Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies Vol. 12, No. 1, March 2015, pp. 102–120

Figuring Radicalization: Congressional Narratives of Homeland Security and American Muslim Communities Downloaded by [University of South Carolina ] at 15:24 12 January 2015

Jonathan J. Edwards

This essay focuses on the language of domestic radicalization as it has been invoked in recent debates regarding homeland security and the specter of homegrown Islamic terrorism. The language of radicalization is not new. However, beginning in 2004 and 2005 this language began to be appropriated into legislative and law enforcement discussions of domestic terrorism and national security. Using the rhetorical figure of polyptoton as a critical frame, this essay explores how the language of radicalization has evolved and how it has come to shape available arguments and define the legitimacy of participants (and non-participants) within recent congressional hearings and legislation. Keywords: Ideology; Islam; Polyptoton; Radical Rhetoric; Terrorism

On March 10, 2011, Representative Peter King of New York opened the first of what would be a series of hearings on “The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community’s Response.”1 Over the next fifteen months, under King’s leadership, the House Committee on Homeland Security would hold five additional hearings on the threats of radicalization in US prisons and the US military, domestic radicalization efforts of al-Shabaab and Hezbollah, and Muslim American reactions to the radicalization hearings.2 In addition to sparking intense, partisan debate on the appropriateness of targeting a particular religious group, these hearings illustrate a significant and relatively recent turning to the

Jonathan J. Edwards is at the Department of English Language and Literature, University of South Carolina. Correspondence to: Jonathan J. Edwards, Department of English Language and Literature, J. Welsh Humanities Office Building, University of South Carolina, Columbia, SC 29208, USA. Email: [email protected] ISSN 1479-1420 (print)/ISSN 1479-4233 (online) © 2015 National Communication Association http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14791420.2014.996168

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language of radicalization in political, legal, academic, and media discourses on homegrown terrorism and American Muslim communities. Radicalization is not a new word. For well over a century in the United States, the term has been applied to groups or populations perceived as politically marginal or ideologically threatening. In the past few decades, radicalization has been appropriated to describe, among others: members of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) in Turkey; ethnic Albanians in Kosovo; Muslim populations in the former Soviet states in Central Asia; and AIDS orphans in sub-Saharan Africa.3 In these contexts, warnings of radicalization have served primarily as appeals linking foreign problems with national interests—often used to justify US intervention in other parts of the world. Beginning in 2004, references to radicalization began to increase noticeably in academic and political discussions of domestic terrorism and homeland security.4 In a February 2005 hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee, for example, Admiral James Loy, Deputy Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security, said, “There has been over the last year a growth of an agenda item referring to radicalization as a significant issue that we have to grapple with.”5 Between the July 7, 2005 London bombings and the 2007 release of an influential and controversial report by the New York City Police Department (NYPD)—which described a four-step “radicalization process” for potential domestic terrorists—references to radicalization surged in government and media documents, and the word has become broadly intertwined with efforts to measure psychological, ideological, and theological change in individuals and groups linked with the specter of homegrown Islamic terrorism.6 The King-led hearings in 2011 and 2012 offer an important illustration of this shift in the language of public policy and national security. In this essay, therefore, I explore how the language of radicalization functions in these hearings as a means to better understand the paradoxes that animate national security narratives. Toward that end, I briefly consider the significance of radicalization in the context of rhetorical and communication scholarship. Then, using the 2011–2012 hearings as my case study, I argue that the adoption of this language damages security efforts and harms American Muslim communities by minimizing the agency of radical actors, insufficiently differentiating between radical beliefs and violent actions, and minimizing the legal protections offered to non-violent critics of the language and its effects. Finally, considering the appropriation of radicalization through the rhetorical figure of polyptoton, I demonstrate that the word cannot be reduced to a static ideograph of political discourse. It is, rather, a word that can only be understood as an evolving and paradoxical reaction to challenges posed by radical protests and minority religious and ethnic communities. By considering interactions between three parts of speech: “radical,” “radicalized,” and “radicalization,” as they appear in these hearings, we can better understand how this language has evolved and continues to evolve and how it limits the available means of persuasion and response from participants, critics, and other interested parties. In a 2012 article, Hakimeh Saghaye-Biria argues that many of the perspectives on radicalization advocated in the 2011–2012 hearings place severe limitations on “the

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possibilities for Muslim activism.”7 Saghaye-Biria associates these limitations with the personal and political biases of Republican committee members and their discursive propagation of “elite racist discourse.”8 Bias, racism, and discomfort with minority religious communities might be factors, but the problems with these hearings are deeper, more fundamental, and extend well beyond the hearings themselves.9 They are problems rooted in the complex rhetoric of radicalization and the broad appropriation of this rhetoric by members of both political parties and throughout American media and law enforcement communities.10 The language of radicalization frequently blurs the lines between protected and unprotected thought, practice, speech, and association. Despite assurances that First Amendment rights will be protected and that, for example, “Conversion to Islam is not radicalization,”11 the legality and legitimacy of community associations and community practices are often left troublingly indeterminate.12 This indeterminacy does not, of course, derive from a single source, and the problems it produces will not have a single solution. Terms can and do bleed into one another. The language of radicalization is certainly not the only influence on the rhetoric of homeland security and homegrown terrorism. Nor if it were somehow eradicated would we likely see dramatic changes in national policies. It is, however, a prominent feature in a complex network of public controversies with significant implications for millions of American citizens. Through rhetorical analysis, we can arrive at a more nuanced critique of this language, which will in turn offer new resources for engaging with and effectively responding to these controversies in the future.

Rhetoric and Radicalization Radicalization cannot be separated from its radix—its root. Within the field of rhetorical studies, concentrated interest in radicalism and radical speech go back to the emerging study of social movements in the 1960s and 1970s. Scholars like Leland Griffin, Parke Burgess, Robert L. Scott, and James Klumpp explored the various dimensions of radical rhetoric and its relationship to the movements for civil rights and political reform that surrounded them.13 Drawing in part on this earlier work, James Darsey and others extended the treatment of radical rhetoric in the 1980s and 1990s by linking radicalism with a prophetic tradition. Prophets and radicals both challenge a society’s deepest presuppositions, and Darsey argues that many radical American orators have drawn on the rhetorical tradition of the Hebrew prophets.14 Prophetic visions, as Darsey says, “do not permit neutrality; they are too threatening.” Yet neither can prophecy be evaluated according to ordinary standards of social rationality because prophecy is not rational. The prophetic radical claims access to poetic inspiration or divine revelation that can only appear as madness or heresy to the establishment.15 Because radical rhetoric cannot be analyzed through abstracted reason, Darsey argues that the societal evaluation of this rhetoric rests in our ability to evaluate a radical speaker’s ethos.16

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The prophetic radical does not attempt to attract or compromise with the audience. He or she speaks directly, using plain, often harsh language to criticize moderates and attack opponents.17 Such a persona presumes that the radical speaker has access to perspectives beyond the self. As Stephen Browne argues, “The courage of the prophet is the courage to address. Such courage presumes power of speech, of course, but also of perspective, the ability to envision comprehensively those to whom the word must be spoken.”18 In order to achieve this perspective and acquire the authority to speak the inspired or revealed words, the prophet must sacrifice self to the radical calling. Darsey says, “Through effacement of the self, the prophet strives to present the uncolored vision of the divine.” The prophetic ethos is thus ultimately based on the testimony of sacrifice—even as far as the ultimate sacrifice of martyrdom.19 If, however, the authority of the prophetic radical relies upon a sacrifice of the self, this sacrificial move presupposes that the radical has a self to sacrifice. Even as radicalism implies a willingness to surrender personal agency to the cause, one cannot become radical apart from agency. As Michael Walzer says of the formation of radical identities, “To be chosen, one must choose.”20 Yet it is precisely this initial choice that is stripped away in the language of radicalization because the radicalized is portrayed as having no self to sacrifice. The radical may, as Darsey recognizes, be condemned as “fanatic,” heretic, or “madman,” but those who are radicalized are consistently positioned as victims.21 Their actions and choices are not their own, and thus they cannot claim the ethos of a prophetic radical. Radicalization appeals to sympathy and fear, not judgment. Radicalization presents the madness of the radical but not the agency required to evaluate radical persons, speeches, texts, or actions. This isolation of radicalization from the self is a recurring theme in the word’s long history in the United States. For example, some of the earliest warnings against radicalization come from debates over reconstruction in the aftermath of the American Civil War. In the terminology of an 1867 New York Times article, “radical emissaries” from the north were accused of coming down south to organize the recently emancipated African American population “against their employers.” The black population, in turn, was portrayed as ignorant and thus susceptible to the dangerous and destructive arguments in favor of such “radicalization.”22 In these narratives, it was radicals who retained political agency. Radicals were the white, northern instigators of political and social disruption. But those listening to the radicals did not partake of the same agency. The black audiences were not agents in these reconstruction narratives; they were passive recipients of outsider arguments. They were victims of manipulation, and yet even as victims, they challenged the political and social order by threatening to succumb to what an 1868 South Carolina article for The Charleston Daily News called “that grand radicalization which is leading the negroes to destruction and would lead the white man to slavery.”23 The victims of radicalization were not radicals, and they could not be prophetic in Darsey’s terms because they lacked a self to sacrifice. This lack of self, in turn,

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implied that being manipulated and exploited was part of their natural state, and the only question that remained was whether radical or reasonable forces would be doing the manipulating. An association between radicalization and manipulation remains even in positive studies of radical social movements. Writing of the 1968 student protests at Columbia University, for example, James Klumpp defines radicalization in two ways. First, he argues that radicalization requires polarization and the emergence of “two polemical groups.” Klumpp describes polarization by saying, Each group labels the other with names reserved for the enemies of the community. Each group sees the other as a devil figure at the root of all evil in the community. The individual caught in the polarization sees his group and its members as just, good, right, rational and the other group as unjust, evil, wrong, irrational. Each group develops a stereotype for the other, and the stereotype becomes an important predictor of behavior.24

Second, Klumpp argues that radicalization is a process of identification through “confrontation” by which people are aligned with radical perspectives. Thus defined, the language of radicalization challenges approaches to rhetoric and argument that emphasize moderation and compromise.25 The price for this uncompromising perspective, however, is a hierarchically oriented focus on leadership directing the identification of the youth—in Klumpp’s words “identifying the individual ideologically and actively with the radical movement, the radical leadership, and the radical interpretation of the situation.”26 Even when radical leaders and radicalized members are, in other ways, equals—being both part of the student body for example—the narrative of radicalization separates them into those who speak from a position of agency and those whose agency is absorbed by the radicalization process. Ideologically, Klumpp is, of course, far removed from the racist paranoia of the 1860s articles, and his approach to radicalization is much more positive than the recent appropriations of the term that have been directed at Muslim American communities in bills, executive memos, speeches, media reports, academic articles, and dozens of congressional hearings. Klumpp treats radicalization as a positive challenge to rhetorical theories that emphasize compromise. Yet, notably, his treatment gives little or no attention to the agency of the radicalized students. There is not, as in Darsey, a sense of self-sacrifice establishing radical ethos. The students Klumpp describes are not, in a significant sense, radicals at all. Instead, they are the subjects of radicalization, already marked for manipulation and incorporation into a radical community. The division between radical agents and the subjects or victims of radicalization remains a consistent feature of the language. And this productive tension offers a starting point for understanding the ways in which radicalization functions in more recent appropriations.

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From “Radical” to “Radicalized” Near the beginning of his opening statement, in the March 10, 2011 hearing, Peter King said, “Despite what passes for conventional wisdom in certain circles, there is nothing radical or un-American in holding these hearings. Indeed, Congressional investigation of Muslim-American radicalization is the logical response to the repeated and urgent warnings which the Obama administration has been making in recent months” [emphasis added].27 King’s statement is representative of the rhetorical and ideological complexity of the language. Radicalization does not operate in isolation but as a form of speech implicitly linked with other forms, against which and through which it derives ideological significance. One productive way of exploring these associations is to consider the language of radicalization through the rhetorical figure of polyptoton. Polyptoton is a figure in which a word appears as different parts of speech in the same text.28 Often polyptoton is simply a device to enhance the beauty of a text through parallel structure and sound similarity; however, in Greek and Latin rhetoric, the figure was also employed to magnify the effect of a concept by showing its consistency across multiple forms.29 Thus Aristotle argued that “if justice is something praiseworthy, then so will a just man, and a just deed, and ‘justly’ connote something praiseworthy.”30 The effect derives from what Jeanne Fahnestock calls “the linguistic machinery of common sense,” and its practical influence extends beyond aesthetics into the realms of argument and ideology.31 Polyptoton begins with a commonly accepted concept and translates it to the particulars of the case under consideration.32 Beneath a surface-level consistency, such translation can support subtle changes in meaning that are often implicitly acceptable to audiences because they seem to proceed naturally from a common-sense understanding of the root.33 Fahnestock argues, therefore, that “Arguments employing polyptoton can be subtle but powerful,”34 and she compares polyptoton to “an operation of sympathetic magic where the shaman manipulates an object by manipulating a token or sign for that object (in this case a word) or gains control of a force by changing its name.”35 More than a figure of style, enhancement, or translation, polyptoton draws our attention to the fluid and contextual processes through which ideological language comes to be inscribed in our political and societal narratives. It offers critics a lens for considering the inherent, irresolvable, and ultimately productive tensions that inhabit our acts of naming. In the quotation from King above, the adjective form “radical” is negatively applied to the hearing itself. The adjective form emphasizes intensity and is most clearly linked to choice. The contradicting term that King offered—“logical”— indicates that the word radical was being used as a synonym for emotional or unreasoning. A presumption of logic and rationality was foundational to King’s justification of the hearings’ legitimacy. While radical actions are disruptive, logic is calm and reasonable, and thus, the implication was, it ought to be uncontroversial. Having identified the hearings as logical, therefore, King apparently felt no need to provide an explicit answer to the charge that they were “un-American.” Logic needs

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no further defense. There was also an implicit contrast between the “logical” and the “ideological”—the latter being a term that appeared repeatedly in these hearings. Twice in his opening statement, King referred to “ideology,” first quoting a reference to “violent Islamist ideology,” and second, referring to the ideology of al-Qaeda.36 If, as King implied, the logic of these hearings should lead critics to view them as the only reasonable and clear-eyed response to potential terrorism, this logic was beset on the one hand by “craven surrender to political correctness” and on the other hand by an Islamist ideology that paves the path to terrorist violence.37 Irrational defeatism and ideological radicalism were alike endangering the security of the nation, but King implied that the language of radicalization offered a method for defeating both. To follow critics and step outside the language of radicalization was to succumb to the illogical or the ideological or both. Thus, while there was a great deal of disagreement about the targeting of particular groups or beliefs, the language of radicalization was appropriated by members of both parties in these hearings. This is not to imply that everyone shared the same narrative of radicalization. There was significant disagreement among committee members and other participants over how to define and when to use the language of radicalization and over the process by which radicalization develops. Representatives Yvette Clarke of New York and Keith Ellison of Minnesota, for example, both argued that radicalization should not be applied exclusively to Muslim individuals and communities.38 Representative Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas, said, Though radicalization is universally associated with an ideology—typically one based in political causes—it is less common for radicalism to emerge based on ideology alone, and personal factors often have a strong role. The goals of radicalization may be to gain political recognition, change, or to enact a retribution for previous injustices.39

This approach offers a more complex perspective on the language of radicalization, but it also illustrates how, as Mark Sedgwick argues, the language itself functions in ways that discourage such complexity and ultimately confuses rather than clarifies our understanding of terrorism.40 Jackson Lee’s reference to “goals” pointed toward agency, but it remained unclear what individual or community could claim that agency. Against the ambiguity involved in linking radicalization to a self who chooses, the more common perspective—identifying radicalization as a process of psychological, ideological, or theological manipulation—is the one that dominated these hearings. King returned to his initial distinction between radical and logical in subsequent hearings—extending links between radical ideology, defeatist irrationality, and political criticism. In his opening statement at the second hearing (June 15, 2011), King described some of the criticism of the first hearing as: “much mindless hysteria led by radical groups such as the Council of Islamic Relations [presumably the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)] and their allies in the liberal media, personified by the New York Times.”41 As in the first hearing, King associated the word radical with irrationality and hysteria, and implicitly contrasted it with the

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established logic of the hearings. In his opening statement for the third hearing (July 27, 2011), King continued his critique of the New York Times along the same line, referring to them as “vacuous ideologues” representing “politically correct” media.42 Although these different references were made at three different hearings over a period of four months, their appearance in a common record and at similar positions in King’s first three opening statements allows us to examine them as elements of a single argument—extending charges of radical irrationality to political and media opponents to the hearings and implying that it was not just terrorists or would-be terrorists who endangered the committee and the nation. Critics of the processes by which radicalization was identified and suppressed were also identified as part of the radicalization problem. Beyond the contrast between radical and logical, there was another layer to King’s use of the adjective form in his opening statement at the first hearing. Given the context of these hearings, it is significant that King implied in the sentence quoted above that radical actions could be chosen. Those who chose to behave radically could also choose to behave otherwise. Thus, while King condemned and distanced himself from any charge that the hearings he presided over were radical, there was, in his appropriation, nothing particularly threatening about the word radical in the abstract. It marked an isolated moment of free choice for an individual who might just as freely choose the logical path. In the best-case scenario, those who had made radical choices might still be argued with, incorporated into the community, and directed back toward logic. In the worst case, those who were radical were treated as easily understood. They were bad people who made bad choices and should be held responsible for them. This association between the adjective form “radical” and choice continued throughout the hearings. When applied to individuals or specific groups (as opposed to more generic references such as “radical Islam”), the adjective form was consistently linked with those who led efforts to radicalize or who incited radicalization in others, as when Representative Frank Wolf of Virginia referred to “radical voices like [Anwar] al-Awlaki [who] corrupt minds.”43 Representative Candice Miller of Michigan also used the adjective “radical” to describe “al-Qaeda thugs” and “extremists” who attempt to convert and manipulate vulnerable youth.44 In these contexts, radical was still a term that was tied to a fundamental notion of agency. Radicals were those who chose to act. This notion of choice was important in the context of King’s opening statement and the assurance that King and other likeminded committee members could (and did) choose to avoid the radical path. When considered from this perspective, it is also worth noting how rarely the adjective form is appropriated to describe individual actions in these hearings, in contrast to the verb “radicalized” and the noun “radicalization.” Radical was the form most clearly linked to choice, and the focus of these hearings was located outside of individual choices and the political legitimacy that choice confers. A significant feature of the language in these hearings and other, similar documents is that homegrown terrorists are not radical but radicalized.

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In contrast to the moment-to-moment choice associated with the adjective form, the passive verb “radicalized” was appropriated in these hearings to indicate an ongoing state, often lacking a clear beginning or end point. Also, while the former implied agency and an internalized ideology, the latter emphasized the externality of the ideology that the radicalized had been tricked, swayed, or seduced into adopting. Those who were being radicalized were passive. Radicalization happened to them, even when they chose it. For example, in his opening statement at the first hearing, King referenced a 2010 interview by Attorney General Eric Holder in which he said, in King’s words, that “the growing number of young Americans being radicalized and willing to take up arms against our country, ‘keeps him awake at night.’”45 In the original interview, Holder talked about “American citizens” who “have decided that they are going to become radicalized and take up arms against the nation in which they were born.”46 There is, in Holder’s phrasing, an initial choice (“have decided”) and a consequent choice (“take up arms”), but the actual process presented these citizens as passive recipients of outside influences. They do not “radicalize;” they “become radicalized.” This shift in agency was evident also in the testimony of invited witness M. Zuhdi Jasser, later in the first hearing, when he said of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki that “before he became a radicalizer, [he] was being radicalized somewhere.”47 As radicalizer, al-Awlaki was an agent, a bad person making bad choices. However, like the unnamed American citizens described by King and Holder, al-Awlaki’s “being radicalized” was somehow outside this agency. In contrast to radical clerics and radical critics who could, in theory at least, choose to act logically and not be radical, those being radicalized were presented as victims of systems and forces that brought their agential power and subsequent responsibility into question. The passive structure of the verb form has been reflected in other government documents as well. For example, the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2007—which Representative Ellison praised in the hearings—describes “the potential rise of self radicalized, unaffiliated terrorists.”48 At first glance, the notion of self-radicalization might suggest agency, but it is presented as a false agency created through a separation between the individual and his or her choices—a self-selected exposure to alien values. Statements and testimony at the joint House and Senate hearing on radicalization in the US military (December 7, 2011) made regular references to the “self-radicalization” of individuals who subscribed to literature or web sites.49 The language of self-radicalization in this context was not referring to those who freely chose a radical path, equivalent to alAwlaki’s choice to radicalize others. It was merely describing those who became radicalized through different venues—through the Internet or magazines rather than through face-to-face interactions in mosques or bookstores. Thus, during the joint hearing, Lieutenant Colonel Reid Sawyer, Director of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, said, “In an effort to continue to drive radicalization in the United States (and the West in general), al-Qaeda and its affiliates have had to specifically tailor their message to reach the ‘self-radicalizing’ audience.”50 The implication was that the radicalized were not guiding and directing the process of

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ideological change through which they were moving. The driving forces remained external: “al-Qaeda,” “al-Shabaab,” “al-Awlaki,” and so forth. Unlike the radical who chooses, those who were being radicalized—even self-radicalized—were presented as somehow alienated from their choices and thus, among other consequences, they had no right to defend those choices or speak on their own behalf. The shift from “radical” to “radicalized” marked and justified a double exclusion of radicalized individuals from hearings in which they were the principal subjects. First, as King inferred, radicals were irrational and thus incapable of participating fully in a political process based on logic, facts, and reasoned argument. Second, those who were radicalized were presented as being already excluded from agential participation in their own move toward radicalism. The radical might choose to sacrifice self for the cause or the message, but the radicalized were treated as those whose “selves” had been lost or stolen. The radicalized were not and could not be radicals; they were victims who had been dragged away from their homeland into foreign beliefs and alien values. As the individual disappeared, the radicalized appeared as another cog in the wheel of an external ideological system, and the focus of attention shifted to the concept and method of radicalization.

(Re)Defining Community The abstract noun “radicalization” appeared six times in King’s first opening statement and in the titles of four of the six hearings; it was used hundreds of times during the hearings themselves. Collectively, the hearings are catalogued as “Hearings on Islamist Radicalization,” and they were referred to as the “radicalization hearings” by committee members, witnesses, and media observers. In the context of these hearings, no agreed-upon definition of radicalization was offered, but, in general, the word functioned practically in two ways. It was, first, a term implying the violation by outside forces of non-agential victims. In this sense, it continued the erasure of agency that we saw illustrated in the move from the adjective “radical” to the verb “radicalized.” As a nominalization of the verb form, radicalization extended the verb’s connotative associations. Those who were radicalized were also victims of radicalization. Thus, on the one hand, King emphasized the strategic value of radicalization for these outside forces, saying, “homegrown radicalization is part of al-Qaeda’s strategy to continue attacking the United States.”51 On the other hand, King emphasized the innocence of radicalization’s victims, describing “the horror which Islamist radicalization has inflicted and will continue to inflict on good families, especially those in the Muslim community, unless we put aside political correctness and define who our enemy truly is.”52 Radicalization was presented as a disease or a foreign invader that robbed parents of children and tore families apart. In his statement at the first hearing, M. Zuhdi Jasser said of radicalization that “This cancer within an otherwise vibrant beautiful faith is at its core an identity problem that can only be resolved with Islamic reform—toward modernity and the separation of mosque and state.”53 Jasser also used the term “inoculation” and described

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radicalization as the end result of a process of “intoxication” derived from mosques “transmitting” political Islamic messages.54 Both the metaphor of cancer and the image of transmitted intoxication highlight the position of the radicalized as victim. Among the invited witnesses at these hearings were some whose relatives had associated themselves with Muslim extremists, and these witnesses defined the process of radicalization in the most forceful terms. Abdirizak Bihi described radicalization as brainwashing, a term that extended Jasser’s language of transmitted intoxication by linking it to historical fears of individuals being turned into weapons by and for an outside power.55 Melvin Bledsoe, the father of Little Rock shooter Carlos Bledsoe (aka Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad), compared radicalization to rape.56 Metaphors of disease, transmission, or assault highlighted the vulnerability and innocence of those who became radicalized. Throughout these hearings, they were described using terms like “young people,” “youths,” “babies,” and “children,” and their agency was minimized. This contrast between passive victims and an association of radical manipulators led to the second practical implication of radicalization in these hearings. Radicalization was presented as a term suggesting order, planning, and structure. In her testimony at the sixth hearing (June 20, 2012), invited witness Qanta A. A. Ahmed said, “We [through these hearings] . . . have learned radicalization in America is usually facilitated by handlers and Islamist seducers who operate on multiple planes using multiple forms of media and are facile at identifying or exploiting the vulnerable.”57 Fahnestock describes how this form of abstract noun creates “a single label” under which an entire process can “be talked about.”58 In this case, radicalization both names a process and creates (or appears to create) the process it names. Radicalization offers a sense of coherence to something that was and is in many ways incoherent, and the cost of this apparent coherence has been at best a minimization of the diverse motivations—economic, religious, political, and personal—that drive people to commit acts of mass violence. In the hearings, Radicalization was presented as a threat belonging to and even inherent within Muslim organizations, and the implication was that only by separating the ideal of “American Muslim Community” from institutions and associations could a community emerge that was acceptable to the government’s and the American people’s demands for security. In this imaginary community, complexities of belief were minimized, and political uniformity was expected if not mandated. For example, Representative Bob Turner of New York said during the joint hearing: Now, the theology of Islam is easily understood. There is prayer and fasting and charity, similar to all religions, and adherence to the natural law, do unto others. Beyond that there is an overlay of politics, and there is a battle within Islam. The political aspects of this, of course, are problematic.59

By privatizing religion and culture, Turner implied that the dangers of collectivity could be reduced while retaining individual choice. Tolerance of an “easily understood” Islam worked to contain the Islamic other as essentially secular and

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apolitical, and features that strayed beyond this containment were treated as political overlay and evidence of a problematic shift in the direction of organized radicalization.60 Within this narrative, a number of advocacy organizations, including CAIR, the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition (MACLC) were treated as indirect contributors to the radicalization process. These organizations were not charged with being radicalizers, but by their criticism or lack of cooperation with law enforcement and legislation, they became implicated in the structure of radicalization. In his testimony at the first hearing, Jasser suggested that “cooperation” was the opposite of radicalization. He said, Radicalization is a continuum. Cooperation is a continuum. I personally never knew a Muslim that wouldn’t report somebody about to blow something up or commit an act of violence. But that is a final step on a continuum of radicalization.61

The implication was that these were zero-sum continuums and that less-thancomplete or less-than-enthusiastic cooperation would put an individual or an organization on the continuum of radicalization. Language used in these hearings repeatedly implied that Muslim Americans who do not cooperate fully with law enforcement or who discourage others from cooperating fully are participating in the radicalization of their youth and are thus part of the threat to American security.62 The solution, these hearings seemed to suggest, was to redefine “American Muslim Community” as a loose association of individuals whose relationship to one another was based on uncomplicated religious values, not politics, and whose principal public responsibility was to serve the interests of the state. Jasser argued that the Muslim community should focus on assimilating itself into America: “I learned growing up in Wisconsin that my family came here more to learn from American values and assimilate those into our consciousness rather than coming here to evangelize any Islamic ideals.”63 Along with condemnation of radicalization and radicalizers, there were a number of references to the virtues of moderation and cooperation. For example, in the first hearing, Representative Michael McCaul of Texas said, “In the past 2 years, there have been 27 terror plots, and each of them involved extreme radicalization of the Muslim faith. This is not to say that all Muslims are the threat; to the contrary, the moderate Muslim is our greatest ally in fighting recruitment of Muslim youth.”64 In the third hearing, McCaul used almost the same language except he referred to “the moderate Muslim” as a “weapon” rather than an ally.65 Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert argue that narratives of radicalization remain rooted in the idea that Islam is inherently destabilizing and disruptive “to the ‘liberal secular’ and/or ‘Judeo-Christian’ West.”66 Describing the 2011–2012 hearings, Saghaye-Biria says, “Practicing Islam is seen as abnormal behavior that is in contrast to normal American culture.”67 Even conversion to Islam, while explicitly identified as “not radicalization” in other contexts,68 was implicitly linked to the continuum of radicalization in these hearings, particularly in the testimony of the relatives of those radicalized, one of whom, for example, described the taking of a

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Muslim name as evidence of the rejection of American culture.69 The way to reverse this presumption of abnormality was, as Jasser indicated, to fully normalize—that is, to stop criticizing and cooperate—with American law-enforcement and government agencies. The language of domestic radicalization as presented in these hearings casts a shadow over American Muslim communities by imagining a vast landscape of passive complicity in radical Islamist movements. One does not have to be radical or susceptible to being radicalized in order to be part of the problem. The contrast to the implied order and structure of radicalization is, as the title of the first hearing states, “the American Muslim Community.” If radicalization is linked to strong order and independent structure, cooperative community must take on the opposite characteristics. Community must be de-radicalized in order to create a space for a non-threatening, non-ideological, and non-confrontational Muslim American identity. Radicalization thus emerges not as a tool of analysis but as “a tool of power exercised by the state and non-Muslim communities against, and to control, Muslim communities in the twenty-first century.”70 The language of community in these hearings is redefined in ways that strip it of institutions and organizations and reform it as an imaginary space of individual responsibility toward and action in service of the state.

Conclusion Since 2004, the language of radicalization has been defended as offering a more thoughtful account of terrorism than the language of evil that had clouded policy discussions in the years immediately following September 11, 2001.71 Ideally, radicalization offers a language through which policy makers can discuss the underlying factors behind terrorism and develop more effective strategies to mitigate its effects.72 Yet, in practice, this language often tends to obfuscate rather than clarify the academic research on terrorism. As Arun Kundnani argues, “a concept has been contrived which builds into official thinking biases and prejudices that, in turn, structure government practices introduced to combat radicalisation, resulting in discrimination and unwarranted restrictions on civil liberties.”73 Radicalization represents what Aziz Huq calls a “new investment” by North American and European governments in understanding the ideological process by which individuals move toward the commitment of terrorist acts, and this investment in ideology limits our understanding of the multiple factors motivating individuals and groups who move from protest to violence.74 Mark Sedgwick argues that: The concept of radicalization emphasizes the individual and, to some extent, the ideology and the group, and significantly de-emphasizes the wider circumstances— the “root causes” that it became so difficult to talk about after 9/11, and that are still often not brought into analyses. So long as the circumstances that produce Islamist radicals’ declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical will often appear as a “rebel without a cause.”75

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From a social and political perspective, the categorization of an individual as “radicalized” rather than “radical” is based on a complex of factors including race, religion, social status, and sympathy for the radical perspective. Those who are radical may be praiseworthy or threatening—depending on the perspectives of those passing judgment—but it is most often the radicalized who lose (or never acquire) the right to speak back to political, military, media, and law-enforcement communities. As illustrated in these hearings, the radicalized are regularly described in terms of dangerous liminality. Despite possessing national citizenship, they lack national identity. Despite acting, they are passive. Despite being legal adults, they are children. Despite making choices, they do not choose. There are, of course, good reasons for wanting to prevent acts of violence before they take place, and the language of radicalization is invoked as part of a broad and complex effort at prevention. However, this language has the effect of isolating agents from their agency in ways that often marginalize and infantilize the victims of radicalization and justify acts of surveillance and expanded scrutiny as acts of care for our children, our moderates, and our religious and social minorities.76 The language of radicalization can and often does become justification for restricting and redefining marginal or minority communities in the name of a greater good for both the nation and the victims of radicalization. And these responses to radicalization are further normalized because the language has, to borrow a phrase from Roderick Hart, “a scientistic air to it.”77 The American people are repeatedly assured that democratic and constitutional rights will be protected even as the institutions, ideologies, practices, and beliefs of fellow citizens are laid bare for state scrutiny. And the only thing that seems to protect us from fear of the same scrutiny is our desperate belief that there is—that there must be—an easily discernible pattern and that, as Faiza Patel says, “by understanding radicalization, [government officials] can identify homegrown terrorists before they strike.”78 From a theoretical perspective, the critical analysis of radicalization should encourage us toward a more complex and nuanced study of radical rhetoric. The study of radical rhetoric by way of Darsey, Klumpp, and others has tended to focus on rhetoric that is identified as radical by speakers and supporters. Such studies are often sympathetic to the perspectives being advocated, and thus there is a tendency to emphasize the purity of the individual radical confronting systemic injustice. Darsey’s presentation on the prophetic radical, for example, tends to emphasize, in his words, “The community confronted by the prophet” and consequently deemphasize the consolidation and transformation of radical perspectives as individuals come together in movements.79 The language of radicalization, in contrast, is often linked with what Jeremy Engels describes as “American constructions of the ‘savage’ enemy” that reflect both our fears of radicalism as excess and, ultimately, “our nation’s deep and abiding fear of democracy.”80 Radicalization narratives typically present their subjects as being so infected and corrupted by the perspectives of an obviously dangerous and disruptive community that the individual

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becomes incidental, and his or her value as a democratic citizen can be safely ignored. By considering in more detail the tensions between the radical and the radicalized, radicalism and radicalization, we can better evaluate the ways in which our rhetorical appeals negotiate the complex relationships between praise of democracy and fear of its excess. My point in this essay has been not to over-determine the significance of a particular word—for many words could be substituted—but to take seriously that the tensions reflected in such ideological language can only be understood in context. The language of radicalization intersects with other words describing infection, extremism, and manipulation; it intersects with other parts of speech against which and through which it derives meaning for our present controversies about security and freedom, religion and citizenship, and the appropriate limits of cooperation and surveillance. By considering this language through the critical lens of polyptoton, we gain a richer insight into the contextual play of ideological rhetoric and the means by which a word or set of words might acquire ideological force in particular contexts. In King’s first opening statement, a contrast between “radical” and “logical” is extended to “radicalized” and “radicalization” as well. Like the radical, the radicalized is not logical and does not reason. But, as the familiar is extended, it is also changed. Radicalization is not a choice to reject reason; it is an organized embodiment of unreason itself. The effect of the language of radicalization in these hearings is enhanced by the establishment of “radical” and “logical” as contradictory terms at the very beginning.81 The lack of emotional control identified in the adjective form “radical” is continued into the verb form “radicalized” and the noun form “radicalization.” But this lack of emotional control is associated with victimization in the verb form and with organized institutions in the noun form. Uncontrolled and illogical thinking become institutionalized as they are nominalized, and the result is a systemic delegitimization of politically critical individuals, organizations, and communities.

Notes [1] [2]

House Committee on Homeland Security, Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization, Vol. 1, 112th Cong., 1st sess. 2011, 2. In total, five House hearings and one joint hearing on radicalization were conducted between March 2011 and June 2012: (1) (2) (3) (4)

March 10, 2011—Radicalization in the Muslim-American Community June 15, 2011—Radicalization in US Prisons July 27, 2011—Radicalization Linked to al-Shabaab December 7, 2011—Radicalization in the US Military (Joint hearing with the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee) (5) March 21, 2012—Hezbollah Threat in the US (6) June 20, 2012—Response of American Muslims to the Radicalization Hearings

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[4]

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[5] [6]

[7]

[8]

[9]

[10]

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Report on Human Rights Conditions in Turkey, March 2, 1995, 104th Cong., 1st sess., Congressional Record (March 28, 1995), E705–6; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on European Affairs, The Crisis in Kosovo, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., 1998, 66, 68; Human Rights in Uzbekistan, 105th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 144 (September 25, 1998), E1818; Iran Nonproliferation Act of 1999—Resumed, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (February 22, 2000), S662; Barton Gellman, “AIDS is Declared Threat to Security—White House Fears Epidemic Could Destabilize World,” Washington Post, April 30, 2000, submitted by Representative Lee of California, 106th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record (May 8, 2000), E664. Arun Kundnani, “Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept,” Race and Class 54, issue 3 (2012): 4, 7. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States, 109th Cong., 1st sess. (February 16, 2005), 58. See Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, “Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse,” International Affairs 86, issue 4 (2010): 889; Mark Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion,” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, issue 4 (2010): 480; Kundnani, “Radicalisation,” 5–6. The four steps in the NYPD report were: “Pre-Radicalization,” “Self-Identification,” “Indoctrination,” and “Jihadization.” See Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt, Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat (New York, NY: New York City Police Department, 2007), 6, 21. Hakimeh Saghaye-Biria, “American Muslims as Radicals? A Critical Discourse Analysis of the US Congressional Hearing on ‘The Extent of Radicalization in the American Muslim Community and That Community’s Response,’” Discourse and Society 23 (2012): 520. Saghaye-Biria, “American Muslims as Radicals?,” 510. Saghaye-Biria draws heavily on Teun A. van Dijk’s research on “critical discourse analysis” and the “reproduction of racism.” See, for example Teun A. van Dijk, “Political Discourse and Racism: Describing Others in Western Parliaments,” in The Language and Politics of Exclusion: Others in Discourse, ed. Stephen Harold Riggins (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 1997), 42–43. Charges of racism and anti-Muslim sentiment have been consistent in the criticism of these and similar hearings, and some of the committee members have made statements that have been seen as lending credence to these charges. King, for example, has been associated with a number of divisive statements about American Muslims, including a September 2007 interview with Politico—included as an attachment to the March 10, 2011 hearing—in which King said that there are: “too many mosques in this country” (a statement that King later claimed “was taken entirely out of context”). Although such statements provide interesting context for the 2011–2012 hearings, I have chosen not to fixate on the personal motivations of King or any other participant in the hearings. The language of radicalization affects discourse across diverse personal and political perspectives, and it is this language that I have chosen to focus attention on in this essay. The Politico article was submitted into the record by Representative Laura Richardson of California. See House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 180–81. The language of radicalization in reference to homegrown terrorism crosses party lines. Indeed, calls for “counter-radicalization” have become common features of the Obama administration’s anti-terrorism strategies. See, for example, The White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (August 2011); Executive Order no. 13584, Federal Register 76: 179 (Sept. 15, 2011); Strategic Implementation Plan for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (December 2011): 10. See also Kundnani, “Radicalisation,” 6–7.

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[11] Carol Dyer, Ryan E. McCoy, Joel Rodriguez, and Donald N. Van Duyn, “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism: A Community Responsibility,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin 76, issue 12 (2007): 4, 8. [12] For example, in a 2005 Senate hearing, FBI director Robert Mueller said:

Through our joint terrorism task forces, we also understand that persons absolutely have the right to practice religion in whichever way they want. . . . But I’m going to say, on the other hand, we have the obligation to determine and identify those persons who are becoming radicalized and become a threat to the United States.

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See Senate Select Committee, Current and Projected National Security Threats, 57. [13] See, for example, Leland M. Griffin, “The Rhetorical Structure of the ‘New Left’ Movement: Part I,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 50 (1964): 113–35; Parke G. Burgess, “The Rhetoric of Black Power: A Moral Demand?” Quarterly Journal of Speech 54 (1968): 122–33; Robert L. Scott, “The Conservative Voice in Radical Rhetoric: A Common Response to Division,” Speech Monographs 40 (1973): 123–35; James F. Klumpp, “Challenge of Radical Rhetoric: Radicalization at Columbia,” Western Speech 37 (1973): 146–56. [14] James Darsey, “The Legend of Eugene Debs: Prophetic Ethos as Radical Argument,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 74 (1988): 434–52. [15] Ibid., 435. [16] Ibid. [17] Phyllis M. Japp, “Esther or Isaiah?: The Abolitionist-Feminist Rhetoric of Angelina Grimké,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 71 (1985): 342. [18] Stephen H. Browne, “Encountering Angelina Grimké: Violence, Identity, and the Creation of Radical Community,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 82 (1996): 66. [19] Darsey, “The Legend of Eugene Debs,” 435–36. [20] Michael Walzer, The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics (London, UK: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), 318. [21] James Darsey, The Prophetic Tradition and Radical Rhetoric in America (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1997), 31. [22] “Affairs in Georgia: Splendid Prospects of Wheat—Political Movements—The Negro Vote,” The New York Times, June 19, 1867; See also “Southern Radicalism,” The Louisiana Democrat, May 8, 1867; “The Devil and Mr. Stevens,” The Charleston Daily News, December 19, 1867. [23] “Seymour and Blair,” The Charleston Daily News, July 25, 1868. [24] Klumpp, “Challenge of Radical Rhetoric” 150. [25] Ibid., 146–47. [26] Ibid., 146. [27] House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 2. [28] Jeanne Fahnestock, Rhetorical Style: The Uses of Language in Persuasion (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011), 131. [29] See William Reid Manierre, “Verbal Patterns in Cotton Mather’s Magnalia,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 47 (1961): 407; Andrew F. Stone, “On Hermogenes’s Features of Style and Other Factors Affecting Style in the Panegyrics of Eustathios of Thessaloniki,” Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 19 (2001): 320–21. [30] Aristotle, “Topics,” in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, Vol. 1. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 190; See also Aristotle, On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse, trans. George A. Kennedy (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), 191.

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[31] Jeanne Fahnestock, Rhetorical Figures in Science (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1999), 170–71. [32] Chris Holcomb, “Performative Stylistics and the Question of Academic Prose,” Rhetoric Review 24 (2005): 202. [33] See, for example, Ilon Lauer, “Ritual and Power in Imperial Roman Rhetoric,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 90 (2004): 427–28. [34] Fahnestock, Rhetorical Style, 131. [35] Fahnestock, Rhetorical Figures in Science, 170–71; see also Holcomb, “Performative Stylistics,” 202. [36] House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 3–4. [37] Ibid. [38] Ibid., 11, 15–16, 108. [39] Ibid., 10. [40] Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization,” 490–91. [41] House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 205–6. [42] Ibid., 280. [43] Ibid., 20. [44] Ibid., 101. [45] Ibid., 2. [46] Jack Cloherty and Pierre Thomas, “Attorney General’s Blunt Warning on Terror Attacks,” ABC News, December 21, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/attorney-general-ericholders-blunt-warning-terror-attacks/story?id=12444727. [47] House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 35. [48] HR 1955, 110th Cong., 1st sess. (October 23, 2007). While criticizing the use of radicalization in these hearings, Representative Ellison emphasized that he voted for this bill, although, in his oral testimony at the March 10 hearing, he mistakenly referred to it as the Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism Prevention Act of 2010. See House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 15, 284. [49] US Congress, Compilation of Hearings on Islamist Radicalization, Vol. 2: Homegrown Terrorism: The Threat to Military Communities Inside the United States: Joint Hearing Before the House Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong., 1st sess, 2011, 5. [50] US Congress, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 2, 27. [51] House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 4. [52] Ibid., 3. [53] Ibid., 36. [54] Ibid., 38, 40. [55] Ibid., 64. [56] Ibid., 63; Ibid., 62, 59, like Bihi, Bledsoe also compares radicalization to “brainwashing.” [57] House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 110. [58] Fahnestock, Rhetorical Style, 47 [59] US Congress, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 2, 57. [60] On some of the problems with this relationship between tolerance and collectivity, see Wendy Brown, “Subjects of Tolerance: Why We Are Civilized and They Are the Barbarians,” in Political Theologies: Public Religions in a Post-Secular World, ed. Hent de Vries and Lawrence E. Sullivan (New York, NY: Fordham University Press, 2006), 310–13. [61] House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 34. [62] Ibid., 26. [63] Ibid., 36–37. [64] Ibid., 89. [65] Ibid., 336.

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[66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72]

Githens-Mazer and Lambert, “Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails,” 900. Saghaye-Biria, “American Muslims as Radicals?,” 519. See Dyer et al., “Countering Violent Islamic Extremism,” 4. House Committee, Compilation of Hearings, Vol. 1, 59. Githens-Mazer and Lambert, “Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails,” 901. Kundnani, “Radicalisation,” 5. See, for example, Peter Neumann, Perspectives on Radicalisation and Political Violence: Papers from the First International Conference on Radicalisation and Political Violence, London 17–18 January 2008 (London, UK: International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, 2008), 4, quoted in Kundnani, “Radicalisation,” 4–5. Kundnani, “Radicalisation,” 8. Aziz Z. Huq, “Modeling Terrorist Radicalization,” Duke Forum for Law and Social Change 2 (2010): 40. Sedgwick, “The Concept of Radicalization,” 480–81. As has often been observed, exploitation can be presented as a form of care. See, for example, Friedrich Engels, “The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State,” in The MarxEngels Reader, 2nd ed., ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 1978), 758. Roderick P. Hart, “Introduction: Community by Negation—An Agenda for Rhetorical Inquiry,” in Rhetoric and Community: Studies in Unity and Fragmentation (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1998), xxx. Faiza Patel, Rethinking Radicalization (New York, NY: Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law, 2011), 1. Darsey, The Prophetic Tradition, 30. Jeremy Engels, Enemyship: Democracy and Counter-Revolution in the Early Republic (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2010), 19. Fahnestock, Rhetorical Style, 232.

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[73] [74] [75] [76]

[77]

[78] [79] [80] [81]