European Integration and the Fragmentation of Party Systems in Western Europe

by Eric Hines University of Iowa [email protected]

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C.

Hines 2

Introduction Political competition can be envisioned as a market where political parties compete to supply voters with the political outcomes (e.g. policy) demanded by voters. Like an economic market, supply must be carefully balanced with demand or there can be serious consequences. Since the 1960s, Western European party systems have become more fragmented as the number of effective political parties contesting parliamentary elections has risen in many countries. This suggests that both the supply of and demand for political outcomes has shifted; sometimes subtly, sometimes dramatically. While in most cases the supply and demand of political outcomes seems to be in balance, understanding the emergence and success of these new or newly successful parties is important to gauging the health of a political market to prevent future imbalances. For this reason, scholars have studied extensively in recent years the growing number of political actors in Western Europe, especially Green parties and the resurgent far-right. These studies have identified a number of factors that correlate with the success (or failure) of these parties. These factors can be separated loosely into those that alter parties’ opportunities to enter the political arena in an attempt to supply political outcomes and those that alter the demands for political outcomes made by voters.1 One factor appears to be European integration, which has had a positive effect on the success of Green parties (Bomberg 1998) and regional parties (Lynch 1996). Still, integration’s role in the general trend of party system fragmentation (i.e. altering the supply and demand of political outcomes) in Western Europe has been neglected. This is problematic because integration, 1

I use the term “loosely” purposefully. Some factors, such as district magnitude, which Durverger (1967) famously demonstrated had both a psychological and mechanical effect on party success, may affect both.

Hines 3 unintentionally, has the potential to unbalance political markets in member states. Critics of the “democratic deficit” in the European Union (EU) like Hix (2003) and Paulson (1997) believe the creation of the common market and the European Monetary Union (EMU) have constrained democratic political competition by reducing the number of policy alternatives available to political parties. For example, the parties of the left have lost their ability to promise higher social benefits and parties of the right have been prevented from making large tax cuts because governmental and opposition parties alike have been forced to advocate the same specific entrenched, centrist EU policies. In short, integration may be preventing political markets from supplying voters’ demands. In the following sections, this paper examines the importance of political competition for a democracy and how the EU may constrain it. It then develops a theory that suggests this constraint might promote party system fragmentation in a manner consistent with spatial models of voting behavior. Finally, it tests two models of party fragmentation and discusses the results of those models.

The European Union and Political Competition A democratic system implies that the preferences of “the people” should prevail in political competition. In order for the popular will to prevail, though, “we require functioning institutions that are designed to, and really do, secure a government responsive to public interest and opinion” (Pitkin 1967, 234). Schumpeter (1942) argues that elections are the principal institutional feature of democracy that provides this responsiveness because they create competition between rival elites for political control. This works because elections produce political competition that functions like a market. This “political market” produces efficient outcomes by providing elites (political parties) with an incentive to present rival policies and candidates that give voters a mechanism for

Hines 4 choosing between parties (Besley and Coate 1997). However, just as markets are often imperfect, elections by themselves do not guarantee perfect political competition. Politics can be oligarchic, which is the case when political elites have insufficient incentive to present alternative policies for voters to choose from or when politics ceases to be competitive. In other words, supply is insufficient to meet demands. Schattschneider (1960) admonishes that under these circumstances “the people are powerless” (137). Politics can also be fragmented to the point that no clear winner emerges. In a famous case, Sartori (1976) describes the “polarized pluralism” of Italy. The political system was so fragmented that it resulted in permanent capture of the government by the dominant centrist party, Partito della Democrazia Cristiana (DC), and increased support for extremist parties. In other words, supply outreaches demand to the point that the market collapses. Anything that constrains political competition can be dangerous to a democratic polity. One argument for the existence of a “democratic deficit” in the EU is that economic integration has proceeded ahead of appropriate political integration (Paulson 1997). Since important economic decisions are made without sufficient input from national governments, national political parties are constrained in the policy alternatives they can offer voters. Hix (2003) summarizes the argument by saying: The EU policy regime has a powerful indirect impact on the process of domestic political competition. The single market rules governing the production, distribution and exchange of goods, services, capital and labour restrict microeconomic policy options. Similarly, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Growth and Stability Pact and the multilateral macro-economic surveillance restrict national budgetary and fiscal policy options. As a result, parties on the

Hines 5 left (who accept the EU regime as legitimate) cannot promise high levels of social protection or expansionary budgetary policies. Equally, parties on the right cannot promise further deregulation of labour, product or capital markets or major cuts in public expenditure (9-10). Hix (2003) looks for evidence of this constraint in the electoral manifestos of the major left and right parties in the EU member states. He demonstrates that the ideological distance between the major parties of the left and right in the member states of the EU has indeed grown closer over time. While the link between integration and this policy convergence is very weak, Hix infers, at least in the short term, policy convergence has been accelerated by the common market. However, Hix does not look for another possible consequence of limited competition, party system fragmentation. If the EU constrains the menu of policy choices available to the leading parties, it has the potential to increase party fragmentation by altering the behavior of both voters and party elites. Given the choice between large parties that differ little on their policy positions and smaller parties that are unencumbered by the policy realities of integration, voters may be encouraged to vote for more extreme parties. However, party elites in larger parties may be willing to lose some votes if by doing so they can consolidate their power or capture the government. An examination of the two major spatial models of voting, proximate voting and directional voting, helps to illustrate this point and generate a testable hypothesis about the effects of limited competition on voting behavior. The classic spatial model of voting is the Downsian proximity model (Downs 1957). As in all spatial models, voters and candidates (or parties) are represented by points in a one-dimensional (or multi-dimensional) space that reflects their respective opinions on the issues. In a single issue, or one-dimensional space, the Downsian model

Hines 6 is a formalization of the standard left-right scale. The theory behind this model of voting is that voters will assess the distance between themselves and the candidates and vote accordingly for the candidate who is closest to the voter’s ideal point. This suggests that a voter’s evaluation is based upon utility and that voters maximize their utility by choosing candidates closest to their ideal. However, Downs noted in his original outline of the model that voters would know that no party would be able to do everything they claim they can. Therefore, voters will anticipate what candidates (or parties) will do once in office and vote accordingly. Grofman (1985) offers a modification of the Downsian model that takes into account the “discounting” of candidate claims by voters. This model uses the position of the status quo and an explicit discount of the candidate’s positions to calculate new utilities of vote choice. Voters will vote for candidates whose likely actions will bring the status quo closer to the voter’s ideal point rather then simply taking the candidates promises at face value. If the EU does constrain the policy actions of political parties, this effect will be disproportionate across parties. The larger the party, and therefore the more likely the party is to be the party of the Prime Minister after an election, the more constraint that the party will face. A minor coalition member can blame inaction on its coalition partners. Large parties generally cannot. This will, in the language of Grofman’s model, cause voters to discount the policy statements of the parties differently. Since the EU constrains policy outputs to the center, parties with centrist leanings will be seen as supporting the status quo no matter how much they promise otherwise. Voters are therefore more likely to vote for parties farther towards the edges of the policy space because their discounted policy position is closer to their ideal point than that of the

Hines 7 major parties. An alternative spatial model of voting behavior is based on directionality rather than proximity. Reynolds (1974) drew on prior work in psychology to develop a theory of voting based on the aggregate of a voter’s belief about a candidate’s issue positions and the voter’s evaluation of those issues. For each issue, Reynolds assigned a value ranging from -3 to 3 or very liberal to very conservative on each belief and evaluation. Reynolds then predicted voters’ attitudes towards candidates by summing the products of a voter’s beliefs about a candidate’s position and the voter’s own evaluation of the issue. In this model, choosing a candidate who is perceived to be on the “right side” of the issues maximizes a voter’s utility. Rabinowitz (1978) and Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) develop a spatial model of directional voting that uses the same utility function as Reynolds but replaces beliefs and evaluations with intensities. Vote choice is based upon a voter utility determined by the intensity and communality of direction of a position of the voters and the candidates’ positions. This theory assumes that voters have diffuse preferences for certain directions on issues whose importance, or intensity, varies. Candidates are also assumed to vary the intensity with which they campaign on a particular issue position. Voters will vote for candidates whose overall intensity on the issues is closest in direction to themselves. Candidates can be more extreme then the voter, but as long as they are on the “right side” of the issues the voter will vote for them. The model generates several specific hypotheses about voter and party behavior in races with three or more candidates (or parties). The most important is that there is no incentive to move to the center, as is the case with a Downsian model. Since voters will only vote for parties on the their side of the ideological spectrum, the movement of

Hines 8 parties to the center does not attract centrist voters from the opposing side. In fact, they risk losing votes to more extreme parties on their ideological flank. If the EU constrains policy competition it will clearly reduce the intensity of the candidates on those policy issues. If voters vote directionally, minor parties will benefit from the declining intensity of the major parties. Even voters who favor centrist outcomes, but who have a passion about a certain issue, will vote for outlying parties because of the benefit of voting the right direction on an issue. Both spatial models of voting behavior suggest that if the political competition of major parties is constrained to the ideological center, more extreme parties will benefit from greater support because of a change in the ability of the party system to supply particular political outcomes. If the EU does in fact cause these constraints, we should see an increase in party fragmentation as each additional constraint of European integration, like completion of the common market and the EMU, is placed on political competition in the member states. This leads to the central hypothesis of this paper: As European integration places constraints on the menu of policies available for political parties to compete on, member states’ party systems will be increasingly fragmented. In other words, integration will produce, in the language of Cox (1990), centripetal forces on major parties that create space within the political area for new parties to emerge and thus increasing the number of parties to ensure a sufficient supply of political outcomes.

Demand-side: An alternative theory While the “supply” theory seems the most plausible to me, there is a compelling alternative based on “demand.” There is significant debate over the dimensionality of political competition in the EU (Marks and Steenbergen 2004). Independent of the actual form of that competition, integration will at least in the short term introduce new issues

Hines 9 into the political arena. Similar to the post-materialist explanations for the emergence of Green parties (Inglehart 1977, 1990), integration may be a catalyst for the formation of new demands by voters. This could mean the enlargement of the domestic political space, with new parties being created to address the needs of the voters. This process could even work in tandem with the supply-side theory since it implies that established parties would be prevented from effectively addressing voters’ new demands. In this sense, fragmentation could be a result of both supply and demand. Figure 1 offers a visual summary of the two theories in action. The top two graphs concern the supply, or centripetal, theory of integration and party fragmentation. The bottom two graphs concern the demand side. Within each pair, the top graphic shows the party system before integration and the bottom graphic show the affect of integration. [Figure 1 about here]

Data and Methods The dependent variable in this study is the effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) in all-national elections held in the EU15 minus Belgium from 1960-1998. If European integration has pushed or pulled voters to support new parties, controlling for other factors that contribute to volatility in the number of political parties, the ENEP would increase over time. If voters have simply shifted support between existing parties, the ENEP would remain steady. Further, if integration had reduced the number of political parties by concentrating the vote, the ENEP would decline. This particular measure of the number of political parties deals with several practical issues faced while studying party systems. Specifically, when counting parties a researcher will be faced with counting parties of different sizes and will be particularly

Hines 10 challenged on the issue of small parties. A general consensus exists for using a weighted measure of political parties (Lijphart 1994). Rae (1971) developed the first generally accepted weighted measure of party fractionalization. However, this measure is not as intuitive as the subsequent measure, ENEP, developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Their measure can be calculated for both vote share and seat share. The formula for calculating the ENEP in an election, where vi is the vote share for each party in the election, is simply: ENEP=

1 å vi 2

(1)

While the effective number of parties can be based on either vote share or seat share, the effect of European integration on the number of parties is more likely to be captured by the measure at the electoral level. The ENEP and the effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) are affected differently by Durverger’s (1954) “mechanical” and “psychological” effects. The mechanical effects are simply the translation of votes into seats after an election. Therefore, ENPP is a function of both the mechanical functioning of electoral rules and the broader psychological effects underlying vote choice. On the other hand, ENEP is a function of only the psychological effects or the expectations of how votes will be translated into seats. Since European integration only changes the psychological calculation of voters and not the mechanical rules for calculating seats, ENEP is a more appropriate measure of political competition than ENPP for this study. The data used comes from a dataset on democratic elections compiled by Golder (2004). To test whether or not the increased fragmentation of the party systems is simply

Hines 11 a result of the general convergence of established parties, I use the ideological/policy distance between the most established party of the left and right in each election-year based upon the Manifesto Research Group’s data presented in Budge et al (2000). While this data is not unproblematic, it does offer a good approximation of the distance between the major parties. The variable itself is the absolute value of the distance theoretically ranging from 0 to 200. The actual range of the variable is 1.21 to 96.3 units. Table 1 lists the countries and the parties used in making the calculations. [Table 1 about here] To measure the potential affects of European integration on electoral fragmentation, I use six measures. Throughout the period covered in this study, three major changes occurred in integration in each of the member states. First, the number of members expanded from six to fifteen. The EU should have no effect on states before they join the EU. To capture any change in the ENEP caused by membership, I include a dummy coded 1 for each election-year in which a country was a member of the EU (or its predecessors). Further, because membership becomes more constraining over time, I include an interaction of membership and time. A second change to European integration that potentially constrained political competition is the push towards completion of the common market that began in 1986. To capture any change in the ENEP caused by this dramatic increase in the power of the EU, I include a dummy coded 1 for each election-year after 1986. Because the common market was also phased in over time, I include an interaction of the common market indicator and time. The third change in the depth of European integration, and the most constraining for political competition, is the introduction of the EMU and the convergence criteria in

Hines 12 1992 as Europe prepared for the adoption of a common currency. To capture any change in the ENEP caused the growth and stability pact, I include a dummy coded 1 for each election-year after and including 1992 in which a member state was a member of the EMU. Alternative covariates of the ENEP are also controlled for in the statistical model. The most important mechanical determinant of ENEP is district magnitude because it determines the permissiveness of an electoral system (Rae 1971, Taagepera & Shugart 1989, Cox 1997). The greater the average magnitude of an electoral system’s districts, the more permissive the system becomes for small parties. I log the measure of average district magnitude because the marginal effect of adding an additional seat is smaller as the magnitude increases. The increasing fragmentation of European party systems may also simply be a function of time.2 This is in part due to the argument that economic prosperity leads to the creation of new demands on government and political parties advocating those demands. There is also a social learning component in which parties will require time to learn the ways to maximize their electoral performance.3 To control for these possibilities, I include a trend variable that takes on a value equal to the year of the observation minus the start year, 1960. The variable ranges from a value of 0 to 38 for elections in the final year of the study. This variable is also used in the interactive variables discussed above. Finally, I control for a variety of economic factors that may increase (or decrease) electoral volatility during an election. One should expect political competition to become 2

Including a time-trend is also necessary since it is included in two interactions. For example, the French Greens eventually gained sufficient support to enter government (and parliament) by forming electoral coalitions with the Socialists in districts where their combined support could win against a divided right. However, it took nearly two decades for the French Greens to do this. 3

Hines 13 more fierce during times of economic hardship. However, political competition should be constrained by greater exposure to international markets. Therefore, I include a measure of the percent of the member state’s GNP that is from the exportation of good to capture the effects of global trade. Greater exposure should increase the number of political parties. To capture the impact of economic hardship, I construct a “misery index” that is the logged annual inflation rate times the unemployment rate. I also include the two components of the index separately. This data comes from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Database.4 Data is missing for unemployment for election-years prior to 1980. Therefore I estimate a model that includes data from 1980-1998 and 19601998. This gives the final model the following specification: ENEPt = b 0 + b1 Membership + b 2 (Membership * Trend) + b 3CommonMarket +b 4 (CommonMarket * Trend) + b 5 EMU + b 6Trend + b 7 ln(Magnitude) + b 8 ln(Trade) + b 9 Misery + b10 ln(Inflation) + b11Unemployment

The data and the model present some specific methodological issues. The model uses pooled cross-sectional times series data. Cross-sectional time series data has two types of information, the cross-sectional data between subjects and the time-series information within subjects that changes over time. Standard OLS regression can be applied to cross-sectional time-series data, but it is not the most efficient method. The reason is that the estimates derived from standard regression may suffer from omitted variable bias. The correction for this problem changes depending on whether the bias is in the cross-section or the time-series portion of the data. The most common type of omitted variable bias occurs when the omitted 4

Available on-line at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/.

Hines 14 variables differ between subjects but are constant over time. The correction for this is to use fixed effects regression. However, panel data can also suffer from omitted variable bias when an omitted variable varies over time but is constant between subjects. The solution for this is between effects regression. When both types of bias are present in the data, a common solution is to use random effects regression that weights fixed and between effects. Since almost any panel data of the sort analyzed in this paper will suffer omitted variable bias due to fixed effects, that correction is necessary. However, if between effects bias exists as well, it is necessary to use a random effects model. A fixed effects model provides more consistent estimates. This provides a way to test which of the two models, fixed effects or random effects, is appropriate. This can be accomplished with a Hausman test (Stock and Watson 2003, Chapter 8). The Hausman test tests the null hypothesis that the estimates from a random effects regression model are the same as the consistent estimates obtained from the fixed effect regression. If they are, random effects regression is recommended. After running the random effects and the fixed effects regression, I obtained a Hausman test statistic that indicates that the random effects regression is not recommended.5 Therefore, I use a fixed effects generalized least squares regression in the following analysis.

Results Table 2 shows the results of two fixed effects GLS regressions. The first model includes all twelve variables and therefore covers 70 elections between 1980-1998. The second model excludes the misery index and unemployment to cover 134 elections from 1960-1998. The performance of both models is mixed. The first model performs slightly 5

A Hausman test statistic is distributed Chi-square with the degrees of freedom equal to the number of estimated coefficients.

Hines 15 better, but this is not unexpected given the shorter time-span of the model combined with the omitted economic variables in the second model. [Table 2 about here] Turning to the results of the short-term model, only two of the key independent variables are significant. The ideological space between established parties does not have a significant effect on the number of effective parties. Membership in the EU and the time trend associated with membership is not significant. Nor is the time trend associated with the membership in the common market. However, entry into the common market in 1986 and entry into the EMU in 1992 both have positive and significant effects on the ENEP. Marginally, joining the common market added .9 more political parties to the party systems of the member states. The EMU had a slightly larger effect, also adding an additional .9 political parties to the party systems of the member states. These findings are consistent with the expectations of my theory that integration has led to some increased fragmentation of party systems. Of the six remaining variables, three are significant. The logged average magnitude of an electoral system actually decreases the number of ENEP. At first, this seemed to be an anomalous result. Decades of research on electoral systems suggest the exact opposite is true. However, this appears to be a function of the fixed effects in the model.6 The average magnitude seems to be negatively correlated with the omitted variable bias corrected for by fixed effects. In short, the bias becomes greater as the number of districts increases and therefore the model must reduce the marginal effect. A second way of looking at this is that average magnitude is such a powerful predictor of the average ENEP in a country that it establishes the intercept, or starting level, for each 6

I examined the data using a between-effects regression and a standard OLS without country dummies. In these cases, as theoretically expected, the coefficient for magnitude was positive and highly significant.

Hines 16 country. The remainder of the information included in the term simply controls for differing effects between countries. Another significant control variable was the misery index. This suggests, not surprisingly, that as the overall economic hardship increases voters begin to vote for smaller parties in protest of the policies of the government. However, unemployment and inflation taken alone do not have an independent effect on the ENEP. Global trade is the only other significant variable in the model. This suggests countries become more electorally permissive as their interdependence on other countries increases, a finding that is in line with Rogowski’s (1987) thesis about the relationship between trade and democracy. The second model is much poorer at explaining overall variation, but this is expected given the omission of two variables included in the short-term model including the significant misery index. The patterns of significance vary slightly in this model. Two variables gain significance in the longer time-span, while one variable drops out. Membership and the membership trend are both significant. In the long-term, joining the EU (or its predecessors) added just over a half an “effective party.” Each additional year in the EU reduced that effect by .02 parties, meaning that after 32 years the direct effect of membership disappears. The significance of membership may be picking up the effects of global trade, which was not significant in this model, since in this longer time span membership is synonymous with globalization and interdependence. The significance of membership is also likely the reason why the common market loses its affect on the ENEP. The EMU continues to increase ENEP, but the effect is only about two-thirds that of the short-term model. Joining results in the addition of .6 effective parties. The only other variable attaining significance is the average district magnitude,

Hines 17 which again has a strong and negative effect on ENEP.

Conclusion Overall, it is difficult to make any strong inferences from the results. While there is a consistent relationship between deeper integration and the ENEP in a member state, the models do not seem to support the general theory that policy convergence amongst the established parties is the driving force behind the increased fragmentation of Western European party systems. In fact, there is little evidence that the increase in the number of parties contesting elections is a result of “supply-side” considerations. The model is insufficient to conclusively test the “demand-side” because it does not examine voter level information, but there is no evidence against it. Testing that side requires a very different data and some deep reflection on the likely sources of specification bias in the models. There are some important normative reasons for considering the claims of the critics of the “democratic deficit” in the European Union (EU) when they suggest that European integration alters political competition in the member states. This paper has explored one implication of that alteration, party system fragmentation. Increased fragmentation of the party system could have consequences for government formation and stability, for parliamentary effectiveness and responsiveness, and most importantly, on the levels of support for extreme parties. This is especially important if it leads to support for the most extreme parties, especially of the right wing. In particular, it would be very undemocratic if the EU constrained political parties in ways that forced them to behave in a manner that increased party fragmentation. This would be what Hix (2003) called “the end of democracy in the EU.” Fortunately, the evidence does not appear to support this conclusion. Instead, it the evidence appears to be suggesting that the

Hines 18 increased fragmentation is a result of changing voter demands. This exactly what is expected in a dynamic political market, where shifting voter expectations lead to shifts in underlying vote patterns. This literature on the effects of integration is divided over the influence of integration on policy convergence and policy constraint in the member states. While this paper began with a general belief that integration was indeed causing some policy constraint, it has found no evidence for that. This suggests one major change in my future research. Consideration of the effect of integration on the increasing fragmentation of party systems must look at the interaction between integration and voters’ demands. This requires looking at public opinion rather than simply event data. This paper assumes that integration has altered voting behavior. While the evidence is not inconsistent with the assumption, my analysis suffers from a general problem of formal modeling — I am looking at macro level evidence of micro level behavior. It is equally plausible that supporters of the major parties have stopped voting so the supporters of smaller parties have more weight. Further, there is no way to say conclusively that the common market, the European Monetary Union (EMU) and its convergence criteria is in any way responsible for changing voter behavior. Therefore, understanding how deepening integration may contribute to the rise (or success) of new parties requires exploring what voters are actually thinking when they cast their votes.

Hines 19

References Besley, Timonthy J, and Stephen Coate. 1997. An Economic Model of Representative Democracy. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112 (1):85-114. Bomberg, Elizabeth. 1998. Green Parties and Politics in the European Union. London: Routledge. Clark, Willam, Matthew Golder, and Sona Nadenichek. 2002. Fiscal Policy and Democratic Process in the European Union. European Union Politics 2 (2):205230. Cox, Gary W. 1990. Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems. American Political Science Review 34: 902-935. Cox, Gary W. 1997. Making votes count : strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems, Political economy of institutions and decisions. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press. Downs, Anthony. 1957. An Economic Theory of Voting. New York: Harper and Row. Duverger, Maurice. 1954. Political parties, their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: Wiley. Golder, Matthew. 2004. Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2000. Electoral Studies forthcoming. Grofman, Bernard. 1985. The Neglected Role of the Status Quo in Models of Issue Voting. Journal of Politics 47:230-47. Hix, Simon. 2003. The End of Democracy: How the European Union (As Currently Designed) Restricts Political Competition. London School of Economics and Political Science. Inglehart, Ronald. 1977. The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Publics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald. 1990. Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. Effective Number of Parties: A meausre with Application to West Europe. Comparative Political Studies 12:2-27. Lijphart, Arend, and Don Aitkin. 1994. Electoral systems and party systems : a study of twenty-seven democracies, 1945-1990. New York: Oxford University Press. Lynch, Peter. 1996. Minority Nationalism and European Integration. Cardiff: University

Hines 20 of Wales Press. Marks, Gary and Marco R. Steenbergen. European Integration and Political Conflict. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Paulson, Andrew. 1997. Cumulative Regional Decline, Institutional Inadequacy and the 'Democratic Deficit': Is European Monetary Union Economically and Politically Sustainable? In Economic Working Paper Archive at WUSTL. Pitkin, Hanna Fenichel. 1967. The concept of representation. Berkeley,: University of California Press. Rabinowitz, George. 1978. On the Naure of Political Issues: Insights from a Spatial Analysis. American Journal of Political Science 22:793-817. Rabinowitz, George, and Stuart Elaine Macdonald. 1989. A Directional Theory of Voting. American Political Science Review 83:93-121. Rae, Douglas W. 1971. The political consequences of electoral laws. Rev. ed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Reynolds, HT. 1974. HT Reynolds. Journal of Politics 36 (4):983-1005. Sartori, Giovanni. 1976. Parties and party systems: a framework for analysis. Cambridge [Eng.] ; New York: Cambridge University Press. Schattschneider, E. E. 1960. The Semisovereign People : a realist's view of democracy in America. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Schumpeter, Joseph Alois. 1942. Capitalism, socialism, and democracy. New York, London,: Harper & Brothers. Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2003. Introduction to econometrics. Boston, MA: Addison Wesley. Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1989. Seats and votes: the effects and determinants of electoral systems. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Hines 21

Table 1: Established Parties in Western Europe Party System Austria Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxembourg Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK

Parties (Left-Right) Socialists (SPÖ), Christian Democrats (ÖVP)

Elections (N) 1962-1995 (11) Social Democrats (SD), Liberals (V), Conservatives (KF) 1960-1998 (16) Social Democrats (SDP), Centre (KESK), National Coalition (KOK) 1962-1995 (10) Socialists (PS), Giscardians (UDF), Gaullists (RPR) 1962-1997 (10) Social Democrats (SPD), Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) 1961-1998 (11) Socialists (PASOK), New Democracy (ND) 1974-1996 (9) Fine Gael (FG), Fianna Fail (FF) 1961-1997 (12) Communists/Left-Democrats (PCI/PDS), Christian Democrats/Forza Italia (DC/FI) 1963-1996 (10) Social Democrats (POSL), Christian Democrats (PCS), Democrats (PD) 1964-1994 (7) Labour (PvdA), Christian Democrats (CDA), Liberals (VVD) 1963-1998 (11) Socialists (PS), Social Democrats (PSD), Popular Party (PP) 1975-1995 (9) Socialists (PSOE), Democratic Centre (UDC), Conservatives (AP/PP) 1977-1996 (7) Social Democrats (SAP), Conservatives (M) 1960-1998 (13) Labour (LAB), Conservatives (CON) 1964-1997 (11)

Hines 22

Figure 1: The Effects of European Integration on the ENEP in Western European Party Systems Supply-Side Theory:

Demand-side theory Before:

After:

Note: Not to scale.

Policy Constraints

After integration:

Policy Constraints

Before integration:

Hines 23

Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression for the Effective Number of Electoral Parties in 14 Western European Countries, 1980-1998 and 1960-1998 (1) 1980-1998 (2) 1960-1998 Ideological Space -0.008 -0.0001 (0.005) (0.004) Membership 0.184 0.643* (1.075) (0.341) Membership * Trend -0.015 -0.028* (0.037) (0.015) Common Market 0.882** -0.105 (0.442) (0.411) Common Market * Trend 0.001 0.004 (0.015) (0.014) EMU 0.924*** 0.572** (0.297) (0.257) -0.438◊ -0.551◊ Average District Magnitude (ln) (0.158) (0.157) Trend -0.045 0.026 (0.050) (0.016) Global Trade (ln) 1.479** -0.154 (0.727) (0.539) Misery Index 0.006** — (0.003) Unemployment -0.040 — (0.039) Inflation (ln) -0.035 -0.017 (0.031) (0.030) Constant 0.810 5.124*** (2.593) (1.69) Observations 70 134 Number of countries 14 14 R-squared within 0.503 0.296 Note: Dependent variable is the effective number of electoral parties. Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10% (one-tailed); ** significant at 5% (one-tailed); *** significant at 1% (one-tailed); ◊ significant at 1% (two-tailed).

European Integration and the Fragmentation of Party Systems in ...

European Integration and the Fragmentation of Party Systems in Western Europe by Eric Hines. University of Iowa [email protected]. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,. Washington, D.C. ...

174KB Sizes 0 Downloads 226 Views

Recommend Documents

European Integration and the Fragmentation of Party ...
Fragmentation of Party Systems in the EU by Eric Hines ... extremist parties. Anything that constrains political competition can be dangerous to a democratic polity. One argument for the existence of a “democratic deficit” in the EU is that ... r

the economics of european integration pdf
the economics of european integration pdf. the economics of european integration pdf. Open. Extract. Open with. Sign In. Main menu. Displaying the economics ...

pdf-1425\the-impact-of-european-integration-on-political-parties ...
Download. Connect more apps... Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. pdf-1425\the-impact-of-european-integration-on-politic ... sus-routledge-advances-in-european-politics-by-dim.pdf. pdf-1425\the-impact-of-european-integration-on-poli

World Views - from fragmentation to integration
2.6 In search of an integrated action model. 2.7 Fragments of world views as a starting point. 3. The Unity of the Seven Sub-tasks. 4. Metaphors and Models: The ...

pdf-18126\pioneers-of-european-integration-and-peace ...
Download. Connect more apps... Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. pdf-18126\pioneers-of-european-integration-and-peace-19 ... nts-bedford-series-in-history-culture-by-sherrill-b.pdf. pdf-18126\pioneers-of-european-integration-and-pe

the economics of european integration 3rd edition pdf
There was a problem previewing this document. Retrying... Download. Connect more apps... Try one of the apps below to open or edit this item. the economics ...

The Welfare Gains of Trade Integration in the European ...
Email: [email protected]. Submitted ... integration thus refers to the trade of intermediate goods triggered by consumption goods pro-.

fragmentation and pollination crisis in the selfs ... - CiteSeerX
Nov 19, 2006 - Technion—Israel Institute of Technology, Haifa 32000, Israel. bDepartment of Evolution, Systematics and Ecology,. The Hebrew University of ...

IP fragmentation and the implication in DNSSEC
naling protocol for Internet telephony, mandates a ... Internet reassembled. Fig. 2 Simplified model for UDP fragmentation test ... 50Mbps to an ISP network.

The myth of the Digital Earth between fragmentation and ... - arXiv
Keywords: Digital Earth, Al Gore, media futures, wholeness, fragmentation, ... anthropological theories of myth-‐making as social construction of meaning. ..... 10 what Graham (2010) calls the construction of a “virtual Earth,” mirroring and ..

Manufacturing Systems, Integration and Control.PDF
(a) Explain in brief the simulation model. 4. (b) Explain cell control module. 5. (c) Discuss the interfacing of coordinate. measuring machines with computer. numerically controlled machine tools in. brief. 5. BME-012 3 1,000. Page 3 of 3. Main menu.

fragmentation and pollination crisis in the selfs incompatible iris ...
plant species to extinction even if their immediate habitats are not affected. .... characterized by a large flower growing individually on each flowering stem.

fragmentation and pollination crisis in the selfs ...
Nov 19, 2006 - conservation means for this species. ... and thus can be used as a test case for our hypothesis. ... This is an asymmetrical specialization: Oncocyclus irises are dependent on ... that presumably did not damage the irises.

4029 WIN - Organisation of CVMP Working Party meetings - European ...
WPs/For secretariats). Send an email to the members of the relevant WP (cc the WP inbox, if ... following link: https://access.ema.europa.eu/sslvpn. You will find ...

the european union and the 'european dimension' in ...
Apr 18, 2008 - European Commission and Parliament to add a 'European dimension' ..... priorities figured the adoption of curricular themes that portrayed "the.

Report - Patients' and Consumers' Working Party (PCWP) - European ...
is delivered. The evidence to support personalised medicine may include so-called 'big data' and an additional challenge revolves around how data can.

4029 WIN - Organisation of CVMP Working Party meetings - European ...
(laptop/desktop) on the MMD login page. Please remember to use the Table of Content document .... Page 9/14. Annex I. Lists of permanent agenda points. AWP.

Integration and Automation of Manufacturing Systems by
ideal for large business applications with multiple users, running many programs at once ... Micro-processors, small computers with simple operating systems (like PC's with ...... Cable - These broadband networks provide a permanent network ...

Comparing Party Systems
many ways the very notion of a party system is centred on the assumption ... systems: a review. The most traditional and most widely accepted criterion for classifying party systems is also the most simple: the number of parties in competition. ....

Work plan for the Blood Product Working Party (BPWP) - European ...
Jul 20, 2017 - 30 Churchill Place ○ Canary Wharf ○ London E14 5EU ○ United Kingdom .... Support to and cooperation with EU institutions and Network.