Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes Sergey V. Popov

Dan Bernhardt

Department of Economics University of Illinois

7 Jan 2011

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Fraternities

We study the situation where productivity irrelevant activity is job market relevant. Fraternity membership is more than "club good": too expensive; many people mention them on resumes.

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Results Preview

In an empirically relevant equilibrium some people would be accepted but do not apply. Fraternity screens out low-ability people, therefore low-ability people earn the most from the outcome. High-ability people self-select themselves out of fraternity. Biggest losers are lowest types who are not admitted.

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

The World New labor market participants are students, mass 1. Each student can be represented as a pair (θ, µ) ∼ h(·) > 0. θ is student’s potential productivity after employment. µ is student’s socializing value. θ and µ are independent.

Students like money and socializing. The representative fraternity likes students with high µ and students with high expected wage; has limited capacity. Firms offer competitive wages: firms observe club membership and a signal about productivity θe ∼ fθe(·|θ); wage is equal to expected θ conditional on observables. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

The World New labor market participants are students, mass 1. Each student can be represented as a pair (θ, µ) ∼ h(·) > 0. θ is student’s potential productivity after employment. µ is student’s socializing value. θ and µ are independent.

Students like money and socializing. The representative fraternity likes students with high µ and students with high expected wage; has limited capacity. Firms offer competitive wages: firms observe club membership and a signal about productivity θe ∼ fθe(·|θ); wage is equal to expected θ conditional on observables. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

The World New labor market participants are students, mass 1. Each student can be represented as a pair (θ, µ) ∼ h(·) > 0. θ is student’s potential productivity after employment. µ is student’s socializing value. θ and µ are independent.

Students like money and socializing. The representative fraternity likes students with high µ and students with high expected wage; has limited capacity. Firms offer competitive wages: firms observe club membership and a signal about productivity θe ∼ fθe(·|θ); wage is equal to expected θ conditional on observables. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Game Timing 1

Students, having beliefs about wage structure, decide whether it is profitable to join the fraternity.

2

The fraternity, having beliefs about set of applicants, picks an admittance rule.

3

Some students become fraternity members; values of productivity signals are realized.

4

Firms, having beliefs membership of students in fraternity, assign wages to combinations of θe and membership status.

In a rational expectations equilibrium, everyone’s beliefs are consistent with actions of everyone. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Firm’s Problem Each firm observes a continuum of students with pdf h(θ, µ), has a common knowledge of signaling e technology fθe(θ|θ), and knows the distribution of students in (and out of) the fraternity c(θ, µ) = I((θ, µ) is in the club) Then the wage offered to a frat member with signal θe is   e c(·, ·)] wC θe = E[θ|θ,

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Firm’s Problem Each firm observes a continuum of students with pdf h(θ, µ), has a common knowledge of signaling e technology fθe(θ|θ), and knows the distribution of students in (and out of) the fraternity c(θ, µ) = I((θ, µ) is in the club) Then the wage offered to a frat member with signal θe is   e c(·, ·)] wC θe = E[θ|θ,

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Student’s Problem Students anticipate wages offered by firms, and possess a e common knowledge about signaling technology fθe(θ|θ). Student (θ, µ)’s utility outside the fraternity is h i e UC¯ = Eθe wC¯ (θ)|θ

Student (θ, µ)’s utility inside the fraternity is h i e UC = Eθe wC (θ)|θ + nµ − c

Students’ solution is:

a(θ, µ) = I(UC ≥ UC¯ |θ, µ) Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

A = ((θ, µ)|a(θ, µ) = 1)

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Student’s Problem Students anticipate wages offered by firms, and possess a e common knowledge about signaling technology fθe(θ|θ). Student (θ, µ)’s utility outside the fraternity is h i e UC¯ = Eθe wC¯ (θ)|θ

Student (θ, µ)’s utility inside the fraternity is h i e UC = Eθe wC (θ)|θ + nµ − c Students’ solution is:

a(θ, µ) = I(UC ≥ UC¯ |θ, µ) Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

A = ((θ, µ)|a(θ, µ) = 1)

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Student’s Problem Students anticipate wages offered by firms, and possess a e common knowledge about signaling technology fθe(θ|θ). Student (θ, µ)’s utility outside the fraternity is h i e UC¯ = Eθe wC¯ (θ)|θ

Student (θ, µ)’s utility inside the fraternity is h i e UC = Eθe wC (θ)|θ + nµ − c

Students’ solution is:

a(θ, µ) = I(UC ≥ UC¯ |θ, µ) Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

A = ((θ, µ)|a(θ, µ) = 1)

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

The Fraternity’s Problem The fraternity observes set A and anticipates same wage functions as students do, and picks set B of admitted people. Club’s utility function is assumed to be Z Z e W (B) = W1 T EθewC (θ|θ)dH(θ, µ) + W2 T µdH(θ, µ) A

A

B

s.t.

Z

A

T

B

h(θ, µ)dµdθ ≤ Γ B

Here Γ is a fraternity’s capacity constraint. Intersection of sets of wishing students A and admitted students B is the set C — fraternity members. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Cutoff Rules Proposition There is a cutoff µA (θ) such that people with µ bigger than that pledge. Proposition There is a cutoff µB (θ) such that people with µ bigger than that are admitted. Proposition If signaling technology has a MLRP property, µB (θ) is decreasing in θ. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Cutoff Rules Proposition There is a cutoff µA (θ) such that people with µ bigger than that pledge. Proposition There is a cutoff µB (θ) such that people with µ bigger than that are admitted. Proposition If signaling technology has a MLRP property, µB (θ) is decreasing in θ. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Fraternity’s Cutoff Rule 1 0.9 0.8 Applicant types accepted by Fraternity 0.7

θ

0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

µ

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Application-Constrained Equilibrium 1 Desired by club, but don’t apply

0.9 0.8 0.7

Club members

θ

0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3

Would like to join the club, but are not accepted

0.2 0.1 0

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

µ

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Single-Peaked Equilibria Assumption Either the support for signals θ˜ is finite, or the support of ˜ θ) ¯ is non-trivial. f ˜(θ| θ

Assumption The cost c of joining the fraternity satisfies µ + θ¯ − E[θ]. nµ + θ¯ − E[θ] < c < n¯ Proposition Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and the fraternity is small enough, the equilibrium is single-peaked. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Estimation 0.25

0.2

0.15

0.1

0.05

0

All seniors’ GPA Fraternity members’ GPA Prob(Fraternity member|GPA) 2

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

2.5

3

3.5

4

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Structural Estimation Penalized OLS Estimate 1 0.9 0.8 0.7

θ

0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.8

0.82

0.84

0.86

0.88

0.9

µ

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Parameters

Parameter n c c/n W1 /W2 Γ

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Estimate 0.2771 0.2281 0.8234 0.2227 0.1563

95% confidence (0.1193, 0.5312) (0.0895, 0.4449) (0.7141, 0.8147) (0.0565, 0.3346) (0.1546, 0.1577)

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Welfare Implications Comparison to No Wage Shift situation 1 0.9

Those who benefit

0.01

0.8

Those who lose 0.005

0.7

θ

0.6

0 Those who benefit

0.5

−0.005

0.4 0.3

−0.01 0.2

Those who lose −0.015

0.1 0 0.8

0.82

0.84

0.86

0.88

0.9

µ

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Introduction

Theory

Results

Estimation

Conclusion

Conclusion

There is a “single-peaked” equilibrium which one cannot get with signalling, screening or networks. Single-peaked equilibrium exists very generally. We get single-peaked fraternity in estimates. “Single-peaked” effect is damaging for highly-able member students... ... damaging for low-able non-members... ... beneficial for low-type members.

Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Department of Economics University of Illinois

Fraternities and Labor Market Outcomes

Jan 7, 2011 - Estimation. Conclusion. Fraternities. We study the situation where productivity irrelevant activity is job market relevant. Fraternity membership is more than "club good": too expensive; many people mention them on resumes. Sergey V. Popov, Dan Bernhardt. Department of Economics University of Illinois.

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