Mandel, D. R., Axelrod, L. J., & Lehman, D. R. (1993). Integrative complexity in reasoning about the Persian Gulf War and the accountability-to-skeptical-audience hypothesis. Journal of Social Issues, 49, 201-215.

Integrative Complexity in Reasoning About the Gulf War and the Accountability-toSkeptical-Audience Hypothesis

David R. Mandel, Lawrence J. Axelrod, and Darrin R. Lehman University of British Columbia

Running head: ACCOUNTABILITY

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Abstract Given earlier polling reports, it was predicted that (a) a majority of Canadian subjects would support the U.S. military intervention in the Gulf crisis and (b), following Tetlock's (1983) accountability-to-skeptical-audience hypothesis, these subjects would display lower levels of integrative complexity in reasoning about the causes of the Gulf War than subjects who indicated opposition to the U.S action. As expected, a significantly greater proportion of subjects (70%) indicated support for the U.S. action, and these subjects did in fact have significantly lower integrative complexity levels than subjects who indicated opposition to the U.S. action. Relations between attitudes toward U.S. military involvement, confidence in attributions about the primary cause of the war, and internality-externality of attributions about either Saddam Hussein, George Bush, Iraq, or the U.S. were also explored. Implications for theory and for future research are discussed.

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Integrative Complexity in Reasoning About the Gulf War and the Accountability-toSkeptical-Audience Hypothesis A large body of literature in cognitive and social psychology indicates that people are "cognitive misers" who, in over-utilizing simple, intuitive heuristics and under-utilizing more complex, formal decision rules, conform to a principle of least effort that renders them vulnerable to a long list of inferential errors (Abelson & Levi, 1985; Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Nisbett & Ross, 1980). Despite the well-known evidence accrued in favor of this view of human information processing, questions concerning the generalizability of an unqualified account of the cognitive miser model have been raised (e.g., Ebbesen & Konecni, 1980). A number of studies have demonstrated that, when motivated to do so, people can reason in more complex and effortful ways (Borgida & Howard-Pitney, 1983; Harkness, DeBono, & Borgida, 1985; Kunda, 1991; McAllister, Mitchell, & Beach, 1979; Rozelle & Baxter, 1981; Showers & Cantor, 1985; Tetlock, 1985a). These studies suggest the importance of interpreting research findings concerning information processing within a larger, well-specified social contingency model. One factor that appears to represent an important candidate in such a model is accountability. Tetlock (1985b) has proposed that accountability--social pressures to justify one's views to others--is a basic feature of everyday decisionmaking environments. Accountability underscores the communicative aspects of social cognition (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). That is, far from reasoning in a social vacuum, people often expect to communicate and justify their opinions to others. The impressions of oneself that others form can have personal consequences of greater or lesser importance. In some situations people may be able to anticipate others' responses to their own positions; at other times people may have little or no clues to inform them of what their audience thinks. Features of this "communication game" (Higgins & McCann, 1984) can exert a strong influence in determining the type of rules governing information processing and the decisions that follow (Higgins & McCann, 1984; Tetlock, 1985a).

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The question of what effect accountability has on information processing is obviously raised. Taken at face value, the findings are inconsistent. A substantial amount of research supports Janis and Mann's (1977) notion that accountability will lead to more in-depth information processing and better decision making. Compared with unaccountable decision makers, accountable subjects are more likely to use complex rules in choosing response options (McAllister et al., 1979), to have a better understanding of the informational determinants of their decisions (Cvetkovitch, 1978; Hagafors & Brehmer, 1983), to evaluate topic-relevant arguments in persuasive messages (as opposed to relying on general evaluations of the likableness of the source; Chaiken, 1980), to have a better awareness of situational constraints on others and reduced overattribution effects (Tetlock, 1985b), and to have reduced overconfidence effects in a personality prediction paradigm (Tetlock & Kim, 1987). Other findings, however, suggest that accountability simply leads people to adopt positions that they believe others will view as acceptable. For instance, negotiators who are led to believe that they are accountable to their constituents take more rigid positions and have more difficulty arriving at mutually beneficial compromise agreements than negotiators who are unaccountable (Klimoski, 1972; Lamm & Kogan, 1970; Pruitt, 1981). Since constituents often favor tough negotiating positions, it has been suggested by some researchers that accountability in this context induces negotiators to protect their own images by adopting inflexible bargaining strategies (Tetlock, 1983a). The notion that accountability may motivate people to adopt opinions or actions that they believe conform to the views of their social audience echoes work by Jones and Wortman (1973) on ingratiation and by Cialdini, Levy, Herman, and Evenbeck (1973) on strategic attitude shifts. Tetlock (1983a) has proposed a framework within which to interpret the discrepant findings concerning accountability. He has suggested that the effects of accountability depend on the extent to which people can infer (or believe they can infer)

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the views of those to whom they feel accountable. The cognitive miser model is an assumed starting point: when people believe that they can readily infer the views of their social audience they will react simply by choosing to conform to this view. This acceptability heuristic (Tetlock, 1985a) represents a cognitively untaxing way to respond to accountability. That is, by adopting the views of those to whom one is accountable, individuals circumvent the need to provide elaborate justifications for their stances. Under many circumstances, however, people are accountable to others whose stances are unknown or to groups with highly mixed views. In such cases, people are forced to think more carefully in order to formulate a defense of their stand. One way that people can prepare to justify their opinions to an audience of unknown views is by engaging in preemptive self-criticism (Tetlock, 1983a)--being self-critical by foreshadowing criticisms of one's own views and considering alternative perspectives on issues. To test the hypothesis that the effects of accountability are contingent upon whether people can infer the views of their social audience, Tetlock (1983a) asked subjects to report their thoughts, followed by their attitudes, on three issues--affirmative action, capital punishment, and defense spending. Subjects were assigned to one of four groups: expecting their attitudes to be anonymous (no accountability) or expecting to justify their attitudes to either an individual with liberal (i.e., for affirmative action and against capital punishment and defense spending), conservative (i.e., vice versa), or unknown views. As predicted, Tetlock found that subjects shifted their attitudes toward the positions of those to whom they were accountable (i.e., when such positions were known), and that subjects accountable to an individual with unknown views provided thoughts on the issues that were significantly higher in levels of integrative complexity (see Method section for more information on this construct and its coding) than thoughts forwarded by unaccountable subjects or subjects accountable to either a liberal or a conservative individual (the latter three groups did not differ significantly from one

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another). Subsequent research by Tetlock, Skitka, and Boettger (1989) has replicated these major findings and has refined the model further. The finding that accountability motivates people to process information in more complex ways only when the cognitively simpler choice of opinion conformity is unavailable raises an interesting question concerning the thought processes of individuals who decline using the acceptability heuristic even when that option exists. One reasonable hypothesis is that, in situations in which the views of the audience are known, people who expect to disagree significantly with those to whom they feel accountable will reason in more complex terms than people who rely on the acceptability heuristic. In follow-up analyses, Tetlock (1983a) found support for this "accountability-to-skeptical-audience" hypothesis. By examining the correlations between integrative complexity and the liberalism-conservatism of attitudes for the accountable to liberal- and accountable to conservative conditions, he found that, in both of these conditions, subjects who did not shift their attitudes in the direction of the individual to whom they were accountable had significantly higher complexity scores than those who agreed with the views of their anticipated interaction partner. The Present Study The recent Gulf War provided an excellent opportunity to pursue several empirical questions regarding people's information processing and the effects of accountability in reference to an important, real-world event. An Angus Reid Group poll (January, 1991) found that, during the third week of January, approximately three quarters (73%) of Canadians supported the U.S. taking military action against Iraq (with a comparable figure of 75% in British Columbia). This represented a substantial increase in the percentage of Canadians supporting U.S. military force, since just one month earlier this figure was set at roughly half (52%) of Canadians. This increase in support for the U.S. action was closely paralleled by Canadians' support for the Canadian Government's decision to place its own military force in the Gulf: While 60%

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of Canadians supported a Canadian presence in the Gulf in December, this figure rose to 75% in January. The swift increase in the percentage of Canadians supporting the use of military force by both the U.S. and Canada from the weeks preceding the war to the first week of its onset indicates that attitudes toward military intervention in the Gulf were, on the whole, highly controversial and subject to change (especially in light of the fact that, for any of the figures given, only three percent or less of respondents indicated that they were "unsure," instead of "opposed" or "in favor"). Given the sharp rise in the numbers of Canadian supporters of military action, coupled with the censorship of the related atrocities in media reports (Angus Reid Group, 1991; Mayton, 1991), we predicted that the vast majority of subjects in our student sample would indicate their support for U.S. military action against the Iraqi regime. Granted what was already known about Canadians' attitudes toward the U.S. action from polling information, this first prediction was, on its own, of little interest. If confirmed, however, it would provide a basis for testing the accountability-to-skeptical- audience hypothesis. The Gulf War generated lots of lively discussion in which people exchanged and justified their attitudes and opinions about the war to each other. From an "accountability perspective" as support for the war became more apparent, the likelihood that people would use the acceptability heuristic and express their own support for the war increased. Following the accountability-to-skeptical-audience hypothesis, however, those remaining opposed to the U.S. action even in light of the growing Canadian support for the U.S.' decision would presumably respond to social pressures to justify their views by reasoning in more complex terms about the issues. Thus, it was predicted that subjects opposing U.S. military intervention would display higher levels of integrative complexity in reasoning about the causes of the Gulf War than would supporters of the U.S. action. In the present study, subjects were asked to list the feature that they thought was the primary cause of the war and to rate their confidence in their assertions. Following

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Tetlock and Kim's (1985) finding that accountability decreased overconfidence effects, one might predict that opposers of the U.S. action (who were presumably experiencing more social pressures to justify their views) would be less confident than supporters of the U.S. action. An alternative hypothesis that is not necessarily incompatible with the previous one is that reluctant supporters and reluctant opposers alike might just regard themselves as less sure of the issues involved in the conflict than definite supporters or definite opposers. If this were true, confidence levels would vary as a concave quadratic function of subjects' attitudes ranging from definite opposition through reluctant opposition and reluctant support to definite support. Finally, it was expected that subjects would maintain consistency between their attitudes toward U.S. military involvement and the internality-externality of attributions about the causal role of either Saddam Hussein, George Bush, Iraq, or the U.S. in bringing about the war. That is, it was predicted that support for the U.S. action would be directly related to the internality of attributions made toward either Saddam Hussein or Iraq, but that support for the U.S. action would be inversely related to the internality of attributions made toward either George Bush or the United States. Method Overview Subjects spent approximately 15 minutes completing an anonymous survey that dealt generally with the topic of the Gulf War. The initial survey item simply asked participants to write up to one page addressing the question "Why is there war in the Gulf?" The following section prompted subjects to respond to a series of questions related to the war. The survey was administered from February 8th to the 25th, during the air phase of the Gulf War. Subjects One hundred and ninety-three (113 female and 80 male) undergraduates at the University of British Columbia voluntarily participated in the study. Subjects ranged in

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age from 16 to 55 years (M = 21 years), and were recruited from various faculties--Arts (45%), Science (15%), Commerce (11%), and other faculties (21%) (8% missing data). Eighty-four percent of subjects were Canadians, 2% were U.S. citizens, and 12% indicated other nationalities (2% missing data). Open-ended reports of ethnic identity were later classified as follows: Asian (26%), European (22%), Canadian (15%), White (12%), Jewish (7%), and others (7%; 11% missing data). Materials Integrative Complexity Coding. The integrative complexity coding system (Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967; Suedfeld & Rank, 1976) is designed to measure people's information-processing tendencies by mapping the structure of thought along a simplicity-complexity continuum. Cognitive simplicity is characterized by categorical, "right-or-wrong" thinking in which potential ambiguity or conflict is unacknowledged. Complex thought is characterized by pluralistic reasoning in which trade-offs between alternative perspectives on an issue are explicitly considered, and/or by thought that synthesizes different dimensions of a topic. The standard integrative complexity coding system relies on a 1-7 ordinal scale designed to assess complexity in terms of increasing levels of conceptual differentiation and conceptual integration. Briefly, differentiation reflects the degree to which people take multiple perspectives and/or recognize different aspects or dimensions of an issue. Undifferentiated thought, reflecting cognitive simplicity, relies on simple, evaluative rules. In considering the causes of the war, for example, an undifferentiated thinker might claim that the war was totally due to Saddam Hussein's quest for power, or alternatively, completely due to the U.S.' greed for oil. A highly differentiated thinker would recognize that there were a number of distinct factors that could have played a role in bringing about the war. In order to be considered integratively complex, however, one must also show evidence of conceptual integration. Integration involves drawing conceptual connections between differentiated aspects of an issue. Thus, an

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integratively complex thinker might, in addition to outlining a number of potential causal factors of the war, describe how such a confluence of factors might have interacted over time to bring about the war. A score of: 1 reflects no apparent integration or differentiation; 3, moderate to high differentiation, but no integration; 5, moderate to high differentiation, and low to moderate integration; and 7, high differentiation and high integration. Scores of 2, 4, and 6 reflect transition points where properties of the next higher score are emergent, but not explicitly evident. In this study, subjects were asked to write up to one page addressing the question "Why is there war in the Gulf?" Although no rigid time requirements were imposed, subjects were instructed to take approximately 10 minutes to complete their essays using full-sentence form. A random sample of 40 essays were coded by two qualified scorers according to the integrative complexity scoring manual (Baker-Brown et al., 1988), providing a single, unaveraged, integrative complexity score for each respondent.1 Agreement was reached in 75% of the cases, and discrepancies were resolved by consensus between the two scorers. The remainder of the essays were scored by one of the two scorers. Survey items. Following completion of their essays, subjects answered a series of brief closed-ended questions. In order of appearance, these questions asked subjects: to state what they felt was the primary cause of the war, and how confident (on a 1-7 scale with 1 = not at all confident, and 7 = extremely confident) they were that their response was, in fact, the primary cause; how well informed (on a 1-7 scale, 1 = not at all informed, 7 = extremely informed) they thought they were about (a) the causes of the war, and (b) what was then happening in the war; and how much time per day they spent obtaining information regarding the war. The next item, adapted from the Attributional Style Questionnaire (Peterson et al., 1982), tapped the internal-external dimension of attributions. It asked "Is the cause of the war due to something about (target) or something about other people, nations, or

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circumstances?" Subjects received one of the four forms of the survey which differed only in terms of the target appearing in this question. These four targets were: (a) Saddam Hussein, (b) George Bush, (c) Iraq, and (d) the United States. Subjects indicated their response on a 1-7 scale (1 = totally due to other people, nations, or circumstances, 7 = totally due to [target]). Finally, attitudes toward U.S. military intervention in the Gulf crisis were measured by having subjects indicate either (1) definitely opposed, (2) reluctantly opposed, (3) reluctantly supported, or (4) definitely supported in response to the question "When the U.S. declared war on Iraq, did you support this action?" Results Preliminary Statistics The overall mean level of support for U.S. military intervention in the Gulf crisis was 2.86 (SD = 1.12), with 20% definitely opposing, 8% reluctantly opposing, 35% reluctantly supporting, and 35% definitely supporting the U.S. action (2% did not indicate their level of support). Thus, in support of our first prediction, and essentially replicating the January Angus Reid Group (1991) poll findings, a significantly greater proportion of subjects indicated support for, rather than opposition to, the U.S. action, χ 2 = 17.35, p < .005. Also consistent with the poll findings, males indicated significantly higher levels of support for the U.S. action than did females (Ms = 3.12 [SD = 1.06] for males and 2.63 [SD = 1.10] for females), F(1,188) = 11.71, p = .001. As support increased (a) age decreased, r(190) = -.19, p < .01, and (b) subjects reported having more information about the causes of the war, r(190) = .20, p < .01. The overall mean level of integrative complexity in reasoning about the causes of the war was 2.74 (SD = 1.31) with a modal response of 3. Integrative complexity was not significantly correlated with age, sex, confidence, or any of the three information variables in this study. Attitudes Toward U.S. Intervention and Integrative Complexity

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Our primary interest was testing the accountability-to-skeptical-audience hypothesis. Thus, a planned linear contrast pitting opposers of the U.S. action against supporters was conducted. As predicted, subjects indicating opposition to the U.S. action had significantly higher levels of integrative complexity than subjects indicating support, F(1,174) = 13.01, p < .001. As can be seen in Figure 1, mean levels of integrative complexity decreased as attitudes toward U.S. military involvement went from definite opposition to definite support: Ms = 3.41 (SD = 1.42), 3.20 (SD = 1.15), 2.56 (SD = 1.35), and 2.43 (SD = 1.10), respectively. Post-hoc analyses using Fisher's LSD tests revealed that definite opposers had significantly higher integrative complexity levels than either definite supporters, t(174) = 3.72, p < .001, or reluctant supporters, t(174) = 3.23, p = .001, and that reluctant opposers had significantly higher complexity levels than definite supporters, t(174) = 2.12, p < .05, and marginally higher complexity levels than reluctant supporters, t(174) = 1.77, p < .10. ____________ Insert Figure 1 ____________ Confidence Levels Figure 2 shows subjects' mean confidence levels in their assertions of the primary cause of the war as a function of their attitudinal stance regarding U.S. military involvement in the Gulf crisis. A planned linear contrast, employed to test the hypothesis that opposers of the U.S. action who presumably had greater accountability pressures would have attenuated confidence levels in their assertions of the primary cause of the war, revealed that opposers did in fact have marginally lower confidence levels than supporters, F(1,182) = 3.35, p < .10. The hypothesis that subjects that are reluctant to firmly adopt a stance for or against the U.S. action would report lower confidence levels than those taking a definite position, however, received stronger support, F(1, 182) = 18.81, p < .001. The pattern of mean confidence ratings, shown in

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Figure 2, ranging from definitely opposed to definitely supported, was 5.74 (SD = 1.35), 4.44 (SD = 1.67), 5.18 (SD = 1.26), and 5.80 (SD = 1.15). ____________ Insert Figure 2 ____________ Internality-Externality of Attributions Mean internality-externality of attributions varied significantly across the four targets, F(3, 186) = 5.57, p = .001, such that attributions about George Bush's causal role in bringing about the war were significantly more external than that of Saddam Hussein's (using Tukey's HSD, p < .005) and Iraq's (p < .01). Mean internalityexternality of attributional ratings for the four targets--Saddam Hussein, George Bush, Iraq, and the United States- were 4.33 (SD = 1.48), 3.12 (SD = 1.41), 4.20 (SD = 1.57), and 3.90 (SD = 1.52), respectively. Following a consistency-theory view, it was predicted that level of support for the U.S. military intervention in the Gulf would be (a) directly related to the internality of attributions made for Saddam Hussein and Iraq, and (b) inversely related to the internality of attributions made for George Bush and the United States. An examination of these relations did in fact reveal the expected pattern of correlations. As support for the war increased, causal attributions became more internal for the targets, Saddam Hussein, r(52) = .37, p < .01, and Iraq, r(49) = .58, p < .001, whereas attributions became more external for the targets, George Bush, r(45) = -.63, p < .001, and the United States, r(37) = -.65, p < .001. Discussion As predicted, the minority of subjects who indicated their opposition to the U.S. military involvement in the Gulf had significantly higher levels of integrative complexity in their reasoning about the causes of the war than the majority of subjects who supported

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the U.S. action. This finding lends support to the accountability-to-skeptical-audience hypothesis put forth by Tetlock (1983a). A number of differences between the present research and Tetlock's (1983a) study are worth noting. First, unlike Tetlock's study where the nature of accountability pressures on subjects was experimentally manipulated, this field study focused, partly at the expense of control, on people's reactions to an important, real-world event that was unfolding at that time and had captured widespread attention. Another difference concerns the features of accountability in the two studies. In Tetlock's study, accountability pressures in the accountable-to-liberal and accountableto- conservative conditions were certain and short-term, involving a single unknown individual to whom subjects believed they were accountable. Subjects in Tetlock's study knew that very shortly they would have to explain their views to an unacquainted individual whom they were led to believe had either conservative or liberal views of their own, who was also a participant in the study, and who presumably they (i.e., the subject) would never interact with again. In contrast to the discrete but certain accountability pressures created in Tetlock's (1983a) study, accountability pressures on subjects in this study were defined in probabilistic terms and over a longer time period. That is, if people did in fact try to justify their views on the war to others (e.g., friends, family members) on various occasions, then the likelihood of having come up against an audience with views contrary to one's own was greater for those people who opposed the war since the majority of people in Canada were in support of the war. This macroscopic focus on accountability, contrasting with the pressures stemming from the anticipated dyadic interactions found in Tetlock's study, suggests an alternative way of operationalizing accountability--one that is amenable to the study of group behavior in naturalistic environments, and one that may hold promise for studying the effects of accountability on other minority groups.

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One might argue, however, that the "rigidity-of-the-right" hypothesis (see, e.g., McClosky, 1967; Stone, 1980; Wilson, 1973) can provide a plausible alternative explanation for the obtained relation. This view, based on the classic work on the authoritarian personality (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), suggests that right-wing ideologues are prone to think in rigid, dichotomous ways. There is a substantial amount of information that has supported the notion that rightwing or conservative ideologues are less-complex thinkers (Tetlock, 1983b). In addition, support for the war was associated with political conservatism. According to the Angus Reid Group (1991), 85% of Conservatives supported the war, whereas this figure declined to 74% among Liberals and 66% among New Democrats. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that the relation between cognitive complexity and support for the war might derive from the relation that each of these two variables has with political orientation. However, while Canadians' support for the war was increasing, a corresponding rise in support of the federal Conservatives was also observed (Angus Reid Group, 1991). The sudden rise in political conservatism argues against the strongly dispositional interpretation of the complexity- attitude relation obtained in this study given by the rigidity-of-the-right hypothesis, since according to that hypothesis both the political conservatism and inflexible thought characteristic of authoritarians are the results of deep-rooted and unresolved psychological disturbances (Adorno et al., 1950). Instead, given the recent evidence by Spellman, Ullman, and Holyoak (1993, this issue) that people maintained cognitive consistency in their views of the Gulf War through attitude change, it may be more likely that the observed increase in political conservatism (Angus Reid Group, 1991) reflects yet another facet of attitude change geared toward maintaining consistency. Indeed, additional support for a cognitive consistency model came from our own finding that attitudes toward the war and attributions about key players in the conflict were highly congruent.

Spellman et

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al. (1993) speculate that, while consistency pressures might be responsible for the relations observed between various attitudes, the increase in general support for the war that they observed over the first two weeks of the air phase might be the result of more "external" factors (e.g., reactions to reports of Saddam Hussein bombing Israel; the dumping of oil into the Gulf, etc.). It also seems plausible to suggest, however, that the increase in mean levels of general support for the war observed by Spellman et al. (1993) and the increase in percentages of Canadians supporting the war found in the January Angus Reid Group (1991) poll are partly the result of accountability pressures that were resolved through the use of the acceptability heuristic. That is, as more and more Canadians supported the war (for whatever reasons), the likelihood that accountability pressures would be resolved by the cognitively simple (and presumably preferable) means of attitude conformity increased, implying a snowballing effect of support for the war. While this notion has yet to gain direct empirical support, it suggests the interesting possibility that accountability pressures might serve as a positive feedback mechanism affecting the selection of attitudes and beliefs at a social level. The preceding notion also suggests that media sources can have a significant impact on the direction of attitude changes regarding important, world events, like the Gulf War, since most people receive information about such events through these sources. The censorship of the media by both sides of this conflict (Mayton, 1991), that resulted in "arcade-like" depictions of the war, might have been a critical, initial factor affecting the increase in support for the U.S. intervention that was witnessed. Contrary to the Western media's depiction of the Allied forces' high-precision weaponry producing only limited damage to Iraqi civilians, it is estimated that approximately 47,000 Iraqi children 5 years old or younger died between January and August 1991, representing a threefold increase in pre-war child mortality rates (Ascherio, 1992). This is just one example of the destruction caused by the war. Presumably, visions of death and

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destruction caused by the Gulf War would, in all likelihood, have made the balance between those who supported the U.S. military intervention and those who opposed it more even. Conclusion This study examined a number of psychological factors related to people's thoughts about the Gulf War. Although these naturalistic findings do not constitute strong evidence in favor of the accountability-to-skeptical-audience hypothesis, they are certainly in line with Tetlock's position, and they suggest that further study along these lines using controlled procedures could be profitable. For example, one suggestion is that the effects of accountability on groups be pursued more directly.

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Ebbesen, E. B., & Konecni, V. J. (1980). On the external validity of decision-making research: What do we know about decisions in the real world? In T. Wallsten (Ed.), Cognitive processes in choice and behavior (pp. 21-45). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Einhorn, H., & Hogarth, R. M. (1981). Behavioral decision theory. Annual Review of Psychology, 31, 53-88. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social Cognition (2nd ed.). Reading, MA: AddisonWesley. Hagafors, R., & Brehmer, B. (1983). Does having to justify one's decisions change the nature of the judgment process? Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 31, 223-232. Harkness, A. R., DeBono, K. G., & Borgida, E. (1985). Personal involvement and strategies for making contingency judgments: A stake in the dating game makes a difference. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49, 22-32. Higgins, E. T., & McCann, C. D. (1984). Social encoding and subsequent attitudes, impressions, and memory: Context-driven and motivational aspects of processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 26-39. Janis, I. L., & Mann, L. (1977). Decision making. New York: Free Press. Jones, E. E., & Wortman, C. (1973). Ingratiation: An attributional approach. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. Klimoski, R. J. (1972). The effects of intragroup forces on intergroup conflict resolution. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 8, 363-383. Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 480498. Lamm, H., & Kogan, N. (1970). Risk taking in the context of intergroup negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 6, 351-363.

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Mayton, D. (1991). The Persian Gulf: Historical perspectives, psychological interpretations & analyses. Lewiston, ID: SPSSI Task Force on Peace. McAllister, P. W., Mitchell, T. R., & Beach, L. R. (1979). The contingency model for the selection of decision strategies: An empirical test of the effects of significance, accountability, and reversibility. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 24, 228-244. McClosky, H. (1967). Personality and attitude correlates of foreign policy orientation. In J. N. Rosenau (Ed.), Domestic sources of foreign policy orientation (pp. 51-109). New York: Free Press. Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall. Peterson, C., Semmel, A., von Baeyer, C., Abramson, L. Y., Metalsky, G. I., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1982). The attribution style questionnaire. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 6, 287-300. Pruit, D. (1981). Negotiation behavior. New York: Academic Press. Rozelle, R. M., & Baxter, J. C. (1981). The influence of role pressures on the perceiver: Judgments of videotaped interviews varying judge accountability and responsibility. Journal of Applied psychology, 66, 437-441. Schroder, H. M., Driver, M., & Streufert, S. (1967). Human information processing. New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston. Showers, C., & Cantor, N. (1985). Social cognition: A look at motivated strategies. Annual Review of Psychology, 36, 275-305. Spellman, B. A., Ullman, J. B., & Holyoak, K. J. (1993, this issue). Shifting views of the Gulf War: Cognitive consistency and attitude change. Journal of Social Issues. Stone, W. F. (1980). The myth of left-wing authoritarianism. Political Psychology, 2, 320.

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Suedfeld, P., & Rank, D. (1976). Revolutionary leaders: Long-term success as a function of changes in conceptual complexity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 169-178. Tetlock, P. E. (1983a). Accountability and the complexity of thought. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 74-83. Tetlock, P. E. (1983b). Cognitive style and political ideology. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 118-126. Tetlock, P. E. (1985a). Accountability: The neglected social context of judgment and choice. In B. M. Staw & L. Cummings (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 1, pp. 297-332). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. Tetlock, P. E. (1985b). Accountability: A social check on the fundamental attribution error. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48, 227-236. Tetlock, P. E., & Kim, J. I. (1987). Accountability and judgment processes in a personality prediction task. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 700-709. Tetlock, P. E., Skitka, L., & Boettger, R. (1989). Social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability: Conformity, complexity, and bolstering. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 632-640. Wilson, G. D. (1973). The psychology of conservatism. New York: Academic Press.

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Authors' Notes This research was supported by a British Columbia Medical Services Foundation Research Scholarship (10023-00) to David R. Mandel, a University of British Columbia Graduate Fellowship to Lawrence J. Axelrod, and by grants 410-88-1338 and 410-901519 from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and grant 87-1715 from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada to Darrin R. Lehman. We thank Peter Suedfeld and Phillip Tetlock for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this manuscript. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to David R. Mandel, Department of Psychology, 2136 West Mall, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z4.

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Footnote 1Since the basic unit of analysis in integrative complexity is the paragraph, researchers often arrive at complexity scores by averaging the scores obtained across the paragraphs sampled for a given subject. In this study, however, participants typically wrote only one paragraph, and so their complete essay response was used as the basic unit of analysis.

Accountability 24

Figure Captions Figure 1. Mean levels of integrative complexity as a function of attitudes toward U.S. military involvement in the Gulf crisis. Figure 2. Mean confidence levels in attributions of the primary cause of the war as a function of attitudes toward U.S. involvement in the Gulf crisis.

Integrative Complexity in Reasoning About the Gulf War and the ...

Briefly, differentiation reflects the degree to which people ... higher levels of support for the U.S. action than did females (Ms = 3.12 [SD = 1.06] for ..... Research Scholarship (10023-00) to David R. Mandel, a University of British Columbia.

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