This article was downloaded by: [University of Macedonia] On: 30 October 2013, At: 07:59 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Mobilities Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rmob20

Investing in Leaving: The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals a

Lois Labrianidis a

Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece. Published online: 29 Oct 2013.

To cite this article: Lois Labrianidis , Mobilities (2013): Investing in Leaving: The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals, Mobilities, DOI: 10.1080/17450101.2013.813723 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2013.813723

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/termsand-conditions

Mobilities, 2013 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2013.813723

Investing in Leaving: The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

LOIS LABRIANIDIS Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, Thessaloniki, Greece

ABSTRACT In the last twenty years, the ‘international migration of professionals’ from Greece has increased. This paper is based on an extensive survey of Greek professionals who work or have worked in another country. It is the first ever research on the topic in Greece and the first one in the international literature to include participants who are currently abroad or have repatriated. The aim of the paper is threefold. First, it presents the main characteristics of this phenomenon. Second, to explain why Greece, alongside other peripheral countries, suffers from migration of its professionals: in contrast to a dominant view insisting on an allegedly abundant supply of highly skilled labour, it is argued that the phenomenon is primarily due to their low demand in the Greek labour market. Third, to argue that such migration can have positive implications for a country, not only when these people return but also when they stay abroad. KEY WORDS: Brain drain, Greece, International migration of professionals, Countries of European periphery, Low demand for professionals, Highly skilled migration

1. Introduction1 The paper deals with the emigration of Greek professionals. It aims to contribute to empirical literature on European migration trends by placing the so far unnoticed Greek case into the global map of highly skilled migration, whilst the big bulk of research in the past 10 years or so has been focusing on the opposite trends of lowskilled immigration into Greece. Not only does it set out to explore key features and trends of the phenomenon, but it also seeks to explain it from a developmental perspective. The central argument is that the domestic part of the explanation lies not in the supply side of a supposedly excessive highly skilled workforce, but rather in the demand-side of a labour market failing to absorb this workforce – related to a path of restructuring towards labour-intensive activities instead of knowledgebased ones that could move the Greek economy up in the global value chain.

Correspondence Address: Lois Labrianidis, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, 156 Egnatias Street, 54006, Thessaloniki, Greece. Email: [email protected] Ó 2013 Taylor & Francis

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

2

L. Labrianidis

The aim of the paper is threefold. First, we aim at presenting the main characteristics of the phenomenon and describe the ‘profile’ of the people involved. Are they a homogeneous group? Second, we seek to explain the root causes as well as the implications of the International Migration of Professionals (IMP) in the Greek case. This phenomenon usually occurs between less developed and developed countries. Thus, one research question is why, despite Greece (along with other peripheral European countries) being part of the so-called developed world, it still suffers from migration of its professionals. Third, we set out to explore whether the IMP may have positive aspects too for a country like Greece, not only when these people return permanently or for prolonged periods, but even when they remain abroad. The paper is the first record of an important but, as yet, un-researched phenomenon in Greece; this phenomenon became an extremely crucial factor at a time when this country under went a deep financial crisis affecting the Eurozone as a whole. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: the next section focuses on the importance of knowledge, innovation and human capital on economic development and situates the phenomenon of IMP within the context of recent economic and cultural changes. Section 3 presents the empirical findings from a study conducted in 2009–10 regarding the migration of graduates from Greece. Section 4 relates IMP to the lack of competitiveness as well as the current economic crisis, while the last section summarizes our basic findings and suggestions. 2.

Background context

2.1. The international migration of professionals The last two decades have been marked by a wide recognition of the role and the impact of knowledge, innovation and human capital on economic development, especially in the case of less developed nations. Human capital emerges as a vital factor in the economic development process, while, under certain circumstances – such as in the case of regional development – its significance can surpass the contribution of physical capital, especially within the most developed regions of a country (Mathur 1999; Romp and de Haan 2007). In this context, it appears to significantly increase productivity; it enhances the exploitation and diffusion of technology and innovation, while it also creates extended external economies that affect the economy and society as a whole. This has stimulated the significance of human resources’ upgrading (Lundvall 1992; Lundvall and Borrás 1997; Florida 2002), thus assigning a central role to highly educated individuals, who are perceived as one of most important factors in the process of developing and diffusing knowledge. Under this perspective, the IMP is clearly a major challenge, especially for home countries. One can argue following Gibson and McKenzie (forthcoming, 2) that research on the development impacts of IMP can be classified within the spectrum of two opposing narratives. On the one hand, there are those who argue that IMP massively erodes the human capital and fiscal revenues of sending countries. On the other hand, there are those who argue that IMP may act as a potent force for developing the economy of sending countries through remittances, trade, foreign direct investment and knowledge transfers. In fact, the first studies of brain drain (Grubbel and Scott 1966; Bhagwati and Hamada 1974; McCullock and Yellen 1977) supported the view that the financial

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

3

and social costs of this process for the home countries are very high. The ‘new’ theories of development suggest that high levels of skilled emigration decrease economic development rates (Barro and Sala-I-Martin 1995) in home countries because of the fall in the local workforce’s average level of education. This view, although recognizing a variety of positive outcomes (i.e. remittances, repatriation of immigrants with additional skills acquired abroad, creation of scientific and business networks), concludes that the prosperity of those left behind continued to be low (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport 2008). Two correlated, negative consequences arise from the loss of scientific personnel in the home countries (Straubhaar 2000, 16): (a) Since physical capital follows the human capital flow, there is an even greater loss of incoming physical capital. As a result, there is a decrease in productivity in home countries, an increase in the incentives for skilled emigration to developed countries, resulting in the acceleration of the process of IMP. (b) Loss of a significant public sector investment on human capital creation. On the other hand, the host countries take advantage of important, positive technological externalities because of the immigrants’ additional human capital and thus, the gap between rich and poor countries expands, creating a ‘vicious cycle’. To the above one might add a psychological cost to graduates who realize that their education can not pose an advantage for a shift in the labour market, given that the market itself cannot build on this advantage. Thus, the upward social and professional mobility that education is supposed to guarantee becomes a ‘busted myth’. On the other hand, more recent approaches emphasize the potential for positive developmental outcomes. A series of studies at the end of the 1990s have stressed the potential increase of the highly skilled pool in the home countries because of this particular process of IMP (Mountford 1997; Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz 1997; Vidal 1998; Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2001; Docquier and Rapoport, 2005). That is, as long as the returns from education are higher abroad, the potential of immigration can increase the expected return from human capital and encourage more citizens to invest in education in the home country. Even in the case that only a small percentage of these individuals choose to stay in the home country (or even to return), the country will end up with a skilled labour force pool capable of boosting its economy. Moreover, Saxenian (2002) has argued that nowadays there are more win-win situations for mobile persons, states and others involved, based on the experience of India and China in setting up technology firms as a result of many of the diaspora working in Silicon Valley. One such benefit is, what Levitt and Nyberg-Sorensen (20042, cited in Faist 2008, 22) termed, ‘social remittances’ i.e. the flow of ‘good’ ideas and practices, such as human rights, gender equity and democracy. After all, the IMP, as Zweig (2006) correctly suggests, can change to brain gain via the immigrants’ repatriation. That is because living abroad offers immigrant professionals the chance to increase their knowledge and experience levels and to bring these with them and use them when they repatriate (Dos Santos and Postel-Vinay 2003). Those who expatriate form a highly specialized labour pool, which constitutes an asset for countries of origin in the long run. However, this depends on whether they are able to repatriate – since it is not a linear sequence of moving abroad and repatriation – and under which circumstances. The repatriation of graduate immigrants leads, according to McCormick and Wahba (2001) and Dustmann

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

4

L. Labrianidis

and Kirchkamp (2002), to cost reduction, because of the returning immigrants’ increased productivity and managerial skills. The irony of the IMP is that those who migrate from less developed countries are those most needed for their countries’ development: these are the ones possessing the skills needed to regenerate an economy (Todaro 1996, 119; Gla Van 2008, 720). In fact, as Williams and Balaz (2008, 17–46) have argued, the host countries (developed) are undoubtedly the winners in this process of the IMP and the home countries (usually less developed) are generally the losers. The developed countries have always faced the dilemma of whether to ‘produce’ all the skilled workforce they need or to attract a portion of it from other nations. Most countries have chosen to attract part of their highly skilled labour force from abroad. The most fundamental reason why some countries managed to be attractive is related to their high levels of investment in R&D (Hunter, Oswald, and Charlton, 2009). Thus, developed countries have attracted not only the largest numbers of skilled scientists but also the best of them (Williams and Balaz 2008, 113–148). In 2000, the number of foreign-born employees with tertiary education who were living in a member state of the OECD was 20 million. The number of highly skilled immigrants coming from less developed countries and living in member states of the OECD doubled between 1990 and 2000 (Carrington and Detragiache 1999; Docquier and Marfouk 2005). This fact is partly due to the change in many countries’ migration policies that encouraged incoming, well-trained personnel to enter the country and that allowed foreign students to have access to these countries’ labour markets (OECD 2005). The paper, based on the human capital theory, accepts that migration and even more so IMP is a possible cause of growth in recipient countries. However, as it will come up clearly from the survey results in the next sections, migrants are attracted to countries because of the opportunities and institutions that are found there – opportunities and institutions which are quite possibly the consequence and cause of growth. Thus, it is by no means certain that the attraction of human capital is a cause of economic growth. In fact, the professionals, who are mobile and well informed, are attracted to economic growth rather than the opposite that Florida (2002) suggested (Shearmur 2007, 41). Furthermore, as Storper and Scott (2009, 161) put it, most migrants are unlikely to move in significant numbers from one location to another unless relevant employment opportunities are actually or potentially available. 2.2. International migration of professionals and globalization Apart from reviewing the literature on the developmental impact of human capital transfers, it is also important to situate the phenomenon of IMP within the context of global economic and cultural changes of the last decades. The increasing globalization of the world economy has led to an increasing mobility of high as well as low-skilled employees following the increasing mobility of capital (Castles and Miller 2009). The increasing IMP is related to the increasing importance of knowledge, of multinational companies as well as of multinational organizations (EU etc) and the expansion of R&D activities. A major factor that has facilitated the IMP is the general ‘convergence’ of western societies nowadays,3 the familiarization with the way of life abroad and the career prospects offered abroad. These features occur due to: (a) the acquaintance

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

5

with the ‘other’ through travelling abroad; (b) the EU common labour market that does not raise obstacles to the migration of professionals and international student exchange programmes (e.g. Erasmus); (c) the capacity to look for employment abroad through Internet agents and the increase of job postings on the Internet, itself a result of the developments in transportation and telecommunication technologies (e.g. Skype), which have led to the time-space compression (Harvey 1990). As a result, people can communicate daily and ‘see’ their friends and family, read their favourite newspapers from their home country on the Internet etc. and reduce the feeling of homesickness. Straubhaar (2000, 17) correctly suggests – underplaying, however, the role of tacit knowledge – that individuals can move around the world within a few hours. Moreover, human capital can move even faster than that and can be available globally in just a few seconds without having to move physically, since cyberspace and the Internet allows them to ‘functionally’ move even when they stay at home. Thus, today, new technologies of communication and transportation allow migrants to sustain more frequent, less expensive and more intimate connections than previously. Such technologies enable migrants to remain active in their sending communities more regularly and influentially than in the past. These have resulted in the fact that today there are immigrants whose daily lives depend on multiple and constant interconnections across international borders and whose public identities are configured in relationship to more than one nation-state. They are called ‘transmigrants’ and they are involved in a set of cross-border relations and practices that connect migrants with their societies of origin.4 Transnational processes are located within the everyday life experience of individuals and families (Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton Blanc 1995, 48, 50). As Levitt, DeWind and Vertovec (2003, 565) argue, ‘some migrants maintain, strong, enduring ties to their homelands even as they are incorporated into countries of resettlement’. In fact, as Glick Schiller et al. (1995, 51–56) put it, migrants maintain family ties, sending money, letters, e-mails, communicating on the telephone and Skype, and they invest in property, business and social status in their country of origin. In some cases, the family is split and becomes, what Schmalzbauer (2008) termed, ‘family-by-phone’ where economic remittances bolster the expectations and improve the lifestyle of youths that stayed at home to the detriment of their migrant parents’ welfare. Thus, these transnational linkages have implications for migrants themselves as well as their home and host countries. Each transnational migrant, as Walton-Roberts and Pratt (2005, 192) argue, is negotiating geographies, gender, class and sexual identity, in different ways, and is deploying rather fluid categorizations of modernity to understand and negotiate his or her transnational experience. Faist (2008, 22–23) argues that there are transnational social spaces which consist of combinations of social and symbolic ties and their contents, positions in networks and organizations and networks of organizations that cut across the borders of at least two national states. IMP was also facilitated due to the increasing, though contradictory, importance of immigration networks (Choldin 1973; Massey et al. 2005). Through the immigration networks of scientists, the home country connects not only with specific individuals and their personal knowledge but also with social and trade association networks with which they are related abroad (Meyer and Brown 1999; Brown 2000), hence the benefits are higher.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

6

L. Labrianidis

The adoption of insights from human capital theory and from developmentalist literature lead us to utilize categories of the ‘nation-state’ such as home/host country, ‘developed’ / ‘less developed’ countries. The usage of these categories does not mean that we take for granted that the main units that are in competition with each other in today’s world are ‘nations’, ‘countries’ and ‘nation-states’ that immigrants always identify, somehow naturally, with their ‘home countries’, or that the boundaries of ‘nation-states’ define and contain different ‘societies’ and so on. One has to be aware that there is a significant literature that challenges the utilization of ‘nation-state’ categories in migration studies (e.g. Wimmer 2007; Glick Schiller 2009). The nation-state, as Mann (1993) has argued, is changing, rather than eclipsing, in the face of globalization. One can speak of the ‘deterritorialised nation-state’ in the sense that state boundaries are defined in social rather than geographic terms (i.e. the state borders spread globally to encompass all migrants, wherever they may settle [Glick Schiller et al. 1995, 58]. The state has clearly weakened as a sovereign entity of formation and political decision-making (either because it has been superseded by supranational institutions, or because economic capital transcends states and is stronger). However, the nation-state is embedded in the very definition of international migration. Immigration is still a quite complicated procedure even for IMPs, it takes a lot of time and money (obtaining work permits, visas, etc.) while the recent tightening of border security and the invasive customs checks are all state organized. Thus, migration of Greek professionals is much easier within the EU which explains why a good part of them are residing there. Moreover, in the minds of immigrants it continues to be a reference point as an entity that encloses a space of common descent, origin and socialization with others and as a bearer of cultural assets. And that applies regardless of whether the state is defined in a positive manner (e.g. akin to the concept of homeland) or negative (to get away from this inhospitable state that leverages and drives me away). 3.

The study

3.1. Research methodology There are no official records of Greek professionals abroad, thus we were not able to design a sample reflecting the characteristics of the total population. This lack of official data constitutes a significant caveat to our study, but on the other hand, it is an advantage, since our study is the first attempt to investigate the phenomenon. In addition, the present study involves participants who are currently working abroad as well as those who have worked abroad for at least one year and have now returned to Greece. This constitutes another advantage of our research, since most studies on brain drain in the international literature involve returnees or migrants abroad in a single country. Our sample comprises of Greek nationals with a higher education degree (from a university in Greece or abroad) who have worked abroad for at least a year and have lived most of their lives up to age 18 in Greece (in order to exclude second generation individuals of Greek origin). The total number of participants reached 2734. Ultimately, 1821 questionnaires were correctly completed (following a rule of the minimum number of answered questions, which should have been more than half) and these were used for our analysis. Of those, the majority of participants (66%) are male and 84.1% still live abroad.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

7

There were two stages to locate those individuals. Initially, an e-mail database was developed by gathering electronic addresses of Greek graduates currently working or having past work experience abroad, mostly through personal relations and Internet searches in selected research institutes, universities, foreign companies, associations and personal websites. During the second stage, a ‘snowball sampling’ method was employed, given that participants were asked to include the electronic addresses of other potential participants in their answers, while in many cases they have directly informed their contacts. In all stages, a link providing access to our online questionnaire was included in the respective e-mail, while the questionnaire was available on the web for nine months (15 May 2009–15 February 2010). In addition, the circulation of the questionnaire was facilitated by many associations that forwarded it to their member lists,5 while in certain cases the link to our questionnaire was also posted on personal blogs and websites. The response rate during the first stage was very encouraging at 85% and participants frequently sent e-mails with very useful comments, which confirmed the importance of our topic for them.6 However, it is needless to state that the analysis is constrained by all of the limitations and caveats of the data collection method (i.e. snowball sampling). SPSS v.19 was employed to perform the analysis presented below. Alongside the questionnaire, some qualitative information was also collected with the participation of 82 professionals working or having worked abroad by employing a semi-structured questionnaire containing 12 questions, which was analysed using the NVivo software. The semi-structured questionnaire allows us to understand how the informers feel about their migratory experience by giving them the opportunity to express themselves in their own words. The interviewees were selected randomly from our e-mail pool and once they agreed on the interview we contacted them via skype, or telephone or, in few cases, face-to-face. In the absence of reliable official statistics, an effort was made to estimate the magnitude of the IMP phenomenon from Greece. Initially, data on first generation migrants from Greece who are graduates and work in four different countries (USA, UK, Germany and Australia) were collected.7 Their total number in these four countries in 2008 reached 69,512 graduates. Our estimation regarding their total number was performed based on a combination of this figure and the distribution of participants in our study according to country of residence today (54.9% in total in USA, UK, Germany and Australia). Assuming that our sample is representative, we can estimate that 69,512 graduates represent 54.9% of their total number worldwide, which led us to conclude that this figure is equivalent to 126,616 graduates or about 10% of graduates in Greece. Needless to say that due to the fact that these professionals are very well qualified, the ‘relevant loss’ for Greece is much higher. This percentage is extremely high compared not only to other developed countries (e.g. in the 1990s, Britain, Italy, Germany, France and Spain had on average 0.4–2.5% [Becker, Ichino and Peri 2004]) but also to less developed countries (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2008 estimate that they had on average 7%, which, however, reaches 45% for those with a population of less than 1.5 million people), which makes Greece an extremely interesting case.

8

L. Labrianidis 100% 90% 80% 70% 60%

40-49 30-39

50%

24-29 40%

18-23 <18

30% 20% 10%

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

0% 1946-1950 1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2009

Figure 1. Distribution (%) of participants according to age group, per decade of migration from Greece.

3.2. Profile of the sample: motives and patterns of migration Over the years, the age of migration has been increasing due to the increasing demand for postgraduate studies and employment abroad (Figure 1). The graduates working abroad have studied for many years (73.6% have an MSc and 50.9% a PhD) and with 40% of the degrees acquired abroad coming from one of the ‘top 100 universities’ in the world! (Figure 2). A significant part of Greek professionals abroad work in Universities and in research related activities (around 46%), 15% in multinational companies, 10% in international organizations and 5% in finance/banking. A minority combines work abroad and in Greece (e.g. a dentist who is employed abroad but visits Greece for some days during the month to perform surgeries).

80,0 70,0 60,0 50,0 % 40,0 30,0 20,0 10,0 0,0 1st Degree

2nd Degree

1st Master's Degree

Top-100 Universities

2nd Master's Degree

PhD

Total

Other Universities

Figure 2. Distribution (%) of total number of degrees received outside Greece according to university ranking and level of education.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

9

Factors related to employment, such as better career prospects, better chances of finding a job related to their specialization and increasing their knowledge in their field, satisfactory income, working experience abroad as well as push factors (i.e. unable to find a job in Greece relevant to their studies and in the field of their expertise) were mentioned as the most important8 factors for living abroad. Apart from the factors related to employment, the next ones considered ‘very important’ were their studies abroad, since many of the participants stayed abroad after finishing their degree (Figure 3). Most of the participants (60.9% of the total) did not look for a job in Greece before deciding to leave or stay abroad for work. What is apparent is that the longer the length of studies abroad, the fewer the chances for the participants to look for work in Greece: 91.1% of those who acquired all of their degrees abroad did not look for work in Greece, while the respective share among those who undertook part of their studies abroad falls to 58.9% and to 47.3% for those who received all of their degrees in Greece. Almost all (90%) participants hold a postgraduate degree from abroad while 29% undertook all of their studies abroad. There is only a small percentage (14.3%) that has worked abroad despite the fact that they didn’t study abroad at all. When these individuals first started working abroad, 80.6% had at least a postgraduate degree. Participants still working abroad at the time of the survey are well paid. Most of them (46.4%) earn more than 40,000 euros per year, while the percentage of those earning less than 25,000 euros per year9 is very small and concerns mostly women and young people.10 Even though financial gains for those employed abroad are higher compared to those who work in the respective positions in Greece (Table 1), this difference has not been, in most of the cases, reported as the defining motivating factor. In contrast, most of participants argue that qualitative dimensions, such as working conditions, career prospects, the wider institutional framework and the sense of meritocracy are of greater importance. As one of our interviews says:

Greek military junta of 1967–1974 Avoid military service in Greece Description of friends' experiences already working there Followed my partner Other reasons I wanted to live in a society with higher tolerance towards the "other" Personal/family reasons Recognition of qualifications abroad Life experience abroad-familiarization with different cultures Lack of meritocracy in Greece/ corruption I studied abroad and I stayed there to work Unable to find a job in my field of expertise in Greece Working experience abroad Unable to find a job in Greece relevant to the level of my studies Satisfactory income Effort to upgrade-update my knowledge on the field of my expertise Interesting job-in the field of my expertise Better career prospects 0,0%

10,0%

20,0%

30,0%

40,0%

Figure 3. Motives to work abroad.

50,0%

60,0%

70,0%

80,0%

10

L. Labrianidis Table 1. Annual earnings abroad and in Greece by educational level (%).

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

Educational level

Remain abroad (%) Graduate degree Master’s degree PhD Total Returned to Greece (%) Graduate degree Master’s degree PhD Total

Gross annual earnings (e) <25,000

25,000–60,000

>60,000

19.1 12.7 4.8 9.2

49.4 45.2 42.9 44.4

31.5 42.2 52.3 46.4

43.5 40.9 36.8 39.4

52.1 33.8 51.8 43.1

4.3 25.2 11.4 17.4

I was searching alone for an interesting job, on my expertise, according to my qualifications and not based on my employer’s friendship with my father. (female, age 29, engineer in private company, N. York). 3.3. Socio-economic characteristics The participants’ classification of their family’s socio-economic profile seems to influence various aspects of the process of IMP. There seems to be a clear social class distinction, which involves two poles, namely an ‘elite’ and a ‘scientific proletariat’ (Table 2). Those included in the ‘elite’ are working abroad while enjoying life there, owning to their high cultural (studies at top universities, linguistic skills etc.), social and symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1984). Some of participants, the highly skilled hypermobile professionals, might be classified as, what Leslie Sklair terms, the ‘transnational capitalist class’. On the other hand, those included in the ‘scientific proletariat’ live abroad without necessarily having an exceptional, or at least satisfactory, job. These people have limited employment potential in Greece – especially nowadays during the financial crisis – while they are employed abroad with better prospects for the future. Both the ‘elite’ and the ‘scientific proletariat’ of those employed as executives confirm the significance of lifestyle (live in the largest cities, travel, the arts, cuisine, etc.), as well as the ‘freedom’ the participants enjoy abroad,11 compared to what they recognize as the vexatious aspects of modern life in Greece. At the same time, an alternative dimension of this lifestyle (e.g. exploring the ‘other’, which embrace a ‘nomad’s’ way of living) holds a preeminent role for a particular share of this population, who may not earn a lot of money (researchers, artists etc.), but whose wages make their living there easy. The ‘elite’ in particular, meaning those that classified their family high in socioeconomic status and graduated from a ‘top school’, choose to go abroad for undergraduate studies and tend to study at one of the top 100 universities of the world. After all, their parents’ past living and studying experiences abroad seem to be an influential factor on the destination of this group of participants for undergraduate studies and in particular in one of the ‘top universities’. In many cases, there can be a relation to the parents’ financial situation that allows paying for the increased

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

11

costs of studying abroad and in the best (and usually most expensive) universities around the world. Greek professionals had lived and worked in 74 different countries altogether. However, 91% of the participants were concentrated in 10 countries only, including mainly the UK (31.7%), the USA (28.7%), Germany (6.5%) and Switzerland (5.4%). A small percentage (4%) worked in less developed countries. The visa regime is crucial in facilitating certain flows of migration (e.g. Andrucki 2010). In this case, the right of Greeks, as EU citizens, to live and work in the rest of the EU12 means that there is a special kind of ease to these migration circuits which is reflected in the large numbers of Greek professionals that live and work in the stronger EU economies (especially UK and Germany). The participants had lived and worked in the past in 528 cities abroad. The most important were the urban areas of London (16.9%), Brussels (3.9%), New York (3.9%), Boston (3.7%) and Paris (2.8%). The main concentration occurred in the capitals and/or each country’s largest cities: Brussels (71% of those in Belgium), Paris (58.7% of those in France), London (52.6% of those in the UK), Geneva and Zurich (40.3% and 27.9%, respectively of those in Switzerland), etc. That is, it is specific cities more so than countries attracting Greek professionals and absorbing their skills. Moreover, they can benefit fully from living in a global city (Sassen 2001), or other large urban metropolis because when they work abroad a significant percentage of participants receive some sort of financial assistance from their parents (paying for their tickets to visit Greece, credit card payments etc.). This finding is in contrast to the bulk of international literature that stresses Table 2. Respondents’ background characteristics by self-evaluation of their families’ socio-economic status (%). Perception of family socio-economic status Extremely Above Below Extremely high average average low Share in total number of respondents Studies in a “Top School” Studies in Greece on undergraduate level Studies in one of the “Top 100 world universities” on undergraduate level Holding a PhD Studies in one of the “Top 100 world universities” for PhD Partner of different nationality Both parents holding a university degree One parent studied abroad None of the parents have an experience of life abroad Receiving economic assistance from family today Entrepreneurs – self employed Working in a university/research centre Annual earnings > 60,000e Looking for a job in Greece Have already returned to Greece

4.3 59.4 53.4 13.7

75.1 30.3 69 8.8

18.1 10.3 76 4.9

2.5 9.4 81.4 2.3

52.0 64.1

49.8 46

54.9 37.9

72.1 53.3

41.9 58.7 52.7 46.7

36.5 41.7 24.7 63.8

36.6 8.2 7.6 70.8

27.3 4.7 0.0 75

14.6

11.6

5.3

3.1

7.8 38.7 61.8 13.8 17.8

10.4 36.7 44.8 19.5 14.2

7.6 45.1 48.8 16.3 11.5

2.5 52.3 61.1 7.9 7.0

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

12

L. Labrianidis

the positive effects of IMP for the home country (e.g. the World Bank 2006), though Faini (2007) advances a similar argument and may have its source in the fact that a large portion of the Greek graduates working abroad comes from better-off families (79.4% - Table 2). Moreover, those participants whose parents either lived or studied abroad are more likely to have a relationship with a non-Greek compared to participants whose parents do not have such experience. This correlation can be explained by the acquaintance of the parents with multicultural environments abroad, the connections to people coming from different cultures and perceptions and religions which are transferred to their children. The parents’ level of education was related only to the undergraduate studies of their offspring in one of the best universities of the world, since in cases where at least one of the parents was a degree holder there was an increased percentage of participants studying in such institutions. What came as a surprise is that participants whose parents are better off socio-economically and tend to belong to the ‘transnational capitalist class’, tend to stay for a shorter period to work abroad (10 years, while it rises to 12.4 for those with lower socio-economic status). However, the fact that ‘elite’ individuals repatriate sooner and in higher shares, simply indicates that they have more chances of succeeding in Greece (e.g. wider and better networks of high profile acquaintances, fewer financial concerns, ‘established’ family businesses) than the rest who are somehow ‘forced’ to stay for longer abroad. On the other hand, there is a minority of individuals who come from families with ‘very low’ socio-economic status. The percentage of those with parents who are degree holders is very small, and, none of their parents studied abroad. They come from a family environment which is unfamiliar with life and studies abroad and they seem to be more conservative in choosing a non-Greek partner. Only a small share of these participants has been at a ‘top school’ and the vast majority took their undergraduate studies in Greece. The high rates of PhD degree holders (from the ‘top universities’ in fact) among these participants illustrate that ‘their lower starting point’ pushes them to struggle for their social status improvement through education. A substantial number (52.3%) of these individuals work at a university/research centre. A very small portion is self-employed while none of them has his/her own business. Their wages are high, and this, combined with the lack of the family’s social ‘connections’, probably explains the low rates of return to or looking for work in Greece, which are the lowest among the groups. We could argue that these participants working abroad are able to enjoy high living standards as well as recognition, which are not available to them in Greece. 3.4. Perceptions of migration and senses of belonging Participants share a common characteristic, since they are all university graduates working abroad, being well educated and belonging, at least for most of them, to the middle and upper classes. However, we could argue that it is an extremely diverse sample as well, since some of the participants are more successful, they are employed in high prestige positions and earn much more compared to others, while there also exists a share which refers to professionals who have just started their careers. Some of the participants live together with their families, while others live alone. Some are more ‘cosmopolitan’ with partners of different ethnic background.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

13

Some are determined to stay abroad, while others are on their way back, in addition to those who have already returned and those who returned and have left again. There are participants who hold a very negative view of Greece and those who are more positive towards the country. They are also significantly differentiated based on gender and age, while dissimilarities are also observed regarding their integration into the local societies depending on the host country. Descriptions and narrations by the subjects of the study reflect on aspects of international mobility and comparisons between the two ‘worlds’ (Greece and the country of residence abroad) in terms of their evaluation, so that someone decides on where he/she prefers to live. Some of them decide, for a particular period, to work in both places and spend much of their lives on airplanes, while their families may be based on either side; they become what Saxenian (2002, 123) termed ‘astronauts’. Their narratives of life reveal how difficult it is to categorize participants. All of the participants seem to hold an extremely negative view regarding certain aspects of their lives in Greece (reproducing in fact the dominant clichés13): bureaucracy, lack of meritocracy and disrespect, degraded public spaces, ‘hostile’ urban environments etc. However, they recognize some positive aspects as well, namely that their families and friends live there, an enjoyable social life, the climate, the cuisine and the ‘easygoing’ Greek way of life. On the other hand, there are some particular aspects of the host societies which are greatly appreciated by the participants (such as a well-organized society with little bureaucracy, better quality of life and the general lifestyle there) and they can constitute the most important motives for staying abroad. What one interviewee states is indicative: Our life is well organised here and I feel safe. Last year my daughter had to go through a difficult operation and everything was done in the hospital in the most excellent way. Of course, I did not have to pay for anything. If I was in

There was a family business in Greece I needed my parent's assistance in raising my children My children are(were) at a critical age-I would not have been able to return later I found a job in Greece with good working hours My partner had already returned to Greece I found a job with a good salary in Greece I found a permanent job in Greece I could not stand the climate of the country where I lived My parents are(were) getting older(sick) I got tired of living abroad I found a job in Greece relevant to my qualifications I found a job in Greece in the area of my expertise I missed the Greek way of living Personal matters I missed my friends-family

0,00

0,50

1,00

1,50

2,00

2,50

Figure 4. Evaluation of the reasons for returning to Greece (1 = not at all important, 3 = very important).

14

L. Labrianidis

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

Greece, though, I do not even want to imagine of what would happen! (male, age 41, executive-industrial sector, Sweden). The most important reasons that professionals return to Greece after living and working abroad were social and personal, such as to reunite with the participant’s family and friends or other personal reasons and also feeling nostalgic about their lives in Greece. After these, employment reasons follow and are mainly concerned with finding a job in accordance with their specialization and skills (Figure 4). The percentage of those that started a family and continue to live abroad is almost the same as those that started a family and returned. However, studying the frequency of certain age brackets, we found that the participants returned to Greece either when their children were at a pre-school age or after they became adults. Relationships with non-Greeks impedes the return to Greece. In particular, 46.5% of those having a steady relationship are related to a non-Greek, this falls to 13.7% for those who already returned to Greece, while it is much higher (52.4%) for those who continue to live abroad. This correlation between these variables is highly significant. Participants who have returned feel very pleased by the fact that they are now close to their elderly parents, whose state of health was often a stressful factor for them while they were abroad. Furthermore, some of those who have repatriated state that their ability to have a more active ‘civic participation’ is a very important factor in their appreciation of life in Greece. On the other hand, those who still live abroad hold a very positive view of the host society: it is well organized, everyday life is easy, they enjoy high-quality services (health, education etc.), it is open to the ‘other’ and more multicultural, while they are given the opportunity to be employed in the area of their expertise. Life abroad is also characterized by ‘professionalism’ at various levels; there are opportunities for vocational education and high career prospects, while there is no discrimination based on nationality, sex, age and wages. Despite these benefits, these individuals wish their ‘importance’ would be appreciated in Greece as well, so that they ‘could offer their services’ or even return to their home country. Some participants are aware that they are bearers of ‘symbolic capital (e.g. professors in a famous University) and they want to capitalize on that in their home country. The decision of women to migrate or return is much more influenced by their partner than vice versa. The ‘existence of partner’ was assessed as cumulatively important or a very important factor for 35.1% of women compared with 18.4% of men. ‘Finding satisfactory employment for themselves and for their partners’ is a more powerful incentive to return for women (67.5% of women rated this factor as ‘very important’, compared to only 55.2% of men). Also elderly/sick parents are a more important factor that led women to return (39.5%) than for men (24.1%) (Labrianidis 2011, 311, 320). The decision of these professionals, especially the women, to work abroad in many cases is difficult to understand, since they could have a much more easy going life in Greece. For example, usually they cannot enjoy support in running their house while in Greece they would, because on the one hand there is abundant and affordable domestic labour and on the other there is the support provided by the ‘mothers’. As one of our informers stated: I would rather live in Brussels where there are high quality day nurseries for free. Thus my kid is becoming sociable while at the same time I will not have to

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

15

suffer the interference of my mother and my mother in law on how I live my everyday life (woman, age 34, working in a consulting company in Brussels.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

4.

IMP as an explanatory factor of current economic crisis

The country’s development is based today on a model which does not promote the production of high value-added products and services and, thus, it does not also allow the utilization of highly skilled labour force. The Greek economy, as was suggested by Makridakis et al. (1998), is under a ‘double pressure’. It is strategically ‘trapped’ (Calogirou 2008) in the competitive advantage field between the economies based on very low labour cost and relatively unskilled labour and those which produce differentiated and quality goods and services. This explains the low international competitiveness of the country and it is a good part of the explanation of the current economic crisis of the country. At the same time, Greece has been gradually transformed into a hosting country for immigrants, whose presence exacerbates the existent growth barriers, since they are usually employed in firms that seek to become competitive via cheap labour force (Labrianidis et al. 2004). Moreover, a high percentage of these migrants (33%) coming to Greece, the highest in all OECD countries, work in jobs for which they are overqualified; also more migrants have jobs for which they are overqualified compared to Greeks (3.5:1 OECD 2008). This is yet another indication that the country cannot capitalize on either its own graduates who emigrate or on the graduate immigrants who arrive in Greece. It seems that under this perspective, emigration and immigration are two sides of the same coin. Greece is characterized by a mismatch between supply and demand of professionals (pronounced unemployment, underemployment, employment in jobs for which they are overqualified etc); we argue that this is due to the low demand on the part of the economy, primarily of the private sector. Forty percent of respondents in our sample stated that they migrated because they were unable to find a job in their field and 51% a job relevant to the level of their studies (Figure 1). As one of the participants puts it: I couldn’t find a job in Greece for 1.5 years. The 2–3 jobs for which I had an offer were jobs for which I was overqualified, with no prospect of promotion and with no job description. The salary was really low, and, thus, I had to continue to live with my parents (male, age early 30s, working in a consulting company in London). So far, the prevailing view in Greek society has been that the ‘oversupply of graduates’ is the result of some alleged ‘over-education’ or ‘over qualification’ of Greeks.14 We contend this view, which is actually contrasted by comparative international statistics. While in Greece the levels of degree holders are apparently high, they are not of the highest in Europe and, generally, in the developed world. In particular, Greece ranks 20th with 27.1% for people between 25-34, 18th with 25.3% for people between 35-44 and 21st with 16.9% for people between 45-64 in 32 European states for 2007 (Eurostat c). Thus, exactly because the country’s industries have not moved upwards in the value chain in order to produce more complex, knowledge- and technology-inten-

16

L. Labrianidis 16,0 14,0 12,0 10,0 %

8,0 6,0 4,0

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

2,0 0,0 1985

1991

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

- - : Total Unemployment - - : Degree holders’ unemployment Source: Compiled by the author– data derived from Hellenic Statistical Authority & International Labour Organisation/Euromonitor International

Figure 5. Rates (%) of degree holders’ unemployment and total unemployment in Greece (1985–2009). Source: Compiled by the author – data derived from Hellenic Statistical Authority & International Labour Organisation/Euromonitor International.

sive goods and services, there is low demand for professionals, unemployment does not fall and the wages do not increase in relation to the level of education. In particular, in Greece, the share of scientists among those employed was 13.7% (21st out of 30 countries) in 2007, slightly less than the EU-19 average of 14.2% and significantly lower than the average of OECD countries (17.3% – OECD 2009). Moreover, the unemployment rate among degree holders is very often higher than the country’s unemployment average (Figure 5). In that sense, Greece demonstrates an indisputable particularity: while in most EU countries the level of education correlates to rates of unemployment, in Greece there is no such correlation (Figure 6). Finally, the IMP towards specific countries is also influenced by the average wages of degree holders. A study of the wages in technology and knowledge-intensive industries in Europe reveals that the annual earnings in Greece are relatively 14,0 12,0 10,0 8,0 6,0 4,0 2,0 0,0

Total

Low

Medium

EU-27

8,5

11,7

8,7

High 4,6

Greece

10,2

9,1

12,8

7,7

Source: Eurostat (b)

Figure 6. Unemployment rates for ages 15–64 by educational attainment (averages 1998– 2008). Source: Eurostat (b).

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

17

low. In 2002, Greece was 17th among 28 countries (Eurostat a). In addition, the field research confirmed that there is a clear correlation between the levels of studies and salaries abroad while, those that returned to Greece tend to have lower wages that do not increase in tandem with their level of education (Table 1). The main reason for that is the low demand for high skills. This could be partly attributed to the fact that the Greek labour market is more oriented to working experience rather than educational levels. In fact, Greek society assigns a dual meaning to knowledge: at the level of symbolic capital and social image, graduates are respectful because they are considered accomplished. At the same time, in terms of employability they are considered too theoretical, impractical and often plainly incapable of dealing with the simple matters of everyday life and business. The current economic crisis in Greece is usually explained as the outcome of three set of factors: first, the destabilising role of financial institutions and rating agencies (cf. Crotty 2009; Nelson, Belkin and Mix 2010), as the liberation of financial markets encouraged governments to obtain seemingly low-risk or risk-free loans that led countries, such as Greece, to access excessive capital at very low interest rates. This policy resulted in high levels of external debt and extended financial pressures. Second, when the debt crisis appeared in the country, the institutional setting within the Eurozone proved to be unwilling to provide the financial markets with a clear signal that a support plan for Greece was set. According to Hadjimichalis (2011) and Lapavitsas et al. (2010), this unwillingness reflects the splitting of the Eurozone into ‘core’ and ‘periphery’, in which the ‘periphery’ has been powerless in competing against the ‘core’, due to the constraints imposed by the EMU. Thus, extended current account deficits and surpluses were created within the EU during the past years. Third, the country also suffers from several ‘internal’ weaknesses and burdens that had a negative impact on its development and competitiveness over time. Spraos (1997), favours the explanation of the ‘Dutch disease’ that made the Greek manufacturing sector less competitive in the international markets and led to negative trade balances during the period 2000–2010. Doxiadis (2011) argues Greece’s low competitiveness is the result of the high percentage of small-scale businesses which are less capable to invest in export-oriented activities, lack financial resources, have restricted investment in highly educated human capital, etc. Furthermore, tax evasion by the upper class since the 1950s, according to Stathakis (2011), can explain the current government debt; while, Pavlopoulos (2002) and Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010) point out the importance of the informal economy which accounts for 20–30 % of GDP. Finally, extended clientelism and rent-seeking attitudes that characterize Greek socio-political culture, as well as the state inefficiencies are among the causes that have been repeatedly used as explanations (e.g. Doxiadis 2011) for the debt crisis. Thus, we argue here that the current economic crisis as well as more generally the low competitiveness of the Greek economy could also be attributed to its inability to take advantage of its highly educated personnel who migrate abroad in order to work there. The loss of these professionals further diminishes the potential for higher competitiveness, which imposes a vicious cycle of underdevelopment that does not allow the country to escape from the crisis. Migration of graduates is likely to increase in the near future due to the economic recession, as a further cut-

18

L. Labrianidis

back of investment both in human capital and in firms’ upgrading efforts in order to move up the value chain are possible.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

5.

Conclusions: policy proposals

Greece faces today the threat of bankruptcy. The implementation of policies which, on the one hand, aim to attract its valuable human capital which remains abroad or, on the other hand, to retain a large share of those young professionals who are currently leaving the country in an upward pace, might be of crucial importance. Policies can influence the rate of return of professionals to their home country (Saxenian 2002). Meyer and Brown (1999) suggest that there are two ways for a country to reap the benefits of its professionals working abroad. One is to focus on their return (return option) and the other to try to utilize this human capital, taking for granted that it will remain abroad. Until the 1980s, national and international policies focused on controlling the loss of professionals or on mitigating the negative impacts by tax incentives for those who returned etc. However, the results were not satisfactory (Meyer et al. 1997; Gibson and McKenzie forthcoming). Of course, there were cases of success for repatriation policies: either in newly industrialized countries, such as Singapore and the Republic of Korea, or in large countries, such as China and India, where the 1980s robust repatriating programmes were followed by the creation of significant R&D structures and high development rates. When graduates decide to repatriate, they have to deal with lower levels of wages and living standards than the ones they had abroad: repatriation offers an alternative option in which non-financial motives are more important than financial ones. In order to have credible chances of repatriation of professionals, Greece needs to change its pattern of development and this transformation is a medium- to long-term target. Moreover, the social and political framework for the creation of a viable, satisfactory and, in the end, pleasant environment that would ‘keep’ Greek professionals in Greece or convince them to repatriate is also crucial apart from the economic environment. Undoubtedly, these parameters cannot change instantly. Of course, there are positive effects due to the decision of some to return and enrich the Greek society with their working and living experiences from abroad. Moreover, the fact that some of participants are bearers of social capital (e.g. professor at a famous university) means that they can influence heavily the sociopolitical situation in the country. In reality, however, many of these people will not return. For many Greek professionals abroad (some of them for many years), returning to Greece is not an easy task, even if there were the respective high status and earning positions in businesses, universities etc. Moreover, a part of our sample (2.4%) is not willing to return to Greece in any circumstances. This finding means that no matter how much their return or any relation to Greece is facilitated, no matter what improvement of conditions occurs in the long-term, many of them will not come back. However, the country can benefit from Greek professionals abroad without necessarily focusing on a repatriation policy; rather, it could handle this valuable human capital under the assumption that in the foreseeable future it will remain abroad (diaspora option). Consequently, what should be done in the short- and mediumterm emerges as a crucial challenge. Greece should immediately recognize publicly and in the most formal way the fundamental value of this human capital. Concomitantly, it should facilitate the establishment of any possible means of cooperation

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

19

between these people abroad and Greece. Some of them might decide, for a particular period, to combine work in both places. Even from afar, through meaningful collaborations between private businesses, universities, research centres, or even through the creation of their own businesses, Greek professionals could contribute to the transfer of know-how to Greece. In this way, Greek professionals working abroad could feel useful to their country, which in turn would benefit from the knowledge and experience these individuals possess. At the same time, they would be able to enjoy ‘the best of both worlds’: they could continue to live and work abroad, but at the same time they would be able to have some sort of activity in Greece, where they would visit regularly on professional missions. This situation could serve as the ‘bridge’ which, in the future, might bring them back, with indisputable positive results for the Greek economy and society in general. On a European level, IMP mainly affects its ‘peripheral’ countries. These countries are unable to maintain a competitive position in the global markets, while the current financial crisis is likely to further increase the loss of their highly skilled individuals. Thus, a vicious cycle of underdevelopment is likely to appear there as a result of IMP. Notes 1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12.

The paper is based on the same empirical research published in a book in 2011 (in Greek). An early version of the paper was presented at the 2010 EURS conference in Vienna. ‘The Transnational Turn in Migration Studies’, Global Migration Perspectives 6: Geneva. In the sense that people tend to listen to the same music, wear the same clothes, watch the same movies etc. Of course, as Portes (2003, 875–877) argues, regular involvement in transnational activities characterizes only a minority of immigrants, and even occasional involvement is not a universal practice. Such as the Hellenic Observatory LSE, the Greek Society of Scientists in the USA, the Greek Alumni of American Universities and the Association of Planning and Regional Development Engineers. There was a huge interest in this research from the international media, too (see http://afroditi. uom.gr/rdpru/?q = el/node/198), perhaps due to the fact that Greece was in the headlines worldwide for many months, and thus there was an interest in understanding the causes and effects of the economic crisis. Through personal communication with the respective national statistical services in these countries, since they were the only available sources. The participants were asked to evaluate different factors in their decision to work abroad as ‘not at all important’, ‘important’ and ‘very important’, while there was a chance to add factors of their own which they considered very important for the decision. 3.3% earn less than 15,000 euro and another 5.9% 15–25,000 euros. The majority (64.4%) of participants in the category (<15,000 e) includes females, while those aged between 22-29 years old form 48.9% of them. In the sense that they can be released from the strict control of their family and social network of their home town. This can be liberating and, as Walton-Roberts and Pratt (2005) argue, it can even lead to a renegotiation of their sexuality. However, the recent economic crisis in Greece challenged even this corner stone of the EU. The British PM David Cameron, in a recent statement indicated that Britain is prepared to override its historic obligations under EU treaties and impose tighter border controls that would block Greek citizens from entering the UK, in case Greece is forced out of the single currency (The Guardian 02/07/2012).

20

L. Labrianidis

13.

In a sense, these responses are influenced by the historical context of the period during which we contacted informants for the survey. One might assume that if the survey were conducted in another historical context responses would have been very different. It is a generally accepted statement that is presented in the press all the time. Tsoukalas (1976) argues for a ‘passion of the Greek people for education and culture’ constitutes, one of the main distinctive features of modern Greek society, especially among the peasantry, but his data are up to 1965.

14.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

References Andrucki, M. J. 2010. “The Visa Whiteness Machine.” Ethnicities 10 (3): 358–370. Barro, R., and X. Sala-I-Martin. 1995. Economic Growth. New York: McGraw-Hill. Becker, S., A. Ichino, and G. Peri. 2004. “How Large is the Brain Drain from Italy?” Giornale Degli Economisti e Annali di Economia 63 (I): 1–32. Beine, M., F. Docquier, and H. Rapoport. 2001. “Brain Drain and Economic Growth.” Journal of Development Economics 64 (1): 275–289. Beine, M., F. Docquier, and H. Rapoport. 2008. “Brain Drain and LDCs’ Growth.” Economic Journal 118 (528): 631–652. Bhagwati, J., and K. Hamada. 1974. “The Brain Drain, International Integration of Markets for Professionals and Unemployment.” Journal of Development Economics 1 (1–2): 19–42. Bourdieu, P. 1984. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. Brown, M. 2000. “Using the Intellectual Diaspora to Reverse the Brain Drain.” In Brain Drain and Capacity Building in Africa, edited by S. J. M. Tapsoba, S. Kassoum, P. V. Houenou, B. One, M. Sethi, and J. Ngu. Joint publication of the Economic Commission for Africa, the International Development Research Centre, and the International Organization for Migration. Calogirou, Y. 2008. “Technology, Knowledge and Economic Growth in the Greek Developmental Model.” In Seeking for a Growth Model for Greece, edited by T. Giannitsis. Athens: Papazisis. Carrington, W. J., and E. Detragiache. 1999. “How Extensive is the Brain Drain?” Finance and Development 36 (2): 46–49. Castles, S., and M. Miller. 2009. The Age of Migration. New York: Guildford Press. Choldin, H. M. 1973. “Kinship Networks in the Migration Process.” International Migration Review 7 (2): 163–175. Crotty, J. 2009. “Structural Causes of the Global Financial Crisis.” Cambridge Journal of Economics 33 (4): 563–580. Docquier, F., and H. Rapoport. 2005. “How does skilled emigration affect developing countries?” Paper presented at the G-20 workshop Demographic Challenges and Migration, Sydney, August 27–28. Docquier, F., and A. Marfouk. 2005. “International migration by educational attainment, 1990–2000.” In International Migration, Remittances and the Brain Drain, edited by C. Özden and M. Schiff., 151–200. New York, NY: Macmillan. Dos Santos, D., and M. F. Postel-Vinay. 2003. “Migration as a Source of Growth.” Journal of Population Economics 16 (1): 161–175. Doxiadis, A. 2011. Keynote Speech at the Conference on What should we do? Greece 2011: dilemmas and prospects, Athens, Greece, July 6. Dustmann, C., and O. Kirchkamp. 2002. “The Optimal Migration Duration and Activity Choice After Re-Migration.” Journal of Development Economics 67: 351–372. Eurostat (a), Mean Annual Earnings in High-tech Industries and KIS, by level of education (SES 2002). Eurostat (b), Unemployment by Educational Attainment, Age and Sex. Eurostat (c), Population by Sex, Indicator of Citizenship Age and Highest Level of Educational Attainment. Faini, R. 2007. “Remittances and the Brain Drain.” World Bank Economic Review 21 (2): 177–191. Faist, T. 2008. “Migrants as Transnational Development Agents.” Population Space and Place 14: 21–42. Florida, R. 2002. “The Economic Geography of Talent.” Annals Association Economic Geographers 92 (4): 743–755.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals

21

Gibson, J., and D. McKenzie. 2010. “How Does High-skilled Emigration Affect Small Countries?” Annales d’Economie et de Statistiques, 97–98. Gla Van, B. 2008. “Brain Drain a Management or a Property Problem?” American Journal of Economics and Sociology 67 (4): 719–737. Glick Schiller, N. 2009. “A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration.” Working Paper 67, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford. Glick Schiller, N., L. Basch, and C. Szanton Blanc. 1995. “From Immigrant to Transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration.” Anthropological Quarterly 68 (1): 48–63. Grubel, H. G., and A. Scott. 1966. “The International Flow of Human Capital.” American Economic Review 56 (1-2): 268–274. Hadjimichalis, C. 2011. “Uneven Geographical Development and Socio-Spatial Justice and Solidarity.” European Urban and Regional Studies 18 (3): 254–274. Harvey, D. 1990. The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell. Hunter, R. S., A. J. Oswald, and B. G. Charlton. 2009. “The Elite Brain Drain.” The Economic Journal 119: 231–251. Labrianidis, L. 2011. Investing in Leaving: The Greek Case of International Migration of Professionals in the Globalization Era. Athens: Kritiki. Labrianidis, L., et al. 2004. “Inflow of Migrants and Outflow of FDI.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 30 (6): 1183–1208. Lapavitsas, C., et al. 2010. The Eurozone Between Austerity and Default. Research on Money and Finance. http://www.aragon.fes-ugt.org/images/atachments/article/218/RMF-Eurozone-Austerityand-Default.pdf. Lundvall, B.-Å., ed. 1992. National Systems of Innovation. London: Pinter. Levitt, P., J. DeWind, and S. Vertovec. 2003. “International Perspectives on Transnational Migration.” International Migration Review 37 (3): 565–575. Lundvall, B-Å. and S. Borras. 1997. The globalising learning economy. Report from DG XII. Luxembourg: European Communities. Makridakis, S., L. Papayannakis, Y. Calogirou, and P. Trivellas. 1998. The Dualism of the Greek Firms. Athens: Association of Chief Executive Officers. Mann, M. 1993. “Nation - States in Europe and Other Continents.” Daedalus 123 (3): 115–140. Massey, D. S., J. Arango, G. Hugo, A. Kouaouci, A. Pellegrino, and J. E. Taylor. 2005. Worlds in Motion. New York: Oxford UP. Mathur, V. K. 1999. “Human Capital-Based Strategy for Regional Economic Development.” Economic Development Quarterly 13: 203–216. McCormick, B., and J. Wahba. 2001. “Overseas Work Experience, Savings and Entrepreneurship Amongst Return Migrants to LDCs.” The Scottish Journal of Political Economy 48 (2): 164–178. McCulloch, R., and J. T. Yellen. 1977. “Factor mobility, Regional Development and the Distribution of Income.” Journal of Political Economy 85 (1): 79–96. Meyer, J.-B., et al. 1997. “Turning Brain Drain into Brain Gain.” Science Technology and Society 2 (2): 285–315. Meyer, J-B., and M. Brown. 1999. Scientific Diasporas. World Conference on Science, UNESCO ICSU, Budapest, 26 June 26–July 1. Mountford, A. 1997. “Can a Brain Drain be Good for Growth in the Source Economy?” Journal of Development Economics 53 (2): 287–303. Nelson, R. M., P. Belkin and D. E. Mix. 2010. Greece’s Debt Crisis. Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42377.pdf. OECD. 2008. A Profile of Immigrant Populations in the 21st Century, Data from OECD countries. Paris: OECD. OECD. 2005. Trends in International Migration: SOPEMI 2004. Paris: OECD. OECD. 2009. Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2009. HRST Occupations αs a Age of Total Employment, 2008. Pavlopoulos, P. 2002. Shadow Economy in Greece. Athens: Research Institute for Tourism. Portes, A. 2003. “Conclusion: Theoretical Convergencies and Empirical Evidence in the Study of Immigrant Transnationalism.” International Migration Review 37 (3): 874–892. Romp, W., and J. de Haan. 2007. “Public Capital and Economic Growth.” Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 8: 6–52. Sassen, S. 2001. The Global City. Princeton, UP: Princeton.

Downloaded by [University of Macedonia] at 07:59 30 October 2013

22

L. Labrianidis

Saxeenian, A. L. 2002. “The Silicon Valley connection.” Science Technology & Society 71 (1): 117–149. Schmalzbauer, L. 2008. “Family Divided: The Class Formation of Honduran Transnational Families.” Global Networks 8 (3): 329–346. Schneider, F., A. Buehn and C. E. Montenegro. 2010. Shadow Economies all over the World, World Bank. http://elibrary.worldbank.org/docserver/download/5356.pdf?expires=1371902848&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=035A5045BFF56FC6A68358224F98422E. Shearmur, R. 2007. “The New Knowledge Aristocracy.” Work Organisation, Labour and Globalisation 1 (1): 31–47. Spraos, J. 1997. Some Thoughts on the Role of the Manufacturing Sector. Athens: SAMISDAT. Stark, O., C. Helmenstein, and A. Prskawetz. 1997. “A Brain Gain with a Brain Drain.” Economic Letters 55: 227–234. Stathakis, G. 2011. Greece 2011: dilemmas and prospects, Keynote Speech at the Conference on What should we do? Athens, Greece, July 6. Storper, M., and A. Scott. 2009. “Rethinking Human Capital, Creativity and Urban Growth.” Journal of Economic Geography 9 (2): 147–167. Straubhaar, T. 2000. International Mobility of the Highly Skilled. HWWA Discussion Paper, 88. Todaro, M. 1996. Economic Development. 6th ed. Addison-Wesley, MA: Reading. Tsoukalas, C. 1976. “Some Aspects of ‘over-education’ in Modern Greece.” Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 268: 419–428. Vidal, J.-P. 1998. “The Effect of Emigration on Human Capital Formation.” Journal of Population Economics 11 (4): 589–600. Walton-Roberts, M., and G. Pratt. 2005. “Mobile modernities.” Gender, Place and Culture 12 (2): 173–195. World Bank. 2006. Global Economic Prospects 2006: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration. Washington, DC: World Bank. Williams, A., and V. Balaz. 2008. International Migration and Knowledge. London: Routledge. Wimmer, A. 2007. How (not) to Think about Ethnicity in Immigrant Societies. In K. Schittenhelm ed. Conference Proceedings. Zweig, D. 2006. “Learning to Compete: China’s Effort to Encourage a Reverse Brain Drain.” International Labour Review 145: 65–89.

Mobilities brain drain 2014 vol 9(2) pp 314-335.pdf

Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms- and-conditions. Whoops! There was a problem loading this page.

339KB Sizes 6 Downloads 29 Views

Recommend Documents

Drain Cleaning.pdf
There was a problem previewing this document. Retrying... Download. Connect more apps... Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. Drain Cleaning.

JOCAAA-VOL-17-2014.pdf
Orthogonal Polynomials,. Approximation Theory,Splines,. Wavelets, Neural Networks. 3. Page 3 of 766. JOCAAA-VOL-17-2014.pdf. JOCAAA-VOL-17-2014.pdf.

JCAAM-VOL-12-2014.pdf
LLC, to the address shown on the Eudoxus homepage. 3. Whoops! There was a problem loading this page. JCAAM-VOL-12-2014.pdf. JCAAM-VOL-12-2014.pdf.

JOCAAA-VOL-16-2014.pdf
University of Applied Sciences. Postfach 105018. D-44047 Dortmund, Germany. e-mail: [email protected] Real Networks,. Fourier Analysis,Approximation.

JAFA-VOL-9--2014.pdf
JAFA IS A JOURNAL OF RAPID PUBLICATION. 3. Page 3 of 404. JAFA-VOL-9--2014.pdf. JAFA-VOL-9--2014.pdf. Open. Extract. Open with. Sign In. Main menu.

Drain Cleaner Indianapolis IN.pdf
... western nations are distinct in that the bather lies down in a. prone position for bathing purposes. These types of baths are typically shallow and long. and can either be free-standing, like those pedestal and claw-footed designs of the 19th. Pa

PP-algorithm.pdf
People doing parallel processing, e.g. me, are not fond of this. kind of computation. Pangfeng Liu National Taiwan University Parallel Algorithm Examples.

PP HKI.pdf
PENGATURAN HKI SECARA. NASIONAL. HKI. Hak milik. perindustria. n (Industrial. Property). Hak cipta. (Copy Right). Paten. Paten. sederhana. Merek. Desain.

Mosa-Shower-Drain-brochure-Mosa-Tiles.pdf
Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. Mosa-Shower-Drain-brochure-Mosa-Tiles.pdf. Mosa-Shower-Drain-brochure-Mosa-Tiles.pdf. Open. Extract.