Causal Uncertainty and the Dilution of Category Information in Judgments Ryan P. Brunner & Gifford Weary The Ohio State University
Abstract Previous research has shown that individuals with chronically available CU beliefs spread their attention equally among all available information when forming impressions (Brunner & Weary, 2004, 2005). To further test this hypothesis, participants, whose CU level had been measured, read about a target described either with or without category information. They then read either four (short-list condition) or ten (long-list condition) diagnostic items about the target and predicted the target’s GPA. Results showed individuals high in CU weighted target information equally. Thus, in the long-list condition, participants high in CU showed no difference in judgment as a function of category information. In the short-list condition, however, high CU individuals weighted the category information more heavily and showed evidence for stereotyping. Individuals low in CU stereotyped regardless of list length.
Introduction • Causal uncertainty (CU) is the uncomfortable feeling or belief that one does not understand the causes and effects of the social world. • Activation of CU leads to the adoption of accuracy goals designed to reduce feelings of uncertainty (Weary & Edwards, 1996) • These subjective-accuracy goals can lead to the avoidance of heuristic cues when forming impressions (Weary, Jacobson, Edwards, & Tobin,2001).
• Past research has also shown that causally uncertain individuals attend equally to all available information when forming judgments (Brunner & Weary, 2004; 2005).
Introduction (cont.) • Thus, if equal weight is given to all available information by high CU individuals, category information may have a differential impact on social judgments depending on the total amount of target information available. • In other words, if a larger amount of information about a target is available, the influence of category information should be diluted for individuals high in CU (relative to those low in CU). • The current study seeks to test whether dependence on category information in judgments changes as a function of amount of information present and CU level.
Method • The current study utilized a paradigm similar to those used in stereotype dilution work (Tetlock & Boettger, 1989).
• Sixty-four participants were asked to read a series of behaviors regarding a target individual. • Participants were informed that the target was an honors student (stereotype condition) or a senior (no stereotype condition). • Participants then read either four sentences (low information) or ten sentences (high information) describing the target.
Method (cont.) • Half of the target behaviors were consistent with an honors student stereotype and half were inconsistent. • Following the presentation of target behaviors, participants were asked to list any thoughts they had about the target. • Finally, participants were told to predict the target’s GPA (on a 4-point scale). • All participants then completed the Causal Uncertainty Scale
(Weary & Edwards, 1994).
Results GPA Predictions in High Information Condition
Predicted Grade Point Average
Sterotype x CU x List Length interaction 3.5 3.3
3.374 3.295
3.1 2.9
2.986
2.931
2.7 Neutral
Honors Student
(ß= -.119, p=.024, N = 64)
High CU Low CU
Results GPA Predictions in Low Information Condition
Predicted Grade Point Average
Sterotype x CU x List Length interaction 3.5 3.4 3.331
3.3 3.1
High CU Low CU
3.024
2.9 2.7
2.758
Neutral
Honors Student
(ß= -.119, p=.024, N = 64)
Conclusions • Results supported the idea that individuals high in causal uncertainty weighted the category information differently depending on the total amount of information available. • When more information was available, the relative importance of the category information was minimized for those high in CU but was still utilized by individuals low in CU. • When little information was available, the category information was used by those high in causal uncertainty as well as those low in causal uncertainty.
Conclusions • Consistent with previous work, individuals high in causal uncertainty avoided stereotype use in judgments while low CU individuals showed significant stereotyping. • This result was qualified, however, by the amount of information available about the target. • Specifically, these results support the CU model’s assertion that activated causal uncertainty beliefs lead to the adoption of a subjective accuracy goal rather than the simple goal of avoiding all heuristic cues or category labels.
Implications • The findings of the current study extend previous research by demonstrating the differential use of category information by individuals high in causal uncertainty. • Consistent with the CU model, the current study showed a condition under which individuals high in CU used category information in the interest of fulfilling their goal of subjective accuracy. • Future research seeks to further investigate the boundary conditions under which individuals high in causal uncertainty attend to and use category information when making judgments.
References Brunner, R.P., & Weary, G. (2004). Causal uncertainty and consequences for social judgment of individuals. Masters thesis, The Ohio State University. Brunner, R.P., & Weary, G. (2005). The Role of Causal Uncertainty in On-line vs. Memory-based Judgments. Presented at the 6th Annual Meeting of the Society of Personality and Social Psychology in New Orleans. Tetlock, P.E., & Boettger, R. (1989). Accountability: A social magnifier of the dilution effect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 388-398. Weary, G. & Edwards, J. A. (1994). Individual differences in causal uncertainty. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 308-318. Weary, G., & Edwards, J.A. (1996). Causal uncertainty and related goal structures. In R.M. Sorrention and E.T. Higgins (Eds.), The handbook of motivation and cognition (Vol. 3): The interpersonal context. (pp. 148-181). New York: Guilford. Weary, G., Jacobson, J., Edwards, J., & Tobin, S. (2001). Chronic and temporarily activated beliefs and stereotype usage. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 206-219.
