Ansar al-Islam al Islam (Partisans of Islam)

Outline • An important part of understand a terrorist group is to understand various factors that contributed to the formation of the terrorist group. This brief follows this outline: – Background B k d and d Obj Objectives ti – Area of Occupation and Areas of Operation – Leadership and Key Individuals – Internal Structure – External Influences – Group Activities – Assessing the Threat – The Unknown

Background & Objectives

Background • The predecessor of Ansar al-Islam al Islam was Jund al-Islam al Islam (JI) – JI splintered from the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan on 1 September 2001. • The first leader of JI was Abdullah al-Shaf’i and the majority of the initial members were Arab veterans of the Afghanistan War. • JI was a combination of at least three Islamists factions that splintered from the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan (IMK). – The Kurdish Hamas – The Islamic Unification Movement (Al-Tawhid) ( ) – The Second Force Battalion of Suran • The Kurdish Hamas, led by Omar Baziani, is of unknown size • The Islamic Unification Movement, led by Abu Bark Howleri had less than a hundred fighters.

Background • The Second Force Battalion of Suran Suran, led by Asad Hasan Hasan, was the largest of the three groups with several hundred fighters, some of whom were nonArabs, and most of whom had fought in Afghanistan. • In I 2002, 2002 JI was renamed d Ansar A al-Islam lI l (AI) which hi h translates t l t to t Partisans P ti of Islam. • AI gained international coverage several months prior to the Iraq War as a brutal guerrilla group located in the Kurdish area of Iraq. The U.S. government stated that AI was the “missing link” between Al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein. – On February 5, 5 2003, 2003 Secretary of State Colin Power cited Ansar al alIslam as the key reason for the pending invasion of Iraq. q War was over, it was common knowledge g that • Byy the time the Second Iraq Saddam had no direct ties to al-Qaeda but AI remained in the news. – In July 2003, General Richard Myers, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman stated that AI was still active in Iraq and that some of the cadre had been captured and were under interrogation.

Objectives

Objectives • Open press reveals several objectives of AI: – Assist Al-Qaeda in establishing an Islamist Caliphate from Andalusia to Turkistan – Offer an alternative to “secular” Kurdish political parties – Create an Islamic state modeled on the Taliban in Kurdish areas of northern Iraq – “Expel Expel those Jews and Christians from Kurdistan and join the way of Jihad, [and] rule every piece of land . . . with the Islamic Shari’a rule.” • Schanzer, 2003 – AI follows f the Salfism S f Sunni S sect while most Kurds are Safi’ite S f Sunni. S Therefore, converting Kurds to radical Islam was also a goal • In the area controlled by AI it issued decree ordering women to g beards,, segregation g g of the sexes,, banning g wear veils,, ment ot grow music, barring women from education and employment

Area of Occupation & Areas of Operation

Area of Occupation • AI occupies an enclave along Iranian border in town of Halabja in the Hawraman region of the Sulaimaniya province bordering Iran – Remote, harsh mountain area – Network of caves – Control C t l off over 4 4,000 000 civilians i ili and approximately a dozen villages, including Biyara and Tawela

Areas of Operation • AI occupies an enclave along Iranian border in town of Halabja in the Hawraman region of the Sulaimaniya province bordering Iran – Remote, harsh mountain area – Network of caves – Control C t l off over 4 4,000 000 civilians i ili and approximately a dozen villages, including Biyara and Tawela

Leadership & Key Individuals

Leadership • The leader of AI is Najmeddin Faraj Ahmad – aka Mullah Krekar. – Kreker studied Islamic law in Pakistan under Insight TV News

– Kreker strongly opposes PUK and KDP efforts to create an independent Kurdish state and instead wanted an Islamic regime to counter Hussein’s Ba’athist regime. – After Gulf War II, he migrated to Norway as a political refugee and he traveled throughout Europe from 1991 to 2002 – In 2002, Kreker was in northern Iraq and is accused of planning AI attacks against Coalition forces and Kurdish citizens – Kreker is currently under custody in Norway but facing extradition to Iraq as long as Iraq guarantees he will not face the death penalty penalty. • Iraqi President Jaffari (Kurdish) is requesting the extradition

Other Key Individuals Mullah Krekar Abu Abdullah Shafae • Iraqi Kurd • Former leader of AI and now the deputy leader • Trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

Abu Wail • Only Arab in AI Senior Leadership • Possible Iraqi intelligence officer under Saddam Hussein’s rule • Credited with AI and Ba’athist cooperation p

Abu Musa'ab Al Zarqawi • Rose to notoriety when he ordered the assassination of PUK leader • Accused of ordering U.S. diplomat Laurence Foley assassinated • Leading terrorist in Iraq • May no longer be a part of AI and now operating independently

Internal Structure

Command Structure • Prior to 2003 2003, AI had a highly centralized command structure • Feb 5, 2003 when Secretary of State Colin Powell announced AI was a major U.S. U S concern and the missing link between Iraq and al-Qaeda al Qaeda – Over 400 AI fighters fled to Iran and returned after Operation Iraqi Freedom – Conducted operations near Fallujah, Tikrit, and Ramadi – AI now very decentralized • Small cells and informal groupings • Cells consists of: • AI fighters fi ht • Freelancers • Foreign fighters • Ba Ba’athists athists

Organizational Structure Mullah Krekar Shura Council 15 men operating from HQ in Beyara C Consultative C Committee Mediation Team Media Bureau Videotapes combat operations Distributes CDs to al-Qaeda Runs website: www.ansarislam.com

Training Camps Instruction on: Tactics Suicide bombings Infantry weapons Assassinations Fighting Force Cells 10 tto 15 members b

Organizational Structure • Small units – Optimized for guerrilla warfare tactics • Exact number unknown – Lack of access to AI area makes verification of the organization’s size d dependent d t on K Kurdish di h reporting ti • Approximately 800 terrorists; Kurds, Jordanians, Moroccans, Palestinians, Pashtun Afghans, Syrians, and Lebanese

Funding • Likely to receive majority of financial assistance from Al-Qaeda Al Qaeda • May receive support from Iran • Some self-sufficiency within Kurdish areas through intimidation

Modus Operandi • Pre Operation Iraqi Freedom – Fought in small groups yet attacks larger PUK and KDP forces to achieve goals – Assassinations of key figures – Harasses H llocall citizens iti • Attacks and vandalized stores in Kurdish towns • Reportedly throws acid in faces of women they believe are dressing immodestly

Modus Operandi • After Operation Iraqi Freedom – Fights in small groups, uses suicide bombers, attacks spread from AI enclave to Sunni dominated areas in Iraq – Likely joining with Ba’athist in fight against Coalition forces – Assassination A i ti off kkey fi figures • Kurdish • Iraqi Government • Iraqi Military and Security Services – Attacks Coalition Partners in Iraq • Mainly y U.S. – Continues to harasses local citizens

Weapons • Fairly new weaponry and munitions • Mortars – 82mm and 120mm • Heavy machineguns • Anti-aircraft weapons • Rocket-propelled grenade launchers • Kalashnikov rifles

Communication • Limited use of cell phones – Believes U.S. monitors communications • Relies on couriers • No formal public relation operations – Produces local newsletter – Provides P id statements t t t to t local l l foreign f i news organizations i ti • Interview on al-Jazeera Mullah Krekar referred to as AI’s leader

External Influences

International Linkages • Italy – Two Tunisians with ties to AI arrested Apr 2003 – Five AI cadre found with Iraqi q p passports p in Aug g 2003 – Wiretaps indicate al-Qaeda network in Italy sending money to AI • Funding from Austria, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Eritrea • England – Possibly received funds from Abu Qatada, key al-Qaeda cleric in London and AI supporter • Indicates AI infrastructure in England • Syria – Staging ground for AI according to Italian wiretaps • Tactic approval by Syria • Europe – Recruiting activities in Germany, Norway, and Spain

International Linkages • Iran – Direct support remains in question, denies any ties to AI – Indirect support pp more verifiable • Allowed terrorists to travel in and out of their area via Iran • Supported AI as a means to ensure the Kurds did not spread their concept of Greater Kurdistan into Iran • PUK claims that Iran has provided AI with rockets, rockets mortars mortars, ammunition, and treated wounded terrorists g when attacked in Iraq q • AI use Iranian town of Marivan as a refuge • Allowed recruitment in Iran, especially border city of Sanandaz, after U.S. attack on AI enclave • Iranians supplied fake identity cards to AI members returning to Iraq

International Linkages • Iranians supplied fake identity cards to AI members returning to Iraq – Kurdish intelligence reports it intercepts three to ten foreign fighters crossing from Iran every week into the AI area of operations • Krekar – Spent many years in Iran – Arrested in Amsterdam after flying in from Iran • When US / Kurds attacked AI,, members fled to Iran – Many initially turned back – Others later allowed to stay in Iran • Iran benefits from AI’s activities by effectively harassing Iraqi democratic process and by gaining influence with other Islamic groups • However, ties between the Sunnite AI and Shi’ite Iran probably only temporary and as AI grows strong, Iran likely to distance itself from the terrorist group it has no direct control over

International Linkages • Iraq – Abu Wael • Possibly served as link between Saddam Hussein and AI • Wife is Izzat ad-Douri’s ((chairman of Revolutionary y Command Council) cousin – Reports indicate that Saddam’s regime helped supply weapons and ammunition to AI • Kurds state TNT captured from AI was produced by Iraqi military – Saddam provided medical aid to Zarqawi before the war • Allowed Zarqawi to remain in Baghdad for eight months to recover from wounds inflicted by U.S. in Afghanistan – Saddam Hussein may have used AI to oppose the Kurds without being directly involved due to U.S. protection of the Kurds – Many captured AI have visas endorsed by Iraq

Linkage to Al-Qaeda • Sheikh Abdullah Azzam – Believer of religious warfare to spread Islam against the “West” – Osama bin Laden studied under Azzam – Krekar studied under Azzam • al-Zarqawi – Pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden • Leaders visited al-Qaeda bases in Afghanistan in Spring 2001 • PUK officials ffi i l state t t AI has h strong t links li k with ith al-Qaeda lQ d – Fifty-seven Arab Afghan fighters, followed by dozens more, traveled from Afghanistan to join the AI after the 11 Sept 2001 attack • Captured bases show graffiti praising bin Laden y • Received $300,000 to $600,000 from al-Qaeda as “seed money” • Thirty al-Qaeda members joined AI in 2001; in 2003 over 120 al-Qaeda

Linkage to Al-Qaeda • Cadre from other Arab countries – some with experience in Afghanistan – AI using same training techniques as al-Qaeda • AI based in area of Iraq q with weak authority y – Ideal for al-Qaeda to launch jihad from • Leaders visited al-Qaeda in Afghanistan during Aug 2001 – Prior to 11 Sept 2001 attacks – Al-Qaeda may have been seeking to create a base in northern Iraq because they feared a U.S. attack in Afghanistan • AI captive stated teams returning from Afghanistan to AI area after 11 Sept 2001 attacks stated that bin Laden told Kurdish Islamic cells to unite • AI imposed Taliban like rule – Men forced to grow beards – Banning alcohol, pictures, and advertising at their bases – Women and girls prevented from studying; wear full veils

Group Activities

Activities Timeline • Sept 2001 – Ambushed and killed 42 PUK fighters – Seized control of several villages near Halabja; • Sharia law imposed • Feb 2002 – Assassinated Kurdish Christian politician, Franso Hariri • Apr 2002 – Attempted assassination of PUK regional government Prime Mi i t Barham Minister, B h Seleh; S l h five fi bodyguards b d d killed kill d • Jun 2002 – Bombed restaurant; killed a child, injured dozens • July 2002 – Killed nine PUK fighters • July 2002 – Destroyed Sufi shrines • Dec 2002 – Killed 103 PUK and wounded 117; executed > 24 – Kurds ask U.S. for assistance • By early 2003 – AI seeking chemical agents (cyanide, ricin, VX)

Activities Timeline • Feb 8, 8 2003 – Assassinated Kurdish Prime Minister Shawkat Mushir Mushir, founding member of PUK, eight others killed • Gulf War II begins • Feb 20, 2003 - U.S. names AI a Specially Designated Terrorist Group • AI prepares ffor combined bi d U U.S. S /K Kurdish di h attack tt k • AI targeted by U.S. and PUK fighters; most of AI enclave destroyed • Mar 25, 2003 – AI attacks PUK, dozens of AI killed – PUK, backed by U.S., retaliate on Mar 23 and destroy AI enclave • Evidence showing meetings occurred between AI and al-Qaeda al Qaeda • Evidence also describes chemical / biological experiments • Most AI flee to Iran – Iran states that they y became p prisoners but later freed many y of them

Activities Timeline • Apr 2003 – AI attack Kurdish security forces • May 2003, Gulf War II ends • Jun 2003 – AI announces it will welcome volunteers to fight the U.S. in Iraq • Aug A 2003 - AI begins b i conducting d ti attacks tt k th throughout h t IIraq • Aug 7, 2003 – AI possibly attacked Jordanian embassy in Baghdad • Aug 2003 – Unknown number (> 100) AI / al-Qaeda militants enter Iraq via Iran • Aug 19, 2003 – U.N. headquarters in Baghdad bombed, killed 22 • Aug 29, 2003 – Car bombing in Najaf, killed 85 • Sep 9, 2003 – Attempted bombing U.S. DoD office in Irbil, 3 killed

Activities Timeline • Oct 14 14, 2003 – Asad Hasan Hasan, assessed as being the third ranking AI AI, captured • Nov 12, 2003 – Four car bombings in Baghdad, killed 33 • Nov 2003 – Truck bombing of Italian headquarters in Nasariyah • Dec D 2003 – AI cells ll operating ti iin Ki Kirkuk, k k M Mosul, l S Samarra, and dH Haweja j • Feb 1, 2004 – Two suicide bombings in Irbil at KDP and PUK headquarters killed 109 and wounded more than 200 headquarters, • Feb 10 & 11, 2004 – Two car bombings in Baghdad, killed over 100 • Mar 2, 2004 – Suicide bombings of Shiite shrines in Baghdad and Karbala, killed 181 and wounded over 500 • Mar M 17, 17 2004 – Bombing B bi iin B Baghdad hd d kill killed d7 7, wounded d d over 30 • Apr 21, 2004 – Car bombing in Basra, killed 74

Activities Timeline • Dec 3, 3 2004 – Three Iraqis believed to have connections to AI arrested in Germany – Planned on assassination of Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi • Early 2005 - Reports that AI no longer exists – U.S. and Kurdish attacks have rendered them ineffective – Attacks Att k currently tl being b i carried i d outt are partt of: f • Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda network • AI is now Ansar al-Sunna – Renamed to show greater Islamic goal; no longer just anti antiKurd

Assessing the Threat

Non-U.S. Threats • Kurds view AI as a threat – Stationed several thousand Peshmerga around the enclave – Mortar and small arms fire between the two sides are common • Europe – In 2004, approximately 20 supporters of AI were arrested – January J 12 12, 2005 raid id captured t d severall AI supporters t iin G Germany – No plans against Europeans, but assessed as willing to conduct attack on Iraqi’s Iraqi s in Europe • Germany arrested three Iraqis suspected of planning assassination of Prime Minister Iyad Allawi during his visit to Germany

U.S. Threat • U.S. US – Ai is fighting a jihad against the United States and their coalition partners across Iraq • Assessed as fighting U.S. in Fallujah, Tikrit, and Mosul • Feb 20, 2003 – U.S. freezes AI assets but does not list AI as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) – The standard of evidence for freezing assets is different than those of naming a group a FTO • A group that poses significant risks of committing terrorist acts can have their assets frozen • A group that engages in terrorist activity and threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the security of the U.S. before becoming a FTO • March 22, 2004 – U.S. designates AI as a FTO – AI provides safe haven for al-Qaeda in Iraq – AI trained in al-Qaeda camps p in Afghanistan g – AI leading groups engaged in anti-Coalition terrorist attacks

The Unknown

Unanswered Questions • What is the relationship between AI and al-Qaeda? al Qaeda? – Evidence points to AI being tied to al-Qaeda • Transfer of funds • Training of AI in Afghanistan • Documents found in Afghanistan discuss AI • Large number of al-Qaeda in AI • Zarqawi a member of al-Qaeda and AI • Same overall goal and objectives – A number b off hi high h profile fil attacks tt k in i IIraq against i t the th C Coalition, liti especially against U.S. forces – If Zarqawi is a member of AI, then AI is likely linked to al-Qaeda; al Qaeda; however, if Zarqawi is now independent of AI, then AI may now longer be tied to al-Qaeda – Question Q ti remains i unanswered d if AI was or is i a partt off Al-Qaeda Al Q d

Unanswered Questions • If AI did have connections to Saddam Hussein’s Hussein s regime, regime was it uniting with Ba’ath partisans to fight the Coalition forces? – Connections between Hussein via Waed may be indicator that H Hussein i was using i AI tto h harass th the PUK – However, • Weapons, Weapons equipment, equipment explosives may have been captured by AI or sold to AI by soldiers without Hussein’s knowledge • It is unlikely that Hussein would plan a long-term strategic tie with AI, but may have been using them as just a short-term nuisance to th PUK the – Current connections • AI appears to be operating in conjunction with former Ba’athist Ba athist party members – Likely to me a marriage of convenience, not connivance • No clear proof that Hussein was using AI or that AI is connected with the current terrorists in Iraq – Many terrorist could be simply following Zarqawi

Unanswered Questions • What ties exist between AI and Iran? – Iran is suspected, but not proven, to indirectly support AI’s efforts to not only destabilize the democratic transition. – Furthermore, • AI’s harassment of the Kurds continues to be a visible reminder to the two major Kurdish political parties parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Democratic Union of Kurdistan, not to attempt to form a Greater Kurdistan that would extend into Iran • Unlikely that Shi’ite Iran would actively support a radical Sunni AI in the long term. – Tie between Iran and AI not proven • Likely that Iran used AI to hinder Iraq under Hussein • Continues to use AI to hinder Iraq post-invasion – Limit formation of U.S. sponsored democratic Iraq – Will pull away from AI if AI becomes, or is, tied to al-Qaeda

Unanswered Questions • Does AI still exist? – Kurdish reports indicate AI has combined with al-Qaeda and is now Ansar al-Sunna • Attacks in early 2004 closely tied to those of al-Qaeda than AI • Suicide attacks increasing; not a AI modus operandi – al-Sunna lS translates t l t to t “Protectors “P t t off Sunni” S i” • May be an attempt to reach out to former Ba’athist • Broaden appeal of AI (seen mostly as anti-Kurd) • Led by Abu Abdullah Hassan bin Massoud – KDP stated is a lieutenant of bin Laden • Deputy leader is Abdullah Shafae, previously deputy leader of AI • Goal is to create a strong Islamic country • Many terrorists are foreign, thus proving Ansar al-Sunna is achieving its goal of uniting Muslims from across the Islamic world – It is unlikely that AI has ceased to exist as a terrorist group; however, many of its hard-core members may have deserted AI and combined forces with al-Qaeda as Ansar al-Sunna

References

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References • Ridolfo, Kathleen. (April 2, 2005). Iraq: Alaged terrorist leader to be deported from Norway. Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://www.rferl.org/ featuresarticleprint/2005/04/d3687fc-0a66-4594-ab86-2f5a2b95ee5a.html • Rubin, Michael. (December 2001). The Islamist threat in Iraqi Kurdistan. Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, 3(12). Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://www.meib.org/articles/0112-irl.htm • Sanders, Edmund. (February 26, 2004). Ansar, Al Qaeda seen as working more closely. Originally published by the Los Angeles Times. Reprint by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://www.puk.org/web/htm/news/nws/news040225a.html • State Department designates Ansar al-Islam as terrorist group. (March 22, 2004). Defend America. Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/ mar2004/a032304b.html • Schanzer, Jonathan. (2005). Al-Qaueda’s armies: Middle east affiliate groups & the next generation of terror (2nd ed.). New York: Specialist Press International. • Schanzer, Jonathan. (2004). Ansar al-Islam: Back in Iraq. Originally published in Middle East Quarterly, 11(1). Reprinted in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the new Iraq: Insights and forecasts (pp. 145-156). • Schanzer, Jonathan. (January 15, 2003). Ansar al-Islam: Iraq’s Al-Qaeda connection. Originally published in PolicyWatch, 699. Reprinted in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the new Iraq: Insights and forecasts (pp. 81-83). • Schanzer, Jonathan. (May 10, 2004). Tehran’s hidden hand” Iran’s mounting threats in Iraq. Originally published in National Review Online, May 10,2004. Reprinted in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the new Iraq: Insights and forecasts (pp. 353-355). • Taylor, Catherine. (March 15, 2002). Taliban-style group grows in Iraq. Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://www.csmoinitor.com/2002/0315/p01s04wome.htm • Terrorism: Ansar al-Islam founder faces extradition to Iraq. (April 19, 2005). Adnkronosinternational The Global Information Gateway. Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Terrorism&loid=8.0.153016312&par=0 • Treasury Department statement regarding the designation of Ansar al-Islam. (February 20, 2003). U.S. Treasury Department. Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://www. treas.gov/press/releases/js48.htm • Ulph, Stephen. (January 20, 2003). Ansar al-Islam expanding Europe. Terrorism Focus, 2(2). Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://jamestown.org/terrorism/ news/ article.php?articleid=2369130 • Walt, Vivienne. (February 16, 2004). Interview with the terrorist. Time Online Edition. Retrieved on June 25, 2005, from http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,591420,00.html • White, Jeffery, Jonathan Schanzer. (February 11, 2004). Eyewitness perspective assessing progress in Iraq: Security and extreminism. Originally published in PolicyWatch, 830. Reprinted in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the new Iraq: Insights and forecasts (pp. 124-127).