Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Globalisation, Societies and Education Vol. 5, No. 2, July 2007, pp. 153–180
Experimenting with global governance: understanding the potential for generational change Mark A. Boyer*, Scott W. Brown, Michael J. Butler, Anat Niv-Solomon, Brian Urlacher, Natalie F. Hudson, Paula Johnson and Clarisse O. Lima GlobalEd Project, University of Connecticut, USA Globalisation, 10.1080/14767720701425727 CGSE_A_242456.sgm 1476-7724 Original Taylor 5202007
[email protected] MarkBoyer 00000July and & Article Francis (print)/1476-7732 Francis 2007 Societies Ltd and Education (online)
The appropriate role for the United Nations in international dispute resolution is a matter of high profile discussion and controversy. This paper begins with this ambivalence about the appropriate role for the United Nations in the world and examines several sets of issues that relate to the future of support for the UN within the US and the prospects for global governance more generally. First, we briefly review two thematic strands in previous and contemporary scholarship:(1) arguments for increased global governance in contemporary world affairs, driven by perceptions of the changing nature of the political, social, economic and military challenges in the contemporary world system. This debate is also put in the context of the relevance of public support for global governance institutions; and (2) why it is valuable to study how the current generation of adolescents perceive issues of global governance and the impact that their views may have on that nexus in the coming years. We then move to an analysis of data generated from an experimental study of American adolescents and their attitudes toward global governance.
Keywords: Experiments; Global education; Governance; Foreign policy attitudes Introduction The appropriate role of global institutions, such as the United Nations, in international conflict resolution is a matter of high profile discussion and controversy. During the prelude to the war in Iraq, US President George W. Bush repeatedly stated that, while he would like the UN Security Council (UNSC) to sanction military intervention in Iraq, he did not feel it was necessary. Others, most notably UNSC members including Russia and France, argued that the UNSC serves a vital and valuable role *Corresponding author. Department of Political Science, Box U-1024, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-1024, USA. Email:
[email protected] ISSN 1476-7724 (print)/ISSN 1476-7732 (online)/07/020153–28 © 2007 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/14767720701425727
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
154 M. A. Boyer et al. in political–military affairs, particularly in authorising any international military intervention. In the end, Bush stated that the US would (and it ultimately did) move unilaterally, without UNSC sanction. Characteristic of the administration’s view, Bush argued: ‘I’m confident the American people understand that when it comes to our security, if we need to act, we will act. And we really don’t need United Nations approval to do so’. Although he tempered his remarks slightly in response to a follow-up question, he still demonstrated his ambivalence to the value of the UN relative to US national interests: I want the United Nations to be effective. It’s important for it to be a robust, capable body. It’s important for its words to mean what they say. [But] as we head into the twenty-first century, … when it comes to our security, we really don’t need anybody’s permission. (Text of Bush news conference, cnn.com, 2003)
The tension in President Bush’s statements reflects a much larger undercurrent of thinking about the relationship between states and global institutions of governance, and the impact this relationship has on addressing the complex problems of today’s world. For instance, Anne Marie Slaughter (2004) notes that increasingly ‘peoples and their Governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a global scale’ (Slaughter, 2004, p. 8). Yet, the very same institutions that are becoming increasingly relevant for global policy agendas also have the potential to undermine individual liberty and national sovereignty, making states less willing to support such institutions, as implied by President Bush’s remarks above. This tension between global problems and national interests and demands is known broadly as the ‘governance dilemma’ (Dehousse, 1997; Keohane, 2001; Slaughter, 2004). According to Slaughter, the way to address global challenges, all the while avoiding the creation of overly powerful governance structures, is to utilise a multitude of networks, both horizontal and vertical. Horizontal networks, such as the G-7 or the World Trade Organisation, are derived from institutions that bring together national officials. Horizontal institutions are also the more common ones. Vertical institutions, such as the EU or the International Court of Justice, involve a delegation of decision-making power (and even some degree of sovereignty) to supranational institutions. Yet even with examples such as these, Slaughter argues that such networks are ‘underappreciated, undersupported, and underused’ (Slaughter, 2004, p. 1). Part of the explanation for this may lie in the anarchic nature of the global system. Put simply, state participation in global governance structures, whether horizontal or vertical, must be secured by persuasion rather than by coercion. Consequently, accountability, participation, and legitimacy at both the state and individual level become central to building strong global institutions and overcoming the inherent problems surrounding sovereignty issues in the governance dilemma (Keohane, 2001, p. 10). And therefore, public support for global institutions, which has varied over the years, is arguably essential for both the participation in and legitimacy of such institutions.
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
155
Drawing on data from the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations surveys from 1967 to 2003, the vacillation of American public support for the UN is well illustrated. For instance, at the height of the revitalised Cold War in the early to mid 1980s, a plurality felt that the UN was doing a ‘poor job’. This changed in about 1990 to a positive plurality (and even a significant majority for much of this decade) only to switch again to more negative evaluations post-9/11.1 At the same time, these negative appraisals of the UN belie a desire in the public for a strengthened UN, where in both elite and mass public samples, a majority (and in many cases a large majority) thought strengthening the UN was either a somewhat important or very important priority.2 Building on this tension between the need for stronger and more effective global institutions and the potential threat they may pose to state sovereignty, this paper seeks to better understand how the emerging attitudes of the next generation could potentially shape the development of global institutions. First, in order to frame our argument and the data we present later in the paper, we briefly discuss two thematic strands of previous and contemporary scholarship. We first explore arguments for increased global governance in contemporary world affairs as well as the processes that can bring this about. Second, we look to why it is valuable to study how the current generation of adolescents perceive issues of global governance and the impact that their views may have on that nexus in the coming years. We then turn to the central portion of our analysis: an examination of adolescent attitudes toward global governance and how those attitudes shift as adolescents become more familiar with horizontal structures of negotiation and interaction. The data examined are drawn from the GlobalEd Project, which uses an Internet-based international simulation as a research and teaching venue. More detail about the project’s methodology is provided below. Global governance and citizen attitudes: toward a new global policy environment? For several decades now, international relations scholars have been arguing that a growing number of the policy challenges facing states in the contemporary global system are transnational in character and thus demand multilateral solutions for effective resolution. The growing need for multilateralism was most prominently enunciated by Keohane and Nye (1977) in Power and interdependence, but many other studies have followed their seminal work and have elaborated on the realities of policy-making and the possible inadequacy of states as autonomous policy-makers. For example, what is broadly termed the ‘globalisation literature’ has spawned an enormous and rich body of research spanning across many disciplines and focusing on the numerous ways that the state is less able to cope with current policy challenges than in the past.3 Within the globalisation genre, there is also a growing set of work focusing on the prospects for global governance and the efficacy (or lack thereof) that existing global institutions possess for coping with contemporary policy challenges. As Halliday (2000) puts it:
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
156 M. A. Boyer et al. … the discussion on global governance has … acquired an importance and an urgency. … The case being made is clear and powerful: that the problems facing the contemporary world cannot be solved either by leaving everything to the actions of individual states, or to the workings of the market, and that existing mechanisms are insufficient to deal with them. (Halliday, 2000, p. 431)
In a similar fashion, Murphy (2000, p. 789) has argued that the broadest of such global governance arrangements are ‘poorly done and poorly understood’ and that while governance agreements are important, multilateralism, per se, and NGO activism do not guarantee efficient and effective policies. While similar critiques of the capacity of international organisations, and the UN in particular, have been recurrent themes in the literature for several decades, there has been a much more limited discussion about how to reform and/or empower such institutions so that they can better address the identified problems and the limits of global governance institutions (see Ruggie, 1985; Coate & Puchala, 1990; Glennon, 2003). Hence, if we begin from the premise that contemporary global affairs increasingly requires global or at least multilateral policy solutions, then we are left with the challenge of how we, as a global society, can improve those institutions, and more fundamentally, whether the political support exists (domestically or internationally) to strengthen and empower such institutions.4 While not an exhaustive list of scenarios for the evolution of increased global governance, we sketch out here three potential paths that could lead to greater empowerment for global institutions. One potential path for growth in global governance points to circumstances where leaders are pushed toward multilateralism by the constituencies they serve. This means that elite and public attitudes are generally supportive of improving institutions for global governance. Consequently, leaders pursue policies that are consistent with the demands of their constituencies. Such an approach is based in a ‘democracy at work’ mindset that focuses on the power held by citizens around the world and their potential perceptions that global governance is a valued and necessary development. A second path available to ambitious (and arguably visionary) elites supportive of global governance is one where citizens are pulled to global governance by such leaders. Depending on the permissiveness of the involved publics and the intensity of their feelings about global institutions, these leaders may be able to drag constituencies toward global governance structures even if there is no strong direct public support for empowering global institutions. In essence, if elites are able to obtain a ‘permissive consensus’ from their constituencies, then elites will be freer to pursue their policy agenda. This permissive consensus view, as it has been developed in the literature, suggests that the Governmental behavior in advanced industrialised democracies is affected, but not dictated by aggregate citizen preferences on international policy issues (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970). This constraint-oriented view implies that policy-makers pay particular attention to the balance of support and opposition for possible contributions, particularly when proposed policies clash with the predominant public opinion (Holsti, 1992, p. 445–447; Eichenberg, 1998; Powlick & Katz, 1998).
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
157
Finally, a third path exists for states with elites who are less than supportive of global institutions. Bobrow and Boyer (2005) argue that even states with reluctant elites will increasingly be forced to engage in progressively more serious multilateralism, if they are to cope with their own domestic problems. ‘Defensive internationalism’ will thus lead in fits and starts to stronger global institutions, as states are compelled to develop mechanisms for addressing the transnational nature of the policy problems at hand. Similarly, Wolfgang Reinecke (1997, p. 132) argues that the ability of states to accomplish domestic goals has been eroding and that states must now rely increasingly upon international cooperation. This approach to the growth of global institutions involves a pulling of leaders and their citizens toward multilateral solutions by a globalising system that increasingly affects the domestic sphere. Put simply, the demands of formulating effective policy solutions to both domestic and international problems will increasingly require multilateralism. Elites who wish to remain in power will thus work to solve problems in increasingly multilateral ways to avoid being bounced from office. Regardless of how the institutions for global governance evolve, there is a critical role to be played by the citizens of states. This is most apparent in the first path where constituencies actually push leaders toward multilateral approaches, but even from the perspective of defensive internationalism or permissive consensus, leaders must still operate within, and in response to, the policy space set by the public and institutions to which they are accountable. Putnam (1988) has ably argued how this dual level policy environment constricts the range of policy options that are available to policy-makers, as leaders must find solutions politically acceptable at both domestic and international levels. Yet, the advancement of global institutions is only possible when the policy space created by public attitudes makes strengthened global structures a politically viable option for leaders. Thus, if we wish to understand the development of global governance structures we need to consider public attitudes toward these structures. Traditional public opinion polling is one method for investigating current attitudes about global governance and is perhaps the most commonly used technique. This paper employs a somewhat different technique by looking at adolescent attitudes as a way to obtain a window on the future and begin to understand where the evolution of global policy choices might be headed. In addition, by drawing on a sample of American high school and middle school students, we are arguably examining what is a ‘hard case’ for evidence regarding the future of support for global governance. This data presents a hard evidentiary case for at least two reasons. First, the US occupies a unique hegemonic position in world politics and, as such, has predominantly viewed the UN and other multilateral institutions with a high degree of skepticism. This skepticism is rather ironic given that the US Government was a primary architect of these institutions after World War II. Nonetheless, as American unilateral hegemony began to wane globally, the value of the UN as a decision-making body came increasingly into question. In fact, critics of the relatively recent appointment of John Bolton as the US Ambassador to the UN argue that the appointment is an indication that the Bush administration is trying to
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
158 M. A. Boyer et al. damage the UN and obstruct decision-making within the institution. The Bush administration, for its part, argues that Bolton’s appointment is merely an effort to appoint a forceful voice for American interests in this global institution. In addition, the high profile global controversy during the Clinton years over American financial arrears to the UN arguably shows that this ambivalence about the value of the UN has not been confined to the most recent Republican administration. As a result, given predominant domestic sentiment about the value of the UN, American students might be expected to be less supportive of global governance than their generational counterparts in other parts of the world. Second, and related to the first point about American hegemony, it is worth noting the role that relative world power relationships may also play regarding attitudes about global governance. For better or worse, American students occupy a privileged position in the world because of the power the US wields globally. As a result, their views on global governance are likely to reflect reactions to global governance that carry with them perceptions that the US is being constrained by organisations in inappropriate, or at least undesirable, ways. In this context, when we turn to our analysis later in this article, it is worthwhile keeping the American role in the world central to our understanding of the findings presented. Why study kids? Any discussion of the changing nature of global policy must be forward looking. Even the most optimistic analyst of the future prospects for global governance recognises that our world system is far from a reality centering on authoritative institutions of global governance. As a result, we are presented with an intellectual and a political need to understand better what the next generation of citizens and policy-makers thinks (and might think in the future) about these issues. Implicit in this endeavor, then, is the need for a forecast of evolving conceptions about the value of global governance now and in the coming years. Unfortunately for scholars and policy-makers, we are rarely in a position to forecast political phenomena in accurate ways, though the topic continues to be of major interest in our field.5 We do, however, possess what is arguably a hazy window into the future of global governance through the analysis of the attitudes of adolescents regarding this set of issues and institutional roles. We argue that an examination of these attitudes is relevant and less hazy than some might expect and is thus worthy of close examination. We hold this view for two primary reasons. The first reason centers on the reality that today’s adolescents are tomorrow’s voters and decision-makers. Democratic theory is instructive in this regard as it reminds us that the assumption and discharge of responsibility in the public arena in the long- and short-term can only be conducted successfully with the participation of informed citizens and leaders, who as a whole provide what Habermas (1996) characterises as an unimpeded deliberative sphere. Shapiro’s (1996) interpretation is even more to the point: ‘democrats are committed to rule by the people … the people are sovereign; in all matters of collective life they rule over themselves’ (1996, p. 224).
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
159
Though democratic practice oftentimes does not measure up to democratic ideals, this deviation hardly obviates the need for systematic analysis of individual political views and preferences in democratic societies. This need is no less great with respect to future generations of citizens and leaders, and perhaps may be greater, given the relative paucity of explorations of this kind; after all, it is precisely the age cohort studied here that will soon inherit the burdens of democratic citizenship and political and economic leadership in our society (whether we like it or not). Global governance is evolving in complex directions and those who are ‘only kids’ will in fact determine society’s future governance structurally and procedurally. But this generational evolutionary rationale is incomplete if there is little relationship between the attitudes they hold today and the one’s they will espouse tomorrow. As the following brief discussion of our second reason for studying students will show, this relationship is quite robust and indicates that their current attitudes will be relatively good predictors of the trajectory of security perceptions in the future. Along these lines, an extensive and interdisciplinary body of literature dealing with attitude formation and change in the area of political socialisation has chronicled the viability of this connection, frequently referred to as the ‘impressionable years hypothesis’ (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989). Notably, many of the seminal studies exploring this hypothesis have explicitly targeted school-age children, largely because of an interest in better understanding the attitudes of those members of society who had previously been assumed to represent a ‘blank slate’ with regard to political attitudes (Greenberg, 1970). The emergence of a modern political socialisation ‘school’ has been attributed to the publication of sociologist Herbert Hyman’s Political socialisation (1959). Other contributions to this field focused on the role of political socialisation in adolescence as serving a crucial, system-maintaining function in the US political system (see Key, 1961; Mitchell, 1962; Lane, 1962). Perhaps colored by the era of good-feelings during the Eisenhower years, early researchers of political socialisation sought to explore the underlying reasons behind the exceedingly high degrees of loyalty to the nation and the near-absence of any attitudes exemplary of ‘fragmentation politics’ in the US. A great deal of attention during this period was paid to attitudes among American schoolchildren about the nation and its symbols and institutions (see especially Lane, 1962). Building on this work, Greenstein (1965) produced a more comprehensive study of the origins of childhood attitudes and orientations towards politics, and political authority. Greenstein’s findings demonstrated the strong emotional or affective appeal of the content of political socialisation upon children. He argued that this appeal makes the associated (favorable) messages relating to authority figures and the political system extremely durable and resistant to change. His work suggests that the affective component of political socialisation lingers well into adulthood, remaining robust even in the face of the introduction of contradictory stimuli with respect to political figures and political life. Greenstein’s findings were further confirmed by Hess and Torney (1967) who found what they called a ‘bond’ on perceptions of
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
160 M. A. Boyer et al. particular figures and institutions of Government rather than the more generic concepts of ‘authority figures’ and ‘system’. Easton and Dennis (1967, 1969) were among the first to examine political efficacy as not only a norm within democratic societies, but as a socialised disposition among school-age children. In the process, they attempted to elaborate upon the linkage stretching from early political socialisation through basic political orientations to adolescent and adult orientations, and the role of socialisation processes in contributing to system ‘persistence’.6 In an important distinction from some of their predecessors, they found that this linkage was two-way and multidimensional rather than passive and monolithic. Easton and Dennis’ findings also indicate that the process of acquiring one’s political worldview is not simply a matter of accepting a preceding generation’s orientations outright, or what they called the ‘transmission belt’ model (1969, p. 11). Independent learning, direct experience, and modeling the attitudes of other non-adults are also important mechanisms throughout childhood and adolescence, helping define the acquisition of political attitudes and explaining their resilience into adulthood. This rejection of the ‘transmission belt’ model was further supported by extensive studies of political attitudes and values demonstrating large shifts in young age cohorts and negligible shifts in middle-aged and older cohorts, indicating both the importance of independent learning and experience, as well as the fertile attitudinal ground that childhood and adolescence represent within the parameters of the impressionable years hypothesis (Converse, 1976; Markus, 1979; Glenn, 1980). More recent studies have further confirmed the viability, as well as extended the scope, of the ‘impressionable years’ hypothesis. These studies demonstrated not only the stability of political attitudes acquired during youth upon transition to adulthood (Krosnick & Alwin, 1989), but also the degree that attitudes acquired during childhood and adolescence are functionally related to relevant action during both youth and adulthood. Though the introduction of social and contextual variables during adulthood can and do modify, and in limited cases may sever, the linkage between attitudes and attitude–relevant behavior (Krosnick et al., 1993), attitude–behavior consistency has been shown to be robust in cases where the attitude in question pertains to a ‘vested interest’; that is, an object of great perceived personal consequence (Crano, 1997). Given this finding, it is relatively safe to assume that security (whether at the individual, state, or global level) registers as a vested interest for most individuals, lending further credence to our rationale for why the knowledge and attitudes of children towards international affairs deserve attention. This portrayal of political socialisation as a process with significant effects lasting well into adulthood raises three important implications for those concerned with the origins and transmission of political attitudes. First, the key to the effectiveness of political socialisation (at least within the American context) lies in the fact that it offers many points of access to the political system and process. These access points help to generate in childhood the diffuse support essential for generating non-specific feelings of loyalty and obligation to system and process that carry over into adulthood and serve as critical lynchpins for any democratic society.7 Second, cognitive as well
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
161
as affective images play an important role in the connection between school-age children and their orientations towards the political system and political issues in later life. The findings of Easton and Dennis, in particular, concerning the cognitive dimension of political learning underscore the third implication; namely, their rejection of the ‘concentric circles’ (1969, p. 103) model once dominant in the literature and in school curricula. Whereas children were once presumed to broaden their range of political awareness, knowledge, and interest outward from the concerns of their immediate neighborhood and school in tedious and sequentially ordered stages, more recent research has demonstrated greater variability in the absorption of ideas and expression of views on political matters, suggesting that there is no linear connection from close to distant objects, or from simple to complex ideas, and hence no rationale for limiting exposure along either dimension. It also lends further credence to the notion that individuals construct their own unique knowledge base and identity. These conceptual findings also fit within our growing understanding of new forms of media on the socialisation process. At a general level, some recent studies have found that the role of media in influencing political socialisation is not an independent one, but rather one that remains part of the overall socialisation environment (Calavita, 2003). Calavita (2005) takes this finding a step further by arguing that the media’s impact is best understood as the convergence of traditional socialisation agents. This naturally has implications for the growing role played by new forms of media, such as the Internet. The advent and institutionalisation of the Internet as a dominant form of media, though, may bring with it some interesting caveats to Calavita’s work. Shah et al. (2001) argue that the Internet is producing a different socialisation process that is positively influencing the development of social capital. McDevitt and Chaffee (2002) concur with this assessment, but argue more specifically that the Internet has helped create a bi-directional socialisation process. In this setting, children who are arguably more Internet-savvy than their parents and thus potentially exposed to more civic and political information than their parents are producing a trickle-up influence in terms of political socialisation. Taking these recent findings a step further and much closer to our discussion about attitudes relating to global issues, several studies have found or have argued that the Internet may also be creating a different sense of citizenship and identity in the coming years. Weare (2002) argues that ‘by simultaneously fragmenting and globalising the media, the Internet disassociates media structures from the contours of nation states’. These shifts in turn make it more likely that some populations within states will ‘begin to form global identities that span borders’ (p. 674). Volkmer (2003) argues similarly that the Internet increases feelings of global community and changes identities, becoming less focused on the local and national and more on the global. Powell (2003) provides further support for this notion by arguing that the free access to information that children now have at their fingertips shrinks the world and allows formative minds access to information and familiarity to far away places and cultures previously only available through travel. It is interesting to note, however, that beyond the specific context of the Internet’s influence, some have argued that the forces of
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
162 M. A. Boyer et al. globalisation are in some instances creating forces for ‘relocalisation’ or a renewed emphasis on local identities and values (see for instance, Lavallee & Boyer, 2006). Each of these implications, in turn, bears striking relevance for testing our own preconceived notions as academicians about the changing nature of international relations and security in the wider populace. If political socialisation does in fact imprint relatively early in life, then the political culture (and the political perceptions it generates) that sustains democracy and citizenship among current and future generations is an important set of concepts to study. Whether or not new dimensions of socialisation will produce a changed process and new socialised outcomes will only be determined through the examination of longitudinal data years from now. Thus, when Nicholas Negroponte, co-founder of the MIT Media Lab, states that 20 years from now people ‘are not going to know what nationalism is’, we can only respond by saying that time and further research will tell us if this prophecy rings true (’Negroponte: Internet is way to world peace’, cnn.com, 1997). We turn now to our findings about these perceptions and what implications they may have for future perceptions and policies in the security realm. Given these ideas about the impact of the educational experience on the socialisation process, our data examines attitudes taken from a sample of adolescents participating in an international studies simulation program based on the ICONS simulation model (www.icons.umd.edu). The following research design discussion and data analysis aims at providing a mosaic of attitudes about global governance so that we might speculate about its prospects in the coming years. Research design and data analysis: the GlobalEd environment As part of a larger project, we have collected and analysed data that gives us a glimpse of how individuals perceive global institutions and how exposure to both horizontal and vertical structures of governance shapes attitudes. For several years, our project has been conducting simulations of real-world negotiations on an array of contemporary world issues for high school and middle school students throughout the US. Based on the ICONS simulation approach, most simulations are ‘populated’ by approximately 15 country-teams and run for about five weeks during the school year with preparation and debriefing/evaluation surrounding the simulation in the educational setting. More information about the exact details of the simulations can be obtained from our web site at www.globaled.uconn.edu. Within the project’s approach, each simulation is monitored and facilitated by a simulation control person, or ‘Simcon,’ who is an advanced political science graduate student. Simcon’s role is to keep the students substantively on track, approximating the role played by a case teacher in an active learning classroom. The Simcon role also exhibits characteristics of international authority that resides ‘above’ the countryteams involved in the game. As such, this hierarchical role serves as a proxy for vertical institutions of global governance. Simcon can sanction misbehaving teams by openly chastising them, criticising their work, and even logging teams off of the Internet-based simulation system in extreme cases. But even with all these ‘powers,’
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
163
the Simcon attempts to be as unobtrusive as possible during the five-week simulation, striving for a purely facilitative role. Thus, the primary structure of the negotiations is a horizontal structure where country representatives meet and attempt to arrive at workable solutions. As part of our research, we have collected a variety of data from the students involved in the simulation, ranging from pre–post knowledge, attitudes and behaviors (KABs) data (see Brown et al., 2003) to the actual messages sent by the countryteams (see Florea et al., 2003). The following data analysis examines some of the online pre–post survey responses, including other more open-ended impressionistic response data. In addition, we look at the change in support for institutions of global governance that occur as a result of the simulation and the exposure to horizontal and vertical forms of governance. Adolescent attitudes about global governance Returning to our argument from above about the potential for generational change in attitudes toward more sophisticated global governance structures, Figures 1 through 3 display various responses to three different questions related to attitudes toward global governance. The survey questions, administered before (pre) and after (post) the GlobalEd simulation experience, were worded as follows.8 Each question used a five-point Likert scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (5): ●
●
●
Figures 1: ‘I think the idea of an international authority (like the UN or Simcon), which can oversee and facilitate diplomatic relations between countries, is a good thing’. Figures 2: ‘I think the idea of an international organisation (like the UN or Simcon) that has the authority to mediate disputes (economic, military and/or diplomatic) between countries is a good thing’. Figures 3: ‘Security is something that only countries can provide for themselves’.
The data presented here is an aggregation of three middle school (MS) and three high school (HS) simulations taking place in the winters 2003–2005 and autumns 2002–2004, respectively. Figures 1(d) through 1(d) provide data that demonstrate a striking level of support among adolescents for the notion of an international authority to facilitate diplomatic interactions. The control group data (Figure 1(d)) also provide evidence that the students in our primary sample are relatively reflective of the overall adolescent population, even if some differences are evident.9 It is interesting to note, though, that for the post-survey responses there is a decline in those students who ‘strongly agree’ with the statement in all three samples (high school, middle school and aggregate), suggesting that support for global governance structures may become tempered through actual interaction with them. Figures 2(a) through 2(d) present a similar picture even if fewer students responded as strongly agreeing about the usefulness of the UN in dispute resolution. As with the first set of responses, the post-survey responses also saw a decline in the
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
164 M. A. Boyer et al. percentage of students selecting the ‘strongly agree’ category. This may suggest that the simulation experience provides students with a dose of skepticism about the nature of state-based world politics and the potential role of the UN in that venue. Students may feel more comfortable operating in a system of horizontal structures rather than functioning under a vertical structure. It may also be explained by evaluating this decline in support (from the first question to the second) as evidence that actually operationalising the function of global governance structures produces less enthusiastic support. To summarise, a comparison of means was conducted to test for statistical significance of the differences between the pre and the post responses. Six out of the nine differences were statistically significant. This outcome suggests that experience with global authority can influence public opinion towards the structure of international Government. More specifically, the results imply that familiarity with vertical authority structures can produce less supportive public opinion. It is also worth noting the relative similarity in the pre-test means across the high school and middle school responses, suggesting a high degree of stability in attitudes across these two age groups. Tackling the public perception of the utility of global governance from a different direction, Figures 3(a) through 3(d) show the responses to the statement about the role of states and the provision of security. In many ways, the results are roughly similar to those shown for the first two indicators, but the plurality result tended toward the center of the scale more so than for the first two questions. Nonetheless, it is safe to conclude from these results that the respondents viewed state-based security provision in the contemporary international system rather skeptically both before and after the simulation experience. A review of the mean changes and Figure (CONTROL) Mean =2D. 1A. 1B. 1C. 1D. 2A. 2B. 2C. 4.27,An SDinternational = 0.902 authoritytoto athority ismediate amediate good thing disputes disputes (HS) (Aggregate) (MS) (CONTROL) isisa agood goodthing thing(Aggregate) (HS) (MS)
40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00%
Pre Post
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
N Pre = 936 Pre Mean=3.94 SD=1.026 N Post = 936 Post Mean=3.85 SD=1.009 t-score = 1.862 P-value = 0.063 Figure 1A.
An international authority is a good thing (MS)
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00%
165
Pre Post
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
N Pre = 817 Pre Mean=3.97 SD=0.988 N Post = 817 Post Mean=3.71 SD=1.003 t-score = 5.219 P-value = 0.000 Figure 1B.
An international authority is a good thing (HS)
significance tests also implies that additional skepticism may indeed exist toward vertical global authority structures in this intellectual setting as well. Lastly, it is necessary to discuss the statistical analysis further. The results of the ttests are presented again in Tables 1(a)–1(c).10 These tables show that, in most instances, for the two UN questions (Q1 and Q2) the mean response declined from pre- to post-test. And the decline was statistically significant for Q1 in the aggregate and for Q2 in the MS and aggregate. At first glance, this could be interpreted as telling us that participation in an international studies educational experience (such as the GlobalEd simulation) actually produces a decline in preferences for vertical
Figure=3D. Mean 3A. 3B. 3C. 2.49,Security SD = 1.017 is something only countries can provide for themselves (Aggregate) (HS) (MS) (CONTROL)
40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00%
Pre Post
Strongly Disagree Not Sure Agree Disagree N Pre = 1753 Pre Mean=3.95 SD=1.008 N Post = 1753 Post Mean=3.79 SD=1.008 t-score = 4.877 P-value = 0.000 Figure 1C.
Strongly Agree
An international authority is a good thing (Aggregate)
60
percent responding
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
166 M. A. Boyer et al.
50 40 30 20 10 0
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (5)
Mean = 4.27, SD = 0.902 Figure 1D.
An international authority is a good thing (CONTROL)
forms of global governance. Whether or not this is a ‘positive’ outcome is more a matter of ideological preference than educational outcome. It may also be the result of an administrative effect in our experimental setting, if the students are picking up on potential queues from Simcon or the preparation materials provided prior to the simulation (Beer, 2001, p. 60). From another perspective, it might also be interpreted as a result of students experiencing for the first time the reality of state-based decision-making in the contemporary world community. In the simulation, students represent actual nation states and are placed within what, we hope, is structurally a realistic simulation 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00%
Pre
15.00%
Post
10.00% 5.00% 0.00% Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
N Pre = 936 Pre Mean=3.70 SD=1.022 N Post = 936 Post Mean=3.49 SD=1.108 t-score = 4.250 P-value = 0.000 Figure 2A.
An international authority to mediate disputes is a good thing (MS)
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
167
40.00% 35.00% 30.00% Pre
25.00% 20.00%
Post
15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00% Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
N Pre = 817 Pre Mean=3.62 SD=0.997 N Post = 817 Post Mean=3.59 SD=0.991 t-score = 0.771 P-value = 0.441 Figure 2B.
An international authority to mediate disputes is a good thing (HS)
environment. In addition, students become intimately involved in their assigned country role. This may then lead students to view global governance with a bit more skepticism when approaching world affairs from a narrow nationalistic vantage point. Only further examination of the exact effects occurring in the experimental setting and additional refinement of our survey instruments will allow us to provide a more conclusive explanation of this decline. 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00%
Pre Post
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Not Sure
Agree
Strongly Agree
N Pre = 1753 Pre Mean=3.67 SD=1.011 N Post = 1753 Post Mean=3.54 SD=1.056 t-score = 3.719 P-value = 0.000 Figure 2C.
An international athority to mediate disputes is a good thing (Aggregate)
60
50 percent responding
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
168 M. A. Boyer et al.
40
30
20
10
0 1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (5)
Mean = 3.73, SD = 1.071 Figure 2D.
An international authority to mediate disputes is a good thing (CONTROL)
On the state-based security question (Q3), it is worth noting that the means increased slightly in each instance, even if the T statistic was significant only for the high school sample. Taken with the results from Q1 and Q2, this again indicates that the simulation experience appears to have the affect of sensitising some students to the ‘realities’ of security in a state-based world. This may mean that students are becoming more ‘realist’ in their interpretations or world affairs.11 But this tendency may also be an artifact of the structure of the GlobalEd simulation approach that focuses on state-to-state 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00%
Pre Post
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
N Pre = 936 Pre Mean=2.51 SD=1.196 N Post = 936 Post Mean=2.56 SD=1.118 t-score = -0.838 P-value = 0.402 Figure 3A.
Security is something only countries can provide for themselves (MS)
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00%
169
Pre Post
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Neutral
Agree
Strongly Agree
N Pre = 817 Pre Mean=2.59 SD=1.093 N Post = 817 Post Mean=2.74 SD=1.051 t-score = -2.906 P-value = 0.004 Figure 3B.
Security is something only countries can provide for themselves (HS)
negotiation and decision-making, again suggesting the possibility of an administrative effect as mentioned above. It may be worthwhile injecting other non-state actors into the simulation environment in the future to test these ideas more directly. Impressionistic responses As part of the post-simulation evaluation process, students are also asked to comment in an open-ended, free-flowing electronic forum about their experiences during the simulation and how they relate back to the themes discussed in their own social studies classes. This forum is conducted in an online environment similar to a chat room 40.00% 35.00% 30.00% 25.00% 20.00% 15.00% 10.00% 5.00% 0.00%
Pre Post
Strongly Disagree
Disagree
Not Sure
Agree
Strongly Agree
N Pre = 1752 Pre Mean=2.55 SD=1.150 N Post = 1752 Post Mean=2.65 SD=1.091 t-score = -2.532 P-value = 0.011 Figure 3C.
Security is something only countries can provide for themselves (Aggregate)
170 M. A. Boyer et al.
percent responding
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0
1
2
3
4
5
Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly agree (5)
Mean = 2.49, SD = 1.017 Figure 3D.
Security is something only countries can provide for themselves (CONTROL)
or instant message setting. The discussion among simulation participants is facilitated by the simulation’s Simcon. Of most relevance here are student responses to the following questions: ● ●
Do you think there should be a real-world Simcon (if such a thing were possible)? Do you think a real-world Simcon would have a positive or negative impact on international negotiations?
Starting at the middle school level (Grades 6 through 8) and drawing data from nine simulations conducted during Winter 2001, 2002 (two games), 2003 (two games), 2004 (two games) and 2005 (two games), we found that 61% of the responses were positive regarding the ‘value of Simcon’ from the middle school students; 23% of the responses were negative and the remaining 16% were more mixed in their evaluations. By contrast, the responses from high school students involved in six simulations during Fall 2001 (one game), Fall 2002 (two games), Fall 2003 (two games), and Fall 2004 (one game) were quite opposite the middle school responses: 33% were negative, 29% were positive and 38% were mixed.12 Table 1(a). Item Q1: Facilitate diplomatic relations Q2: Mediate disputes Q3: Only state can provide security for themselves Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
Means compared middle school Pre means (SD)
Post means (SD)
T-testing
3.94 (1.02) 3.70 (1.02) 2.51 (1.19)
3.85 (1.00) 3.49 (1.10) 2.56 (1.11)
1.862 4.250*** −0.838
Experimenting with global governance
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Table 1(b). Item Q1: Facilitate diplomatic relations Q2: Mediate disputes Q3: Only state can provide security for themselves
171
Means compared high school Pre means (SD)
Post means (SD)
T-testing
3.97 (0.98) 3.62 (0.99) 2.59 (1.09)
3.71 (1.00) 3.59 (0.99) 2.74 (1.05)
5.219*** 0.771 −2.906**
Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
Some of the representative positive and negative comments follow. They are direct, unedited quotations that country-teams made during the post-simulation online debriefing conference. Positive responses The UN should have more authority than it does. This would allow it to better enforce its resolutions and bring violating nations into line in the interest of world peace. However it does not deserve the power that Simcon has. (Fall 2002, high school) A non-biased group could potentially function as a real-life Simcon. (Fall 2002, high school) I believe there is already a Simcon in the world, the United Nations. Both work to keep negotiations peaceful and productive. (Winter 2003, middle school) We felt that Simcon was a very good idea. It is true that at times we got very angry at another country and if Simcon wasn’t there, we would have done something we’d regret. (Winter 2003, middle school) Having a Simcon in the real world would take time for its development, and it would have to be run by the UN or another international organisation. It would be for the world’s benefit, though. (Winter 2003, middle school) Simcon was greatly helpful during the simulation as being a mentor and a neutral advisor to all groups. In the real world someone like Simcon would be quite useful and help to ease tensions. (Winter 2003, middle school) We think that having a real life organisation that would be like Simcon would make negotiations more organised. (Winter 2001, middle school) We think Simcon was a good thing to have because it was the force that kept everyone on the right path with the questions and negotiations. (Winter 2001, middle school) Table 1(c). Item Q1: Facilitate diplomatic relations Q2: Mediate disputes Q3: Only state can provide security for themselves Notes: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.
Means compared aggregate Pre means (SD)
Post means (SD)
T-testing
3.95 (1.00) 3.67 (1.01) 2.55 (1.15)
3.79 (1.00) 3.54 (1.05) 2.65 (1.09)
4.877*** 3.719*** −2.532**
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
172 M. A. Boyer et al.
Student Reactions to Simcon 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0%
Total MS Total HS
30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0% Positive
Negative
Mixed
Reactions
HS: positive 29%, negative 33%, mixed 38% (n=45) MS: positive 61%, negative 23%, mixed 16% (n=95) Figure 4.
Negative responses A real version of Simcon probably wouldn’t work, since the countries would have trouble agreeing on who should be in charge. (Fall 2002, high school) A real Simcon would never truly exist, only in a child’s paradise could it exist. Unfortunately, the world is a little more harsh than that. World negotiation only works behind closed doors. (Fall 2002, high school) While a completely neutral moderator would be useful in negotiations, this is entirely unrealistic in the real world. Each member of the UN will have, if only subconsciously, bias, so such a neutral rule over the world Government would never exist without risking corruption and unfairness to nations. (Fall 2002, high school) No, the UN should not have more authority. In this simulation perhaps Simcon had too much authority. (Fall 2002, high school) A non-biased group is not logical. As it has already been said, it is human nature to have a bias and very difficult to denied [sic] those biases. (Fall 2002, high school) No, there should not be a Simcon in the real world. (No offense), but we think that Simcon is somewhat of a dictator. Simcon keeps everyone on task, and although that helps in the simulation, in the real world, people should be free to say whatever they want. There should be no barriers, nothing to hold you back. The real world is a battlefield, so if you can’t defend yourself … too bad. (Winter 2003, middle school)
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
173
No, we don’t think there should be someone like Simcon in the real world because they may take advantage of their high position or, side with a country and this may result in dispute. (Winter 2001, middle school) I think that having a real Simcon might help solve high tension issues, but overall I think that those people might have a side preference and might tend to favor a country more than another, because they are human. (Winter 2001, middle school)
The summary results in Figure 4 and the comments themselves suggest a number of interesting ideas about globally oriented educational programs and the prospects for support for the institutions of global governance over the long run. First, the differences between the middle school and high school responses are intriguing in both their interpretation and implications. They might be explained in several ways that are not mutually exclusive. One explanation rests on the notion that middle school students are still in their formative years in terms of political and social attitudes. As a result, they are more prone to registering the impact of an educational experience that demonstrates to them the role that can be played by some form of international or global authority. High school students by contrast have more defined attitudinal structures by that age and are less likely to be affected by experiences that differ from previously held attitudes and values. Another explanation of these differences rests on the idea that middle school students, in general, are more compliant to the dictates of authority than are high school students. As a result, one can speculate that the general anti-authority attitudes held by high school age students are reflected in their reactions to an authority figure (Simcon) that at times told them what to do (or not to do) during the simulation experience. From a methodological perspective and taking these results in tandem with the relative similarity in the means to the questions examined in Figures 1 through 3 (and the accompanying table) is that those students who ‘spoke’ at the debriefing conference (i.e., typing their responses on-line) were the ones with the most strident views on the subjects. Control of the keyboard, then, might have over-ridden the tendency on the part of the group to respond in reasonably similar ways. Lastly, as discussed briefly above, it is also worth considering whether the middle school modalities are at least partly a result of the administrative effect imposed by the fact that Simcon chairs the on-line debriefing conference. As a result and related to the compliance issue raised just above, it is possible that middle school students are more apt to provide Simcon with what they think Simcon wants to hear: that Simcon and the UN are worthwhile, helpful and all-around positive influences on the course of international interactions.
Figure HS: MS: positive positive 4. 29%, 61%, negative negative 33%, 23%, mixed mixed 38% 16% (n=45) (n=95)
Summary and conclusions The data we have examined in this article, though quite voluminous and diverse, suggest a number of conclusions about the future pursuit of global governance:
174 M. A. Boyer et al.
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
●
●
There appears to be relatively high degree of support among adolescents for global governance structures, at least as gauged by analogies to the role Simcon plays in the online simulations and within their limited contact with the ‘real-world’ of international affairs. This level of support is interesting, given the relatively high level of ambivalence that exists among elites and current policy-makers about the value of global institutions. The simulation environment has some interesting implications for the impact of educational programs (at least this one) on attitudes about the UN. At one level, the simulation experience made most students slightly more skeptical about the value of global governance, but it also seemed to sensitise them to the need for collaborative action to achieve state-level security goals.
Obviously, these results demand that we examine in a more refined way the exact attitudes held by adolescents about the UN, and international cooperation more generally, to understand more fully the impact of educational programs on those attitudes. This might mean further refining our survey instruments and also employing a similar pre-post testing methodology to other international studies programs. It may also be an artifact of the open-endedness of the simulation environment, because of the lack of closure that occurs on many of the issues discussed during the simulation. Thus, by attempting to simulate five weeks of real-time negotiation, students are left without a finite set of negotiated results and feelings that Simcon was the primary obstruction to successful issue resolution. One way that we might consider refining our experimental environment would be through the introduction of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ Simcon’s into the simulation system. This would then allow us to test comparatively the ways stronger versus weaker global governance institutions impact the attitudinal scales we administer pre and post. In addition, it would also be very instructive for us to administer similar attitudinal scales to students in other countries. This would, then, help us determine if the US sample of students is indeed unique globally or not. In an optimal research environment, we would not only want to administer a base-line, control type survey abroad, but would also include non-US samples in the treatment or actual simulation environment. Along these lines, we are in the process of administering these attitudinal scales to samples of Israeli students in the fall and winter 2006–2007. We hope to broaden this out further in the coming years. When looking at the more impressionistic open-ended responses, some other patterns also emerge. At policy and normative levels, the results indicate that those interested in promoting positive sentiments toward the United Nations, and global governance more generally, would be well-served by the development and cultivation of globally-focused educational programs at an early age. Instead of focusing civics education at the high school and even college levels in our efforts to educate ‘good citizens’ locally and globally, such programs must target a population whose values are more open to input, enlightenment and revision.13 It also suggests an increased role in promoting such programs by global organisations and private foundations with interests in this area. This might take the
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
175
form of greater involvement in local educational systems through promotional campaigns (such as UN Day), funding for innovative globally-focused educational programs and the development of training programs for primary and early secondary school teachers on the issues involved. Content education for teachers has become a ‘prime directive’ of many teacher education initiatives, and global studies is one content area that is under-provided in the current array of teacher education programs at least in the US. Development and promotion of such programs will necessarily need to reside in the hands of the international and nonGovernmental organisations and private interests supportive of such initiatives. It seems unlikely that a central role in promoting such educational strategies will be taken by states, as they continue to work to stem the tide against erosion of their sovereignty. In conclusion, it is clear to many observers, both casual and professional, that globalisation trends increasingly demand policy solutions based on multilateral, regional and global collaboration. But, it is also clear that such solutions are still obstructed by increasingly outdated, state-based notions of sovereignty and unilateralism. In many ways, then, the future efficacy of global governance will rest on the perceptions and desires of the next generation of citizens and policy-makers. Introducing and solidifying a globally oriented component to education becomes imperative if the world community will be able to cope effectively with policy challenges that transcend state power and jurisdiction. So although state-level policy-makers still tend to prefer independence and autonomy in their decision-making when making globally focused policy choices, they are being forced to move in (or at least consider) more multilateral directions. This means that even policy-makers within states are recognising, albeit grudgingly, the realities of policy solutions in an interdependent world. As suggested above, this means that true multilateralism and effective global governance will likely be the result of states being pulled (or even dragged) to such arrangements by the imperatives of problems and events. And just as parents are often urged by their children to make decisions (on issues ranging from curfew to borrowing the family car) that they would rather not make, American decision-makers may well be pulled toward greater appreciation for the value of global governance by their own children and their cohorts in the contemporary American adolescent population. Acknowledgements This article was originally prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the International Studies Association (ISA), Montreal, Quebec, Canada, 16–20 March 2004. The authors wish to thank Francis Beer, Victor Asal, Marie Henehan and Vicki Golich for comments on earlier drafts. All the authors are associated with the GlobalEd Project, University of Connecticut, www.globaled.uconn.edu.
176 M. A. Boyer et al.
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Notes 1. The data discussed in this paragraph are from surveys obtained online at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut, www.ropercenter.uconn.edu. The question wording for the question discussed in this paragraph was: ‘Do you think the United Nations is doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?’ (In some instances, ‘in general’ was added to the beginning of the question.) The surveys were conducted by a variety of polling organisations, all asking the same question at different points in time. The wording for the question discussed in the next paragraph was: ‘I am going to read a list of possible foreign policy goals that the United States might have. For each one please say whether you think that it should be a very important foreign policy goal of the US, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important goal at all. … Strengthening the United Nations. These surveys were conducted for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. 2. It is worth noting that the public thought strengthening the UN was a higher priority than did those in the elite sample. This elite/mass gap in opinions about the UN is consistent with other research about foreign policy attitudes that has shown the existence of an elite/mass gap (Wittkopf, 1994). 3. The anthology edited by David Held and Anthony McGrew (2000) is an excellent place to start for an overview of research in the globalisation field. 4. It is worth noting that the role of the public in shaping foreign policy has been a rather controversial scholarly issue over the past several decades. Scholars have argued that public attitudes can have a negative impact on policy (Lippmann, 1955; Morgenthau, 1978) or even that public attitudes are too unstable to be useful as a guide (Almond, 1950; Rattinger, 1991). Yet there is also a wide body of literature that argues that public attitudes do matter for the policy process because they set the boundaries of the potential political options that are available to policy-makers even if public attitudes do not determine actual policy choices (Russett, 1990; Powlick, 1991; Risse-Kappen, 1992; Sobel, 2001). Still other scholars view public opinion as stable, coherent, and responsive to information at least in the aggregate (Page & Shapiro, 1992; Page & Barabas, 2000). A substantial body of work supports that position for the American public (Wittkopf, 1986, 1990; Holsti, 1992, 1996; Murray, 1996; Chanley, 1999), and there are comparable findings for European and Japanese publics (Bobrow, 1989; Gabel, 1998). 5. One recent effort in forecasting the future of international relations is seen in the Summer 1999 issue of International Studies Review, guest edited by Davis B. Bobrow. 6. Easton and Dennis found that these attitudes were formed by the time of entry into middle school (see also Alvik, 1968). They also explicitly replace the more common language of system ‘maintenance’ or system ‘stability’ with persistence, which they argue more effectively captures the ultimate concern of political socialisation research—how socialisation keeps the system’s broad parameters in place and functioning. This distinction is important, they contend, because it helps transcend the conservative bias of early political socialisation research, which underemphasised possibilities for alternative discourses within the system (and ignored the socialisation processes and agents fueling them). 7. These feelings are, of course, critical to the evolution and persistence of a democracy-sustaining and enhancing ‘civic culture’ (Almond & Verba, 1963). 8. The reader should remember that ‘Simcon’ is the project’s simulation control person who oversees and facilitates the simulation process. The word ‘Simcon’ is not included in the presurvey, as students have no contact with Simcon prior to the simulation. It is included in the post-survey, as Simcon in many instances plays a mediation/facilitation role among the participants and thus provides a ‘global governance’ benchmark for the students involved in the experience. 9. The reader should note that the control group displayed a statistically significant difference with the mean response from the high school sample only for the first survey question
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
10. 11.
12.
13.
177
(displayed in Figure 1). Control group data has only been collected to date for some of the high school samples. The differences in the response means were not statistically significant for the dispute resolution or security question. Key: Q1: UN as diplomatic facilitator; Q2: UN as facilitator of dispute resolution; Q3: State’s as providers of security. The term ‘realist’ refers to a theoretical perspective in the political science/international relations field that emphasises the distinct role of the state in global interactions and the role played by the pursuit of state power in those interactions. The reader should note that the texts for all the responses to these questions can be obtained from the GlobalEd Project. Space, however, dictates that we only excerpt some of the responses here. A recent book title Educating citizens (2003) lays out a rationale for preparing undergraduates for moral and civic responsibility. But while this is certainly a laudable set of educational goals, our research suggests that earlier intervention may be needed and more directly productive (Colby et al., 2003).
Notes on contributors Mark A. Boyer is a Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of The GlobalEd Project at the University of Connecticut. Scott W. Brown is a Professor of Educational Psychology, Co-Director of the GlobalEd Project and Director of the Teachers for a New Era at the University of Connecticut. Michael J. Butler is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Clark University. Anat Niv-Solomon is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science at the University of Connecticut. Brain Urlacher is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of North Dakota. Natalie F. Hudson is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Dayton. Paula Johnson is an Assistant Professor of Educational Psychology at Western Washington State University. Clarisse O. Lima earned her Ph.D. at the University of Connecticut and is a private consultant for educational institutions and international non-profit organisations in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
References Almond, G. (1950) The American people and foreign policy (New York, Harcourt Brace). Almond, G. A. & Stanley, V. (1963) The civic culture (Princeton, Princeton University Press). Alvik, T. (1968) The development of views on conflict, war, and peace among school children, Journal of Peace Research, 5(2), 171–195. Beer, F. A. (2001) Meanings of war and peace (College Station, TX, Texas A&M Press). Bobrow, D. B. (1989) Japan in the world: opinion from defeat to success, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33(4), 571–604. Bobrow, D. B. & Boyer, M. A. (2005) Defensive internationalism: providing global public goods in an uncertain world (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press).
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
178 M. A. Boyer et al. Brown, S. W., Boyer, M. A., Mayall, H. J., Johnson, P. R., Meng, L. Butler, M. J., Florea, Hernandez, M. & Reis, S. (2003) The GlobalEd project: gender differences in a problembased learning environment of international negotiations, Instructional Science, 34(4/5), 255–276. Calavita, M. (2003) Within the context of many contexts, The Communication Review, 6(1), 23–43. Calavita, M. (2005) Apprehending politics: news media and individual political development (Albany, NY, SUNY Press). Chanley, V. A. (1999) US public views of international involvement from 1964 to 1993, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43(1), 23–44. Coate, R. A. & Puchala, D. (1990) Global policies and the United Nations system: a current assessment, Journal of Peace Research, 27(2), 127–140. Colby, A., Ehrlich, T., Beaumont, E. & Stephens, J. (2003) Educating citizens: preparing America’s undergraduates for lives of moral and civic responsibility (San Francisco, CA, Jossey-Bass). Cnn.com (1997) Negroponte: internet is way to world peace. Available online at: www.cnn.com/ TECH/9711/25/internet.peace.reut/ (accessed May 2003). Cnn.com (2003) Text of Bush news conference, 6 March. Available online at: twww.cnn.com (accessed May 2003). Converse, P. E. (1976) The dynamics of party support: cohort-analyzing party identification (Beverly Hills, CA, Sage). Crano, W. D. (1997) Vested interest, symbolic politics, and attitude-behavior consistency, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(3), 485–491. Dehousse, R. (1997) Regulation by networks in the European community: the role of European agencies, Journal of European Public Policy, 4(2), 246–261. Easton, D. & Dennis, J. (1967) The child’s acquisition of regime norms: political efficacy, American Political Science Review, 61(1), 25–38. Easton, D. & Dennis, J. (1969) Children in the political system: origins of political legitimacy (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press). Eichenberg, R. C. (1998) Domestic preferences and foreign policy: cumulation and confirmation in the study of public opinion, Mershon International Studies Review, 42(1), 97–105. Florea, N., Boyer, M. A., Brown, S. W., Butler, M. J., Hernandez, M., Weir, K., Meng, L., Johnson, P. R., Mayall, H. J. & Lima, C. (2003) Negotiating from Mars to Venus: some findings on gender’s impact in simulated international negotiations, Simulation and Games, 34(2), 226–248. Gabel, M. J. (1998) Interests and integration: market liberalisation, public opinion, and European Union (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press). Glenn, N. D. (1980) Values, attitudes, and beliefs, in: O. G. Brim & J. Agan (Eds) Constancy and change in human development (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press). Glennon, M. (2003) Why the Security Council failed, Foreign Affairs, 82(3), p. 16. Greenberg, E.S. (1970) Political socialisation (New York, Atherton Press). Greenstein, F. I. (1965) Children in politics (New Haven, CT, Yale University Press). Habermas, J. (1996) Between facts and norms (Cambridge, The MIT Press) Halliday, F. (2000) Global governance: prospects and problems, in: D Held & A. McGrew (Eds) The global transformations reader (Cambridge, Polity Press). Held, D. & McGrew, A. (2000) The global transformations reader (Cambridge, Polity Press). Hess, R. D. & Torney, J. V. (1967) The development of political attitudes in children (Chicago, IL, Aldine Publishing). Holsti, O. R. (1992) Public opinion and foreign policy: challenges to the Almond-Lippmann consensus, International Studies Quarterly, 36(4), 439–466. Holsti, O. R. (1996) Public opinion and American foreign policy (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press). Hyman, H. H. (1959) Political socialisation (Glencoe, IL, The Free Press).
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
Experimenting with global governance
179
Keohane, R. O. (2001) Governance in a partially globalised world ‘presidential address’, ‘American Political Science Association, 2000’, The American Political Science Review 95(1), 1–13. Keohane, R. & Nye, J. (1977) Power and interdependence (Boston, MA, Little and Brown). Key, V.O. (1961) Public opinion and American democracy (New York, Knopf). Krosnick, J. A. & Alwin, D. F. (1989) Aging and susceptibility to attitude change, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57(3), 416–425. Krosnick, J. A., Boninger, D. S., Chuang, Y. C., Berent, M. K. & Carnot, C. G. (1993) Attitude strength: one construct or many related constructs?, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(6), 1132–1151. Lane, R. (1962) Political ideology (New York, The Free Press). Lavallee, T. M. & Boyer, M. A. (2006) Globalisation and local governance: implications from Wal-Mart’s expansion, International Studies Perspectives, 7(3), 254–266. Lippmann, W. (1955) Essays in the public philosophy (Boston, MA, Little Brown). Lindberg, L. & Scheingold, S. A. (1970) Europe’s would be polity: patterns of change in the European community (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall). Markus, G.B. (1979) The political environment and the dynamics of public attitudes: a panel study, American Journal of Political Science, 23, 338–359. McDevitt, M. & Chaffee, S. (2002) From top-down to trickle-up influence: revisiting assumptions about the family in political socialisation, Political Communication, 19(3), 281–301. Mitchell, W. C. (1962) The American polity (Glencoe, IL The Free Press). Morgenthau, H. J. (1978) Politics among nations (New York: Knopf). Murphy, C. N. (2000) Global governance: poorly done and poorly understood, International Affairs, 76(4), 780–803. Murray, S. K. (1996) Anchors against change: American opinion leaders’ beliefs after the Cold War (Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan Press). Page, B. I. & Barabas, J. (2000) Foreign policy gaps between citisens and leaders, International Studies Quarterly, 44(3), 339–364. Page, B. I. & Shapiro, R. Y. (1992) The rational public: fifty years of trends in American policy preferences (Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press). Powell, A. C. III. (2003) Democracy and new media in developing nations: opportunities and challenges, in: H. Jenkins & D. Thorburn (Eds) Democracy and new media (MA, The MIT Press) Powlick, P. J. (1991) The attitudinal basis for responsiveness to public opinion among American foreign policy officials, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 35(4), 611–641. Powlick, P. J. & Katz, A. Z. (1998) Defining the American public opinion/foreign policy nexus, Mershon International Studies Review, 42(1), 29–62. Putnam, R. D. (1988) Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games, International Organization, 42(3), 427–460. Rattinger, H. (1991) The development and structure of West German public opinion on security issues since the late 1970s, in: D. Munton & H. Rattinger (Eds) Debating national security: the public dimension (Frankfurt, Verlag Peter Lang). Reinicke, W. H. (1997) Global public policy, Foreign Affairs, 76(6), p. 137. Risse-Kappen, T. (1992) Public opinion, domestic structure, and foreign policy in liberal democracies, World Politics, 43(4), 479–512. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. (2003) Various surveys cited above. University of Connecticut. Ruggie, J. G. (1985) The United States and the United Nations: towards a new realism, International Organisation, 39(2), 343–356, Russett, B. (1990) Controlling the sword: the democratic governance of national security (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press). Shah, D. V., Nojin, K., Holbert, R. (2001). ‘Connecting’ and ‘disconnecting’ with civic life: patterns of Internet use and the production of social capital, Political Communication, 18(2), 141–162.
Downloaded By: [University of Connecticut] At: 22:05 21 July 2007
180 M. A. Boyer et al. Shapiro, I. (1996) Democracy’s place (Ithaca, Cornell University Press). Slaughter, A. (2004) A new world order (Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press). Sobel, R. (2001) The impact of public opinion on US foreign policy since Vietnam (New York, Oxford University Press). Volkmer, I. (2003) Beyond the global and the local, in: H. Jenkins & D. Thorburn (Eds) Democracy and new media (MA, The MIT Press). Weare, C. (2002) The internet and democracy: the causal links between technology and politics, International Journal of Public Administration, 25(5), 659–691. Wittkopf, E. R. (1986) On the foreign policy beliefs of the American people: a critique and some evidence, International Studies Quarterly, 30(4), 425–445. Wittkopf, E. R (1990) Faces of internationalism: public opinion and American foreign policy (Durham, NC, Duke University Press). Wittkopf, E. R. (1994) Faces of internationalism in a transitional environment, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 38(3), 376–401.
