Nat Hansen Curriculum Vitae

Department Address Department of Philosophy University of Chicago Chicago, IL 60637 Fax: 773-702-5259

Home Address 5428 S. Kimbark Ave., Apt 3R Chicago, IL 60615 [email protected] Tel: 773-368-0867

Education Ph.D. B.A. (Hons.) A.B.

University of Chicago, Philosophy (Expected June 2010) University of Oxford, P.P.E., First Class, 2000–2002 Georgetown University, Philosophy, Summa Cum Laude, 1996–2000

Areas of Specialization Philosophy of Language, Metaphysics, Epistemology Areas of Competence Aesthetics, Philosophy of Mind, Early Analytic Philosophy, Wittgenstein Dissertation Radical Contextualism Dissertation Committee Josef Stern (director), James Conant, Michael Kremer, David Finkelstein, Jason Bridges Dissertation Abstract My dissertation concerns the interaction of context with linguistic meaning. I defend a systematic truth-conditional semantic theory against attacks mounted by radical contextualists, who argue that context affects meaning in pervasive and open-ended ways that can’t be explained by such a theory. My defense consists of three interconnected parts: (1) I rebut several a priori arguments based on Wittgenstein’s discussions of rule-following that are supposed to show that systematic semantic theory is impossible; (2) I describe in detail how apparently radical forms of context-sensitivity are the result of the interaction of different kinds of tractable contextsensitivity; and (3) I show that both radical contextualists and the defenders of systematic semantics rely on an overly simplistic method of generating linguistic intuitions. I develop a more comprehensive, nuanced method of eliciting intuitions and show how the scrupulous application of this method alters the foundational assumptions of the contextualist debate. What emerges is an approach to the study of meaning that does justice to the extensive contextual variation described by radical contextualists within the powerful explanatory structure of systematic truthconditional semantic theory and exposes and explains ignored sources of variation in semantic intuitions.

Works in Progress • “Color Adjectives and Radical Contextualism” • “A Slugfest of Intuitions: Contextualism and Experimental Design” • “Neo-Wittgensteinian Debunking Arguments” Academic Awards, Fellowships, Grants • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Lee Prize (for best graduate essay in theoretical philosophy), University of Chicago, 2008 Mellon Dissertation Completion Fellowship, 2007–2008 Nicholson Center for British Studies Dissertation Fellowship (Declined), 2007–2008 Franke Institute of the Humanities Affiliated Fellow, University of Chicago, 2007–2008 Stuart A. Tave Teaching Fellowship (competitive Division of the Humanities award), Spring 2007 Century Fellow (award covering tuition with stipend), University of Chicago, 2002–2007 Doolittle-Harrison Travel Fellowship, Summer 2007 Humanities Travel Grant (For research on J.L. Austin in Oxford), Summer 2006 Nicholson Center for British Studies, Graduate Project Grant (competitive grant used to fund a History of 20th Century British Philosophy lecture series), awarded twice, 2005-2007 Woodrow Wilson National Fellowship Foundation Practicum Grant (awarded for a proposal to integrate philosophy into a high school humanities curriculum), 2004 Mellon Fellowship in Humanistic Studies (national award covering tuition and stipend for the first year of graduate study), 2002–2003 Allbritton Fellowship, Brasenose College, University of Oxford (Georgetown University award covering tuition and stipend for two years at Oxford), 2000–2002 Ryan Medal (for highest GPA in advanced philosophy courses at Georgetown University), 2000 Undergraduate Philosophy Thesis defended with distinction (first time ever awarded), Georgetown University, 2000

Talks • “A Slugfest of Intuitions: Reconsidering the Evidence for Contextualism” (Conference: Context and Levels of Locutionary Content, Institute for the Philosophy of Language, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, December 2009; Semantics and Philosophy of Language Workshop, University of Chicago (U of C), November 2009, Wittgenstein Workshop, U of C, October 2009; Contemporary Philosophy Workshop, U of C, May 2009) • “Color Adjectives, Radical Contextualism, and the Metaphysics of Color” (with Zed Adams) (Conference: Issues in Contemporary Semantics and Ontology 1, Buenos Aires, August 2009) • “Neo-Wittgensteinian Debunking Arguments” (Georgetown University, February 2009) • “Color Adjectives and Radical Contextualism” (Semantics and Philosophy of Language Workshop, U of C, Fall 2008; Formal Philosophy Workshop, U of C, Winter 2009) • “Radicalism and Rule-Following” (Semantics and Philosophy of Language Workshop, U of C, Spring 2008) • “Occasion-Sensitivity and Perceptual Representation” (Philosophy of Mind Workshop, U of C, April 2008) • “Varieties of Semantic Explananda” (Contemporary Philosophy Workshop, U of C, May 2008)

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• “On ‘Wittgenstein’s Rule-Following Considerations and the Central Project of Theoretical Linguistics’” (Franke Institute for the Humanities, January 2008) • “Three Debunking Arguments: Circularity, Open Texture and Rule-Following” (Wittgenstein Workshop, U of C, January 2008) • “Faute de Mieux : J.L. Austin on Ordinary Sense” (Conference: Perception et sense commun Austin et la question du r´ealisme, Colloque international `a l’Universit´e de Picardie, June 2007) • “Wittgensteinian Contextualism”(Wittgenstein Workshop, U of C, December 2006; Semantics and Philosophy of Language Workshop, U of C, November 2006) • “Radical Contextualism and Communication” (Contemporary Philosophy Workshop, U of C, December 2006) • “Time, Tense and Change” (with Jay Elliott) (Philosophy of Mind Workshop, U of C, May 2006) • “Contextualism: The Lazy Man’s Approach to Philosophy?” (Philosophy of Mind Workshop, U of C, March 2006) • “Haute Banal : An Aesthetic of the Everyday” (University of New Mexico Pop Culture Conference, February 2007; Cornell University Aesthetics of Pop Conference, March 2006) • “Reconsidering Frege on Demonstratives” (Contemporary Philosophy Workshop, U of C, January 2006) • “Files, Chains and Internal Continuity” (Oxford University Graduate Philosophy Conference, November 2005; University of Iowa Graduate Philosophy Conference, May 2005) • “Address and the Second Person” (with Ben McMyler and Josef Stern) (Wittgenstein Workshop, U of C, May 2005) • “Groucho’s Joke” (Lecture for Undergraduate Philosophy Majors, U of C, October 2005; University of Pittsburgh/Carnegie Mellon Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2005; Intermountain West Philosophy Conference, University of Utah, February 2005) • “Contraries, Echoes, Pretense: Approaches to Irony” (Lecture for Undergraduate Philosophy Majors, U of C, March 2005) • “De-Filing the Mind” (Contemporary Philosophy Workshop, U of C, November 2004; Philosophy of Mind Workshop, U of C, November 2004; Indiana Philosophical Association, Indiana University, November 2004) • “Unconscious Belief” (Contemporary Philosophy Workshop, U of C, March 2004) • “The Unintuitive Criterion of Difference” (Wittgenstein Workshop, U of C, November 2003) • “Is Thought Essentially Social?” (Northwest Philosophy Conference, Reed College, November 2003; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Graduate Philosophy Conference, April 2003; Marquette University Intentionality Conference, April 2003) • “Gareth Evans vs. Walker Evans: Photography and Thought” (Philosophy of Mind Workshop, U of C, June 2003; Indiana Philosophical Association, Ball State University, November 2003) • “The Knights Who Say: WE! Normativity and Social Practices”, Graduate Student Colloquium, Georgetown University, May 2000)

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Teaching Experience Instructor (designed syllabus and taught course) • Philosophical Perspectives II: Early Modern Philosophy, University of Chicago, Winter 2010 • Philosophical Perspectives I: Ancient Philosophy, University of Chicago, Fall 2008 • Philosophical Perspectives III: 18th and 19th Century Moral Philosophy, University of Chicago, Summer 2007 • Telling the Truth: Skepticism, Relativism and Bullshit (Tave Fellowship Class), University of Chicago, Spring 2007 • Philosophical Perspectives II: Early Modern Philosophy, University of Chicago, Winter 2007 • Philosophy of Mind (co-taught), Center for Talented Youth, Loyola Marymount University, Summers 2004 & 2005 • Personal Identity, (Funded by Woodrow Wilson Practicum Grant), University High School, California State University Fresno, Summer 2004 • Ethics (co-taught), Center for Talented Youth, Johns Hopkins University, Summer 2003 Preceptor (led seminars for philosophy B.A. honors students) • Philosophy B.A. Thesis Seminar, University of Chicago, Fall 2008–Spring 2009 Teaching Assistant (assisted in grading and led discussion sections) • Philosophy of Language: Theory of Reference, Professor Josef Stern, University of Chicago, Fall 2009 • Analytic Philosophy (for Master of Arts in the Humanities students), Professor Michael Kremer, University of Chicago, Spring 2006 • Hegel’s Phenomenology, Professor Michael Forster, University of Chicago, Spring 2006 • Reasons and Reasoning (for Master of Arts in the Humanities students), Professor Jason Bridges, University of Chicago, Winter 2006 • The Philosophy of J.L. Austin, Professor Ted Cohen, University of Chicago, Fall 2005 • History of Philosophy III: Kant to Hegel, Professor Michael Forster, University of Chicago, Spring 2005 • Ethics, Johns Hopkins University, CTY Summer Program, 2001 & 2002 Writing Intern (directed writing workshops and assisted in grading) • Philosophical Perspectives I: Ancient Philosophy, Professor Jason Bridges, Fall 2006 Teaching Training • Pedagogies of Writing, The University of Chicago Writing Program, Spring 2006 (quarterlong course on writing pedagogy) • Graduate Teaching Consultant Training, Center for Teaching and Learning, University of Chicago, Fall 2006 (series of workshops on effective teaching techniques, styles of learning, and technology in the classroom)

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Professional Service • Director, History of 20th Century British Philosophy Lecture Series, 2005-2007 (won two competitive grants from the Nicholson Center for British Studies to fund two year-long lecture series on British philosophy, coordinated visiting speakers, and organized joint meetings of the Philosophy of Mind Workshop and Contemporary Philosophy Workshop as venues for the lectures). • Graduate Student Coordinator, Philosophy of Mind Workshop, 2005-2007 (responsible for developing workshop budget, making arrangements for visiting speakers, maintaining workshop blog (http://www.mindworkshop.blogspot.com), and running bi-weekly meetings). • Vice-President, Philosophy Department Graduate Student Association, 2003-2004 (elected position; proposed quarterly graduate student budgets to the division of the humanities, represented grad student interests in annual student-faculty meetings). Research Language German (speaking, writing, reading) References Jason Bridges Associate Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Chicago 1115 E. 58th St. Chicago, IL 60637 [email protected]

James F. Conant Chester D. Tripp Professor and Chair Department of Philosophy University of Chicago 1115 E. 58th St. Chicago, IL 60637 [email protected]

David Finkelstein Associate Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Chicago 1115 E. 58th St. Chicago, IL 60637 [email protected]

Chris Kennedy Professor and Chair Department of Linguistics University of Chicago 1010 E. 59th St. Chicago, IL 60637 [email protected]

Michael Kremer Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Chicago 1115 E. 58th St. Chicago, IL 60637 [email protected]

Josef J. Stern (Director) William H. Colvin Professor Department of Philosophy University of Chicago 1115 E. 58th St. Chicago, IL 60637 [email protected]

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Dissertation Summary My dissertation concerns the interaction of context with linguistic meaning. I defend a systematic truth-conditional semantic theory against attacks mounted by radical contextualists (RCs), who argue that context affects meaning in pervasive and open-ended ways that can’t be explained by such a theory. My defense consists of three interconnected parts: (1) I rebut several a priori arguments based on Wittgenstein’s discussions of rule-following that radical contextualists take to show that systematic semantic theory is impossible; (2) I describe in detail how apparently radical forms of context-sensitivity are the result of the interaction of different kinds of tractable context-sensitivity; and (3) I show that both RCs and the defenders of systematic semantics rely on an overly simplistic empirical methodology. In response, I develop a more comprehensive, nuanced method of eliciting intuitions and show how the scrupulous application of this method alters the foundational assumptions of the debate over contextualism. After an account of the basic commitments and explanatory goals of compositional truthconditional semantics (CTCS) in Chapter 1 and the range of different methods that CTCS has adopted to handle the obvious forms of context-sensitivity and indeterminacy of meaning in natural language (ambiguity, indexicality and the claims of what Grice calls “A-philosophy”) in Chapter 2, I present the attack on CTCS mounted by RCs in Chapter 3. I show how the attack should be understood as consisting of two parts. The first part consists of a priori arguments based on Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following which attempt to prove that the explanatory project undertaken by CTCS is impossible. The second part involves a series of empirical arguments that rest on intuitions generated in response to a variety of thought experiments which RCs interpret as showing that the effects of context-sensitivity are too varied and pervasive to be systematically described by CTCS. My defense of CTCS begins in Chapter 4 with an examination and rebuttal of the a priori arguments employed by RCs. I show how Wittgenstein’s remarks on rule-following, properly understood, are compatible with a revised conception of the explanatory project of CTCS, and that they actually challenge the picture of unconstrained context-sensitivity that is essential to RC. In Chapter 5, I focus attention on color adjectives (“red”, “green”, etc.), which play an important role in the criticism of systematic truth conditional semantic theory offered by RCs. While I agree with RCs that color adjectives display wide-ranging context-sensitivity, I disagree that they pose a radical threat to systematic semantic theory. I give a systematic account of how color adjectives vary their content in different contexts, and how they interact with several kinds of ambiguity and context-sensitivity in canonical examples of the RCs. Peeling apart the different kinds of context-sensitivity and ambiguity at work in the RC deployment of color adjectives reveals more context-sensitivity than one might expect, and more than has previously been noticed even by RCs, but not the wholesale, untamable variability the RCs endorse. Chapter 6 introduces a novel challenge to the linguistic evidence that contextualists of all varieties (not just RCs) present in support of linguistic context-sensitivity. Evidence for contextualism consists of intuitions generated in response to a variety of thought experiments. I argue that features of experimental design exert a pervasive influence over the intuitions generated by contextualist thought experiments. In Chapter 7, the final chapter of my dissertation, I summarize the results of the preceding chapters and conclude that an adequate response to the RC attack on CTCS requires deploying a range of different techniques for accommodating the wide-ranging effects of context on semantic content, acknowledging the limits of the explanatory project of CTCS, and developing and consistently applying a more sophisticated method of generating evidence for semantic theories.

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