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Post-Soviet Managers at the Gate of the European Union -- Estonian Managers' EU Opinions Under a Magnifying Glass Kari LIUHTO Institute for East-West Trade Turku School of Economics P.O.Box 110 FIN-20 521 Turku, FINLAND Phone: +358 21 3363 565 Fax: +358 21 3383 268 Abstract The member states of European Union generally believe that the former socialist countries would rush into the union with the first opportunity. Despite this assumption, only a few studies have been conducted on the way new EU candidates relate to the European Union and its impact on their countries. This article examines how the Estonian managers see the impact of the European integration on the Estonian society and economy. The Estonian views will then be compared to the opinions of the Finnish enterprise managers. The second aim of the study is to evaluate the future development of the Estonian entrepreneurship. 1.
Estonian Economy and Entrepreneurship in 1995
The scale of the social, political and economic transformation experienced by the transition economies often seems incomprehensible from the Western point of view. The radicalness of the situation might be more concretely understood by imagining that some Western economy would suddenly be forced to bring its OECD trade to a virtual end and then socialize its enterprise sector and ownership. In addition, the Western enterprise manager could waste no time in adopting the rules of the COMECON trade and integrating the company into the planned economy. Moreover, after these, and other simultaneous operations, the enterprise manager would have to survive among companies already familiar with the system. All this considered, it is hardly surprising that even the model student of market economy -- Estonia -- has not entirely managed to avoid the economic difficulties arising from the transition. The drastic fall of Estonian Gross Domestic Product could serve as an example: it decreased in 1991 by over 10 per cent and in 1992 another 20 per cent. However, GDP fell no further in 1993 and even increased by 4 per cent in 1994 (Bank of Finland, 1/1995, 69). Despite this slight growth, one should bear in mind that with a four-per-cent annual increase Estonia will not reach the
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level of the early 1990s before the end of this century. Even if Estonia could reach this level, it still remains far below the average of western Europe. This simply means that even this model student needs a substantial amount of time to achieve the average level of the European Union. Another alarming trend in the Estonian economy is the development of the industrial production, which fell even more severely than GDP. According to official statistics, the industrial production has decreased by as much as 70 per cent since 1990 (Sepp, 1995, 53). The discontinuation of the economic relations with the former Soviet Union resulted in a simultaneous disappearance of both the raw material and consumer markets. Other major reasons for the falling industrial production can be found in its outdated technology and shortage of capital. The decrease in industrial activities is in turn reflected in the increase in the unemployment rate. Even though the statistic indicates only a few per cent unemployment, in reality the rate is probably five times higher (Lainela - Sutela, 1994, 30). The number of the unemployed is alarmingly high in the predominantly Russian-speaking, northeastern Estonia, where almost every second person at working age is believed to be without work. Severe unemployment may expose the Russian population to populistic trends and hence sow the seed of social unrest into Estonia. The falling industrial production in Estonia seems to have no impact on the value of the Estonian foreign trade which has grown vigorously. In 1992 the value of the Estonian foreign trade was slightly over 10 billion Estonian kroons, while two years later it was nearly four times higher.[1] Unfortunately, the deficit in the foreign trade was over 10 per cent from the total value of the foreign trade in 1994. The Estonian foreign trade has also transformed from the Soviet-oriented foreign trade toward the Western markets. While the share of the Soviet trade represented nearly 90 per cent of the Estonian foreign trade at the turn of this decade, it fell to 25 percent in 1994. This Westernorientation can be seen in the EU share from the Estonian foreign trade, which amounted to 60 per cent (Lainela, 1995, 34). Another piece of evidence that the economic transition proceeds in Estonia is the explosive growth of the organization sector. When Estonia had only 35 000 registered organizations in the early 1992, only three years later the number of the registered organizations had risen to over 83 000. One should nevertheless remember that only 50 000 of these can be classified as real enterprises. Secondly, only 30 000 of these enterprises are active, in other words operate on a regular basis (Liuhto, 1995b, 13). When evaluating the state of the Estonian entrepreneurship, one needs to pay attention to the scarce financial resources of Estonian companies. Approximately 70 per cent of them were
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established with a capital less than 10 000 kroons, which means an investment less than 1 250 DEM. In order to increase the reliability of companies, Estonia raised the minimum capital requirement for the joint-stock companies to 400000 kroons in September 1995. The joint-stock companies, which currently represent 85 per cent of the total number of the Estonian enterprises, were allowed four years to raise their minimum capital according to the new standards. At the moment, roughly 6000 Estonian joint-stock companies would meet these new demands (The Estonian Enterprise Register, 26 September 1995). The pressure to increase the capital is also directed towards the majority of the foreign companies. The total number of the foreign companies registered in Estonia at the beginning of this year is 7 700, which represents approximately 15 per cent of all the real enterprises in Estonia. The foreign direct investments (FDIs) in Estonia add to a total of 471 million USD (IMF, 1995, 63). The role of foreign investment in the Estonian economy should not be underestimated. Per capita, Estonia has attracted more foreign direct investment than any other former SEV country, including Hungary (ECE, 1994, 108). The foreign investment per capita in Estonia surpasses the investment directed to Russia by ten times and to Latvia by six times (Bank of Estonia, 1995, 38). The FDIs in Estonia by country divide between the Swedish 28, the Finnish 22, the Russian 12 and the rest 38 per cent coming from about 70 other countries (Liuhto, 1994, 101-102, Lainela, 1995, 37). While the foreign companies are becoming increasingly powerful, the role of the state and municipal enterprises has diminished in importance. At the beginning of 1995, the state and municipal organizations represented less than 2 per cent of the total number of organizations registered in Estonia. Three years previously their share had been one-fourth (Liuhto, 1995b, 17). In 1994 the private sector formed over 60 per cent of Estonian GDP (Kuddo, 1995, 12). 2.
Objective and accomplishment of the Research
The study intends to outline how the Estonian managers see the European integration influencing the Estonian society and economy. The Estonian views will then be compared to the 1990 study on opinions of the Finnish enterprise managers toward the impact of the European Union on Finland (see EVA, 1991, 99). The second aim of the study is to evaluate the future development of the Estonian entrepreneurship. The first empirical research surveyed how the Estonian enterprise managers believed the European integration would affect their country. The answers from 100 Estonian enterprise top managers
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were received by July 1995. The questionnaire was sent to 500 companies, which represented Estonian organizational structure in terms of their industry, size, region and ownership. To summarize the sample: the average age of the managers who responded to the questions was 39 (median), which corresponds to the average age of all the Estonian managers -- 37-38 years (Kaubaleht, 1995, 12). Eleven per cent of the managers were under 30 years old, 42 were 30-40 years old, 20 were 41-50 years old, and 27 per cent were over 50 years old. Most of the managers had a degree in higher education (87 per cent), which corresponds to all the Estonian managers (Kaubaleht, 1995, 12). The majority of the managers (96 per cent) spoke Estonian as their mother language and the rest were Russian-speaking. This particular ethnic division corresponds, according to Estonian experts, to the Estonian managers in total. Unfortunately, the number of the studied Russian-speaking managers is too low for a reliable comparison between the Estonian and Russian managers. The companies for which the participating managers worked were principally established after year 1992. Approximately every fourth of the companies was founded during the Soviet era and every tenth before the annexation of Estonia into the Soviet Union in 1940. Two-thirds of the companies were in private hands and one-third consisted of state or municipal enterprises. Over one fifth of the companies had some foreign ownership. The number of the Finnish companies was 7 and the Swedish 6. Finally, six of the companies came from other European Union countries and two outside the European Union. Every fifth of the studied companies operated in Tallinn. When the industrial division is analysed, 19 companies operated in industry, 20 in trade, and 60 per cent in other industries. The division found in this study was far more industrial than the total Estonian organization field. Moreover, the average size of these companies was also larger than the size of the Estonian companies usually. The size of the studied companies divides in the following manner: Personnel
0-4 14%
5-19 21%
20-49 12%
50-99 9%
over 100 44%
Turnover (mn kroons)
0-0.5 21%
0.51-4.9 16%
5.0-19.9 22%
20-99.9 21%
over 100 20%
Almost half of the companies participating in this study were involved in foreign trade. The share of export from the turnover in all these companies was 10 per cent and the share of import was 7 per cent.
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The findings of this study were compared to the opinions expressed by 401 Finnish enterprise managers in 1990. Although this comparison is made somewhat more difficult because of the five-year lapse in time, two facts need to be pointed out. First, the private entrepreneurship in Estonia had not yet been generated in 1990, when the only seeds of private entrepreneurship in the Soviet Estonia were the small number of private Estonian co-operatives and about one hundred foreign-owned enterprises. Second, the comparison drawn afterwards is underlined by the fact that Finland joined the European Union five years after that study was accomplished. According to some estimations, Estonia can likewise become a member of the European Union five years after the accomplishment of this particular study. As a matter of fact, a five-year time difference between these two studies may have even improved the comparability of the results. In addition to the survey, a study based on interviews about the future prospects of the Estonian entrepreneurship was carried out. The interviews aimed at surveying the Enterprise Development Programme, Estonia's position as a gateway between East and West, and the development of the Estonian entrepreneurship in future. Three experts representing different views were interviewed for this study: the director of the Department for Enterprise Development Alexander Bakirov (The Estonian Ministry of Economy), trade commissioner Helka Leinonen (The Finnish Foreign Trade Association), managing director Juri Laanesaar and project manager Ilmar Jogi (both from Estonian enterprise Ariko MG). 3.
Estonian Managers' Opinions on the European Integration and Its Impact on Estonia
The responses given by the Estonian enterprise managers clearly reveal that the most important motives for the Estonian integration into the European Union were the increasing sense of national security and the stability of society in Estonia. Almost all the managers (95 per cent) considered that the European Union would have a positive impact on national security and 88 per cent thought it would influence the stabilisation of society. The emphasis laid on national security hardly comes as a surprise, as many Estonians are concerned about the changes in the political climate in Russia. The need for security reflects the current atmosphere, but, even more importantly, signifies uncertainty toward the future development in Russia. The strive for maintaining social stability primarily reflects the present changes in domestic policies and the individual's sense of insecurity in society where the police lack resources in their fight against the organized crime (see Table 1.). Surprisingly, the managers interviewed found the environmental
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protection more important than the economic factors. The economic issues indicate that the managers do not regard the European Union as an economic paradise. This is simply due to the fact that the European Union would introduce many regulations and restrictions that are not found in the liberal business environment of Estonia. Is the Estonian enterprise manager prepared to change over from the Soviet bureaucracy to the EU system, where regulations cannot be applied as freely as in the Soviet Union? In terms of social security, self-determination and employment, the views of the Estonian managers show that half of them regarded the impact of the EU as positive. In social security, none of the managers thought the Union would impair the system of social security, which is a natural conclusion, as the current social security system in Estonia is practically non-existent. When self-determination was concerned, the views of the managers began to deviate from another. In fact, one-fourth of the Estonian managers saw the European Union restricting the Estonian right to self-determination. In regard to employment, it is surprising that 16 per cent of the Estonian managers considered that the European Union would be disadvantageous for the Estonian labour market. Only 3 per cent of the Estonian managers thought that the European Union would have a negative effect on ownership. This is understandable as at the moment only a small fragment of the Estonian land has been privatised. Thus many Estonians are likely to believe that the European integration would oblige the Estonian government to agree on a rapid solution to the ownership matters. In terms of culture, the views could be interpreted so that the Estonian culture is living a strong transitional era, when foreign influences can be seen as a threat. This cultural resistance becomes easier to understand when remembering the scale with which the Western business culture is flooding into Estonia. The intervention of this multinational into a society at a powerful national cultural stage inevitably generates resistance. The only negative effect of the European Union can be observed in the increase of the price level -- 45 per cent of the managers saw it as disadvantageous. The explanation to this negative reaction is that the Estonians believe the European integration will raise prices in Estonia. From the perspective of enterprises, increasing prices would naturally reduce the competitive advantages of Estonian goods. On the other hand, it can be predicted that the cost of living will increase steadily with or without the incorporation into the union. If the answers are divided according to the location of the enterprises, the results indicate that the enterprise managers
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operating in Tallinn related to the impact of the European Union in a more positive manner than their colleagues operating outside the capital. Also the state enterprises viewed the economic impact of the integration more favourably than the private enterprises. For example, 85 per cent of the state enterprises believed that the union would improve their foreign trade, whereas "only" 60 per cent of the private enterprises thought similarly. The age of the managers did not have much impact on the results. This is somewhat surprising as one might have imagined the younger enterprise managers to be more anxious to join the European Union than the older managers. Moreover, the different age groups were very similar to one another when their knowledge about the European Union was concerned. Although the age of the managers did not affect the amount of information about the Union, the differences between regions proved different. The managers operating outside Tallinn were less informed about the impact of the Union than their colleagues in Tallinn. This is indicated by the managers outside Tallinn resorting to the category of "Do not know" twice as often as the managers in the capital. This fact stresses the importance of distributing more information about the union outside Tallinn. In view of this, two factors need to be pointed out. First, the managers in Tallinn, who were better informed about the European Union generally had more positive views in the Union than their colleagues outside Tallinn. Second, one should not forget that two-thirds of the Estonian population live outside the capital -something bound to be emphasised at the latest when Estonia is preparing for its national referendum. 4.
Opinions of Estonian and Finnish Managers Compared
The opinions of the Estonian and Finnish managers deviated widely from one another in their emphases: while the Estonians stressed the positive effect of the union on national security, social stability and environmental protection, and only after these on economic aspects, the Finnish managers, in contrast, stressed the importance of economic factors, such as prices, the development of entrepreneurship and economic growth. The Estonian managers believed the union would in the first place strengthen Estonia's national identity, and, only in the second, the economy. The Finnish managers considered the membership mostly as an economic integration, however, which to some extent might weaken national self-determination, threaten national ownership and the Finnish social security. The Estonian and Finnish responses deviated considerably in terms of price level (the difference was over 1.). The Estonian managers
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saw the future development of the price level as negative, as they believed that the European integration would raise the cost of living in Estonia. When Finland was concerned, the situation was opposite. In a similar manner, the wide differences in social security, self-determination and ownership are simply due to the fact that the Finnish managers see the impact of the Union as negative, while their Estonian colleagues see them as positive (see Table 2.). These two particular countries also differ in that the Finnish membership was realized through a kind of Nordic co-operation, whereas the Estonian membership is often linked to the integration process of the other Baltic states and the Visegrad countries. In practice, this may entail the weakest EU candidates hampering the integration of those countries, such as Estonia, who have a reputation for successful economic reforms. On the other hand, without combining the integration process of these countries, the European Union might no longer express such interest in Estonia, whose population is only 1.5 million. Although Estonia and Finland share common historical, cultural and linguistic features, their positions in the integration into the European Union are largely dissimilar. Predictably, this was manifested in the differences found in these surveys, which are summarized in the following two tables. Table 1:
How Estonian and Finnish Managers Thought the European Integration Would Affect Their Countries (percentages: the Estonian shares in parentheses and the Finnish in plain text)[2]
vant. AVERAGE ) In terms of national security ) In terms of social ) stability
Much advantage
Some advantage
No effect
Do not know
(18)
(44)
(12)
(15)
(10)
(01
22
30
25
02
19
03
(46)
(49)
(02)
(02)
(01)
(00
(38)
(50)
(03)
(09)
(00)
(00
10
32
39
01
16
02
In terms of
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Some disadvant.
Much disad
29
environmental ) protection
(25)
(57)
(08)
(07)
(03)
(00
08
44
36
02
08
02
(19)
(62)
(08)
(11)
(00)
(00
39
44
07
01
09
01
In terms of independent decision) making
(17)
(30)
(14)
(14)
(25)
(00
00
02
33
02
55
08
In terms of export and foreign ) trade
(17)
(56)
(04)
(16)
(07)
(00
54
38
04
01
04
00
(11)
(30)
(17)
(14)
(25)
(03
26
42
19
02
11
01
(10)
(50)
(16)
(20)
(04)
(00
34
50
10
01
05
00
(09)
(34)
(08)
(33)
(16)
(00
09
33
27
03
25
03
(08)
(47)
(23)
(22)
(00)
(00
01
04
52
04
35
05
(08)
(34)
(33)
(22)
(02)
(01
03
08
41
01
41
06
(03)
(30)
(07)
(15)
(41)
(04
54
38
06
01
02
00
In terms of entrepre) neurship
In terms of ) culture In terms of living ) standards In terms of ) employment In terms of social ) security In terms of ownership ) rights In terms of ) price level Table 2.
How the Estonian and Finnish Managers Thought the European Integration Would Affect Their Countries[3]
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=== FINNISH
### ESTONIAN
AVERAGE
|######## 0.78 |===== 0.49 | |############## 1.43 |= | |############## 1.38 |=== 0.31
NATIONAL SECURITY SOCIAL STABILITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP
|########### 1.12 |=========== 1.12 | ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION |########### 1.12 |===== 0.48 | EXPORTS/FOREIGN TRADE |########## 0.99 |============== 1.42 | LIVING STANDARD |######## 0.83 |=========== 1.12 | SOCIAL SECURITY |######## 0.81 -0.39 ====| | OWNERSHIP RIGHTS |###### 0.59 -0.39 ====| | EMPLOYMENT |##### 0.54 |== 0.19 | INDEPENDENT DECISION-MAKING |#### 0.45 -0.69 =======| | CULTURE |## 0.24 |======== 0.80 | PRICE LEVEL -0.15 #| |============== 1.43 5.
Different views on future development of Estonian entrepreneurship
5.1. View of the Estonian Ministry of Economy The Enterprise Development Programme Scheme (Ettevotluse arenguprogrammi) prepared in mid-1995 was one of the first serious attempts at creating an enterprise policy in Estonia. The outline
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of this policy contained, for instance, founding capital for beginning enterprises, export subsidies, the establishment of regional enterprise centres, and the development of various funds important for industries. According to Alexander Bakirov, the official behind the tailoring of the enterprise programme scheme in the Estonian Ministry of Economy, the programme draft was not sufficiently specified, which was one of the reasons why the Estonian government did not ratify it in summer 1995.[4] This programme draft placed special emphasis on the areas outside Tallinn, particularly northeastern Estonia with a Russian majority, which is suffering from a high rate of unemployment. In addition to this regional development, increasing investments will provide another great challenge. This requires that companies will be guaranteed reasonable and long-term funding. Bakirov believes that, currently, the most urgent problem is precisely the lack of long-term funding. One way to solve this problem would be the privatisation of the land. Discussions about the privatisation have generated some fear for the Estonian property falling into the hands of foreign proprietors. These fears are justified to a certain extent, but Bakirov does not regard the increasing activities of the foreign companies as damaging for Estonia. Bakirov believes the atmosphere that is positive toward foreigners will continue to prevail in Estonia. Estonia's position as a gateway into the Russian markets has often been given as the reason for the increasing interest on the part of foreign companies in Estonia. However, Bakirov points out that all the Baltic states and Kaliningrad also emphasise their own mediator roles between Russia and the West. Bakirov states that the construction of this gateway will not depend solely on the actions of the Baltic states, but, first and foremost, on the political choices made in Russia. In fact, if a country is to act as a mediator, it must enjoy the confidence of both East and West. Without this basic requirement -- trust -attempts at creating a gateway, however active they be, may suffocate under the institutional restrictions of trade. 5.2. View of a Foreign Organization Leinonen was more doubtful concerning the role of the state subsidies than Bakirov. Leinonen points out that "financial support granted, for instance, to beginning enterprises, may turn against itself. Here the businessman is thrown into cold water, and only the best will learn how to swim and survive." If the Estonian state begins to financially support its entrepreneurship, the promotion of export and education would prove much more efficient targets than labour political support for entrepreneurs, believes Leinonen.
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Leinonen sees the new enterprise law affecting the future of the Estonian entrepreneurship in various ways. According to her, "at this moment, this increase in the minimum capital of joint-stock companies is a tough demand to meet." The new law leads to such a situation where the establishment of a joint-stock company is beyond the reach of the Estonian earning the average salary.[5] Leinonen believes the Estonian enterprises view the European Union positively. However, she suspects that the reasons for this are not merely economic but "the attraction of Europe is particularly strong from the perspective of national security." The role of foreign companies in the development of the Estonian entrepreneurship is explained by Leinonen; "the foreign impact here [Estonia] has been stronger than in any other former Soviet republic or many Eastern European countries. The activities of foreign companies have been positive and brought Estonia closer to the world market, despite some industries where foreign companies may have worked against the survival of Estonian companies." Leinonen expressed some reservations toward the mediator position of Estonia. It would be important to realise that Estonia has many competitors. Leinonen states that "the gateway position of Estonia is worse than usually believed. This is partly due to the special customs regulations set by Russia, and to possible competition on the part of Latvia and Finland. In addition, less and less people speak Russian in Estonia, and the number of flights to Russia have been reduced. Soon Estonia may begin to remind of an anti-gateway." 5.3. View of an Estonian Organization Laanesaar states that the future development of the Estonian economy is in the hands of entrepreneurs, not of the state. "The state always reacts more slowly to the changing conditions than a businessman", he points out. The future prospects of the Estonian entrepreneurship seem most promising in the electronics, foodstuffs and furniture industries, in the opinion of Jogi. The advantages of the Estonian electronics industry are its ability to react rapidly and to manufacture small production units. In terms of foodstuffs industry, the Russian markets may generate a boom. The third strong industry is the furniture industry, which is based on unique design and wood material. Jogi's view of how the Estonian industries will relate to the European Union is fairly pessimistic. He believes that, "Estonian enterpreneurship opposes the European Union because the union will lay restrictions on their activities and thus weaken their opportunities. The union will continue to regulate us so that in the end we will contract an allergy typical of the Soviet
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era." Laanesaar agrees with this opinion when stating that "the bureaucracy in the European Union is punctilious German and not indifferent, as in the former Soviet Union. This fear of bureaucracy reduces the interest of our business managers in the European Union." Both Laanesaar and Jogi state about the gateway position of Estonia that the problem concerning the mediator position is primarily in the special risks involved in trading with Russia and the lack of confidence in Russian managers. According to Laanesaar, "you can trust one in five [Russian businessman] nowadays". A third factor impeding the gateway position is the Russian customs. The managers pointed, for instance, to specific duties introduced by the Russian authorities and the misconduct detected among the Russian customs officers. 6.
Summary
In the average, 62 per cent of the Estonian managers believed the joining in the European Union would have a positive impact on their country. Only 11 per cent of the managers saw the impact of the European Union negatively. Approximately every eighth manager did not expect the union to have much effect on the various subareas of the Estonian society. The most alarming fact arising from these results is that 15 per cent of the responses belonged to the category of "Do not know". Ignorance and insecurity add to the prejudices against the advantages and implementation of the European integration. Hence these results call for both more information about the European Union and more research on the impact of the European integration. The outcome of the survey revealed that the Estonian enterprise managers expected the European Union to provide, above all, national security. The second expectation was the internal stabilisation and the third, the improvement of environment. Only after these came the economic issues. The only negative aspect of the integration into the European Union was the expected increase of the price level. The comparison of the responses given by the Estonian and Finnish enterprise managers revealed a considerable difference in the emphases. The Finnish managers saw the economic benefits as the motives for the European integration, whereas they feared the integration would weaken their social security, right to selfdetermination and national ownership. However, the Estonian managers firstly regarded the European Union as a guarantee of their national security and only secondly as an economic issue. An extremely positive surprise in terms of the future prospects of the Estonian entrepreneurship was the market economy orientation
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of the Estonian managers. They underlined the importance of enterprises finding by themselves their means of survival through the transition period. Various state subsidies can, in the view of the Estonian managers, distort the economic structures and thus impede the integration of the Estonian economy into the world market. The role of foreign companies in the transition of the Estonian entrepreneurship is emphasised by the representatives of the Estonian Ministry of Economy, local entrepreneurs and the foreign organization. Even though the foreign companies usually have better economic resources, they were generally not seen providing any serious threats to the structure of the young industries in Estonia. The Estonian managers were neither afraid of increasing Western ownership. It is nevertheless important to underline that some reservations were expressed in Estonia when the increase in Russian ownership was concerned. Various discussions often introduced the mediator position of Estonia between East and West. The managers interviewed in this context expressed some doubts concerning this gateway position. First, one should remember that Estonia faces serious competition from the other Baltic states and even the European Union. Second, the mediator requires the trust of both the Eastern and Western partners. In the international business the geographical lead can be fairly rapidly reduced. Finally, one can conclude that the Estonian managers are fairly anxiously travelling toward the European Union. In this context, one should bear in mind that the Estonian membership in the European Union requires the determination and economic resources of both the union and Estonia. To connect the Estonian integration development with the other Baltic and Eastern European countries does not only provide a great challenge for the economies of these particular countries, but to the entire European Union. If Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary and the Baltic states were to join the European Union at the same time, they would increase the population of the union by 70 million people. REFERENCES Bank of Estonia, Eesti Pank Bulletin No. 4, Tallinn 1995. Bank of Finland, Review of Economies in Transition, Unit for Eastern European Economies, Bank of Finland, Helsinki 1995. ECE, Economic Bulletin for Europe, Economic Commission for Europe, United Nation, Geneve 1994. Enterprise Development Programme Scheme, Estonian Ministry of
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Economy, Tallinn 28.6.1995. Estonian Enterprise Register, Enterprise Register of the Statistical Office of Estonia, Tallinn 26.9.1995. Estonian Ministry of Economy, Eesti majandusulevaade 1994-1995, Estonian Ministry of Economy, Tallinn 1995. EVA, Yritysjohdon arvomaailma, EVA publication, Helsinki 1991. IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1995, Washington DC 1995. Kaubaleht, Keskmine Eesti juht in nooremas keskeas haritud mees, Kaubaleht 15.05.1995, pp. 12-13. Kuddo, Arvo, Investment policy in Estonia in a transitional period, Interregional workshop on structural investment policy for transition to a market economy, United Nations Department for Development Support and Management Services in collaboration with the Government of Kazakhstan, Alma Ata 16.-19.5.1995. Lainela, Seija, Baltian maat vuonna 1994, Review of Economies in Transition 1/1995, Unit for Eastern European Economies, Bank of Finland, Helsinki 1995, pp. 25-45. Lainela, Seija - Sutela, Pekka, The Baltic Economies in Transition, Unit for Eastern European Economies, Bank of Finland, Helsinki 1994. Liuhto, Kari, Ulkomaiset investoinnit Viroon - tilastoja ja totuuksia, Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Institute for East-West Trade, Turku 1994. Liuhto, Kari, Entrepreneurial Transition in Estonia - three views, Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, Institute for East-West Trade, C3/1995, Turku 1995. Sepp, Urmas (1995) Estonia's Transition to a Market Economy, Review of Economies in Transition 5/1995, Unit for Eastern European Economies, Bank of Finland, Helsinki Tullinen, Ulvi (1995) Ettevotluse arengu programmid esitakse sellel nadalal valitsusele, Aripaev, Tallinn 9.10.1995. Ulbo, Kalle (1995) Valisministeerium kardab Vene kapitali, Aripaev, Tallinn 21.08.1995. [1]
Eight Estonian kroons equal to one Deutsch mark.
[2]
The impact of the European integration on Finland's national
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security was not inquired from the Finnish managers. The Finnish answers are from year 1990 (EVA, 1991, 99). The total of shares can be other than 100, which is due to roundings. [3]
The impact is an average of the answers where 'much advantage' is +2, 'some advantage' +1, 'no effect' and 'do not know' 0, 'some disadvantage' -1, and 'much disadvantage' -2.
[4]
Another programme draft was presented to the Estonian government in its rewritten form in October 1995. The renewed programme contains three subprogrammes: the programme for the development of the export, and of smalland medium-sized companies, and the innovation programme. The next year's budget for the funding of these programmes is 70 million kroons (Tullinen, 1995, 5).
[5]
The average Estonian needs the total of a 20 months' wages to found a limited liability company with a minimum capital or 200 months' wages to found a joint-stock company.
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