International Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Linked Tax-Trade Statistics in the UK Li Liu, Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, and Dongxian Guo International Monetary Fund, Federal Reserve Board, and LSE

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Disclaimers

This work contains statistical data from HMRC which is Crown Copyright. The research datasets used may not exactly reproduce HMRC aggregates. The use of HMRC statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of HMRC in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the information.

The views expressed in this presentation are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management. Nor do the views necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Board or the Federal Reserve System.

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Introduction Profit shifting by multinational companies (MNC) is a large concern for policy makers Unilateral: implementation of various anti-avoidance rules; ”Google tax” in the UK (2015) and Australia (2016) Multilateral: the G20/OECD base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project

Common strategies used by MNC to shift profits: Debt shifting Royalties and service fees Transfer mispricing

Some well-known cases: Google, Apple, Starbucks, Pfizer often through intellectual property rights, licensing etc

But there are also some well-known TP cases: e.g. Caterpillar

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Transfer Mispricing: A Simple Example

A Simple Example

Manipulating prices of goods and services sold between related parties to shift pre-tax income across countries and to lower local and global tax burden

P produces good for £1 million

P (30%)

Taxable income falls by £500k

S (15%)

Taxable income increases by £500k

P charges S a price of £500k

S sells good for £1 million

500k of taxable profits shifted; Tax liability decreases by 75,000 General approach and current international consensus: arm’s length principle charge price that would be charged to independent/unrelated buyer in practice difficult/costly to observe ALP LSG (IMF, FRB&LSE)

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Literature

Early indirect evidence on systematic correlation between pre-tax profits and cross-country tax differentials: Grubert and Mutti (1991), Harris et al. (1993), Hines and Rice (1994), Collin et al. (1998)

Recent direct evidence (US, France, Denmark, and Germany): Clausing (2003): industry level (U.S.) Bernard et al. (2006), Flaaen (2017): U.S. Census data Vicard (2015), Cristea and Nguyen (2016), Davies et al. (2017), : transaction-level price data (France, Denmark) Hebous and Johanessen (2015): services trade value (Germany)

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Our Contribution Improved identification using a full set of three-way fixed effects: firm-product-country, country-product-year, and firm-product-year Baseline: 1% larger ∆τ ⇒ 3% lower RP price

New aspects of transfer mispricing: in different international taxation regimes (worldwide vs territorial) in R&D Intensity across different locations (tax havens vs. regular countries)

Theory: extend model with different international taxation regimes and tax-motivated trade diversion Tax savings = ∆τ × (pa − pt ) × exports, with ∆τ the tax difference; pt : transfer price; pa : the arm’s length price.

Quantification: around 0.4 - 0.8% of CIT revenue eroded due to transfer mispricing of tangible goods in manufacturing

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Model: Set-up Consider an MNC facing a demand function q(p) Governments punish deviations from the arm’s length price: λ − [(pa − pt )2 ]qf 2 Let γ ∈ {γW , γT } denote the value of £1 after-tax profits in a low-tax country relative to £1 after-tax profits at home Under the territorial system: γT = 1 Under the worldwide system: γW < 1

Overall post-tax profits of the MNC are given by: Π = (1 − τh )(pa − c)qa + [γ(1 − τf )pf − (1 − τh )c]qf | {z } | {z } arm’s-length Π related-party Π λ − pt ((1 − τh ) − γ(1 − τf )qf ) − [(pa − pt )2 ]qf | {z } |2 {z } tax cost of transfer price penalty LSG (IMF, FRB&LSE)

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Optimal transfer price

FOC for pt delivers: pt = pa −

(γ − 1 + τh − γτf ) λ

pt < pa : transfer price manipulation Transfer price manipulation is stronger under the territorial system: ∂ (pa − pt ) >0 ∂γ

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Simulation: Prices

Prices (relative to CES) 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.00

p_a p_t p_f p_x 0.05

0.10

0.15

0.20

tax difference

0.25

0.30

0.35

Transfer price falls in tax difference Related-party final price below standard CES price when tax difference large enough LSG (IMF, FRB&LSE)

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Data Trade Statistics: Transaction-level data for the universe of UK imports and exports during 2005-2011 8-digit commodity codes, trade values and quantities, destinations, etc to compute the firm-product-destination-year unit price

CT600: Universe of UK Corporation Tax records detailed tax position of all companies in the UK precise information on their qualifying R&D spending

FAME Ownership data: information on ownership to determine stand-alone vs. MNC, and ultimate owner location of overseas affiliates

Restricted to UK multinationals in manufacturing for clean identification ⇒ Final dataset includes 931,773 observations at the firm-product-year level for 1,256 unique companies in manufacturing during 2005-2011 LSG (IMF, FRB&LSE)

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Tax Differential with UK

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Empirical Strategy Baseline specification: ln pijkt = αijk + αjkt + αikt + (β1 ∆τjt × Ilow,t + β2 ∆τjt × Ihigh,t ) × AFFij + εijkt

(1)

With: pijkt : unit value of exports by firm i, selling product k to country j at time t ∆τjt = |τjt − τUK,t | AFFij : indicator dummy, 1 if firm i has an affiliate in country j Ilow,t : indicator if destination tax rate below UK rate αijk : firm-destination-product fixed effect αjkt : destination-product-year fixed effect αikt : firm-product-year fixed effect ⇒ β1 : negative if MNCs shift profits to low-tax countries

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Evidence on tax-motivated transfer mispricing

For exports to low-tax jurisdictions, a one percentage point lower destination tax rate, on average, reduces RP trade prices by 3 percent In line with Clausing (2003), but an order of magnitude larger than Cristea and Nguyen (2016) and Vicard (2015). LSG (IMF, FRB&LSE)

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which increased after the 2009 territorial reform Postt = yeart > 2009

Following the reform, there was more transfer price manipulation: Low-tax destinations: 1% larger ∆τ ⇒ additional 1.5% lower RP price LSG (IMF, FRB&LSE)

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Heterogeneous Effects in R&D Intensity

High R&D firms manipulate transfer prices substantially more Tangible goods mispricing seems to complement profit shifting via intangible assets

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Heterogeneous Effects in R&D Intensity

High R&D firms manipulate transfer prices substantially more Tangible goods mispricing seems to complement profit shifting via intangible assets Robust to controlling for firm size

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Heterogeneous Effects in R&D Intensity

High R&D firms manipulate transfer prices substantially more Tangible goods mispricing seems to complement profit shifting via intangible assets Robust to controlling for firm size and the type of goods

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Driven by Tax Havens? Haven classification based on Hines (2005)

No evidence with tax havens only sample Results hold when focusing on non-haven countries LSG (IMF, FRB&LSE)

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Driven by Tax Havens?

No evidence with tax havens only sample Results hold when focusing on non-haven countries

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Non-Linear Tax Effects 5

ln pijkt = αijk + αjkt + αikt + ∑ βq × Iqt × AFFij + εijkt

(2)

q=1

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Effect on trade flows?

Dependent variable:

ln(Weight) (1)

ln(UnitPrice) (2)

ln(TotalValue) (3)

∆τjt × Ilow,t × AFFij

-0.027 (0.020) -0.012 (0.008)

-0.032*** (0.011) -0.007 (0.006)

-0.059** (0.024) -0.019** (0.010)

0.975 380,655

0.973 380,655

0.968 380,655

∆τjt × Ihigh,t × AFFij R2 N

MNC do not sell more to low-tax countries to shift additional profits If anything, they are selling somewhat lower quantities However, effects may be at the firm-country and not the product level

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Quantification

Total

Pure price effect Shifted profits Foregone taxes 600.7 168.2

Value effect Shifted profits Foregone taxes 1,201.4 336.4

About 0.4-0.8 percent of total UK corporate tax revenues lost due to transfer mispricing on manufacturing goods In line with estimates for France by Davies et al. (2017) C

shifted profits =

∑ β1 × Ilow,c × ∆τc × exportsc c=1

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Conclusions

Evidence on transfer mispricing by UK multinationals in manufacturing Systematic transfer price manipulation Intensified after the 2009 tax reform Concentrated in high R&D firms About 0.4 - 0.8 percent loss in corporate income tax revenue

Not just tax havens / mostly linear in tax difference No evidence for trade diversion towards low-tax countries Additional results (mispricing stronger for): Goods shipped more frequently Goods with larger share in total exports

Policy implications for TP audit, tax authorities in other countries and beyond?

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International Transfer Pricing and Tax Avoidance ...

Some well-known cases: Google, Apple, Starbucks, Pfizer often through ... Recent direct evidence (US, France, Denmark, and Germany):. Clausing (2003): ...

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