A glimpse of the future?
What the minority governments of the 38th and 39th Parliaments can teach about proposals for electoral reform Paul E. J. Thomas Office of the Hon. Yoine Goldstein, Senator www.pauledwinjames.com
[email protected]
Disclaimers ●
Member of the Parliamentary Internship Programme in 2005/06; worked in the offices of two Liberal MPs
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Volunteered for the NDP in '04 and the Liberals in '06
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Employed by a Liberal Senator since June 2006
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Here as a private participant – no tax dollars were harmed in bringing you this presentation Revised version of the paper prepared for the Parliamentary Internship Programme. A previous version of this paper was published in the spring edition of the Canadian Parliamentary Review
A glimpse of the future? Agenda ● ●
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Premise Arguments for and against electoral reform Performance review of the 38th and 39th Parliaments
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Conclusion and discussion
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Post script
Premise – Part I Electoral reform will make minority parliaments more common: ●
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Adopting an electoral system based on proportional representation (PR) will increase the frequency of minority parliaments. In fact, many of the purported benefits of electoral reform come from the perceived strengths of minority parliaments (e.g. greater need for cooperation). The reverse is also true (e.g. greater instability).
Premise – Part II It is possible to compare current parliaments with those that would exist after electoral reform: ●
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Parties will face different incentives after reform. However, without changes to the Standing Orders, parliaments after electoral reform would be still bound by the same procedures and conventions. These procedures will shape the functioning of postreform parliaments and what they can achieve. Canadian political parties both federally and provincially have avoided coalition governments.
Premise – Part III The minorities of the 38th and 39th Parliaments can offer insights as to how parliament would operate post-reform: ●
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By comparing the actions of the 38th and 39th Parliaments to those of their predecessors, it is possible to evaluate some of the arguments for and against electoral reform. This evaluation can contribute to a fuller discussion of options for eventual reform.
Arguments for electoral reform Those supporting the adoption of a more proportional electoral system claim that it will: ●
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Prevent artificial majority governments, forcing the parties to compromise with each other in order to get things accomplished; Allow the parliament to hold the executive more accountable; and Increase the influence of private members.
Arguments against electoral reform Those opposing the adoption of a more proportional electoral system claim that it will: ●
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Make the parliament much less efficient; Make the parliament much less stable; and Reduce voters' ability to hold the government accountable at election.
Criteria Arguments for electoral reform will be supported if the comparison shows an increase in: ●
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Legislative compromise and deliberation; The role for private members; The ability of Parliament to hold the executive accountable.
Criteria Arguments against electoral reform will be supported if the comparison shows an decrease in: ●
Legislative efficiency; and
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Stability.
It is beyond the scope of the paper to measure the ability of citizens to hold the Parliament to account
Methodology The paper uses the five criteria to compare the behaviour and outcomes of the 36th to 39th Parliaments: ●
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Because of procedural reforms relating to the function of standing committees and private members business it is not possible to use previous minority governments. In order to allow for a meaningful comparison, the behaviour and outcomes for each Parliament are presented by session. The results are also standardized to a session of 150 sitting days. The third session of the 37th Parliament is omitted since it last only 55 days and does not standardize well
Criterion I: Legislative deliberation Measuring legislative deliberation: ●
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It is difficult to measure deliberation since it includes elements such as thoughtful debate that are not easily quantified. Thoughtful debate should be manifested by an increase in the number of bills that are amended. Committee stage is where the bulk of amendments should take place seen since it is the stage at which MPs have the opportunity to study a bill.
Legislative deliberation Comparison of government bills reported to the House of Commons during the 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to 150 sitting days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Amended by committee
24
17
20
16
17
16
Not amended by committee
18
14
16
18
17
16
Amended by committee
2
1
1
4
10
2
Not amended by committee
1
-
-
2
2
-
58%
56%
57%
50%
59%
53%
Sent to committee after 2nd reading
Sent to committee before 2nd reading
Total percentage of bills amended
Legislative deliberation Comparison of government bills reported to the House of Commons during the 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to 150 sitting days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Amended by committee
24
17
20
16
17
16
Not amended by committee
18
14
16
18
17
16
Amended by committee
2
1
1
4
10
2
Not amended by committee
1
-
-
2
2
-
58%
56%
57%
50%
59%
53%
Sent to committee after 2nd reading
Sent to committee before 2nd reading
Total percentage of bills amended
Legislative deliberation Comparison of government bills reported to the House of Commons during the 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to 150 sitting days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Amended by committee
24
17
20
16
17
16
Not amended by committee
18
14
16
18
17
16
Amended by committee
2
1
1
4
10
2
Not amended by committee
1
-
-
2
2
-
58%
56%
57%
50%
59%
53%
Sent to committee after 2nd reading
Sent to committee before 2nd reading
Total percentage of bills amended
Criterion II: Legislative efficiency Measuring legislative efficiency: ●
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As with other criteria, this is hard to quantify since some bills will take longer to pass due to the subject matter they deal with. However, the number of bills passed by the legislature can be used as a rough measure.
Legislative efficiency Success rate of government bills in the 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 Sitting Days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Bills introduced
50
51
36
39
77
54
Bills receiving royal assent
41
33
33
27
43
22
-
-
-
-
2
-
82%
64%
92%
70%
56%
41%
Bills negatived % success rate
Legislative efficiency Success rate of government bills in the 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 Sitting Days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Bills introduced
50
51
36
39
77
54
Bills receiving royal assent
41
33
33
27
43
22
-
-
-
-
2
-
82%
64%
92%
70%
56%
41%
Bills negatived % success rate
Legislative efficiency Success rate of government bills in the 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 Sitting Days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Bills introduced
50
51
36
39
77
54
Bills receiving royal assent
41
33
33
27
43
22
-
-
-
-
2
-
82%
64%
92%
70%
56%
41%
Bills negatived % success rate
Legislative efficiency Success rate of government bills in the 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 Sitting Days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Bills introduced
50
51
36
39
77
54
Bills receiving royal assent
41
33
33
27
43
22
-
-
-
-
2
-
82%
64%
92%
70%
56%
41%
Bills negatived % success rate
Criterion III: the role of private members Success rate of private members bills that reached the Order of Precedence, 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 sitting days
Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Bills placed on the precedence list
39
53
43
40
48
45
Bills receiving Royal Assent
4
3
-
4
4
-
9%
6%
0%
10%
8%
0%
Success rate (%)
The role of private members Success rate of private members bills that reached the Order of Precedence, 36th to 39th Parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 sitting days
Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Bills placed on the precedence list
39
53
43
40
48
45
Bills receiving Royal Assent
4
3
-
4
4
-
9%
6%
0%
10%
8%
0%
Success rate (%)
Criterion IV: Executive accountability ●
MPs have two main groups of tools that can be used to hold the executive to account: 1) Those exercised by standing committees; and 2) Those exercised by the House as a whole
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It is difficult to determine a tool is exercised for genuine accountability, and when it is used for partisan purposes. Situations that hinted of both were found.
Accountability of the executive Comparison of executive oversight exercised by selected standing committees, 36th To 39th parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 sitting days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Motions for government action
3
9
5
10
36
62
Studies
45
41
44
60
46
32
Budget estimates altered
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-
-
2
4
-
Nominations reviewed and supported
1
-
-
2
8
2
Nominations reviewed and opposed
-
-
-
-
1
2
Accountability of the executive Comparison of executive oversight exercised by selected standing committees, 36th To 39th parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 sitting days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Motions for government action
3
9
5
10
36
62
Studies
45
41
44
60
46
32
Estimates altered
-
-
-
2
4
-
Appointments reviewed and accepted
1
-
-
2
8
2
Appointments reviewed and rejected
-
-
-
-
1
2
Accountability of the executive Comparison of executive oversight exercised by selected standing committees, 36th To 39th parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 sitting days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Motions for government action
3
9
5
10
36
62
Studies
45
41
44
60
46
32
Estimates altered
-
-
-
2
4
-
Appointments reviewed and accepted
1
-
-
2
8
2
Appointments reviewed and rejected
-
-
-
-
1
2
Accountability of the executive Comparison of executive oversight exercised by selected standing committees, 36th To 39th parliaments, by session, standardized to a session of 150 sitting days Parliament
36.1
36.2
37.1
37.2
38
39
Motions for government action
3
9
5
10
36
62
Studies
45
41
44
60
46
32
Estimates altered
-
-
-
2
4
-
Appointments reviewed and accepted
1
-
-
2
8
2
Appointments reviewed and rejected
-
-
-
-
1
2
th
Committee motions - 38 Parliament ●
Create a new system for temporary resident visas;
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Increase the funding for the CBC;
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Halt the closure of RCMP detachments in Quebec;
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Defend agricultural supply management at the WTO;
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Create a national breast-implant registry;
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Ban internet pharmacy sales to the US;
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Allow the immigration of 2,000 Vietnamese families from the Philippines; and Improve the system for the appointment of judges
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Committee motions - 39 Parliament ●
Apologize to Mahr Arar;
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Create an independent environment commissioner;
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Support the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples;
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Aid farmers affected by golden nematode infestations;
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Commit stable funding for the National Homelessness Initiative;
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Publish three research reports created by Status of Women Canada;
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Put a moratorium on the deportation of undocumented workers;
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Reinstate funding to the Court Challenges program, the Law Commission of Canada, the Adult Literacy and Learning Program, the Workplace Partners Panel, the Summer Career Placement programs, Telefilm Canada, the Wind Power Production Incentive Program, and Status of Women Canada. Rescind the questions developed for the referendum on barley marketing and replace them with a set developed by the Committee.
Accountability exercised by the House 38th Parliament: ●
Amended budget and throne speech
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Negatived legislation to split DFAIT
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Disrupted functioning of parliament
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Non-confidence vote
39th Parliament: ●
Clean Air Act
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Non-renewal of provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act
Criterion V: Stability Length of the 36th, 37th, and 38th Parliaments Parliament
36th
37th
38th
Months between elections
42
43
19
Sitting days
381
422
160
Conclusion Summary of findings Criteria
Outcome
Legislative deliberation
unchanged
Legislative efficiency
unchanged
Role of private members
unchanged
Ability to hold the executive to account In standing committees
Improved
In the House of Commons
Improved
Stability
Reduced
Conclusion ●
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Contrary to the literature, the minority situation does not necessarily affect the extent of deliberation, legislative efficiency or the role of private members. Therefore in terms of the criteria used electoral reforms appears to offer a trade-off: a more accountable executive at the price of a more instable government. This is logical since non-confidence is the ultimate tool of accountability to be used when all others fail.
Discussion ●
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One possible way of improve the accountability of the government without electoral reform would be to give opposition parties a one member majority on all standing committees. That way these committees could conduct thorough study of bills, review appointments and estimates, and make motions for government action while the stability of the government would be preserved. It is difficult to say whether the different incentives introduced by the adoption of proportional representation could affect the actions of post-reform parliaments.
Postscript ●
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Ceased observing the 39th Parliament on May 9th. Since then there has been a great deal of conflict around the Standing Committees on Official Languages, National Defence, and others. This conflict is a testimony to the effective way in which the opposition has been able to use the committee process to hold the government to account. In contrast to what was said by the Hon. Jay Hill, the opposition parties are not trying to act like a coalition government (neither were the Conservatives and BQ in the 38th). Rather, they are trying to work together act like an independent legislative branch, much like we see at present in the US.
Postscript
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Postscript During minority parliaments, the Canadian executive branch faces constraints similar to those experienced by the American executive branch when the congress is controlled by the opposing party.
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Appreciation ●
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Senator Yoine Goldstein Jean-Pierre Gaboury, Parliamentary Internship Programme
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JoAnne Cartwright, Parliamentary Internship Program
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Gary Levy, Canadian Parliamentary Review
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Heather Limburg, Lesia Horbay, Stasia Horbay, Jarret Boon
