U.S. Department of Justice Executive Office fo r Immigration Review

Board oflmmigration Appeals Office of the Clerk j/()7 /.usbllrg Pike, Suite :ZOGO Falls Church. Virginia non

Sukach, Marsha Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP 1177 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10036

DHSIICE Office of Chief Counsel - PIS 27991 Buena Vista Blvd Los Fresnos, TX 78566

Name:

_ _ 808

Date of this notice: 10/15/2015

Enclosed is a copy of the Board's decision and order in the above-referenced case. Si ncerely,

Donna Carr Chief Clerk

Enclosure Panel Members: O'Leary, Brian M. Grant, Edward R Guendelsberger, John

Userteam: Docket

U.S. Department of Justice

Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Executive Office for Immigration Review Falls Church, Virginia 2204 J

File; _ _ Los Fresnos, TX

Date:

OCT i 6 2015

In re: IN REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS APPEAL ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT: ON BEHALF OF DHS:

Marsha Sukach, Esquire

Jose R. Solis Assistant Chief Counsel

APPLICATION: Asylum, withholding of removal, Convention Against Torture

AMENDED DECISION'

The respondent, a native and citizen of Honduras, has appealed from the Immigration Judge's April 2, 2015, decision denying his applications for asylum and withholding of removal under sections 208 and 241 (b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 123 I (b)(3), and protection under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). The Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has filed a motion for summary affirmance of the Immigration Judge's decision and opposition to the appeal. The appeal will be sustained and the record remanded solely for the required security checks. We review Immigration Judges' findings of fact for clear error, but questions of law, discretion, and judgment, and all other issues in appeals, de novo. See 8 C.F .R. §§ 1003.I(d)(3)(i), (ii). Because the applicant's application was filed after May 11 ,2005, it is subject to the provisions of the REAL ID Act. The respondent presented evidence and testimony to support his claim that he was a journalist in Honduras until shortly before he left for the United States (1.1. at 3-5; Tr. at 19-29). The respondent was fired from his position as ajoumalist after he stopped reporting for work due to fear of tJ:rreats and violence made against him for his reporting on local nareo-traffickers I To correct an error in our original decision, the Board's order of September 11,2015, in this matter is vacated and the proceedings reinstated upon the Board's own motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). This order is hereby issued as of this date, incorporating the text of the attached vacated order, with the following exception: In the last full paragraph on page two, the words "withholding of removal" are hereby corrected to read "asylum." Additionally, in the last full paragraph on page two and in the ORDER, the word "applicant" is hereby corrected to read "respondent. "

(I.J. at 5; Tr. at 29). The respondent testified that he went to the police to refort the threats and violence, but that he was not offered any protection (1.1. at 4-5; Tr. at 27-28). Upon de novo review, we conclude that the respondent has demonstrated he suffered past persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group as a journalist who spoke publicly against narco-traffickers. The respondent submitted evidence to demonstrate that journalists are a socially distinct group within Honduran society, and frequently targets for violence and murder (Exh. 3). See Matter oj M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 242 (BIA 2014) ("a group's recognition for asylum purposes is determined by the perception of the society in question"). Furthermore, the respondent provided testimony that he was harassed, threatened with violence, shot at, and beaten, all in connection with his reporting on local narco-traffickers and by individuals he recognized as narco-traffickers (I.J. at 4; Tr. at 19-26). See Eduard v. Ashcroft, 379 F.3d 182, 188 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Matter oJO-Z & l-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23, 26 (BIA 1998)) (recognizing implicitly that past persecution may be established based on ·the cumulative effect of multiple threats and attacks, even if no single incident is sufficient). The respondent testified that he sought protection from the police in Honduras and was told they could not do anything because the alleged perpetrators were minors (1.1. at 5; Tr. at 28). See Shehu v. Gonzales, 443 FJd 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding violence is not persecution unless it is demonstrated government authorities were completely helpless to protect the victim). As the respondent has demonstrated that he suffered persecution on account of his membership in a particular social group and that the Honduran govenunent was unable or unwilling to protect him, the respondent has demonstrated he qualifies as a refugee as described under the Act. See section 101(a)(42) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Additionally, the respondent's evidence shows that the drug trafficking organization that attacked him is powerful throughout Honduras geographically and politically (Exh. 3, Tab V). The respondent also explained that he would likely face hann from gangs in other regions of the country (I.J. at 9; Tr. at 31-32; Exh. 3). The respondent's evidence shows that Honduras has one of the highest crime rates in the world (Exh. 3, Tab G). The country struggles with political corruption, drug cartels, and gangs (Exh. 3). Inasmuch as we find that the respondent established past persecution on a protected ground, we find that DHS has not met its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent could avoid persecution through internal relocation. 8 U.S.c. §§ 1208.13(b)(i)(8) and (ii). We conclude it is unreasonable to expect the respondent, whose family, social and economic ties are all within one region of the country, to relocate within Honduras. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3)(B) and (ii). In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent established eligibility for asylum. Accordingly, we will sustain the respondent's appeal and remand the matter solely for the required security checks. The following orders will be entered.

2 The Immigration Judge did not make an explicit adverse credibility finding in this case. Therefore, the respondent has a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal. See section 240(c)(4)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c)(4)(C).

2

ORDER: The respondent's appeal is sustained, and the record is remanded solely for the

required security checks. FURTHER ORDER: Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § l003.1(d)(6), the record is remanded to the Inunigration Judge for the purpose of allowing the Department of Homeland Security the opportunity to complete or update identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations, and further proceedings, if necessary, and for the entry of an order as provided by 8 C.F.R. § IO03.47(h).

FORlIHE

3

AAD