1 Social Morality and Social Misfits: Confucius, Hegel, and the Attack of Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard By Daniel M. Johnson There is a remarkable and surprising connection to be found between an argument of Søren Kierkegaard’s and one of Zhuangzi’s – what I call the “social misfit” critique. I will argue that this connection highlights a hitherto unacknowledged parallel between the moral thought of their respective targets: Hegel in the case of Kierkegaard and Confucius in the case of Zhuangzi. Specifically, it reveals a significant parallel between Hegel’s movement from Moralitat to Sittlichkeit and Confucius’ position on the central and irreducible role of li (ritual or propriety) in morality. I will begin by briefly tracing the “social misfit” critique as it is found in Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling and in the Zhuangzi. In the second section, I will sketch Hegel’s argument for the indispensability and irreducibility of social norms (Sittlichkeit) for morality, and reflect on the implications of this move for the possibility of social criticism. Finally, I will argue that Confucius can be understood as articulating a vision of morality and of social criticism very close to Hegel’s.

1. Kierkegaard and Zhuangzi There should be little doubt that Hegel is Kierkegaard’s primary target in Fear and Trembling.1 Kierkegaard’s pseudonym Johannes de Silentio’s objective throughout the book is to prove the following thesis: if Hegel is right, then Abraham is a murderer. Johannes’ burden is to show that Abraham’s decision to obey God and sacrifice his son Isaac simply cannot make ethical sense if Hegel’s view of the ethical is correct. Johannes characterizes Hegel’s view of the ethical as the “universal” – there is no criterion for morality external to the social norms realized 1

See Westphal (1987), chapter 5; Westphal (1998), 109-110; and Evans (2004), 66-70. I do think it possible, though, that Kant is a secondary target; see Johnson (2011).

2 in a community, and no one exists or can exist in abstraction from their roles in their community, which means that social norms are universal in the sense that no one exists or acts ethically apart from them.2 Each of the three Problems of Fear and Trembling expresses a different characteristic of the ethical as the “universal” – that it applies to everybody at all times (Problem I), that God is merely a vanishing point for morality, not a being that can speak directly, unmediated by the ethical (Problem II), and that ethical decisions can always be made publicly intelligible (Problem III) – and argues that Abraham’s decision fails to exhibit each of these characteristics.3 Abraham’s decision to sacrifice Isaac, therefore, cannot be made ethical if social norms (Sittlichkeit) are made the necessary context for ethical action. Since Abraham is considered the father of faith in the Judeo-Christian tradition, and his decision to obey God in the case of the sacrifice of Isaac is considered a paradigm of faithfulness, Abraham is the social misfit par excellence – a social misfit that renders an entire religious tradition (Judeo-Christian theism) incompatible with Hegel’s socialization of morality. Johannes’ social misfit critique of Hegel in Fear and Trembling doesn’t stop with Abraham, though, but goes even deeper. Johannes makes no attempt to show that Hegel is in fact wrong or that Abraham is not a murderer, but rests content with simply showing the incompatibility of Hegel’s ethical system with making Abraham the father of faith. He does say, though, that Abraham is “a guiding star that rescues the anguished.”4 In Problem III, Johannes gives some clues as to what he means by this, in the form of a series of stories of people who in various ways find themselves unable to meet the demands of the universal and fulfill their social

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As I will point out in the next section, this does not rule out the possibility of social criticism for Hegel. Kant’s view of morality also exhibits all three of these characteristics of the ethical understood as “the universal,” and so Johannes’ arguments apply to Kant and well as to Hegel. However, Hegel is the primary target, which is especially clear in Johannes’ treatment of the figure of the tragic hero. 4 Kierkegaard (2006), 18. 3

3 obligations.5 There is no hope for these people, the “anguished,” if Hegel is right and Abraham is a murderer; but if Abraham is not a murderer but in fact the justified father of faith, then there is hope for these people because there is something beyond the norms of society in which they may be able to take refuge. Johannes’ “social misfit” critique of Hegel is therefore twofold: Hegel can neither admit the value of Abraham’s faithful transcendence of social morality nor offer hope to those who find themselves unable to meet their social obligations. Zhuangzi’s version of the “social misfit” critique is focused in three stories found in the “In the World of Men” chapter of the Zhuangzi.6 The first two are not about people at all, but about trees. Carpenter Shih and Tzu-ch’i each encounter trees that are useless by the standards of human society. The tree that Carpenter Shih encounters is large and beautiful, but is not a “timber tree” – the type of wood it possesses is useless for making boats, coffins, doors, or anything else that society values wood for. The tree that Tzu-ch’i encounters is ugly, with twisted branches, a pitted trunk, a foul stench, and no edible produce, and so is also useless for anything human society values trees for. Both men realize (though it takes Carpenter Shih a while) that it is precisely this uselessness by societal standards that has allowed the trees to grow large and strong, while all the “useful” trees have been cut down by humans. There must therefore be value in valuelessness, usefulness in uselessness, a perspective on value that lies beyond human society. The message of these two stories about trees reaches its fulfillment in the story about Crippled Shu. Shu is a cripple, unable to fulfill the social roles and requirements that define a “normal” and “valuable” human being. He is able, however, to provide for himself, and it is

5

Sarah and Tobias, Agnes and the Merman, Faust, and Gloucester. See Kierkegaard (2006), 82-98. The stories of Agamemnon and the Delphic bridegroom do not fall into this category, because they are stories of decisions that remain within the ethical and so are intelligible on Hegel’s view of ethics. 6 Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] (1996), 59-62.

4 precisely his disability that exempts him from the military service and hard labor expected of “normal” and “valuable” members of society. “With a crippled body, he’s still able to look after himself and finish out the years Heaven gave him,” says Zhuangzi, who then adds (this is key), “How much better, then, if he had crippled virtue!”7 Confucius, who is featured throughout this chapter of the Zhuangzi in many of the stories, is the target of this critique, because of his view that morality, virtue, and value are essentially and irreducibly social in nature. Zhuangzi, like Kierkegaard, thinks that such a socialization of ethics cannot do justice to the value of those beings and actions which simply cannot meet social norms. Kierkegaard, as I mentioned before, has a two-pronged social misfit critique: first, Hegel cannot properly value Abraham, who is capable of meeting the demands of social morality but transcends it; second, he cannot provide hope for those beings constitutionally incapable of meeting the demands of social morality. Zhuangzi’s critique isn’t divided in this way, but constitutes a sort of mixing of elements of both of Kierkegaard’s points. On the one hand, the “hope” motif present in the second element of Kierkegaard’s critique is absent from Zhuangzi’s, which emphasizes the value of beings and actions who do not meet social norms. In this sense Zhuangzi’s critique is closer to the first element of Kierkegaard’s critique than the second. On the other hand, Zhuangzi is concerned with the value those beings who, unlike Abraham, are constitutionally incapable of meeting the demands of social norms. In this sense his critique bears a greater similarity to the second element of Kierkegaard’s critique than the first. I am not going to try to evaluate the status of the social misfit critique any further – I won’t try to decide the precise form of the argument or whether the argument is successful. Nor will I examine the difference between Kierkegaard’s and Zhuangzi’s solutions to the problem raised by their critique. What I am interested in is investigating the connection between the 7

Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi] (1996), 62.

5 targets of this critique, Hegel and Confucius. I will argue that the similarity between the critiques directed at the two thinkers points to a similarity between their views on the social nature of morality. Now, the similarity between the arguments of Kierkegaard and Zhuangzi does not, by itself, prove a similarity between the ethical theories of their respective targets. After all, it could be that one or both critiques are entirely mistaken.8 It does, however, at least suggest that a connection is there to be found, and I will attempt to find it.

2. Hegel The element of Hegel’s ethical theory relevant to the comparison I want to make with Confucius is his socialization of morality, expressed in his critique of Moralitat (translated “morality”) in favor of Sittlichkeit (translated “ethical life”), the concrete ethical norms embodied in a society. Moralitat or the moral perspective, epitomized by Kant, is the attempt to derive moral requirements in abstraction from the particular concrete social roles and relationships in which the rational being is embedded. Moral duties, thinks Kant, can and must be derived by pure practical reason, reason divorced entirely from my perspective as a particular human being with a particular situation and expressing instead simply my perspective as a rational being qua rational being. Pure practical reason gives the moral law in the form of the categorical imperative, one expression of which is the formula of universal law: “So act that you may will the maxim of your action to be a universal law.”9 This doesn’t allow for the contingencies of social norms to determine obligation, because the maxims that determine 8

It could be, also, that the critics could hold the position that their targets’ views have the practical effect of making ethics reducible to social norms, even if the targets’ theoretical positions do not. For instance, the Mohists are probably a secondary target of Zhuangzi’s critique here, and their theory of morality probably does not reduce morality to social norms – Zhuangzi’s point is that their theory does do so practically if not theoretically. All this just to say that I need some more argument to show that this commonality between Zhuangzi and Kierkegaard reflects an actual commonality between their targets, Hegel and Confucius. 9 Wood (1990), 154.

6 obligation must be universal and indexed only to the perspective of the human being qua rational being. One of the motivations, perhaps the primary motivation, for the moral perspective is a desire for universality, a desire to avoid prioritizing myself over others in determining my moral duties. Hegel thinks that there is something right about the moral perspective: the emphasis on rationality and universality. However, he thinks that there is something fundamentally lacking in making the moral perspective the final word on ethical duty. Hegel’s famous critique of Kant and of the moral perspective generally is the emptiness charge: the moral perspective, argues Hegel, precisely because it abstracts from the particular historical and social situation of the individual, is fundamentally empty of content. It is too abstract to require particular actions rather than others, too general to provide determinate content to morality. The details of Hegel’s critique have been the subject of a great deal of controversy, and there have been other emptiness charges urged against Kant’s categorical imperative that may or may not be identical to Hegel’s.10 The precise form of Hegel’s argument is unimportant for my purposes, as is the question of whether Hegel’s argument succeeds. The important thing to note is the problem that he identifies with the moral perspective (the lack of determinate ethical content) and what he thinks is necessary to solve the problem. The only candidate for providing the determinate content that the moral perspective lacks, thinks Hegel, is Sittlichkeit, the norms embodied in the social relations and institutions of an actual community. These norms cannot be determined or evaluated by a rational standard that is abstracted entirely from those norms – and so, since such norms are underdetermined by any abstract standard of rationality, they irreducibly determine the concrete ethical duties of the human beings embedded within them. 10

For an extensive treatment, see Wood (1990), chapter 9.

7 It is important to note that this does not commit Hegel to radical conservatism, where the norms and institutions of my society are unchallengeable. Hegel does have the resources to affirm the possibility of social criticism. He simply has to deny that criticism of social norms can be conducted from a perspective that is itself abstracted from all social norms. Criticism of social norms can be conducted, though, from the perspective of other social norms. Social criticism, then, must follow the model of immanent critique, where internal tensions between various social norms and institutions reveal an underlying inadequate rationality of the actualization of the ethical life in the society. This is how Hegel can incorporate Kant’s emphasis on the rational determination of ethical duties without admitting that they can be determined by pure reason abstracted from the ethical life of a community – only that society which is free from internal tensions and so immune to immanent critique is the society in which Spirit is fully actualized and fully rational. This view of social criticism does, however, rule out the possibility of criticism or abandonment of social norms from a perspective private to an individual. Social criticism can only be conducted from the perspective of some subset of the norms and institutions operative in society, which are always and necessarily intersubjective and public in nature, and which involve communities rather than single individuals.

3. Confucius It is precisely Hegel’s socialization of morality that Kierkegaard targets with his social misfit critique in Fear and Trembling. The similarity between Kierkegaard’s use of the social misfit and Zhuangzi’s suggests that Confucius engages in a similar socialization of morality – and, indeed, that is precisely what we find in what is perhaps the central concept in Confucian

8 ethics, the notion of li (rites or rituals of propriety). Li are sacred rites or holy ceremonies, which Confucius extends to cover all the mores or conventions that govern social interactions and institutions.11 Li are therefore communal norms and practices which express public meanings and which govern public duties. The first characteristic of Confucian ethics that suggests a parallel with Hegel is the absolutely central role in his ethical thought that Confucius assigns to li. Virtue is precisely the ability and willingness to conduct oneself according to the rites: “To subdue one’s self and return to propriety (li), is perfect virtue.”12 There is no virtue apart from the rules of propriety: “Without an acquaintance with the rules of propriety (li), it is impossible for the character to be established.”13 As with Hegel, there is therefore no morality apart from the rites and norms, the ethical life, of a community. A potential objection could be to note that Confucius denies that simply following the outward form of the rite in a rote and artificial manner is sufficient to be acting ethically.14 For an action in accordance with a rite to be ethical, it must be engaged in sincerely, exhibiting a unity of the attitude of the actor and the form of the action. The outward form of the action is therefore insufficient to render the action ethical, and we could take this as one way in which Confucius refrains from a total socialization of ethics. This is not, however, a discontinuity between Confucius’ thought and Hegel’s, since Hegel also thinks that genuine ethical action requires a unity between the inner and the outer, the motives and attitudes of the actor and outward conformity of the action to communal norms.15 Hegel and Confucius therefore

11

Fingarette (1972), 6. Analects 12:1. See also Analects 15:17. 13 Analects 20:3. See also Analects 8:8 and 8:2. 14 Analects 3:12, Finagarette (1972), 8. 15 This is actually one of the motives for Hegel’s critique of Kant’s view of the good will. See Wood (1990), chapter 12. 12

9 stand together in making ethical action a function of conformity (of the whole person, inwardly and outwardly transformed) to communal norms and practices. This isn’t quite enough to really firmly establish a strong parallel between Confucius and Hegel. What is distinctive about Hegel is not simply his stress on the importance of communal norms but his insistence on the irreducibility of those communal norms to any more basic standard of ethical evaluation. Sittlichkeit, for Hegel, is the necessary context for determining moral duties precisely because Moralitat underdetermines moral duties. If we could establish that Confucius, though he makes social norms (in the form of li) essential for ethical action, thinks that li can be derived from some more basic standard of value that is not irreducibly social, then we would have a decisive disanalogy between his thought and Hegel’s. This brings us, then, to the second and most important parallel between Confucius’ thought and Hegel’s: the irreducibility of li to any more basic standard for ethical action. The most significant evidence for this interpretation of Confucius’ thought is his view of learning. The li, without which the moral life is impossible, are learned: “The superior man, extensively studying all learning, and keeping himself under the restraint of the rules of propriety, may thus likewise not overstep what is right.”16 Consider the following passages: “Respectfulness, without the rules of propriety, becomes laborious bustle; carefulness, whithout the rules of propriety, becomes timidity; boldness, without the rules of propriety, becomes insubordination; straightforwardness, without the rules of propriety, becomes rudeness.”17 “There is the love of being benevolent without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to a foolish simplicity. There is the love of knowing without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to dissipation of mind. There is the love of being sincere without the love of learning –the beclouding here leads to an injurious disregard of consequences. There is the love of straightforwardness without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to rudeness. There is the love of boldness without the love of learning – the 16 17

Analects 6:25; see a parallel passage at 12:15. Analects 8:2.

10 beclouding here leads to insubordination. There is the love of firmness without the love of learning – the beclouding here leads to extravagant conduct.”18 The role that the rules of propriety play in the first passage is identical to the role that learning plays in the second passage – there is even some repetition between the two passages (boldness and insubordination). The role is that of the vehicle for the transformation of the raw materials of the self into ethical being. These passages tightly tie learning together with the li. The learning in question is presumably learning from other people. The rites are therefore learned from society or some part of society. If it were possible to reduce the rites to some more basic standard of value, it shouldn’t always be necessary to learn them from somebody else – it should be possible to figure them out for yourself, to derive them from that more basic standard. The fact that Confucius draws such a tight connection between learning and li – suggesting that mastery of the li must be acquired by learning them from others – therefore indicates that the li are irreducibly social and not derivable from some more basic standard of value. I’d like to take a look at two objections to my argument. The first is based on Confucius’ version of the Golden Rule. Confucius claims that there is “one thread” running through morality, “to be true to the principles of our nature (zhong) and the benevolent exercise of them to others (shu) – this and nothing more.”19 A principle given such central importance by Confucius would be a good candidate for a standard more basic than li from which li is derived, and so would constitute a challenge to my interpretation of Confucius if the standard is indeed independent of li. Now, there is a great deal of controversy about how to translate and interpret the two concepts (zhong and shu) which constitute the “one thread” running through morality. It is generally agreed that shu involves some concept of reversibility that is expressed elsewhere in the Analects as the negative form of the Golden Rule: “not to do to others as you would not wish 18 19

Analects 17:8. Analects 4:15. See also 6:27-28, 12:2, and 15:23.

11 done to yourself.”20 Much of the controversy over the interpretation of the “one thread” revolves around the notion of zhong. Some have seen this as the positive side of the notion of reversibility, others as something else entirely. I cannot here deal with the many conflicting interpretations.21 I can, though, make a general point that I think suffices to respond to the objection: in light of Confucius’ clear belief in the irreducible role of li in the ethical life and in learning to be moral, we should not expect to see all the content of li reduced to a principle that is itself abstracted from a social context. Therefore, we should favor interpretations that see this “one thread” as itself embedded in the context of li and not abstractable from them, unless there is solid evidence to the contrary. And, in fact, many current interpretations of the principle do not abstract the principle from li. For example, the interpretations of Fingarette, Nivison, and Ivanhoe (both his earlier and later interpretations) all build the content of li into the notion of zhong by making zhong in some sense the following of the li or some subset of them, and deny that shu can be realized in abstraction from zhong. Even Ivanhoe’s view that the principle of reversibility (shu) can limit the observance of li in certain circumstances does not threaten the parallel with Hegel, so long as we deny that such a limitation on the li can operate in abstraction from all li altogether – and Ivanhoe does deny this, affirming that shu appeals to moral intuitions that are themselves shaped by the observation of li.22 Other interpretations may do something similar. My argument is that any interpretation that does not consider Confucius’ “one thread” to be abstracted from the context of li is prima facie more plausible than any that does, and such an interpretation does not threaten the parallel between Confucius and Hegel. Since there is a wealth

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12:2; see also 15:23. For a good treatment of a range of interpretations, see Ivanhoe (2008). 22 Both Ivanhoe’s earlier (1990) and later (2008) interpretations agree on this point. 21

12 of such interpretations available, the Confucian Golden Rule does not at this stage constitute an objection to my argument. The second objection to my argument is based on the relationship between Heaven and morality. Sometimes Confucius speaks as if moral duties are the ordinances of Heaven and moral virtue a function of correspondence to Heaven: “It is only Heaven that is grand, and only Yao corresponded to it. How vast was his virtue!”23 Regardless of whether Heaven is a personal being or an impersonal principle, if we take this to signify that there is a standard of morality that is separate from society that can be apprehended and used to judge societal norms according to whether they correspond to it, then this is an objection to the connection between Confucius and Hegel, who thinks that moral duty cannot be apprehended except in the context of ethical norms actualized in a society. Indeed, this issue of Heaven is simply one way into the larger issue of social criticism in Confucius. Confucius certainly thinks that he can criticize the mores of his society for falling short of ethical perfection (which, in his view, was realized in the time of the sage-kings), and there are some passages (pointed out by David Hall and Roger Ames) that seem to indicate that Confucius disapproves of uncritical acceptance of all learned practices (all li).24 How can he engage in such social criticism, exalting one set of social norms above another, unless he thinks he has apprehended a standard independent of them both? The key to answering this objection is to realize that Hegel himself has the resources to affirm social criticism. I think that the best way to understand Confucius is to understand him as engaging in a practice of social criticism analogous to Hegel’s. There are three ways we could understand Confucius. (1) There are moral standards independent of li, knowable apart from li, on the basis of which li can be criticized. The quote about Heaven may support this, but it 23

Analects 8:19. See especially Analects 15:36 and perhaps also 19:6 and 4:10. See Ames and Hall (1987), 48 and 96. Ames and Hall suggest the concept of yi, rather than knowledge of Heaven, as the basis for criticism of the li. 24

13 doesn’t make sense in light of Confucius’ larger theory of moral cultivation and the centrality and irreducibility of li for ethics. (2) The second interpretation is Fingarette’s. On his interpretation, it isn’t important that the age of the sage-kings actually happened or that the system of li traditionally held to have been actualized by the sage-kings be in any sense objectively right or wrong. What matters is that everybody shares the same system of li, so that social harmony can be realized. Fingarette thinks, then, that we should regard Confucius’ reverence for tradition as a utilization of narrative myth, as a tool to effect a unification of widely diverse and competing practices under one harmonious system of social norms. I have two comments to make about this view. First, this would attribute to Confucius an even more radical socialization of morality than Hegel’s, since it would mean that only the fact that some unified set of social norms prevails widely is important, not any particular set (and so this wouldn’t really challenge my thesis in any significant way). Second, I find this view objectionable because, if it is attributed to Confucius himself, it represents him as a kind of deceiver who isn’t being totally honest when he reveres traditional morality as closer to the truth and to Heaven than contemporary morality. (3) The third way to understand Confucius is to understand him as engaging in a kind of Hegelian immanent critique, criticizing some li on the basis of a character shaped by other li.25 This interpretation would understand his reverence for tradition as his looking back to a system of social norms that is free from all internal tensions, which exists in communal memory and so is not derived from some abstract standard. This interpretation, unlike (1), harmonizes with Confucius’ general theory of moral cultivation, without the disadvantages 25

If Hall and Ames are right in pointing to yi as the basis for criticism of the li (a point on which I remain neutral), then my argument would amount to the claim that yi cannot, according to Confucius, step entirely outside the system of social norms (li) and criticize them; yi itself must be informed and shaped by learning, socialization, and the li. This interpretation is, I think, strongly supported by Confucius’ insistence that learning is indispensable for the moral life. If yi could be employed to step outside the li, criticize them, and generate a better system, then learning would be dispensable and yi would be the foundation of the moral life. The text seems not to support this view. See Ames and Hall (1987), 89-110.

14 of Fingarette’s interpretation. On this view, we can understand Confucius’ statements about Heaven and his endorsement of criticism of the li as analogous to Hegel’s judgments about how close a particular society’s Sittlichkeit is to being a fully rational actualization of Spirit, not by reference to an independent standard but by reference to standards internal to the society being criticized. I conclude that the similarity between the social misfit critiques in Kierkegaard and Zhuangzi reveals a significant similarity between the moral thought of Hegel and Confucius: the central and irreducible role of social norms and institutions in determining ethical duties (Hegelian Sittlichkeit and Confucian li). There are certainly many differences between the precise roles that the two thinkers assign social norms in their respective theories. For one thing, li seems to signify for Confucius sacred symbolism and ritual expression of distinctively human power, a signification somewhat different than Hegel’s understanding of Sittlichkeit as the progressive self-realization of Spirit.26 For another, the content of the perfectly ideal system of social norms certainly differs between the two thinkers, though they also exhibit some significant commonalities – for instance, both thinkers emphasize the institutions of the state and the family as the fundamental source for moral duty, but they differ in deciding which of the two institutions trumps the other. Finally, they obviously differ in where and when they think the perfect system of li or perfectly rational actualization of Sittlichkeit has occurred – Hegel looks forward and sees the perfect set of social norms as the end and climax of world history, while Confucius looks backward and sees it as having been achieved in former times and since lost. Nevertheless, each of these differences occurs in a context of a more basic agreement on the irreducible role of social norms in determining ethical action.

26

See Fingarette (1972), chapters 1 and 5.

15 References Ames, Roger T., and Hall, David L. (1987). Thinking Through Confucius. Albany: State University of New York Press. Chuang Tzu [Zhuangzi]. (1996). Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings. Translated by Burton Watson. New York: Columbia University Press. Confucius. (1971). Confucian Analects, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean. Translated by James Legge. New York: Dover Publications. Evans, C. Stephen. (2004). Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fingarette, Herbert. (1972). Confucius: The Secular as Sacred. Prospect Heights, Illinois: Waveland Press. Ivanhoe, Philip J. (1990). “Reweaving the ‘One Thread’ of the Analects.” Philosophy East and West 40 (1): 17-33. ---. (2008). “The ‘Golden Rule’ in the Analects.” In David Jones (ed.), Confucius Now: Contemporary Encounters with the Analects. Chicago: Open Court, 81-107. Johnson, Daniel M. (2011). “Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard’s Supposed Irrationalism: A Reading of Fear and Treambling.” Kierkegaard Studies Yearbook, 51-70. Kierkegaard, Søren. [Johannes de Silentio]. (2006). Fear and Trembling. Edited by C. Stephen Evans and Sylvia Walsh and translated by Sylvia Walsh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Westphal, Merold. (1987). Kierkegaard’s Critique of Reason and Society. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press. ---. (1998). “Kierkegaard and Hegel.” In Alistair Hannay and Gordon D. Marino (eds.), The

16 Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 101124. Wood, Allen W. (1990). Hegel’s Ethical Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.