopting a multi-stakeholders approach. (2) However, Rescue 15 is a notable initiative of community friendly. Policing which should be made community inclusive. It must, therefore, be supported. (3) It can serve as forum for advocacy for hazard avoidance cum management through its community reach.
IGP Isd Capital Territories (M)
SSP Isd Police (S)
SSP Isd Police (S)
ICT Administration/ IGP Capital Territori (M)
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Punjab Emergency Services (11 Nov) Subject Resource Person History
Inspiration
Legislation
Facts as Explained by Resource Person/Observed
Comments
Dr Rizwan Naseer Created in October 2004, Punjab Emergency Services (PES), better known as Rescue 1122, have earned a repetition for performance by providing emergency services consistent with its mandate. It claims to have rescued 24,000 victims from emergency situations by providing effective and quick response, rescue, emergency medical treatment and safe transportation to victims. The Service has very quickly acquired a reputation for performance among members of public, considering provision of such services has been a much neglected area so far. Dr Rizwan Naseer, a young and energetic trauma surgeon, has pioneered creation of PES. In fact he has contributions in evaluation of emergency services, while working UNDP more in a voluntary capacity. He along with a study group have contributed in drafting the legislation in support the Service. He enjoys much confidence of the decision makes in the province and has managed considerable funding support for the creation and further expansion of PES. Punjab Emergency Service Act 2006 was passed in June. Its salient features are: x Deal with emergency situations through timely response. x Provide rescue and emergency medical services x Arrange emergent transportation of disaster victims. x Maintain efficient communications and information exchange means. x Main universal toll free number for ease of public access. x Play a lead role in coordinating other emergency services. x Impart training to emergency service providers and generate compatible certification. x Establish community emergency response teams by eliciting volunteer contributions. x Analyse emergency response data to benefit research work aimed at prevention of hazardous situations. x Suggest measures for prevention and mitigation of hazards endangering public safety. x Facilitate NGOs contributions to emergency response manamgent x Undertake resource mobilisation
Funding
As per Dr Rizwan Naseer Punjab government has granted Rs 3.5 Billion for creation of 10 Emergency response stations in Lahore, 6 have been created and for extending this service to 12 selected districts of the province, work on which has commenced.
Human Resource
Service rules encourage recruitment of young people with qualifications matching their job description. Persons employed in physically demanding vocations will be retired on 40 years. Apparently the employees are better paid compared to government service but do not enjoy the pension benefits. The staff members seem motivated and exude positive energy normally not
DrRizwan Naseer’s prominence in the context of PES has also attracted much criticism from competing emergency services, mostly subjective in substance. x It is an ambitious mandate. However, PES should focus on quality provision of basic emergency services related functions and then incrementally build its capacity in other areas. x PES is not playing any role in harmonising the inputs of other emergency service providers like Civil Defence and Fire Services. At the moment there is much duplication in this regards, impressive contributions of Rescue 1122 notwithstanding. Long term sustainability may be an issue with parallel expenditures incurred on Civil Defence and Fire Services. Sustainability of expenditures on pay and allowances when the service is extended widely in the province may be an issue
105 seem in government devices. Capacity Building & Standard Setting
Operational Functioning
Cooperation with other stakeholders Expansion Plans How can OCHA Support
x PES have set up a training school in Ichra, Lahore, where training in essential functions consistent with the mandate in imparted. In doing so, there is an endeavour to follow internationally accepted standards. Efforts are underway to institutionalise collaborations with renowned foreign training schools in emergency response services like Leicestershire Fire School, UK. x While master trainers are trained from the central school, they in turn facilitate refresher trainings in situ, which is ongoing. I visited the central control of ‘Rescue 1122’ in Feozpur Road, Lahore and observed the following:State of the art command post with ability to track and analyse data. Emergency response vehicles are tracked through GPS on an electronic screen. Emergency services for various parts of Lahore City match their specific hazard profile, created from hazard data analysis. State of the art vehicles and equipment are provided to emergency service providers, be it medevac, fire services, SAR. Chemical hazard teams are also deployed for matching incident response. Emergency response time will be cut down to 10 minutes with the planned expansion in Lahore. Cooperates with police emergency 15 service in terms of hazard early warning and information exchange. No cooperation with Civil Defence and Fire Serives Extend Rescue 1122 to 12 cities in Punjab. Work underway in Rawalpindi.
Capacity building support to PES is recommended
Capacity building trainings in emergency response. Creation of emergency control centres consistent with service expansion plans.
Requires a separate need assessment
Presently all aspects of emergency services look impressive. How quality control is maintained over a period of time remains to be seen.
The latter needs resolution.
106
Eidhi Ambulance Services (20 Nov 06) Subject Resource Persons General
Scope of Operations
Explanation Abdul Sattar Eidhi, Bilqius Eidhi and Anwar Kazmi, Incharge of Operations Abdul Sattar Eidh is a household name in Pakistan for his humanitarian services, particularly in emergency relief services. He has over 30 years of solid result oriented contributions to his credit which includes responding to 17 major overseas emergency situations including during the recent Lebanon conflict. Edhi humanitarian services spread across all the provinces of the country and are organised in 8 zones. Every zone has 2-3 circles and one circle in turn controls 4-10 centres depending on the service needs and quality imperatives. While financial control is fairly centralised, operational control is decentralised on a common work method. Eidhi receives enormous contributions from all parts of country and from Pakistanis living abroad. From a pure humanitarian focus Eidhi has expanded into health capacity building programmes. His main forte is Eidhi emergency ambulance service. However, Eidhi centres provide either all or some of the below mentioned services:x Eidhi welfare centres undertake capacity building functions for livelihood generation and as advocacy platforms. x Eidhi destitute home house 35,000 for shelter and food and for capacity building for self enablement. x Maternity homes for providing reproductive health care. x Nursing centres for capacity building of female paramedics x Health consultancy has been started in Karachi x Runs 16 free dispensaries across the country. x Air ambulance service x Marine Rescue service x Has started free primary education to the under privileged in Karachi x Coffin and bath service and mortuaries.
Eidhi Ambulance services
They are being run by his son Faisal Eidhi and comprises a vast network employing 1200 ambulances across the country. Structured a follows;x One centre houses 8-10 ambulances x It is connected on wireless and telephone with Police and all emergency services. Has a UAN # 115. x About 60-70 persons staff one centre. x Ambulance services control rooms are the only ones that are computerised with recorders. x Emergency services are provided free, however, it can be hired on nominal charges to meet about 45% operational costs. x Taking into account the earnings, one ambulance’s operational monthly costs range between Rs 10,000-15,000. x They cover nearly all the main highways of the country. x The service is being gradually upgraded to provide Basic Life Support manned by one trained paramedic. Introduced in Karachi but is being extended elsewhere. Thereafter, selective advance cardiac life support system is being installed selectively. x Response Time. It is common knowledge in Pakistan tnat Edihi Emergency Ambulance services are the first ones to respond to an y emergency, be it an air crash or train accident or even a terrorist attack
107
Comments
.
Resource Person The Problem
x An excellent private sector initiative in humanitarian services provision in Pakistan where government services are grossly inadequate and quite inefficient x With the gradual change in management to his children, capacity building initiatives are figuring among sole humanitarian initiatives. x Quality of ambulance services are improving with introduction of life saving skills and equipment during emergency evacuation. x Perhaps the largest philanthropic ambulance services in the world. x Use of computer is on the increase in managing various services. x Volunteerism. Motivated and result oriented. Greater role of a value adding volunteer x A very strong in-house work ethic x Organisational flexibility with centralised financial control but devolved operations.
Port Oil Pollution Hazard Brig Rashid Siddiqui, Director Administration PNSC Geographically Pakistan is located in a region where 80% of world’s oil passes through its EEZ. Moreover Pakistan itself is a net importer of oil. A major oil spillage along its coasts would, therefore, be disastrous for the country and for its oil import based economy In 2003, an oil ship named Tasman Spirit incident spilled 50,000 tons of oil which could not be averted over 15 days when the ship stood stranded due to lack of institutional basis for averting such accidents. It had disastrous outcomes for the local environment besides bringing the Karachi Port to a standstill.
Where are we now
Major stakeholders
Way Forward
x No comprehensive legislation exists till new to enable dealing with the problem. x Major emergencies continue to be tackled on adhoc basis. x However, two port authorities, Karachi and Qasim have been made responsible to handle such emergencies under the Ministry of Ports and Shipping x Ministry of Ports and Shipping x Port authorities x Ship operators x Ship agents x Waste contractors x Key on-shore government agencies, namely Karachi City government, government of Sindh and DHA Policy x Set up clear guidelines to combat pollution in the marine environment x Guidelines for pollution prevention form land based activities x Timely availability of outside expertise and resources Operational Issues x Identification of chain of command for each port x Availability of trained/skilled persons for on and off shore aspects of the operation x Preparing SOPs for all phases of the operation x Ensure communication networking x Integration of relevant stakeholders in all phases of the operation x Avaiability of sensitivity maps and necessary planning data x Availability of tugs for salvage operation (which was not the case in Tasman Spirit disaster Handling of Port Waste x Ports t o carry out a periodic review of their facilities to ensure that they meet users need
108 x Treatment of port waste in keeping with international best practices x All practices must be consistent with national environmental laws On Shore Disaster Management x Plans for timely evacuation of population adjacent to the contaminated area x Action to pre-empt onset of health epidemic x Actions to limit or prevent beach pollution Maritime Oil Pollution Control Capability x Use of oil booms and absorbents x Skimmers for oil surface cleaning x Use of oil chemical dispersants x Use of oil spill containment methods Conclusion
Much more needs to be done to come up wit h a satisfactory national capacility for handling major oil spills along Pakistan’s coastline
109
Volunteerism National Volunteer Movement (3 Nov 06) National Volunteer Movement (NVM) was created in the aftermath of the October 06 earthquake, with the aim of tapping and institutionalising the volunteer sentiment that was much in evidence during that period. It is a top-down initiative in which Mr Mahmood Ali Durrani, present Minister for Information has been made overall incharge. It has a Board of Directors comprising eminent but extremely busy people, who have till now failed to articulate a plausible concept for operationalsiing this initiative. However, NVM has, and is contributing selectively in recovery an rehabilitation initiatives in the earthquake zone and it has number of other initiatives to its credit. I met DG NVM Mr Khalid Masood Chaudhary, a career civil services officer, in his office in Islamabad and the analysis of our deliberations is reproduced below. Please bear in mind that the conclusions drawn are not based of field evaluations, therefore, their veracity should be considered as tentative:Issue
Resource Person Mandate
Operational Concept
Target Groups
Volunteers Registered Reach
Current Situation
Comments/Recommendations
Responsibility Long-Term (L) Medium (M) Short (S)
DG NVM Mr Khalid Masood Chaudhary To convert the volunteer sentiment observed after Oct 06 EQ into a national movement and employ it for nation building purposes Not clear. VNM is being run on adhoc basis, more out of DG’s initiatives. Present operational method reflects the following:(1) Initiatives occurring from collaboration with some INGOs in the EQ Zone focusing on rehabilitation of communities. (2) Drawing potential of university students for targeted interventions. Linking VNM with international volunteers through UN system.
(1) Lacks focus as it is vague in its scope. (2) There are no clear deliverables. (3) Does not serve as a clear guide for implementation. (4) Must be clearly defend (1) There is little grass root connectivity with targetted communities using a uniform method. (2) NVM does not employ a studied social mobilisation method for sustainability of its contributions. (3) Again for sustainability reasons, there is no connectivity of NVM’s initiatives with the local governments. (4) There is no uniform criterion and mechanism for volunteer identification.
Board Of Directors/GOP (S)
NVM is correctly targeting two categories in meeting its objectives: youth (university and college students) and need based volunteers in the EQ zone. Above 10,000
However, there is a need to be consistent in what it is doing. Secondly, volunteers must be involved in targeted activities for both capacity building and maintaining linkage with the cause.
Board Of Directors/ DG (S/M)
Besides the EQ Zone, plans
(1) No clear criterion for district selection as part of
Board Of Directors/GOP (S)
Requires second party verification Board Of
110
Political Angles Up scaling Capacity
are afoot to introduce NVM in selected districts, again using a top-down approach NVM is used by the policy makers for media focused events for drawing political mileage No institutionalised linkages have been drawn with organisations having a larger and more permanent footprint at the grass roots
expansion. (2) No clear deliverables.
Directors/DG (S)
Constitutes a major distraction for the lower management and tends to discredit the Movement in the public eye. Needs to be coorected
Board Of Directors/GOP (S)
Recommended that such arraignments should be arrived at with the provincial CD entities as they have wide grass root presence but face resource deficiency. A synergy can be drawn to mutual advantage.
Board Of Directors/DG (S)
111
Annexure D Drought, Dengue Virus Epidemic and Flood Management
Drought Management Subject
Facts as explained by the Resource Persons
Resource Person The Problem
Mr Muhammad Anwar, Project Director, Federal DERA Unit and Mr Abdul Rafique Leghari, Provincial DERA Coordinator, Sindh Droughts are known to occur in Pakistan and other rain deficient regions as a cyclic phenomenon, recurring after 5-7 years. However, the changing global weather patterns seem to have shortened the cycles, more so as it pertains to our region. In Pakistan, 1998-2002 period saw onset of a very severe situation, with the severest impact in rain starved regions of Baluchistan, Sindh and southern Punjab provinces. In all 68 districts of the country were affected, causing negative stress on developmental gains and accentuating poverty in the affected regions.
Drought Affected Regions
Criterion for Ranking Drought Venerable Regions
Like elsewhere in the world, besides shortage in rainfall, dynamics factors making droughts severe in Pakistan are (1) growing population pressure on fragile ecosystems; (2) denuding soils of its green cover by excessive grazing of rangelands and tree cutting: (3) fast depletion of under water reservoir much beyond nature ability to recoup Drought affected districts are reflected at Annexure------. However, seriously affected districts, province wise are Baluchsitan
Sindh
Punjab
NWFP
FATA
Dera Bugti Pishin Chaghai Panjgoor Loralai Qilla Abdualah Kharan
Tharparkar Jacobabad Sanghar Thatta Dadu Larkana Shikarpur
Rahim Yar Khan Bahawalpur Bhakar Mianwali Rajanpur DG Khan
Tank Lakki Marwat Bannu DI Khan Karak Hangu
SW Agency N W Agency Kurram Mohmand
Criterion for ranking disaster vulnerable distts including World Bank Defined Indicators x Arid districts outside River Indus basin and not having ample rains x National rain weighted average (NWA) as indicated by the Met Deptt is taken as a benchmark. Rain average figuring below NWA: 277.8 mm are indicated as drought vulnerable. Province wise weighted average have been defined as follows:x Sindh – 162.2 mm x Baluchistan – 158.4 mm x Punjab – 389.2 x NWFP – 625.9 x 2000-2002 were considered as worst drought affected years x In 2002 – NWA was negative > 42, in Sindh > 68.8, Baluchistan >58.1, Punjab > 39.4, NWFP > 17.8 x Another indicator is related to hydrological drought, based on national water capacity as determined by Indus River System Authority (IRSA)
112 x For Local/ District Level Monitoring. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Population dislocations due to drought Access to piped water supply Access t o potable water supply Crop loss Comparative shortage of rainfall. Loss of human lives and livestock (7) Depletion of water in local reservoirs (8) Type of sub-soil water (9) Finally , impact accentuated by dynamic pressures relating socio-economic poverty.
National Capacity Building
(1) To combat the negative consequences accruing from the disaster, the government launched a $ 360 million donor assisted Drought Emergency Relief Assistance (DERA) with 20% GOP share. Federal Planning Commission and provincial Planning & Development (P&D) Departments and the affected district governments were the key implementation agencies. DERA constitutes the Federal Government principal drought management agency. Thus institutional capacity that was created to combat drought encompassed financial and focused implementation mechanisms.
(2) DERA should serve as focal agency at the national level for drought management in the NDMA’s DERA Strategic Impact Areas
DERA Financial Outlay
Secretariat. However, the provincial and district level mechanisms are more relevant in combating drought in concert with the provincial disaster management authorities. Scope. Impact areas are : (1) agriculture, irrigation and water management (2) water supply management, (3) roads infrastructure, (4) health infrastructure in affected areas, and (5) community livelihood generation. Main features of programme implementation strategy are: (1) Focus on need based projects identified by the community, and (2) Livelihood generation schemes accorded priority. Total Outlay Rs 10,482 Millions ADB component WB component
DERA Financial inputs for Sindh
Emergency Response Measures for Sindh Drought Mitigation Impact
Rs 6,438 Rs 2,652
GOP Rs ,.392 x Total provincial outlay : Rs 2892 Million x Financial inputs for Medium and long term Drought Impact were structured as follows:x Communication Sector (road construction) 76% x Water supply schemes 18% x Water conservation schemes 3.2% x Remaining amount utilised for creation of health basic facilities, livestock veterinary centres and for reforestation. Rs 1000 M given as cash support grant from the Federal government. Prioirty response areas were: x Food supplies x Arranging population relocations to life sustaining regions x Monetary support x Animal fodder provision. (1) Commencing in 2002, 2730 schemes covering irrigation and water management, drinking water supply, agriculture and road sectors were accomplished in 68 drought affected districts. The Wold Bank component was retired Dec 2004 whereas ADB component was completed in Dec 2005. (2) In terms of programme impact, rural infrastructure in the targeted areas was improved and
113 affected population segments were provided with short-term employment x Improvement in drinking water supply x Increase in water storage capacity x Improvement in accessibility – road network x Poverty alleviation x Soil conservation (3) In Sindh province 3000 affected people with 3 million population were rehabilitated with 100% in time project completion. (4) Overall, DERA is considered to have removed 20% drought impact. Follow up of DERA
Drought Early Warning Issues
Another 5 year programme (Drought Recovery Assistance Programme Project (DRAPP or DERA 2) with a Rs 30 billion financial component has been conceived and efforts for resource mobilisation are underway. It has, though, yet to take off. x Rainfall shortage viz area weighted rainfall monitoring undertaken by Met Department constitutes a fairly reliable early warning indicator. x Water shortage in reservoirs and the river system as indicated by IRSA. x However, DERA’s detailed impact analysis study is underway which is likely to yield more accurate indicators: (1) availability of drinking water, (2) water for agricultural usage, (3) effectiveness of existing water conservation strategies and on (4) ease of access to the drought impacted areas. x Issue. Even if the government agencies are forewarned through the Met Department based early warning, affected vulnerable communities are left stranded to suffer and cope with the disaster on their own, with some support from local or national NGOs.
Analysis
As per DERA Project Director, the programme has been successful in eradicating 20% of the drought’s cumulative impact Institutional Capacity. DERA management is confident of the sustainability of the provincial drought management mechanisms. However, they feel that significant capacity vacuum exists at the district level, Baluchistan in particular. Respective DCOs are the key implementation partners. Poor information dissemination, particularly to the affected communities degrades the quality of local response in the drought affected areas. Some feel that DERA’s focus was more general within a broader scio-economic uplift of the depressed regions context and it I did not specifically focus much on drought impact mitigation.
114
Dengue Virus Epidemic Management Meeting with Dr Muhammad Hasan, Director Health Services, Punjab and Muhammad Saleem Rana, Dy Programme Manager for Communicable Diseases Punjab (11 Nov 06) – 0300-4335628 Subject History
Worst Case Implications
Incidence Areas in the Province
Facts as Explained by Resource Person/Extracted from Secondary Source In Punjab 2003 few cases in Soan Valley but were eradicated. The disease was endemic in Karachi and lower interior Sindh for the last 3-4 years caused by a peculiar mosquito vector (aedes sgepi). Transmitted to Punjab as a consequence of mass migration that occurred during Eid-ul-Fitr. x It can cause the lethal dengue hemorrhagic fever. x Mortality rate can increase many fold with its psycho-social implications x Exacts an economic burden due emergent mobilisation of resources to combat it and temporary loss of economically able manpower afflicted by the disease x Causes excessive burden on the economic system. x Spreads mass panic and disinformation As of 11 Nov, as per Director Health Punjab, 86 cases reported, 85 positive. 17 in Lahore, 44 in Rawalpindi, 16 ,Bwp 2, Khushab 1 ,Fsd 1 and Multan 1. Please refer to disease incidence graph attached as Annexure ---
Adopted Strategy Pre-Epidemic x On receipt of information even from adjoining regions, a meeting of Provincial Epidemic Phase Control Committee was convened, chaired by DG health services, Punjab. This was held in Oct. x Established liaison with principals of medical colleges and all EDOs-H in districts and a warning with preventive guidelines were despatched. x For awareness of masses, issue was highlighted through print and electronic media and public. This exercise was also aimed at curbing disinformation and panic. x Through Internal resource assessment shortfalls were identified. x Liaison mechanisms were established with non-governmental stakeholders, WHO, UNICEF, professional medical organisations. They were communicated of the support needs, mostly in terms of technical capacity building. x Information management was streamlined within, and with outside agencies on commonly understood and used formats.
Epidemic Phase
Issues/Weak Areas
x Daily situation management through coordination. x Disease incidence reporting on standardised formats, x Peripheral medical facilities like private hospitals included in incident management x Flow of medicines and logistics associated with building a fogging capacity facilitated x Media management for a wider response and to curb panic x Technical assistance sought from WHO and other donors. x Define roles and responsibilities of the existing institutions in the federal and provincial governments in combating present days viruses and mass communicable diseases. x Improve existing gaps in the HIMS and identify institutional responsibility for incident management. . For example currently 3 months delay occurs for information to reach districts to locations where analytical facilities exist in the provinces or centre. x With the emergent of complex public health threat, there is need for configuring a health incident management system in the country for health disaster management with focus on preparedness, response and recovery.
115 x Surveillance of number of infectious diseases is occurring vertically through mostly donor funded programmes with little interconnectivity. They focus on acute disease detection like HIV, avian flu etc. Such programmes usually do not tap all sectors and information collection at source remains incomplete. Witihn a district surveillance may not be covering number of hospitals. x In Punjab during the current crisis, poor coordination within reporting officers and inadequate information management has been identified. For example first case of dengue fever occurred in Rawalpindi General Hospital on 2 Oct. but was reported in Lahore on 21 Oct. Delayed reporting was likewise detected on many cases. Such trends thus cause delays implementation of preventive and preventive strategies. x Punjab is working to update DEWS. Source: “Why we need to think beyond dengue” by Dr Sania Nishtar”, News, Political Economy Edition Nov 5, 06.
Dengue Virus in Sindh Subject Resource Persons Back ground
Early Warning
How it is being managed
Issues
Facts as Explained by the Resource Persons Comments Dr Sheikh, Secretary Health Sindh, Dr Capt ® Abdul Majeed, Additional Secretary Monitoring and Inspection, Health Department, Sindh In 1994 and 95, 198 cases of dengue virus were reported in the The vector cycle has never province. In 2003, 300 cases were reported with 10 deaths. comprehensively been However, from 2006 May onwards 4000 cases have been eliminated in the province and reported with 46 deaths so far. Karachi, a mega city with nearly 16 there has not been sufficient million populations and with many unplanned settlements and follow up of earlier virus numerous stagnant water sources, has been the epicentre of the incidence. Secondly, the vector virus incidence with 95% of reported cases. Hyderabad follows strain variety which seems to with few cases and there has been random virus incidence in the further complicate makes rural areas. elimination difficult. x EPI surveillance system that is in place and functional in the province is being used for early detection and reporting of the disease. x Sindh Health department has the Disease Early Warning System capability but for some reasons it has not been operationalised x For emergency management, a disease crisis control centre has been activated with Dr Majeed as the point person. x Daily updates are announced on disease incidence and response. x Transparency in dealing with the public where an aggressive awareness campaign has been launched, which did create a bit of panic initially. x Seminar and other activities have been organised for doctors capacity building in the province to facilitate common strategy implementation. x Through government subsidies, testing kits have been provided free of cost.
There is no effective disease early warning system in place in the province. The present virus outbreak has been handled in a reactive manner
x Certain functional disconnect exists between the Sindh health department and the Karachi City government in terms of common implementation of agreed strategies. x Secondly, City government in Karachi controls only 35% of the
Problems have been experienced in articulating virus response in a major city like Karachi with numerous
While the anti- dengue virus campaign has been effective in terms of generating public awareness but vector control and eradication has been patchy.
116 areas. Remaining is under jurisdiction of numerous stakeholders. Despite efforts problems are being faced in implementing agreed strategies. x Information management ahs suffered due to delays and inaccuracies despite efforts to introduce common reporting formats. x Legislation is being enacted for establishing a formal linkage with private hospitals to facilitate integrated management of the disease.
Virus Eradication
Vector eradication through fogging. Encouraging vector defence within the household through aggressive publicity campaigns. Massive media and public information campaigns targeting schools and universities and even traditional Eid congregations.
Future Prognosis
The disease incidence is likely to decrease with coming winters in the province, however, it is likely to recur on a larger scale next years with a strong footprint in the rural areas.
Deficient Areas
stakeholders. A per a general perspective fogging campaign for vector eradication has been patchy and large parts of the city are left unattended. Private hospitals are not effectively networked in formulating a common response to the campaign.
x A post epidemic post mortem is planned to sift lessons for formulating next year’s strategy. x Enhance fogging capacity x Improved EW and information management x Institutionalsied crisis management within Health Department x Remove structural impediments related to multi stakeholders governance in Karachi x Consistent emphasis on vector removal x Better coordination x Learn from others experience x Need for a national strategy for health crisis management
Flood Control Mechanisms Source: Meeting with Mr IB Shiekh, Federal Flood Commissioner (4 Nov 06) and Research Document (F-1) Pakistan experienced disastrous floods in the Indus Basin in 1955, 1956 and later in 1973 and 1976. Colossal losses t o life, property and to the communication infrastructure prompted the government to gradually introduce national flood management mechanisms. Federal Flood Commission (FFC) was thus created in 1977. A national flood plan was prepared in 1978 (NFPP-1978) with a view to reducing flood losses, especially in areas of economic significance and improving flood control/ protection infrastructure. Following the severe floods of 1992, flood forecasting and warning systems were planned for installation. It included installation of S-Band weather radar and preparation of fold warning manuals. Later, similar radars were installed in Mangla and Sialkot and plans finalised to further improve upon the flood forecasting system and creation of flood simulation decision support system.
117 Classification of high, very high and exceptionally high food limits have been defined for each river indicating water channel overflow scenarios in particular to trigger local early warning mechanisms. These classifications also define step-wise action to be taken both by flood management staff and local administration. On receipt of a significant flood forecast, following actions are taken for flood management; (1) relief authorities initiate specific actions which may include requesting for Army’s deployment; (2) district authorities take steps for relocation of vulnerable population through local early warning mechanisms. In case of exceptionally high flood, arrangements are put in place to effect breach(es) as per contingency planning. Flood affected communities are planned to be involved in local food management in the following manner; (1) local community representative is involved in every planned activity; (2) at district, tehsil and provincial levels government has assigned each minister a district for food management to affect coordination between the elected representatives and local government. Institutions Responsible for Flood Management Besides FFC following institutions play a major role:Flood Forecasting Division (FFD) of the Met Department plays a pivotal role in entire flood impact mitigation process. Hydrometreological data from various national and international sources is processed to prepare flood forecasts and warnings to be disseminated outwards to various national and sub-national entities. Provincial Irrigation and Drainage Authorities (PIDA) roles include water flow measurement in rivers, canals and water channels; and planning, design, construction and maintenance of flood protection works. WAPDA is involved in management of dams and its major functions are collection of rainfall data from telemetric rain gauge stations and provide hydrometric flood data at water regulation barrages. Provincial Relief Commissioners are responsible for flood disaster preparedness, emergency response, and postflood disaster rehabilitation activities. Pakistan Army flood related employment encompasses rescue and relief operations. Army Engineering Corps is employed in structural flood control measures in support of provincial government. Commission on Indus Waters is regulatory body which accesses flood data from India. District Flood Plans focuses on timely relocation of vulnerable communities, providing rescue and relief support normally with Army’s support. The district authorities are supposed to involve elected representatives and community representatives in implementing their plans. Summary of discussions with Mr IB, Sheikh, Federal Flood Commissioner After number of lean years the flood control mechanisms were partially tested in 2006 without encumbering any major difficulty. A case in point was affecting evacuation of population from some vulnerable villages down stream of Maralla Headwork on River Chenab on only 4 hours early warning received from India. The fact this feat was remarkably accomplished asserts the viability of our flood response mechanism, from the Federal through to the provincial, district and sub-district level response mechanism. However, there are glaring weaknesses in addressing flash floods in the mountainous and semi-mountainous regions of NWFP, AJK and Northern Areas. Vulnerable areas are along River Kabul and Swat in NWFP and numerous rivers and mountains nullahs in the Northern areas and AJK.
118 Two flood control radars are planned to be installed in Chirat (near Nowshera) in NWFP and another in Gilgit for Northern Areas. Their installation would much improve the early warning for flash floods. Provincial and local governments in NWFP, Northern Areas and AJK are being encouraged and guided to make comprehensive flood mitigation, preparedness and response plans, similar to the ones prepared for southern Indus Basin regions. However, there is much need for community based flood hazard advocacy particularly in the northern flash flood regions and to initiate programmes meant to strengthen/create coping mechanisms to reduce their vulnerability. In the Indus Basin regions, provincial governments are encouraged to minimise/eliminate population encroachments along traditional flood channels.
119
Annexure E Case Studies of Disaster Vulnerable Communities and Schools Disaster Vulnerable Communities Community Evaluation # 1 Village Karli, UC Salmiah, District Muzzafarabad Case Study for Community based Disaster Management Intervention (18/19 Oct 06)
Preamble Communities remain vulnerable to disasters and multiple hazards as (1) they do not normally have the skills, resources and the coping capacity to avert or minimise losses accruing from natural or man instigated disasters; (2) for number of reasons they are normally poorly served by disaster response mechanism of the local administration, latter’s efficacy notwithstanding, (3) real life experiences point towards lesser political sensitivity to their concerns as opposed to disasters impacting cities; and importantly, (4) rural communities’ disaster vulnerability stands enhanced due to very poor delivery of basic social services. While the proposed NDMA led disaster management efforts are likely to energise the line departments’ response to disasters, concerns of vulnerable isolated communities are less likely to be adequately addressed. Earthquake experience (Oct 05) and havoc brought by torrential rains in lower Sindh province verifies this assertion. Through case studies of some disaster vulnerable communities, it is intended to highlight ingredients of a possible intervention meant to enhance communities’ resilience to disasters and common hazards. I would like to add that very rarely we experience a disaster of October 8 2005 earthquake magnitude. Normally disasters or common hazards leave a relatively small footprint impacting number of vulnerable communities. Factors like their remoteness, lack of information and timely response and absence of local coping mechanisms tend to act as dynamic pressures to enhance the disaster impact. There is, therefore, a very strong case for interventions aimed at enhancing communities resilience to natural disaster, as enunciated very prominently in Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2115). However, in doing so It is not intended to isolate community based disaster management from the overall rural poverty alleviation efforts for understandable reasons. Therefore, disaster resilience enhancing efforts should preferably be addressed as part of overall poverty alleviation and human resource development efforts. However, for communities very vulnerable to hazards/ disasters, a focused time sensitive intervention meant to reduce their vulnerabilities by transferring necessary skills and institutionalising them within the existing the existing social structures is certainly recommended.
120 Outcomes Community disaster/hazard risks and vulnerabilities identified, particularly those relating to vulnerable groups. Communities’ capacity and coping mechanisms strengthened for responding to disasters/hazards. Community awareness to disaster risks, risk reduction and response enhanced. Community disaster response capacity institutionalised. Structural schemes aimed at risk minimisation, lying outside the response ambit of communities, identified. Method. The assignment was attempted as a focused on site study relying on primary sources. It included two sessions of semi-structured group discussion with locals representing varying socio-economic shades and the major castes, focused interviews and through personal observation. Village Karli and the October 2005 Earthquake Village Karli is an amalgam of numerous house clusters spread over an area of about 2 square kilometres along a mountain side. It extends from Chikar- Bagh road down to an artificially created lake. In fact not far from Village Karli, an entire mountain side collapsed as a consequence of October 8 earthquake to block a perennial water channel that flowed into River Jhelum. 1468 people perished as a consequence in what can be termed as perhaps a major environmental disaster. 33 houses and nearly 25 kanals of agricultural of Village Karli are now submerged in the lake. With a population of 2500, about 450 households at a height of 5,000 feet ASL., the village remains snowbound in a severe winter. Karli is largely a crime free village with local conflict resolution mechanisms sustaining social harmony. Tough the local governance structures normally favour the socially dominant Chaudharys, Syeds and Awans who constitute nearly 63% of the population. They live in the upper reaches of the village, while most residing in the lower reaches include the relatively marginalised Rajputs and Sheikhs have the above mentioned houses and agricultural land in the Lake. However, all communities have suffered immensely as a consequence of the Earthquake. 103 died and 90% of the livestock was lost and all social institutions which include the two local schools and 5 village mosques have been destroyed. Besides the Lake, numerous slides have emerged as secondary hazards within the village to threaten lives, particularly during snow. Slides also tend to degrade the soil cohesion. However, donors have facilitated formation of a Village Committee with an all-caste representation for equitable sharing of relief and rehabilitation benefits. While temporary shelters offer a degree of protection against the oncoming winters but delays in reconstruction of permanent houses remain an anxiety inducing factor. In the communities’ perception, early construction of their fallen houses and removing impediments that hinder this process constitutes the foremost priority. The community, on the whole, seems to have lapsed into a dependency syndrome and shows little inclination to willingly seek livelihoods regeneration opportunities. It is widely speculated that many people do not want to work as they are living off abundant stocked relief goods.
121
Future Disaster/hazard Scenarios Worst Case. Recurrence of an earthquake of a magnitude paralleling Oct 05 or even more with its disastrous implications. Likely Scenario. The local community is likely to face either or a combination slides, communication links severed due to winter snow accumulation or lightening exposure in summers. However, vulnerability to these hazards stands enhanced when seen in the context of dynamic pressures in the shape of extremely poor social services, particularly in health and absence of a collective self help sentiment.. Social Profile Health
Education
Livelihood
Literacy @ 60% appprox. Compares with 68% Literacy @ of district Muzzafarabad Female literarcy @ compares well with male Literacy. Primary school for girls in the village. They join Boys Middle school, in the village, after class 5 Graduate colleges for both in Chikar (5 KMs)
Nearest BHU at Rawal Gali (3 KMs). Remains non-functional RHC at Chikar but with no specialist facility Similar facilities at Hattian Bala (20 KMs Gynae available All specialist facilities at Muzzafarabad (50 KMS). 2 hours away. No access to livelihood skills based education Common ailments: psycho-social stresse Specially among children and women, ARI, Gastroenteritis, goitre
Among 450 bread earners, about 300 are Daily wage earners. Daily wage earners have limited employm Opportunities in winters There are 35 government servants Only 15 are self employed by running Local business. Generally lack livelihood generation skills Particularly in women
Damage Caused by October 05 EQ Physical and Economic 400 katcha houses destroyed. Remaining 40-50 pucca houses seriously damaged 35 houses submerged in the lake 90% livestock destroyed
Local businesses destroyed or Seriously disrupted 25 kanals of productive land Submerged in the Lake
Psycho- Social
Environment
103 dead (75 children, 15 women & 13 men)
Creation of the artificial lake
Socially marginalised Rajputs And Shiekhs worst affected. Will accentuate poverty Government ‘s inability to compensate and clearly guide the locals with regards to reconstruction of houses 2 schools and 5 mosques destroyed
Frequent sliding degrading Soil compactness
Psycho-social stresses specially among women and children
Cracks appeared on soil Surface degrading productive use Some water supply sources Have diminished output
122 Risk Statement Risk Statement
Probability
Earthquake above 6.5 magnitude Unlikely Rise in Lake level causing loss to housing and productive Likely Land thus causing poverty accentuation of the marginalis Land sliding activity, particularly in winters Certain 90% loss of livestock causing economic hardships Certain Land degradation due to sliding activity and soil ruptures Certain Causing economic losses Inadequate housing causing physical vulnerability in wint Certain Health hazards due to poor health cover, more so in wint Certain Donor dependence instilling sedentary mindsets and curb Certain Community centred self livelihood initiatives Psycho-social stresses due to multiple earthquake related Likely Stresses Vulnerability to lightening related hazards in summers Likely
Consequence
Risk Level
Disastrous/catastrophic High Major High Major Major Major
High High High
Major Moderate Major
High High High
Moderate
Medium
Moderate
Medium
Proposed Risk Management Strategy Risk Statement
Risk Level
Existing Risk Management Arrangements
Earthquake above 6.5 magnitude (structural)
High
ERRA/AJK # Implementation of the present Government Strategy Intervention # Community awareness and capacity for abiding by EQ resistant building codes Agency (M) enhanced Water exit being # Lake level not to be allowed to rise # AJK govt/ERRA prepared to Above present level. #M confine water # Those who lost houses/agri land to #L Level be equitably compensated, preferable through allotment of alternative land Some families Community # Slide risks fully determined have relocated # Vulnerable houses relocated to capacity and houses awareness Safer locations To reduce built through # Local Early warning system vulnerability DM intervention set-up to warn of slide risk # Local SOPs developed to avoid risk are (S/M) # Local capacity built to clear minor slides Some vulnerable # Recreation of lost stock through specific AJK government/ families have grants by government and donors. Donors (M) been given # Donor providing livestock to vulnerable families livestock in limited quantity Through donor assistance Nothing Soil quality/compactness recovered throug AJK government / Application of appropriate short and long Interventions in
Rise in Lake level causing loss to High housing and productive Land thus causing poverty accentuation (structural) Land sliding activity, particularly in High Winters (non-structural)
90% loss of livestock causing economic hardships (livelihood)
High
Land degradation due to sliding activity and soil ruptures causing
High
Land zoning and building of EQ Resistant housing being implemente
Recommended Inputs for DM Strategy
Responsibility Time Frame L – long term M – Medium S - Short
123 economic losses (Structural) Inadequate housing causing physical vulnerability in winters (structural)
High
Health hazards due to poor health High more so in winters
Term strategies ERRA is supporti # ERRA speeds up the grass root reconstruction Component of its housing rebuilding of houses Strategy. # ERRA curbs disinformation through Appropriate social marketing strategy. # Features of traditional houses built on EQ resistant standards re-introduced in ERRA proposed house design. NCHD providing # First aid facility created in village and basic health care Run trough local volunteer support, Services through who are trained. the BHU # Mothers trained in common preventive Childcare methods. # Health awareness level enhanced. # BHU providing basic services through Local government interventions. Nothing # Self reliance attitude created in the community through sustained SMP through the Village Committee and by using the institution of mosque
High Donor dependence instilling sedentary mindsets and curbing Community centred self livelihood initiatives. The issue related to Institutionalising benefits accruing From external intevntions Psycho-social stresses due to Medium Random psycho- Children specific psycho-social therapies multiple earthquake related social therapies launched Targeting children stresses have been Administered Vulnerability to lightening related Medium # Houses afforded lightening protection hazards in summers through Installation of conductors # Local volunteers trained for this purpose
Soil recovery (M/L) ERRA /AJK Government (S)
# Achieved through Donor intervention (M) # Local government (M)
Donor intervention (M)
Specialised Interventions (S)
Donor based Intervention (S)
124
Community Evaluation # 2 Village Gul Dehri, UC Garhi Habibiullah Case Study for Community Disaster Management Intervention (20 Oct 06) Outcomes Community disaster/hazard risks and vulnerabilities identified, particularly those relating to vulnerable groups. Communities’ capacity and coping mechanisms strengthened for responding to disasters/hazards. Community awareness to disaster risks, risk reduction and response enhanced. Community disaster response capacity institutionalised. Structural schemes aimed at risk minimisation, lying outside the response ambit of communities, identified. Note. The proposed action plan for this case study has much application value for communities endangered by flash floods, particularly in the mountainous regions of all provinces in the country. Method. The case study was attempted through semi-structured interviews by some informed community members including local Naib Nazim, by on site evaluation and discussion with numerous disaster victims from the community. Village Gul Dehri and the Unexpected Disaster The village is located in Balakot Tehsil of Mansehra district of NWFP province, within the seriously impacted area of October 8 2005 earthquake. It has population of 1500 approximately and 250 households. Sadaats and Khan Swatis comprising 23 households own most of the local lands and forests. Mughals constitute the majority with about 150 households. They migrate to upper reaches of Kaghan valley for subsistence farming during summers. Many among the Mughals and Gujjars, who constitute the other marginalised segment (with about 80 (40% households), work for daily wages. Most of them, however, remain unemployed. While the majority among the elder men and women are illiterate, the younger generation is keen on education across the gender divide. The educated elders determine the literacy rate close to 50%. Gul Dehri is located towards the southern end of the picturesque Balakot Valley on the banks of the perennial fast flowing Kunhar River. Right in front of the village the Kunhar is joined by the seasonal Asseri Nullah which flows out of the higher mountains to the east. About 3-4 KMs upstream along Assari Nullah, the mountains have experienced extensive fissures and sliding activity consequent to the October 2005 earthquake. Locals recall that on three occasions water mixed with heavy sedimentation have flowed from Assari Nullah into Kunhar when there was no rain. It sprouted from the earthquake generated fissures where a small lake is also created.
125
The last deluge of heavy sedimentation from Asseri Nullah into Kunhar occurred on 23 July 06, during monsoons, with disastrous consequences for Gul Dehri. It temporarily blocked Kunhar River for 3 days and a sizeable lake was created next to the village. However, on 26 July at around 2200 hours, the lake broke as Kunhar changed course to the east and swept through Gul Dehri village destroying every thing that came in front, while sweeping right through the village. Luckily warning by the local administration and a village vigil ensured its timely partial evacuation. However some household were trapped in the gushing water. Four died, 125 houses were swept and deep gashes crisscross the village. Kunhar kept flowing through the village for 5 days before Army Engineers restored its original course on 30 October. Much fertile land adjoining the river has been rendered unfit for agriculture. People representing all social segments suffered. But the consequences are more telling for the relatively poorer Gujjars and Mughals. Gul Dehri’s residents, nonetheless, remain vulnerable as Asseri Nullah can again sprout heavy sedimentation to similar disastrous outcomes. The village must be relocated and rebuilt. Earlier, 150 houses were either destroyed or seriously damaged during the October 2006 earthquake. The village did receive significant relief goods from provincial government and donors and a Committee was formed for its equitable distribution within the affected residents. Social Profile Issue Community Structure Literacy% Land holdings Community Institutions School and health facilities
Out of 250 Households, about 25 belong to the relatively affluent Sadaats and Swatis. About 200 plus households belong to wither daily wage earners or migrant labourers/herders belonging to the Mughals and Gujjar caste Appox 50%. Mostly elders and women. Very limited belonging to Sadaats and Swatis A committee formed by donor agencies during he earthquake. Not institutionalised Education facilities up to intermediate for both boys and girls at Garhi Habibullah. Basic health facilities and an newly made Tehsil hospital at Garhi Habibiullah.
Damage Caused by River Kunhar Changing its Course Physical & Economic
Psycho-Social
Environmental@
Village ceased to exist cohesively in a physical sense. More than half completely destroyed
Survivors live in insecurity, adding to the trauma of earthquake
125 houses and personal belongings completely destroyed
Uncertain future till government relocates the village/or protective dykes built along Kunhar Poverty and social misery of the marginalised accentuated
Environmental hazards created as a consequent of Oct 05 EQ will continue to pose threat to communities physical security in its present location. Degradation of mountain slopes due to Oct 05 EQ gives rise to sliding threat
Loss of local businesses and livelihoods
126 Absence of a viable community social intuitions exacerbate the situation. @Environmental hazards created due to Oct 05 EQ but can cause recurrence of the disaster situation being reviewed
Risk Statement Risk Statement Flash flood threat emanating from R Kunhar owing to Sedimentation activity in Asseri Nullah, particularly in view of absence of early warning mechanisms deployed by local government Earthquake above 6.5 magnitude 60% loss of housing over and above damage caused by EQ with approaching winters Loss of productive assets: livestock and agri land accentuating local poverty, especially of vulnerable group Community poorly mobilised for facing flash floods threat Land degradation due to flash floods which constitutes an Environmental disaster Absence of local capacity to deal with flash floods, like First aid facilities etc. Other vulnerabilities arising out of high unemployment & Poor Social services delivery which are more of perenni Nature Psycho-social stresses due to multiple flash floods and E Related stresses Vulnerability to lightening related hazards in summers
Probability
Consequence
Risk Level
Likely
Catastrophic
Very High
Unlikely Certain
Disastrous/catastrophic High Disastrous/Major High
Certain
Disastrous/Major
High
certain Certain
Moderate Major
High High
Certain
Moderate
High
Likely
Moderate
Medium
Certain
Moderate
Medium
Likely
Moderate
Medium
Risk Management Strategy Risk Statement
Risk Le Existing Risk Managem Recommended Risk Arrangements Management Arrangements
Responsibility
Risk of flash floods from Kunhar River
V. High None
# provincial & distt Governments # provincial & distt Governments # Local governmen and affected communities.
Earthquake above 6.5 mag High
Land zoning and building of EQ Resistant housing
# Preferably the village should be Relocated to a safer location. # If not, then an embankment should be Along the eastern bank of Kunhar R # System of vigil should be kept along Asseri N to monitor recurrence of sedimentation activity. # Local government must put in place a viable EW mechanism. # Environmental assessment/counter measures undertaken to stop source of sedimentation flow into River Kunhhar # Implementation on the present Strategy reinforced
ERRA/AJK Government
127
Vulnerability due to loss of High Housing with coming Winters
being implemented by ERRA and NWFP govt. About 60 % of affected Households provided with Temporary shelters
Loss of productive assets High Causing poverty Accentuation
None
Community poorly mobilised for facing flash flood threat
Nothing
High
Land and environmetal High Degradation enhancing Poverty Absence of first aid High facilities in the village Vulnerabilities arising from High Poor social delivery, Particularly in health & Education sectors
None None Being addressed, though With poor outcomes, thru Long/short term strategies
Psycho-social stresses du Medium Random psycho-social multiple flash floods & EQ Therapies targeting Related stresses children have been administered Vulnerability to lightening r Medium hazards in summers
# Community awareness generated for Intervention abiding by EQ resistant building codes agency # ERRA/donor assistance sought for # NWFP govt/ Proving 100% shelters to affected HHs by ERRA 15 Nov. # NWFP govt/ERRA to formulate housing Compensation Policy for village Gul Dehri by 1 Nov 06 # Financial compensation for livelihood # Provincial govt Regeneration by the Provincial government & donors. # Livelihood regeneration interventions by Donors. Though specifc # Community mobilised around Flash flood risk the village Committee formed for relief Managements Operations. intervention # Capacity created for combating Flash floods hazard, by vigils, reinforcing Embankments and developing a local system Of early warning. # Essential stores for rescue like ropes, Bamboo ladders, floating expedients, torche Etc stored. # Local SOPs developed for emergency Response and nec trainings imparted # Land productive quality restored through NWFP govt/ Provincial government and donor support donors First aid facility created through donor Specific intervention and local volunteers trained intervention Scoial uplift efforts for the region reviewed NWFP govt/ And gaps addressed for concerted outcomes donors
Children and vulnerable women specific psycho-social therapies launched # Houses afforded lightening protection throu Installation of conductors # Local volunteers trained for this purpose
Specialised interventions
128
Community Evaluation # 3 Village Khana Labana (8 Nov 06) Outcomes
Community disaster/hazard risks and vulnerabilities identified, particularly those relating to vulnerable groups. Communities’ capacity and coping mechanisms strengthened for responding to disasters/hazards. Community awareness to disaster risks, risk reduction and response enhanced. Community disaster response capacity institutionalised. Structural schemes aimed at risk minimisation, lying outside the response ambit of communities, identified. Method The case study was conducted through semi-structured interview of the community members belonging to the major castes and social profile, local government functionaries and the concerned official of Lahore Zone Irrigation Works Department, through extensive multiple site visits and post visit discussions with key stakeholders. Introduction to the Disaster Scenario It was intended to case study a river flood affected district in Punjab province. But owing to the changing weather pattern major floods have not visited central Punjab since 1988. However, floods occur repeatedly in four districts of Gujranwala, Sheikhupura, Sialkot and Narowal due to sudden surge in rain water channels during summer monsoons. They flow westwards from Parmanadal ranges in district Jammu in Indian Held Kashmir, thus, allowing little early warning. Among them Degh Nullah causes relatively more damage to life, crops and property. Punjab government has undertaken to widen and deepen Degh’s flood channel and raise shoulder embankments based on maximum water flow accumulated data. As per Mr Waqar, Chief Irrigation Lahore Zone, it is being executed as a two years project spanning 2005-06. Its main objective is flood control with a view to minimising collateral damage to lives, crops and livelihood. However, the project is delayed as nearly 40% of the work remains as of Nov 2006. Its planned cost is Rs 997 million. The project also entails reconstruction of 40 bridges on wider specifications. Last serious floods in Degh Nullah occurred in 1988, causing loss of 55 lives and severe loss of livestock and standing crops
There was no work in progress when I visited the site in Nov 05. Till then Chota Degh Nullah (smaller tributary of Degh Nullah) was widened till a certain point, 5 KMs upstream of Vilage Khana Labana. The remaining downstream portion is relatively constricted which means that flood water spilled over during monsoon season of 2006 when its flow was impeded by the constricted portion and its narrow bridges. Despite its flash flood risk minimisation scope, it has actually caused widespread economic loss in a region where the majority population constitutes daily wage earners. . Early Warning The need for timely early warning has accentuated due the fact due widening of upstream segment of Degh channel, it now takes water just 24 hours to travel to village Khama Labana area from district Sialkot, compared to 4-5 days that it used to take earlier with the narrow channel. The Irrigation Department claims to monitor water flow quantum during the flood system as water flow measurement gauges are installed along Degh’s course. However, local administration representatives claim that Irrigation Department maintains poor vigil of flash flood bearing water channels, while concentrating more on the major rivers. Community members claim that no flood early warning was provided by the local government. They monitored the flood through radio and television broadcasts and by maintaining contact with their relatives in upstream villages. Risk Reduction as a Planning Consideration. There are some who feel that the loss could have been minimised had the water channel widening work been attempted from the other way, i.e. downstream to upstream. It also seems that the local
129 administration never anticipated the disastrous consequences accruing from the delayed project implementation. It, therefore, emerges that disaster risk reduction was not factored fully in the Project planning considerations. Moreover, ‘poor are voiceless’ cliché seems to come true as no one seems to be concertedly advocating their concerns with the local and provincial government with regards to the negative impact of Degh Nullah project, in terms of accentuating latent poverty in the region. Relief by Punjab and Local Government.. While the local and provincial governments claim that the flood affected communities were provided with timely relief stores, the local community claim that except for mild health and livestock support, no government relief agency came when such support was most required. Compensation of Flood Losses. As per Relief Commissioner Punjab, the District Revenue staff has surveyed the flood damage. It will be sent to his office for verification and for compensating the affectees. He however, pointed out that this process can be much delayed as the local influential tend to inflate the losses which makes the compensation assessment less credible. A third party verification of damage assessments was recommended to establish credibility of the compensation assessment exercise. Moreover, the province with limited resources at its disposal, and with competing compensation claims from all over, is inclined to offer partial compensation at best. The poor and the marginalised, thus, suffer the most. Village Khana Labana It is one of the 65 villages of district Sheikhupura that were badly inundated with severe damage caused to rice and other crops, and to habitats due to overflow of rain water from Chota Degh during 2006 summer monsoons. The village has a population of 3200, approximately, comprising about 500 households. It is structured in one central cluster of houses and about 3 smaller satellite clusters belonging to the poor and the marginalised. Despite its location at one hour drive from Lahore, the Village reflects very weak social indicators.
I met wives of Muhammad Shariff and Mhammad Shafique, both daily wage earners, belonging to the marginalised Mughal caste. While the former had rebu house by arranging Rs 50,000 loan, the latter was living in a one room house with a temporary plastic sheet roof which was leaking, with 8 family members Muhammad Shafique could not till then arrange loan for house reconstruction. Both earn approximately Rs 4000 pm. Loss of habitat means further poverty accentuation.
Livelihood Profile Being a predominantly agricultural community, land holdings or their absence define the livelihood and poverty patterns. Land Holding 25 acres or above 12-25 acres 5-12 acres 1-5 acres Less than 1 acre # Landless
Occupation Profile Those who can subsist off the land. Includes land holding of 5 acres and above
House Holds 4 9 35-40 150 97 200
% 0.8 1.8 8 30 19.4 40
Households 53
% 10.6
130 Land holdings of 1-5 acres can only serve 150 to supplement domestic income. Self employed –shop keepers/local 13 transport owners Daily wage earners @ 284
30 2.6 56.8
# Fall in the landless category considering its negligible income potential. @ daily wage earners are mostly employed in adjoining industries in Muridke and along road Muridke-Shekhupura. Also employed in the fields as agricultural labour. Their monthly earning ranges from Rs 2500-4500 per month.
The Marginalised Various castes are identified in the village in the order of relative affluence. Caste Gujjar (relatively affluent) Rajput Changar Kumbar/Arain/Dogar/Mughal (relatively marginalised)
Households 40 25 435#
% 8 5 87
# mostly landless/daily wage earners
Miscellaneous Social Indicators Literacy % Schools
Health Houses Social intervention
35-40%. Illiteracy more pronounced among the women and the elders including wage earners Government primary schools for boys and girls in the village. Middle schools at 5 KMs. College for intermediate and above education at Muridke (8 KMs). While the poor send their children to government schools, others prefer private schools. BHU at Patiala (4 KMs). No doctor. For minor ailments locals approach quacks, but serious patients are taken to hospitals in Muridke or Lahore. Most houses including of the relatively poor are of brick and mortar with latrines. About 3-5% HHs live in katcha houses and nearly 10% follow open defecation routines No NGO or external agency have undertaken health or education related intervention in the recent past.
Hazards and Vulnerabilities The communities residing in village Khan Labana do not face life and death hazards akin to those residing in the earthquake zone. The most serious hazard stems from the delayed implementation of the Degh Nullah Project. Once completed, hazards emanating from ordinary floods are likely to reduce. The local communities, through, will remain vulnerable to major floods like the one in 1988. I guess the most pronounced vulnerability lies in the absence of any social mobilisation mechanisms within the community. There is no committee or organisation that voices collective concerns. This is truer for the marginalised. The community stands divided on caste and creed basis and the poor tend to accept adversities more as a fait accompli. The relatively affluent were seen to advocate for early completion of the Degh Nullah Project due to the threat that the present situation poses to their economic interests.
131 Government’s relative insensitivity to the concerns of the flood affected people, latent poverty and abysmal social services tend to serve as the dynamic pressure that accentuates flood related losses. Flood Damage As alluded to earlier, the flash flood originated from Chota Degh Nullah about 5 KMs northeast of village Khana Labana. The water flow was also impeded by a narrow bridge, close by. The first flood came during the monsoons on 2 August 06 and the water stagnated in the fields for nearly ten days. However, a more serious second wave came in the beginning of September and water stood in the fields and portions of the village for nearly 20 days. There was no loss to life as the vulnerable households; nearly 45 were relocated to safer locations within the village. Future Disaster Risk Scenario Worst Scenario. Degh Nullah water course widening work inordinately delayed and the local communities are exposed to a major flood next year, comparing or exceeding the one is 1988 in terms of loss to life, crops and habitats. Likely Sceanrio. Degh Nullah water course widening work is further delayed and the community is exposed to a similar flood situation in the next monsoon in terms of the damage caused to local economy, to habitats and through introduction of health hazards to humans and livestock.
Summary of Losses/Vulnerabilities Economic 70% standing crops, mostly rice and animal fodder destroyed. (as claimed by the community) Livestock mortalities occurred due to diseases emanating from the unhygienic conditions in the stagnating water 25 houses destroyed and nearly 100 damaged, mostly belonging to the marginalised households
Social including Behavioural Loss of employment opportunities and loss/damage of houses had an impact in accentuating poverty of the poor Lack of social awareness and absence of social mobilisation institutions in the community makes the relatively poor and marginalized more vulnerable to economic shocks. Absence of early and equitable compensation mechanisms makes the poor less capable of recovering from the economic losses accruing from loss of livelihood or habitat. Caste and economic status based divisions makes the poor in particular more vulnerable to socio-economic losses due to exposure to the flood disaster.
Floods restricted employment opportunities as the local agri activities came to a standstill. Loss of rice crop curtailed employment of daily wage earners in rice harvesting and subsequent processing. Caused severe shortage of animal fodder. Women more than any one else face the worst in terms of disaster instigated poverty accentuation
Environment Water sources excessively polluted owing to unchecked industrial waste discharge Industrial waste polluting sub-soil water thus making local communities more vulnerable to disease. Excessive stagnant water makes the area vulnerable to onset of gangue fever, an epidemic currently affecting large parts of the province
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Proposed Risk Management Strategy Risk Statement
Risk Level
Existing Risk Management Arrangements
High Vulnerability to Rain fed sever floods on River Degh Nullah
Being improved through deepening and widening of Degh Nullah
Delay in realisation of flood High compensation to the earthquake affectees. Causing poverty accentuation among the poor. Economic losses further High accentuating poverty
Nothing is being done at present
Responsibility Long term (L) Medium (M) Short (S) x Punjab government targeted through x Local leaders/ proactive advocacy for early completion x influential (S) of ongoing flood hazard minimisation x District work on Degh. government (S) x Irrigation Department and local x Local government based flood early warning communities system improved (S) x Community based early warning system for flood warning improved. Local Leaders (S) Proactive advocacy by local leaders, influential and intervention agency for early Intervention conclusion and grant of equitable flood agency (S) damage conclusion, particularly to the poor
Nothing is being done at Micro-credit facility extended to the local present except for waiting government through donor intervention for government compensation Nothing much Implementation ensured on relevant environmental policies and laws by the Federal and provincial governments
Environmental and health High hazards being caused due to massive inflow of industrial waste in water channels. This is much publicised issue with health implications documented. High Nothing Absence of social mobilisation among the community. Makes the poor more vulnerable to all types of shocks. Loss of livelihood as a Medium Nothing consequence of flood losses. More negative impact on local women Animal mortality due to Medium Nothing disease onset after floods causing economic loss
Dengue virus risk in stagnating water
Recommended Risk Management Arrangement
Medium Nothing much
Community organisation created through representation of all castes and economic shades for organising the community to advocated for their rights and to facilitate livelihood regeneration intervention Women vocational centres established in village Khana Labana and other flood impacted villages based on need assessment x District government ensures better veterinary cover to the flood affected areas through the provincials livestock department x Affected communities advised on taking necessary animal disease onset preventive measures Following undertaken by the provincial and district health departments:x Targeted anti-mosquito periodic
Intervention agency (S) Federal, provincial and district governments
Intervention agency (S/M)
Intervention Agency (S) x District and provincial government (M) x District Government (M) Provincial and district health departments
133 sprays in stagnant fresh water deposits. Local population sensitised on preventive measures
Community Evaluation # 4 Village Bhakuo, District Tharparkar, Sindh (21 November 2006) Outcomes
Community disaster/hazard risks and vulnerabilities identified, particularly those relating to vulnerable groups. NGOs contributions in enhancing communities’ capacity and coping mechanisms against natural disasters highlighted. Community awareness to disaster risks, risk reduction and response enhanced. Community disaster response capacity institutionalised. Structural schemes aimed at risk minimisation, lying outside the response ambit of communities, identified Method I conducted semi structured interviews of the community members representing various social classes and also carried out a personal inspection of various projects undertaken by the community members, through TRDP support to build local capacities against the drought and flash flood hazards. I was facilitated in the community hazard evaluation study by Dr Ghulam Rasul, post graduation in veterinary medicine and presently employed as Manager Natural Resources in Thardeep Rural Development Programme (TRDP). The Context Tharparkar is located in the south eastern corner of Sindh province. The district adjoins the Rajastan province of India and bears many similarities with its culture. Out of a population of 1.5 million with a density 41.45 persons per square kms of desert, nearly 50% are Hindus. The district falls in the arid desert zone and it receives erratic monsoon rains (June to Sep) with an annual average of 200-250 mm. It has been one of the worst affected districts in the drought of 2000-2002 in the country. Its depressed economic environment offers very limited employment opportunities, Tharparkar has, however, in the recent years seen wide extension of its communication network and there has been a provincial government focus towards exploiting its mineral wealth. In short, some of the these developmental initiatives constitute structural measures meant to cushion the local population from the drought hazard. In parallel, there have been some impressive initiatives taken by national and local NGOs to build both structural and non-structural capacities of vulnerable communities, with the purpose of building their resilience against natural hazards. Therefore, more than just highlighting communities vulnerabilities in the face of multiple hazards, it attempts to project the positive outcomes of focused community capacity building through proactive social mobilisation in building hazard resilience.
134
Social Profile of Village Bakuo The village is located amid he ubiquitous sandy landscape of Thar desert comprising shallow bhits and dhar, sandy mounds patterned by the local wind, about 27 KMs from Mithi, District HQ along a metalled road. It has a population of 3200 and 510 HHs. The village is equally divided among Hindus and Muslims. Among the Muslims, major castes in ascending order of affluence are Dars, Lunjah, Hajjam (socially mot vulnerable – 5 HHs), Hindus largely comprise of Manguar caste, among the relative poor in the village.
Livelihood Profile Categories Earnings of Rs 10,000 pm and above Rs 5000 and above Up to Rs 2500-4000 Less than Rs 2500
Explanation About 50 HHs are financially self sufficient as they possess land, livestock or are employed by the govt. Among them 40 Muslims and 10 Hindus About 50 HHs are economically barely self sufficient. Can survive on their own and not under debt. About 300 HHs normally out migrate to the Kotri Barrage region (on Indus) for employment as agri labour when there are no rains or to major cities. The majority are Hindus Remaining 100 HH do not even have means to out-migrate and look for local employment where possible. Remain constantly under debt. They rank among the poorest. Majority among them are Hindus.
Land Holding . Size 50-60 acres 5-10 acres Less than 5 acres Income per acre
Explanation 50 HHs. Mostly Muslims 200 HHs. Mostly Muslims Remaining In good rains, yield is approx - 5-10 maunds millet and cluster beans each. Aggregate incomeRs 17000 -1800 If poor rains, Rs 5000 – 10000. In case of draught no income.
Diverse Social Indicators/Assets
Subject Literacy Rate Habitats Water Availability Schools Health Common Ailments
Explanation Male 50% literate and about 1-2% female literates. However, much emphasis on children education. Puuca houses- 50 HHs, remaining thatched huts, Chouras Water accessed from 26 sweet water wells in the village. However, if no rain water turns brackish when there is no rain. Locals wither survive on brackish watter or travel to nearby sweet sources. 4 priamry schools, one for girls. 1 middle school being constructed. College education in Mithi BHU in the village with no doctor, only dispenser. Basic medicines. Specialists available at Mirpurkhas (70 KMs) Hepatitis B and C and malaria.
135
.
Disaster History Drought. Last drought extended from 2001to 2005. Its impacted residents of Bhakuo as follows:75% livestock perished. Some sold at loss as its market fell. Onset of multiple disease, including cholera because of vulnerability created due to mal nutrition. Poverty accentuation prompted seasonal migration of 50 complete HHs. However, in nearly 300 HHs only the earning members migrated for economic reasons. Nearly all HHs pushed under debt @ 5-10% pm, by keeping valuables mortgage. The very poor borrowed jewellery as mortgage for debt. Compensation. For 3 years government provided wheat given at 50% discount. No monetary compensation. TRDP provided food items, female nutrition and animal fodder
Floods. The village is excessively vulnerable to flash floods as they feature occasionally when it rains. Last floods came in Jul 2003 and they swept all belongings of 26 HHs. Most HHs though lost some valuables. Earthquake. Tharpakar was badly shaken during the Gujrat earthquake in --------------. Many houses of the village were damaged though no loss of life was reported. It served to make the community aware of either relying on their traditional mud thatched houses, chouras, for living or making sturdy EQ resistant concrete houses for those who can afford. Future Scenarios. Worst Scenario. Occurrence of a severe earthquake during a drought vulnerable period. Likely. Accentuation of drought cycles in terms of time and intensity due to changing global and regional weather patterns.
Summary of Losses/Vulnerabilities Economic Drought. Severe Loss of crops, livelihood and livelihood during droughts, which recurs in cyclic patterns after 3-5 years. Also forces massive economic migration. Floods. 26 HHs lost all belongings including shelter. Nearly 300 other HHs suffered multiple losses. r Earthquake. Widespread damage to habitats. Made community vulnerable to multiple hazards. Natural hazards tend to starve the locals of livelihood opportunities mainly due loss of crops and force migrations to
Social including Behavioural The social structure marginalises many among the Hindus in particular and Muslims in terms of access to livelihood generation opportunities. The only traditional safety net, institution of advancing loans, for poverty alleviation is exploitative in nature and tends to bond the poor in a never ending bond. Natural disasters and latent socioeconomic poverty tends to enhance gender poverty more profoundly owing to absence of financial or livelihood generation skill capital among the women. Rural societies in Tharpakar are traditionally caste and creed divided in which the lower economically less
Environment Natural disasters like drought have a way of degrading the quality of fresh water sources making the brackish. Excessive cutting of trees during disaster stressed periods tend to enhance desertification of green patches. Poor economic environment mainly owing to scarcity of water tends to make the community more vulnerable to health hazards.
136 cause stress on economically productive regions like the Kotri barrage areas of major urban centres. Few livelihood generation opportunities owing to depressed economic environment of Tharparkar and absence of a vibrant socio-economic infrastructure.
productive segments tend to suffer much more in conditions of natural calamites. Women more than any one else face the worst in terms of disaster instigated poverty accentuation
Proposed Risk Management Strategy Risk Statement
Vulnerability to cyclic droughts
Vulnerability to flash floods
Risk Level High
High
Vulnerability of a major EQ High
Existing Risk Management Arrangements
Recommended Risk Management Arrangement
x TRDC through its Community Infrastructure Project (CIP) has facilitated development of 165 underground water harvesting tanks among the poor households of the village. x TRDC has also extended microcredit for livelihood generation to help the vulnerable community members recover from the drought shock. x Moreover, the communication infrastructure of the area has been very well developed over the last years to allow vulnerable communities options to migrate with ease to productive areas in the region
x TRDP should continue to build community resilience against drought and should gradually expand the scope of their work to include more vulnerable x Areas.
Responsibility Long term (L) Medium (M) Short (S) TRDP/NGOs, district, provincial and federal governments (S,M,L )
x Local government must develop an effective operational capacity to monitor drought onset and impact and mobilise relief resources.
x Provincial and federal governments must continue working in long term drought impact mitigation projects dealing with development of communication infrastructure and harnessing rain and flood water Such efforts should be replicated Again TRDP has facilitated both by NGOs and the local development of a 260 feet long and 10.5 feet high flood protection government to protect more wall after the 2003 floods. This was communities from the flash flood tested for functional efficacy when hazard. in 2006 flash floods were checked Communities and local by the wall to protect the government should develop a community. local early warning system to forewarn vulnerable communities during the flood season.
NGOS, Local and provincial government (S&M)
Moreover provincial government should build larger protection systems along water routes More reliance on traditional mud Flowing from the Gujrat and the TRDP/NGOs, and straw thatched choura houses recent Oct 05 earthquake, sindh district, provincial
137 By the local community.
Vulnerabilities arising out of latent socio-economic poverty
High
Accentuation of gender High poverty by natural hazards Economic hardships Medium arising out frequent population dislocations owing to on set of droughts Absence of social safety Medium nets for the poorer segments Economic threats arising Medium out of rapid desertification of the area
TRDP as part of its larger programme in the district has conducted structured social mobilisation of the local community at the grass root (HH cluster) and village level. Their capacities have been built to undertake micro credit backed local livelihood programme. A sum of Rs 3723500 has been expended in 247 loans. Many contributions by TRDP through micro credit facility extension to the local women folk
provincial governments should ensure application of EQ specific building codes not only in Tharparkar but in other EQ vulnerable distts of the province Much more needs to be done to generate economic activities in the region through development of its mineral potential and offering economic incentives to investors.
and federal governments (S,M,L)
District and provincial government to provide situation based relief
District and provincial government
Above explained contributions by TRDP in building social safety nets through SMP. TRDP addressing tree plantation Provicnail and federal and preservation though its government to address community based environmental productive soil loss in drought programme like conditions through drought impact mititgation programme
TRDP/NGOs, district, provincial and federal governments (S,M,L)
Communities, NGOs, government at all tiers (M,L)
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Case Studies for School Disaster/Hazard Management Preamble
More than half of the 73,000 plus killed in the October 05 earthquake were children. They died because in most cases the government schools, built to poor specifications could not withstand the tremors while many adjacent buildings stood. There is very little that the school inmates could have done to escape the sudden disaster. However, in some cases those who could escape, could not, and as the schools were located in crowded market places with constricted exits. Many schools did not have adjacent open grounds. There was no culture of practising emergency exits and in some cases teachers led students in panic to places which were even more hazard prone. The disaster, more than any thing highlighted the absence of a school safety culture, which encompasses responding to major and minor disasters/hazards like injuries, minor burns or institutionalising fire precautions etc. However, even more important in addressing this glaring deficiency of our school system is the need to instil disaster and hazard awareness among students, in schools and in institutions of higher learning. If we want our future generations not to commit the same follies in making earthquake vulnerable houses, schools and public buildings that led to the EQ instigated catastrophe, we then certainly need to infuse the culture of disaster awareness, prevention and response among the younger generation. It also transpires that school safety is a developmental issue as much as much as awareness imperative. Building safe schools should figure prominently in the disaster risk minimisation strategies particularly in earthquake prone regions. The case studies that appear below are essentially meant to make an argument in favour of initiating a school based hazard/disaster management interventions with the aim of generating awareness on this vital aspect in the younger generation; and to institute some situation specific actions aimed at making our schools and colleges safer.
School Evaluation # 1
Government Girls Middle School Chikar Case Study for School Hazard Risk Management Intervention (18 Oct 06) Intended Outcomes (1) School hazard vulnerabilities identified. (2) Actions and resources meant to foster hazard management skills and capacity among students and the school administration identified. (3) Students and school administration’s’ awareness to hazards and their management enhanced. (4) Structural measures meant to enhance school safety through appropriate risk mitigation strategies identified. Method. A focused on-site case study with semi-structured interviews with the school principal and teachers, on-site inspection and through soliciting views of local influential. Earthquake Experience The school was built in the 1970s and before the October 05 EQ. It had 9 class rooms, a staff room, library, science laboratory, 2 stores, kitchen and 4 toilets. It is located in crowded main market of Chikar city with only
139 one entrance/exit to the main bazaar. The school was built on two levels with the lower level closer to the entrance comprising classes 1 to 6, and classes 7 and 8 plus administrative offices on the upper level, hemmed between adjoining houses and shops. Mrs Safia Rukhsana, second headmistress with 27 years teaching experience and the vibrant Ms Rukhsana Jabeen, a teacher with 7 years experience served as our resource persons. Both were in the school at the time of the EQ. This is how they explained the traumatic events on the fateful day with 415 students and 13 staff members within the premises. All students were in their respective classes when the earth shook violently with a frightening explosive sound. Every one panicked and screamed as the walls started to collapse inwards and roofs came down. While some students, close to only exit, escaped others lay trapped, many with wounds and some dying. Every one was for herself. Parents and locals came later in the day to rescue many trapped students and staff members from the fallen rubble. However, it took days to take stock of what had happened. The entire school building had collapsed, and the earth split across the upper segment class 7 & 8 rooms devouring some unfortunate victims. In all 31 students died, 25 from the upper classes with no exit while 6 victims were from the lower class rooms. About students 100 sustained injuries of a varying degree. The trauma seems permanently etched in the minds of the survivors as even after one year, student tend to scream and to rush out even on the sound of a passing by truck. Given the scale and suddenness in the manner the tragedy occurred, one wonders as to what could have been done in those fateful moments to lessen its cruel impact. However, through discussions we did identify some factors which seem to accentuate the devastating impact of the EQ:x Poor quality construction of the school building as it collapsed to the last room when many adjoining shops and private houses stood but sustained damage. x Absence of multiple exits had the effect of trapping students in the fallen debris. x There was no open space within the school premises as the debris fell - only 30x20 feet courtyard. While in a boys school nearby, most students survived primarily for being engaged in an outdoor congregation in an adjoining play ground when the earth shook. x There was no culture of crisis management as even the school Principal and senior management lapsed into shock and inaction. x In short it was a combination of structural and non-structural factors that amplified the impact of the tragedy. A culture of disaster awareness could have perhaps led to more students exiting moments earlier which could have saved some precious lives. School Hazard Risk Register Risk Statement Earthquake of 6.5 magnitude or above Initiation of fire hazard within the school premises Absence of hazard management skills/culture in the School administration and students Students continue to suffer from Psycho-social stres Injury(ies) sustained by students in minor accidents From routine activities in the school Injuries occurring from accidental electrification from Faulty exposed live electric source. Hazards emanating from wind storms Hazards emanating from lightening during summers
Probability Unlikely Possible Certain Certain Likely
Consequence Catastrophic Disastrous Major
Risk Level High High High
Moderate Minor/moderate
Medium Medium
Possible
Moderate/Major
Medium
Likely Possible
Minor/Moderate Moderate/ Major
Medium Medium
140 Proposed Ingredients of School Risk Management Strategy Risk Statement
Risk Level
Existing RM* Recommended Disaster/Hazard Responsibility Arrangement Management Arrangements /Time Frame Long Term –L Medium – M Short - L
Earthquake of 6.5 magnitude or Above
High
Totally inadequate # School rebuilt to EQ resistant standards. # School relocated to an open site with Better exits and adjoining open spaces # Students drilled in evasive SOPs to Minimise the impact of EQ: instant exit Or taking shelter under sturdy furniture
Initiation of fire hazard within school premises
High
# School # Fire hazard sources removed. Management (S) # Fire extinguishers placed at # DM Intervention Vulnerable points. # Students trained in use of extinguishers (S) # Students regularly drilled in fire hazard Response. None # RM culture created through awareness # School Programmes, practising risk specific Management Evasive/protective procedures and # DM intervention # Commemorating Oct 8 as risk awarene (M/L) Day. # Students encouraged to write essays /stories highlighting risk awareness Random therapies # Teachers trained on conduct of Intervention agency As part of Educatio psycho-social therapies And school interventions # Therapies administered on sustained Administration (S) basis None # First aid kits placed within premises # School as per need assessment Management # Students and staff trained in first aid # DM intervention Procedures. (S) # First aid room within premises identified None # Source of hazard removed. # School # Training imparted in electrification Management recovery procedures # RM intervention (S) None # Hazard inducing items during a wind # School Storm like CGI sheets removed from Management Premises. (M) # Requisite first aid procedures applied None # Lightening conductors installed # School # Students drilled in evasive SOPs like Management (S) Removing any source of transmitting # DM intervention Lightening impact etc. # School should be linked to city’s # City Emergency crisis response centre for administration Ambulance or any other support during # School emergency situation Management (M)
Absence of hazard management skill High in the School administration, students
Student continue to suffer from psycho-social stresses
High
Injury(ies) sustained by students in Medium minor accidents from routine activities
Injuries occurring from accidental electrification from a faulty exposed live electric source.
Medium
Hazards emanating from wind storms Medium
Hazards emanating from lightening during summers
Medium
None
# AJK government And ERRA (M) # DM Intervention (S)
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School Evaluation # 2 Government Girls Higher Secondary School, Garhi Habibiullah Case Study for School Hazard Management Intervention (20 Oct 06)
Intended Outcomes (1) School hazard vulnerabilities identified. (2) Actions and resources meant to foster hazard management skills and capacity among students and the school administration identified. (3) Students and school administration’s’ awareness to hazards and their management enhanced. (4) Structural measures meant to enhance school safety through appropriate risk mitigation strategies identified. Method. It included a structured interview with the two resource people identified in the study, focused discussion with school administrative staff members and local influential including Naib Nazim of Garhi Habibullah, and through personal observation. The Earthquake Experience The School runs classes from 6 to 12 ( post -primary to pre graduation level). It is located 2 KMs north of Garhi Habibulalh Town, 18 KMs south of Balakot in the October 8 2005 earthquake seriously impacted zone of the NWFP Province. The pre-earthquake school building comprised of 11 class rooms, science lab, computer room, an office and a store room. On the day of the earthquake the school housed 740 students, 12 teaching and 3 administrative staff members. School principal, Ms Riffat Aziz, with 16 years teaching experience and a teacher Ms Nargis Kazmi very kindly served as the resource people for the case study. This is how they explained the events of the fateful day. Second class of the day had just commenced when the earth shook violently. Within no time the entire school structure including double storied academic block collapsed. It was utter mayhem with students shrieking as they lay buried under the rubble. The school structure fell so instantly that many students while trying to escape lay trapped in the balconies or verandas. It just did not allow time for any one to escape. Both the resource persons lay under the rubble for couple of hours till dug out. Local volunteers and parents arrived at the scene in about three hours and they started the salvage operation. 80 people died which included 67 students and 13 others, some from the administrative staff and some visitors. Ms Nargis Kazmi’s sister died as she had come on a visit. Reportedly some girls reportedly died from drinking polluted water after being rescued from the rubble. All blamed this unfortunate loss more than any thing else on the school building which was constructed to poor standards not too far back in 1987/88, through the allegedly corrupt contractor system. A triple storey school building located close by did not collapse and so was the case with most of private housing and shops, though most sustained serious damages. Presently the school is being run in a pre-fabricated structure. Students also continue to suffer from immense psycho-social stress and even today they exhibit panicked reaction to intrusive sounds, from trucks, tractor trolleys etc.
142 Lunda Nullah, a non-perennial water channel runs next to the school is another possible hazard source as it had seriously damaged the local Tehsil Hospital, located close by, downstream during the 1992 flash floods. Even in 2006 it rose to a menacing level. .
School Hazard Risk Register Risk Statement
Probability
Earthquake of 6.5 magnitude or above Initiation of fire hazard within the school premises Absence of hazard management skills/culture in the School administration and students Students continue to suffer from Psycho-social stres Flash flood risk from Lunda Nullah Injury(ies) sustained by students in minor accidents From routine activities in the school Injuries occurring from accidental electrification from Faulty exposed live electric source. Hazards emanating from wind storms Hazards emanating from lightening during summers
Unlikely Possible Certain Certain Possible Likely
Consequence
Risk Level
Catastrophic Disastrous Major
High High High
Major/moderate Major Minor/moderate
High Medium Medium
Possible
Moderate/Major
Medium
Likely Possible
Minor/Moderate Moderate/ Major
Medium Medium
Proposed Inputs of School Disaster/Hazard Management Strategy Risk Statement
Risk Level
Earthquake of 6.5 magnitude or Above
High
Initiation of fire hazard within school premises
High
Absence of hazard management skill High in the School administration, students
Student continue to suffer from psycho-social stresses Flash flood risk from Lunda Nullah
High
Medium
Existing RM* Recommended Risk Arrangement Management Arrangements
Responsibility
Totally inadequate # School rebuilt to EQ resistant # AJK government standards. And ERRA # School relocated to an open site with # RM Intervention Better exits and adjoining open spaces # Students drilled in evasive SOPs to Minimise the impact of EQ: instant exit Or taking shelter under sturdy furniture None # Fire hazard sources removed. # School # Fire extinguishers placed at Management Vulnerable points. # RM Intervention # Students trained in use of extinguishers # Students regularly drilled in fire hazard Response. None # RM culture created through awareness # School Management Programmes, practising risk specific # RM intervention Evasive/protective procedures and Commemorating Oct 8 as risk awareness Day. Intervention agenc Random therapies # Teachers trained on conduct of As part of Educatio psycho-social therapies And school interventions # Therapies administered on sustained Administration Basis None # Safety embankments to be made to # Tehsil Shield the school from flash floods Administration
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Injury(ies) sustained by students in Medium minor accidents from routine activities
None
Injuries occurring from accidental Medium electrification from a faulty exposed live electric source. Hazards emanating from wind storms Medium
None
Hazards emanating from lightening during summers
Medium
None
None
# Tehsil administration to deploy an Early # School Warning system during vulnerable period Adminstration school administration to be kept in Loop for undertaking timely evasive Actions # School to prepare a contingency plan fo This eventuality # First aid kits placed within premises # School as per need assessment Management # Students and staff trained in first aid # RM intervention Procedures. # First aid room within premises identified # Source of hazard removed. # School # Training imparted in electrification Management recovery procedures # RM intervention # Hazard inducing items during a wind # School Storm like CGI sheets removed from Management Premises. # Requisite first aid procedures applied # Lightening conductors installed # School # Students drilled in evasive SOPs like Management Removing any source of transmitting # RM intervention Lightening impact etc. # City # School should be linked to city’s administration Emergency crisis response centre for Ambulance or any other support during # School emergency situation management
144 School Evaluation # 3 Government Primary and Lower Secondary Boys Ack Ack Schools, Gizri, Zamzama, Karachi Intended Outcomes (1) School hazard vulnerabilities identified. (2) Actions and resources meant to foster hazard management skills and capacity among students and the school administration identified. (3) Students and school administration’s’ awareness to hazards and their management enhanced. (4) Structural measures meant to enhance school safety through appropriate risk mitigation strategies identified. Method. The school hazard assessment was attempted through semi-structured interviews with the schools staff and some students, and based on personal observation Scope This is a case study of two government schools an urban area in Karachi where most students come form low income group localities, nearby. The vulnerabilities of the students may not be of life threatening proportions as in the previous studies, but they stem from inadequacies related to social poverty like poor health care or form attitudes that are insensitive to daily hazards. Some relate to institutional inadequacies like the public sector’s neglect of buildings safety. While the proposed school hazard awareness interventions must be structured specific to situations but they have on underlying aim: to promote the culture of hazard and disaster awareness among the students and the school administration. This evaluation also indicates a strong corrective linkage with the students’ home environment in reducing hazards as some stem for incorrect behavioural attitudes of the parents or poor hygienic living conditions. These must be addressed either through proactive advocacy with parents, or through students subtly introducing school reformed behaviour/attitudes into their homes. In other students positively influencing the home environment through applied behaviour. The Schools The school hazard assessment focused on two schools located in one premises. One is a primary school, for students up to class 5 and other lower secondary school which goes till matriculation (class 10) Government Primary School Ack Ack, Gizri, Zamzama Student Population:. 400 Staff members: 12 Headmistress: Ms Ishrat Ara with 28 years teaching experience Government Lower Secondary School, Ack Ack, Gizri, Zamzama Student Population: 120 Staff Members: 7 Head Master: Mr Rafique Ahmad with 14 years teaching experience. Nearly 95% students of the two schools walk up from Shah Rasul or Neelum low to very low income group colonies located close by.
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Hazard Risks Faced by the Students. These can be grouped as follows:Category 1. Owing to Hazards emanating from the school environment. These include both structural i.e. from inadequacies in school building structure or its maintenance & non-structural: relating to in-school preventable causes. Category 2. Owing to attitudes of parents or students home environment.. School Hazard Risk Register Risk Statement
Risk Probability
Category 1 – Structural Varies form Likely to Unlikely x School building is located 3 feet lower than the adjoining road leading to flood risk during rains. x Portions of school building structure cracked and worn out due to poor maintenance and construction. x Poor quality electrical wiring which can short circuit t to a fire hazard or can cause inadvertent electrocution x Toilets to be built consistent with students population Risks. Can be fatal in an EQ or due to electrocution and can vary to introducing health hazard due to stagnant water in rains Category 1 – Non structural Varies form Likely to Unlikely x No fire fighting system in the school x The school has not been fumigated for dengue fever at a time when this epidemic is raging in Karachi city x Absence of school health screening. Till a year back government doctor used to carry out students health screening but it has been discontinued. x Absence of first aid facilities in the school x Tendency of some teachers to physically abuse students for their academic deficiencies x Very unhygienic toilets and poor personal hygiene awareness x Absence of clean potable water x Local trash/domestic waste dumped next to school premises thus introducing a possible health hazard Risks. Vary form severe from absence of fire hazard or dengue fever risk to those that can lead to personality deformation due to physical abuse Category 2 Likely x Poor personal hygiene awareness at home. Students coming to school with flu and common ailments. Partly due to health hazards relating to their living environment x Students inadequately dressed for winter conditions, partly due to poverty at home. x Physical abuse at home
Risk Level Moderate to High
Moderate to High
Moderate
Proposed Inputs of School Disaster/Hazard Management Strategy Risks Category 1
Proposed Actions x As part of a school disaster management programme, it essentially
Responsibility # Intervention
146 Structural x Category 1 Non structural
x x x x x x x x x
Category 2
requires advocacy with the education department to make schools safer and to undertake regular maintenance to make them hazard free to the extent possible. This should involve both advocacy wit h the Education Department and highlighting safe schools concept in the press Introduce a rudimentary fire fighting system in the school and fire prevention awareness Immediate dengue fever fumigation by the school Recommence health screening for students Establish one first aid post for 100 students in the school. Train staff members and students in administration of first aid Ensure cleanliness of school toilets and more toilets to be built consistent with students population System of waste management to be introduced to be introduced in the school by involving school administration and students A culture of personal hygiene care to be introduced Provide clean potable water in the school Removal of garbage dump close to the school (through advocacy)
Remedial measures involve focused advocacy with parents through the Parents Teachers Meeting forum that is in place
agency # Education Deptt Intervention Agency Education Deptt Education Deptt Intervention Agency Education Deptt Intervention Agency Intervention agency Intervention agency School authorities and local government Intervention agency School administratio Parents
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Annexure F Evaluation Criterion Setting the Context History Contributions in disaster/crisis situation Mandate/TOR Policy Emphasis Legislative Support Organisational Viability Quality of human resource Budget and its breakdown in (1) fixed operational expenses, (2) CAPEX and (3) capacity development. Human resource quality Capacity building Internal functioning – bureaucratic, lean, application of modern managerial concepts Resource mobilisation capacity Public private partnership Operational Focus Target group Grass root connectivity Connectivity with the government at the relevant level Outreach Up scaling capacity Social Mobilisation capacity Advocacy functions M&E Developmental Priorities. Short and long term. Analysis. Summary of strengths and weaknesses How OCHA can Support?
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Bibliography Home and Tribal Affairs Department NWFP, Provincial Disaster Management Strategy, May 2006. National Disaster Management Authority, Draft National Disaster Management Framework, Islamabad, December 2006. National Headquarters, Islamabad , Pakistan Red Crescent Society, January 2006. Pakistan Metrological Department and Norstar Norway, Seismic hazard analysis for the Cities of Islamabad and Rawalpindi, February 2006. Qamar-uz-Zaman Chaudhary Government of Pakistan Cabinet Division, Strengthening National Capacities for Multi Hazard Early Warning and Response System, , May 2006. Rizwan Naseer Dr, Report in Emergency Response Services in Pakistan, UNDP in collaboration with Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan. . WDCR, A Review of Disaster Management policies and Systems in Pakistan, WDCR 2005. NRB Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 2001, compiled by NRB, 2005. Sania Nishtar Dr, Why We Need to think Beyond Dengue , News, November 5, 2005 ed Shaukat Ali Awan, Pakistan, Flood Management, River Chenab from Marala to Khanki, www.apfm.info/pdf/case_studies/pakitan_chenab EM – DAT Emergency database. http//www.em.net/disasters/pr
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