A Note on Discrete Convexity and Local Optimality∗ Takashi Ui† Faculty of Economics Yokohama National University [email protected] May 2005

Abstract One of the most important properties of a convex function is that a local optimum is also a global optimum. This paper explores the discrete analogue of this property. We consider arbitrary locality in a discrete space and the corresponding local optimum of a function over the discrete space. We introduce the corresponding notion of discrete convexity and show that the local optimum of a function satisfying the discrete convexity is also a global optimum. The special cases include discretelyconvex, integrally-convex, M-convex, M\ -convex, L-convex, and L\ -convex functions. Keywords: discrete optimization; convex function; quasiconvex function; Nash equilibrium; potential game.



I thank Atsushi Kajii, Kazuo Murota, and anonymous referees for helpful comments. I acknowledge financial support by MEXT, Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research. † Faculty of Economics, Yokohama National University, 79-3 Tokiwadai, Hodogaya-ku, Yokohama 240-8501, Japan. Phone: (81)-45-339-3531. Fax: (81)-45-339-3574.

1

1

Introduction

The concept of convexity for sets and functions plays a central role in continuous optimization. The importance of convexity relies on the fact that a local optimum of a convex function is a global optimum. In the area of discrete optimization, on the other hand, discrete analogues of convexity, or “discrete convexity” for short, have been considered. There exist several different types of discrete convexity. Examples include “discretelyconvex functions” by Miller [5], “integrally-convex functions” by Favati and Tardella [3], “M-convex functions” by Murota [7], “L-convex functions” by Murota [8], “M\ -convex functions” by Murota and Shioura [12], and “L\ -convex functions” by Fujishige and Murota [4]. While these functions also have the property that a local optimum is a global optimum, the type of local optimum (i.e. the definition of locality) depends upon the type of discrete convexity. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between discrete convexity and local optimality by asking what type of discrete convexity is required by a given type of local optimality. We consider arbitrary locality in a discrete space and the corresponding local optimum of a function over the discrete space. We then introduce the corresponding notion of discrete convexity and show that a function satisfying the discrete convexity has the property that the local optimum is a global optimum. Finally, we argue that the special classes of functions satisfying discrete convexity include discretelyconvex, integrally-convex, M-convex, M\ -convex, L-convex, and L\ -convex functions. Thus, we can understand the local optimality conditions for these functions in a unified framework. We also argue that a sufficient condition for the uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the class of strategic potential games [6] obtained by [14] can be seen as a special case of our results.

2

Results

We denote by R the set of reals, and by Z the set of integers. Let n be a positive integer and denote N = {1, . . . , n}. The characteristic vector of a subset S ⊆ N is denoted by χS ∈ {0, 1}N : { 1 if i ∈ S, χS (i) = 0 otherwise. We use the notation 0 = χ∅ , 1 = χN , and χi = χ{i} for i ∈ N . For a vector x ∈ RN , let ∑ kxk1 = i∈N |x(i)| be the `1 -norm.

2

A function f : RN → R ∪ {+∞} is convex if λf (x) + (1 − λ)f (y) ≥ f (λx + (1 − λ)y) for all x, y ∈ RN and λ ∈ (0, 1). If f is convex, then max{f (x), f (y)} > f (λx + (1 − λ)y) for all x, y ∈ RN with f (x) 6= f (y) and λ ∈ (0, 1). A function f satisfying this condition is said to be semistrictly quasiconvex. Note that f is semistrictly quasiconvex if and only if max{f (x), f (y)} > min{f (x + ∆), f (y − ∆)} for all x, y ∈ RN with f (x) 6= f (y) where ∆ = λ(y − x) and λ ∈ (0, 1). It is known that a local minimum of a semistrictly quasiconvex function is also a global minimum.1 We consider discrete analogues of convexity and semistrict quasiconvexity having a similar property. Fix D ⊆ {−1, 0, 1}N \{0} such that χi ∈ D for each i ∈ N and −d ∈ D for all d ∈ D. For x ∈ ZN , we write D(x) = {z ∈ ZN : z = x + d, d ∈ D}, which is interpreted as a neighborhood of x. Note that y ∈ D(x) if and only if x ∈ D(y). For a function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞}, we say that x ∈ ZN is a D-local minimum of f if f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ D(x). For x, y ∈ ZN , we write R(x, y) = {z ∈ ZN : x ∧ y ≤ z ≤ x ∨ y} where (x ∧ y)(i) = min{x(i), y(i)} and (x ∨ y)(i) = max{x(i), y(i)} for each i ∈ N . Note that kx − zk1 + ky − zk1 = kx − yk1 if and only if z ∈ R(x, y). For a function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞}, let domf = {x ∈ ZN : f (x) < +∞} be the effective domain. We say that f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} with domf 6= ∅ is D-convex if, for any x, y ∈ ZN with x 6= y, f (x) + f (y) ≥

min

x0 ∈D(x)∩R(x,y)

f (x0 ) +

min

y 0 ∈D(y)∩R(x,y)

f (y 0 ).

(1)

Note that the above inequality is trivially true when y ∈ D(x) and x ∈ D(y). We say that f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} with domf 6= ∅ is semistrictly quasi D-convex if, for any x, y ∈ ZN with f (x) 6= f (y), { } 0 0 max{f (x), f (y)} > min min f (x ), min f (y ) . (2) x0 ∈D(x)∩R(x,y)

y 0 ∈D(y)∩R(x,y)

Note that the above inequality is trivially true when y ∈ D(x) and x ∈ D(y) with f (x) 6= f (y). A D-convex function is semistrictly quasi D-convex. The following proposition is the main result of this paper. 1

See Avriel et al. [2] for more accounts on quasiconvexity.

3

Proposition 1 Suppose that f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} is semistrictly quasi D-convex. Then, x ∈ ZN is a D-local minimum of f if and only if it is a global minimum of f , i.e., f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ D(x) ⇔ f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ ZN . Proof. The “if” part is obvious and we show the “only if” part by induction. Let x ∈ ZN be a D-local minimum of f . Then, f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ ZN with kx − yk1 = 1 because x ± χi ∈ D(x) for each i ∈ N . Suppose that f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ ZN with kx − yk1 ≤ k where k ≥ 1. Let y ∈ ZN be such that kx − yk1 = k + 1. We show that f (x) ≤ f (y). Seeking a contradiction, suppose that f (y) < f (x). Since x is a D-local minimum, f (x) ≤ minx0 ∈D(x)∩R(x,y) f (x0 ). Since f is semistrictly quasi D-convex, f (x) = max{f (x), f (y)} { > min min

0

x0 ∈D(x)∩R(x,y)

f (x ),

min

} f (y ) = 0

y 0 ∈D(y)∩R(x,y)

min

y 0 ∈D(y)∩R(x,y)

f (y 0 ).

Note that kx − y 0 k1 < kx − yk1 = k + 1 for all y 0 ∈ D(y) ∩ R(x, y). Thus, by the induction hypothesis, f (x) ≤ miny0 ∈D(y)∩R(x,y) f (y 0 ), a contradiction. The following proposition, which we will use later, provides a sufficient condition for semistrict quasi D-convexity in terms of a local condition, where one point is in the local area of another if neighborhoods of the two points have a non-empty intersection. Proposition 2 Suppose that, for any x, y ∈ ZN with y 6∈ D(x), x 6∈ D(y), and D(x) ∩ D(y) ∩ R(x, y) 6= ∅, { < max{f (x), f (y)} if f (x) = 6 f (y), min f (z) (3) ≤ f (x) = f (y) otherwise. z∈D(x)∩D(y)∩R(x,y) Then, f is semistrictly quasi D-convex. Proof. For x, y ∈ ZN with y ∈ D(x), x ∈ D(y), and f (x) 6= f (y), (2) is trivially true. For x, y ∈ ZN with y 6∈ D(x), x 6∈ D(y), and f (x) 6= f (y), construct a sequence {xk ∈ R(x, y)}m k=0 such that x0 = x and xm = y by the following steps: set xk+1 ∈ D(xk ) ∩ R(xk , y) for k = 0, . . . , m − 1 such that • xk+1 ∈ arg

min

f (z),

z∈D(xk )∩R(xk ,y)

• kxk+1 − xk k1 ≥ kx0 − xk k1 for all x0 ∈ arg 4

min z∈D(xk )∩R(xk ,y)

f (z).

Since xk ± χi ∈ D(xk ) for all i ∈ N and xk 6∈ D(xk ), we have kx0 − yk1 > kx1 − yk1 > · · · > kxm−1 −yk1 > kxm −yk1 = 0. Thus, this sequence is well defined. By construction, x0 (i) ≤ x1 (i) ≤ · · · ≤ xm (i) if x(i) ≤ y(i) and x0 (i) ≥ x1 (i) ≥ · · · ≥ xm (i) if x(i) ≥ y(i). This implies that xk+1 ∈ R(xk , xk+2 ) ⊆ R(xk , y) for all k ≤ m − 2. We also have xk+1 ∈ D(xk+2 ) because ±(xk+1 − xk+2 ) ∈ D. Therefore, f (xk+1 ) =

min

f (z) =

z∈D(xk )∩R(xk ,y)

min

f (z).

z∈D(xk )∩D(xk+2 )∩R(xk ,xk+2 )

By (3), if xk+2 6∈ D(xk ) then { < max{f (xk ), f (xk+2 )} f (xk+1 ) ≤ f (xk ) = f (xk+2 )

if f (xk ) 6= f (xk+2 ), otherwise.

(4)

If xk+2 ∈ D(xk ) (and thus xk+2 ∈ D(xk ) ∩ R(xk , y)), we must have f (xk+1 ) < f (xk+2 ). To see this, recall that kxk+1 − xk k1 ≥ kx0 − xk k1 for all x0 ∈ arg minz∈D(xk )∩R(xk ,y) f (z). Since kxk+1 − xk k1 < kxk+1 − xk k1 + kxk+2 − xk+1 k1 = kxk+2 − xk k1 , it must be true that xk+2 6∈ arg minz∈D(xk )∩R(xk ,y) f (z) and thus f (xk+1 ) < f (xk+2 ). Therefore, to summarize, (4) is true for all k. The condition (4) implies that if f (xk ) < f (xk+1 ) then f (xk+1 ) < f (xk+2 ), which further implies f (xk+2 ) < f (xk+3 ). Therefore, if f (xk ) < f (xk+1 ) then f (xl ) < f (xl+1 ) for all l ≥ k. Symmetrically, if f (xk ) < f (xk−1 ) then f (xl ) < f (xl−1 ) for all l ≤ k. Using this property, we show that (2) is true. If f (x0 ) < f (xm ), there exists k ≤ m − 1 such that f (xk ) < f (xk+1 ). By the above argument, we must have f (xm−1 ) < f (xm ). Therefore, max{f (x), f (y)} = max{f (x0 ), f (xm )} = f (xm ) > f (xm−1 ) ≥ min{f (x1 ), f (xm−1 )} { } 0 0 = min min f (x ), min f (y ) x0 ∈D(x0 )∩D(x2 )∩R(x0 ,x2 ) y 0 ∈D(xm−2 )∩D(xm )∩R(xm−2 ,xm ) } { ≥ min min f (x0 ), min f (y 0 ) , x0 ∈D(x)∩R(x,y)

y 0 ∈D(y)∩R(x,y)

which implies (2). Similarly, we can also show that if f (xm ) < f (x0 ) then (2) is true. Therefore, f is semistrictly quasi D-convex. Note that the condition in this proposition is not necessary for semistrict quasi Dconvexity. For example, let f : Z3 → R ∪ {+∞} be such that domf = {0, 1}3 and, for 5

each x ∈ domf ,

{ f (x) =

1 0

if x = (0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), otherwise.

A function f is semistrictly quasi D-convex with D = {±χ1 , ±χ2 , ±χ3 } ∪ {±(χ1 + χ2 )} but does not satisfy (3) for x = (0, 0, 0) and y = (1, 1, 1).

3

Examples

3.1

Coordinatewise locality and Nash equilibrium

Let DC = {±χi : i ∈ N }. If f is semistrictly quasi DC -convex, then Proposition 1 implies that2 f (x) ≤ f (x ± χi ) for all i ∈ N ⇔ f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ ZN . (5) For example, suppose that, for any x, y ∈ ZN with kx − yk1 = 2, { < max{f (x), f (y)} if f (x) 6= f (y), min f (z) ≤ f (x) = f (y) otherwise. z:kx−zk1 =ky−zk1 =1

(6)

Then, by Proposition 2, f is semistrictly quasi DC -convex and thus (5) is true. It is easy to check that a separable convex function satisfies the above condition and thus it is semistrictly quasi DC -convex. Note that a semistrictly quasi DC -convex function is not necessarily separable convex. The above argument has an application to game theory. A game consists of a set of players N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of strategies Xi = Z for i ∈ N , and a payoff function ∏ gi : X → R ∪ {−∞} for i ∈ N where X = i∈N Xi = ZN . Simply denote a game ∏ by g = (gi )i∈N . We write X−i = j6=i Xj and x−i = (xj )j6=i ∈ X−i , and denote (x1 , . . . , xi−1 , x0i , xi+1 , . . . , xn ) ∈ X by (x0i , x−i ). A strategy profile x ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of g if gi (xi , x−i ) ≥ gi (x0i , x−i ) for all x0i ∈ Xi and i ∈ N . A game g is a potential game [6] if there exists a potential function p : X → R∪{−∞} satisfying gi (xi , x−i ) − gi (x0i , x−i ) = p(xi , x−i ) − p(x0i , x−i ) for all xi , x0i ∈ Xi , x−i ∈ X−i , and i ∈ N . If x ∈ X maximizes a potential function p, then p(xi , x−i ) ≥ p(x0i , x−i ) for all x0i ∈ Xi and i ∈ N , which is equivalent to gi (xi , x−i ) ≥ gi (x0i , x−i ) for all x0i ∈ Xi and i ∈ N . This implies that if x ∈ X maximizes p, then it is a Nash equilibrium. Note that 2

Altman et al. [1, Corollary 2.2] states that if f is multimodular then (5) is true. Murota [11], however, finds a counterexample against it and provides a correct local optimality condition.

6

every Nash equilibrium does not necessarily maximize p. However, if it holds that p(x) ≥ p(x ± χi ) for all i ∈ N ⇔ p(x) ≥ p(y) for all y ∈ ZN , then every Nash equilibrium maximizes p. To see this, let x ∈ X be a Nash equilibrium. Then, gi (x) − gi (xi ± 1, x−i ) = gi (x) − gi (x ± χi ) = p(x) − p(x ± χi ) ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . This implies that p(x) ≥ p(y) for all y ∈ X. The following result reported in [14] is an immediate consequence of the above discussion. Proposition 3 Let g be a potential game with a potential function p. Suppose that f ≡ −p satisfies (6) for any x, y ∈ ZN with kx − yk1 = 2. Then, x ∈ X maximizes p if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium. Thus, if a potential maximizer is unique, so is a Nash equilibrium.

3.2

M-convex, M\ -convex, L-convex, and L\ -convex functions

Recently, Murota [8, 10] advocates “discrete convex analysis,” where M-convex and Lconvex functions, introduced respectively by Murota [7] and Murota [8], play central roles. M\ -convex and L\ -convex functions, introduced respectively by Murota and Shioura [13] and Fujishige and Murota [4], are variants of M-convex and L-convex functions. By choosing appropriate D, we can show that these functions are D-convex. Let supp+ (x) = {i : x(i) > 0} be the positive support and supp− (x) = {i : x(i) < 0} be the negative support of x ∈ ZN . A function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} with domf 6= ∅ is said to be an M-convex function [7] if, for any x, y ∈ domf and i ∈ supp+ (x − y), there exists j ∈ supp− (x − y) such that f (x) + f (y) ≥ f (x − χi + χj ) + f (y + χi − χj ). It is known that this inequality implicitly imposes the condition that the effective domain ∑ of an M-convex function lies on a hyperplane {x ∈ Z : i∈N x(i) = r} for some r ∈ Z and, accordingly, we may consider the projection of an M-convex function along a coordinate axis. A function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} is said to be an M\ -convex function [13] if the function f˜ : Z{0}∪N → R ∪ {+∞} defined by { ∑ f (x) if x0 = − i∈N x(i), f˜(x0 , x) = +∞ otherwise is an M-convex function. The following proposition characterizes an M\ -convex function [10, Theorem 6.2]. 7

Proposition 4 A function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} is an M\ -convex function if and only if, for any x, y ∈ domf and i ∈ supp+ (x − y), f (x) + f (y) ≥ min{f (x − χi ) + f (y + χi ), min

j∈supp− (x−y)

f (x − χi + χj ) + f (y + χi − χj )}.

This proposition and the definition of D-convexity imply that an M\ -convex function is DM -convex with DM = {±χi : i ∈ N } ∪ {χi − χj : i 6= j}. Thus, by Proposition 1, if f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} is an M\ -convex function, then { f (x ± χi ) for all i ∈ N f (x) ≤ ⇔ f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ ZN . f (x + χi − χj ) for all i, j ∈ N This result is reported in Murota [7]. Proposition 4 says that an M-convex function is an M\ -convex function. Thus, an M-convex function is also DM -convex.3 A function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} with domf 6= ∅ is said to be an L-convex function [8] if f (x) + f (y) ≥ f (x ∨ y) + f (x ∧ y) for all x, y ∈ ZN and there exists r ∈ R such that f (x+1) = f (x)+r for all x ∈ ZN . Since an L-convex function is linear in the direction of 1, we may dispense with this direction as far as we are interested in its nonlinear behavior. A function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} is said to be an L\ -convex function [4] if the function f˜ : Z{0}∪N → R ∪ {+∞} defined by f˜(x0 , x) = f (x − x0 1) for x0 ∈ Z and x ∈ ZN is an L-convex function. The following proposition characterizes an L\ -convex function [10, Theorem 7.7]. Proposition 5 A function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} is an L\ -convex function if and only if, for any x, y ∈ ZN with supp+ (x − y) 6= ∅, f (x) + f (y) ≥ f (x − χS ) + f (y + χS ) where S = arg max(x(i) − y(i)). i∈N

This proposition and the definition of D-convexity imply that an L\ -convex function is DL -convex with DL = {±χS : S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅}. Thus, by Proposition 1, if f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} is an L\ -convex function, then f (x) ≤ f (x ± χS ) for all S ⊆ N ⇔ f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ ZN . One can obtain the local optimality condition for M-convex functions by weakening that for M\ convex functions. See Murota [10, Theorem 6.26] for more accounts on this issue. 3

8

This result is reported in Murota [9]. It is known that an L-convex function is an L\ convex function [10, Theorem 7.3]. Thus, an L-convex function is also DL -convex.4 Murota and Shioura [13] introduced semistrictly quasi M-convex and L-convex functions. It can be readily shown that a semistrictly quasi M-convex function is semistrictly quasi DM -convex and that a semistrictly quasi L-convex function is semistrictly quasi DL convex. Murota and Shioura [13] obtained the local optimality conditions for semistrictly quasi M-convex and L-convex functions, which are weaker than those for DM -convex and DL -convex functions, respectively.

3.3

Discretely-convex and integrally-convex functions

For x ∈ RN , let N (x) = {z ∈ ZN : bxc ≤ z ≤ dxe} where bxc denotes the vector obtained by rounding down and dxe by rounding up the components of x to the nearest integers. A function f : ZN → R ∪ {+∞} is a discretely-convex function [5] if, for any x, y ∈ domf , it holds that λf (x) + (1 − λ)f (y) ≥

min z∈N (λx+(1−λ)y)

f (z) (∀λ ∈ [0, 1]).

(7)

Let DA = {−1, 0, 1}N \{0}. The following lemma connects a discretely-convex function to a semistrictly quasi DA -convex function. Lemma 6 Let x, y ∈ ZN be such that y 6∈ DA (x), x 6∈ DA (y), and DA (x) ∩ DA (y) ∩ R(x, y) 6= ∅. Then, N ((x + y)/2) ⊆ DA (x) ∩ DA (y) ∩ R(x, y). Proof. By the assumption, there exist d, d0 ∈ DA such that y = x + d + d0 , d + d0 6= 0, and d + d0 6∈ DA . This implies that |d(i) + d0 (i)| ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N and |d(i) + d0 (i)| = 2 for some i ∈ N . Thus, if b(d + d0 )/2c ≤ δ ≤ d(d + d0 )/2e then δ ∈ {−1, 0, 1}N \{0} = DA . Let z ∈ N ((x + y)/2). Then, b(x + y)/2c ≤ z ≤ d(x + y)/2e. Thus, z ∈ DA (x) because (x + y)/2 = x + (d + d0 )/2. Similarly, z ∈ DA (y). Since z ∈ R(x, y), we have N ((x + y)/2) ⊆ DA (x) ∩ DA (y) ∩ R(x, y). Let x, y ∈ domf satisfy the condition in the above lemma. discretely-convex. Then, we have f (x) + f (y) ≥ 2

min z∈N ((x+y)/2)

f (z) ≥ 2

Assume that f is

min

f (z)

z∈DA (x)∩DA (y)∩R(x,y)

One can obtain the local optimality condition for L-convex functions by weakening that for L\ -convex functions. See Murota [10, Theorem 7.14] for more accounts on this issue. 4

9

where the first inequality is due to (7) and the second inequality is due to Lemma 6. This implies that (3) is true for all x, y ∈ ZN with y 6∈ DA (x), x 6∈ DA (y), and DA (x) ∩ DA (y) ∩ R(x, y) 6= ∅. Thus, we have the following proposition by Proposition 2. Proposition 7 A discretely-convex function is semistrictly quasi DA -convex. Therefore, by Proposition 1, if f : ZN → R is a discretely-convex function, then f (x) ≤ f (x + χS − χT ) for all S, T ⊆ N ⇔ f (x) ≤ f (y) for all y ∈ ZN . This result is reported in [5]. Favati and Tardella [3] introduced integrally-convex functions and showed that these functions form a special class of discretely-convex functions. Thus, an integrally-convex function is also semistrictly quasi DA -convex.

References [1] E. Altman, B. Gaujal, and A. Hordijk: Multimodularity, convexity, and optimization properties, Mathematics of Operations Research, 25 (2000), 324–347. [2] M. Avriel, W. E. Diewert, S. Schaible, and I. Zang: Generalized Concavity, Plenum Press, New York, 1988. [3] P. Favati and F. Tardella: Convexity in nonlinear integer programming, Ricerca Operativa, 53 (1990), 3–44. [4] S. Fujishige and K. Murota: Notes on L-/M-convex functions and the separation theorems, Mathematical Programming, 88 (2000), 129–146. [5] B. L. Miller: On minimizing nonseparable functions defined on the integers with an inventory application, SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 21 (1971), 166–185. [6] D. Monderer and L. S. Shapley: Potential games, Games and Economic Behavior, 14 (1996), 124–143. [7] K. Murota: Convexity and Steinitz’s exchange property, Advances in Mathematics, 124 (1996), 272–311. [8] K. Murota: Discrete convex analysis, Mathematical Programming, 83 (1998), 313– 371. 10

[9] K. Murota: Algorithms in discrete convex analysis, IEICE Transactions on Systems and Information, E83-D (2000), 344–352. [10] K. Murota: Discrete Convex Analysis, SIAM, Philadelphia, 2003. [11] K. Murota: Note on multimodularity and L-convexity, Mathematics of Operations Research (2005), in press. [12] K. Murota and A. Shioura: M-convex function on generalized polymatroid, Mathematics of Operations Research, 24 (1999), 95–105. [13] K. Murota and A. Shioura: Quasi M-convex and L-convex functions: Quasiconvexity in discrete optimization, Discrete Applied Mathematics, 131 (2003), 467–494. [14] T. Ui: Discrete concavity for potential games, working paper, Yokohama National University, 2004.

11

A Note on Discrete Convexity and Local Optimality

... (81)-45-339-3531. Fax: (81)-45-339-3574. ..... It is easy to check that a separable convex function satisfies the above condition and thus it is semistrictly quasi ...

106KB Sizes 1 Downloads 256 Views

Recommend Documents

A Note on Discrete- and Continuous-time Optimal ...
i.e. taking into account that next period's policy-maker will choose policy in the same way as today's policy-maker: gt+1 = G(kt+1), kt+2 = K(kt+1), ct+1 = f(kt+1,1) ...

Discrete Distribution Estimation under Local Privacy - arXiv
Jun 15, 2016 - cal privacy, a setting wherein service providers can learn the ... session for a cloud service) to share only a noised version of its raw data with ...

Discrete Distribution Estimation under Local Privacy - arXiv
Jun 15, 2016 - 1. Introduction. Software and service providers increasingly see the collec- ... offers the best utility across a wide variety of privacy levels and ...... The expected recoverable probability mass is the the mass associated with the.

Satisficing and Optimality
months, I may begin to lower my aspiration level for the sale price when the house has ..... wedding gift for my friend dictates that I must buy the best gift I can find. ... My overall goal in running the business is, let's say, to maximize profits

Note on Drafting a speech.pdf
Page 1 of 1. Speech is supposed to be an oral presentation. But ,since you have speech as a discourse ,it is desirable. that we must learn the techniques of writing a speech.While presenting a speech on a stage, the speaker has a. lot of advantages .

A note on Kandori-Matsushima
Sep 16, 2004 - Social Science Center, London, ON, N6A 5C2, Tel: 519-661-2111 ext. ... equilibria, where private information is revealed every T-periods, as δ ...

RANDOM WALK ON A DISCRETE TORUS AND RAN - Project Euclid
... of [9], the interlacement at level u ≥ 0 is the trace left on Zd by a cloud of ... forms of functions of finite support on Zd taking the value 1 on A, resp. as the ...

Some results on the optimality and implementation of ...
be used as means of payment the same way money can. ... cannot make binding commitments, and trading histories are private in a way that precludes any.

A Note on Quasi-Presuppositions and Focus
Jan 31, 2011 - If John came late, the party was a disaster implies: ..... The above data seem to show that indeed the inference triggered by modifiers seems.

A Note on Quality Disclosure and Competition
I analyze how a change in the degree of horizontal product differentiation affects the incentives of duopolists to disclose quality information. If disclosure is costly, ...

A note on Minimal Unanimity and Ordinally Bayesian ...
E-mail address: [email protected]. 0165-4896/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2006.12.

A Note on -Permutations
We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Mathematical Association of America is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,

A note on for-phrases and derived scales
phrase set to restrict its domain; Bale (2008) takes a gradable adjective to determine ... by a New Initiatives Funding grant from Centre for Research on Language, Mind and Brain in ..... (30) Mia: “Buy me a hat that costs more than $5!” (31) Mia

A Note on Strong Duality and Complementary Slackness
Aug 27, 2015 - where x, c ∈ H1, b ∈ H2, d ∈ H3, A is a linear map from H1 to H2, B is a .... Convex Analysis, Princeton Landmarks in Mathematics, Princeton.

A note on the upward and downward intruder ... - Springer Link
From the analytic solution of the segregation velocity we can analyze the transition from the upward to downward intruder's movement. The understanding of the ...

A note on extremality and completeness in financial ...
σ(X, Y ), and we apply it to the space L∞ with the topology σ(L∞,Lp) for p ≥ 1. .... Now, we want to apply Theorem 3 to the special case X = L∞(µ) equipped with ...

briefing note on - Services
systems. In the light of these conclusions, a series of meetings in Africa, including the Foresight. Africa workshop in Entebbe, the AU meeting of Directors for Livestock Development in. Kigali 2004, the Congress ... OIE meeting of SADC Chief Veterin

A note on juncture homomorphisms.pdf - Steve Borgatti
A full network homomorphism f: N -+ N' is a regular network homomorphism if for each R E [w fi( a) f2( R) fi( b) * 3 c, d E P such that fi(u) = fi( c), fi( b) = fi( d), cRb and uRd for all a, b E P. In a network N the bundle of relations B,, from a t

A Note on Heterogeneity and Aggregation Using Data ...
Abstract: Using data from Indonesia, I show that both household- and ... (i) the Pareto being more appropriate than the exponential distribution for Yiv and Riv, ...

On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games
relations are imposed on the job in one-machine sequencing situations. ... We call a processing order σ ∈ Π(N,P) admissible for S with respect to the ...... CentER Discussion Paper 2002-49, Tilburg University, The Netherlands (to appear in ...

On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games - Csic
theory and cooperative game theory. Hamers et al. (1996) and Van Velzen and Hamers (2002) investigate the class of sequencing situations as in considered ...

Note on commented games - GitHub
The starting point for debate upon a classic joseki. 4. An other ... At the start of this game, White made grave errors. ..... 3: At move 28, Black cannot start a ko.

On the Convexity of Precedence Sequencing Games
problem can be transformed into a multiple decision maker problem by taking agents into account who ... determination of the maximal cost savings of a coalition one has to solve the .... The (maximal) cost savings of a coalition S depend on the prece

On the Optimality of the Friedman Rule with ...
This idea is at the center of many theories .... and call the nominal interest rate. ..... not this is a relevant consideration for advanced economies is unclear,.