GOVT 454 Senior Seminar: Theories of International Relations Department of Government & International Affairs Sweet Briar College Spring 2012 Wednesday-1:30-4:15 Location: Gray 206

Spencer D. Bakich [email protected]

Office Hours: T&W 12:00-1:00 Location: Gray Hall 211

This course serves as both a capstone and introduction. As the Senior Seminar, this course provides students with a broad perspective of the field of international relations. Topically, this course will survey a number of critical themes, including the causes of war, great power “balancing,” the orientation of states’ security policies, revolutions in foreign policy, the role of international and domestic institutions on state behavior, and the prospects for inter-state cooperation. The central substantive aim of the course is to develop an understanding of how different theories explain international politics and which are most persuasive. This task often has no single "right" method or answer and the issues leave wide room for debate. Nonetheless, each approach has its own logic and corresponding strengths and weaknesses. Everyone must learn what these are and how they compare. Theories are important because they define how we see the world and respond to it. In short, theories drive action. Each of the approaches comes with a particular set of answers as to why people and states deal with one another as they do. As citizens and future world leaders, your votes and policies will be driven by the particular ideas you believe are right and appropriate. The question is, are they? Required Texts: The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, Peter J. Katzenstein, ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Drezner, Daniel W., Theories of International Politics and Zombies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). Haas, Mark L., The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Owen, John M., The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510-2010. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). Press, Daryl G., Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Evaluate Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005). Additional readings, market with an asterisk (*), are available on the course Google Docs page. Requirements: 1. Participation (20% of final grade). Assessed by two criteria: Attendance and active participation necessitate a careful and close reading of the arguments offered in each work. Everyone is expected to make a substantial contribution to the discussions in this seminar. It is imperative that you stay on top of the material covered in class. If, for any reason, you find yourself in a position where you cannot attend class, please contact me immediately. 1

Theory Journal: all students are required to keep an online portfolio containing causal diagrams of the assigned readings. Causal diagrams must be completed on Google Docs (the draw function) and then shared to the appropriate folder on the Google Docs site. Students must have their weekly causal diagrams completed and submitted prior to each class period. I strongly recommend that you make a hard copy of your causal diagram for use in class. Corrections to your diagrams can be made in class, after which you can modify your diagrams online. Journal entries will consist of a schematic diagram of the basic argument of the assigned readings that includes the causal factor(s) (independent variable), the result (dependent variable) and any intervening variables (factors that mediate the effect of the independent on the dependent variable). In short, you will diagram what the author is trying to explain and how she/he actually explains it. For example, a simple “arrow diagram” for an argument can look like this: A  B. This is read as, “A causes B.” In this case, A is the “independent variable” and B is the “dependent variable.” Remember, A and B are both variables. This means that the absence of A will lead to the absence of B. A more complex causal chain is as follows: B C E + D F You can read this causal chain as: B causes C, C without D causes E, C with D causes F. In this case, C and D are “intervening variables”—they intervene in the causal process that begins with B, or the independent variable. Your entry will also include a brief description of the argument (i.e., you should translate your diagrams into Standard English), and a statement as to whether you think the evidence provided supports the causal argument made. Each class, selected student diagrams will be displayed in class and will serve as the basis for that day’s discussion. Your grade will reflect whether you are keeping the journal up to date rather than whether your particular interpretation is accurate. Nonetheless, I expect that you will make corrections to your diagrams and descriptions based on class discussions. Make sure to check for special instructions at the end of each day’s list of readings. These instructions will include the readings that should be diagrammed. Along with your essays, you should submit your journal entries to me (in pdf) on the days listed below. 2. Complete three essays of 3,500 words maximum. The word count should be identified in the header of the first page. The essays will be due at the start of class on the following days: 2/22, 4/4, and 4/25. The essays are to be submitted electronically on the course Google Docs site. The topic and instructions for each essay will be posted on the Docs site immediately following the preceding week’s class. The first paper is worth 20% of the final grade. The second and third are worth 30% each. My policy for late papers is firm: papers are discounted two letter grades if not submitted by the date and time listed on the essay prompt, followed by one letter grade for each subsequent 24 hour period.

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Grading criteria: “A” denotes excellent command of readings and lectures, incisive analytical faculty, as well as mature and independent judgment. “B” denotes good command of readings and lectures, good analytical faculty and good judgment. (Note that a “B” is a good grade for the instructor.) “C” denotes significant deficiencies in at least one of the criteria (i.e., readings, lectures, analysis and judgment). “D” and “F” denote significant deficiencies in more than one of these criteria. Week 1 January 18: Introduction to the Course Week 2 January 25: Key Concepts in the Study of International Relations Power: *Barnett, Michael, and Raymond Duvall. 2005. “Power in International Politics.” International Organization 59(01): 39-75. Institutions: *Duffield, John. 2007. “What Are International Institutions?” International Studies Review 9(1): 1-22. Ideas: Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security,” in CNS, 33-65. Agents *Byman, Daniel L., and Kenneth M. Pollack. 2001. “Let Us Now Praise Great Men: Bringing the Statesman Back In.” International Security 25(4): 107-146. Briefly describe the main concepts discussed in each piece. To which perspectives/theoretical approaches are these concepts attributed and why? Week 3 February 1: Overview of the Major Schools of Thought Daniel Drezner, Theories of International Politics and Zombies, entire. Diagram the main causal pathways in each theoretical approach?

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Week 4 February 8: Realism(s) Offensive Realism: *Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 1-54. Defensive Realism: *Taliaferro, Jeffrey W. 2000. “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited.” International Security 25(3): 128-161. Neoclassical Realism: *Schweller, Randall L. 2004. “Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing.” International Security 29(2): 159-201. A Non-realist Critique: *Legro, Jeffrey W., and Andrew Moravcsik. 1999. “Is Anybody Still a Realist?.” International Security 24(2): 5-55. Diagram Taliaferro and Schweller Week 5 February 15: Threat Assessment—Realism vs. Analogical Reasoning Daryl Press, Calculating Credibility, entire. Diagram CCT and the argument in one case Essay prompt posted Week 6 February 22: Balances of Power and Threat Balance of Power Theory: *Waltz, Kenneth N. 1986. “Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power.” In Neorealism and Its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 98-130. Balance of Threat Theory: *Walt, Stephen M. 1985. “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power.” International Security 9(4): 3-43. Revisionism and Bandwagoning: *Schweller, Randall L. 1994. “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In.” International Security 19(1): 72-107. Future of American Power: *Wohlforth, William C. 1999. “The Stability of a Unipolar World.” International Security 24(1): 5-41. Essay and journals due Week 7 February 29: Ideology and Great Power Politics Mark Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989, entire. Diagram Haas’s theory and the argument in one case. Week 8 March 7: Transnational Networks and Regime Overthrow John Owen, Clash of Ideas in World Politics, entire. Diagram Owen’s theory and argument in one case 4

March 12-16: Spring Break Week 9 March 21: Culture, Norms and the Use of Force Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and French Military Doctrine Before World War II,” in CNS, 186-215. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China,” in CNS, 216-68. Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War,” in CNS, 271-316. Paul Kowert and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Norms, Identity, and Their Limits: A Theoretical Reprise,”in CNS, 451-97 Diagram Kier and Herman Week 10 March 28: International Institutions—General propositions *Martin, Lisa L. 1992. “Interests, Power, and Multilateralism.” International Organization 46(4): 765-792. *Martin, Lisa L., and Beth A. Simmons. 1998. “Theories and Empirical Studies of International Institutions.” International Organization 52(4): 729-757. *Mearsheimer, John J. 1994. “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International Security 19(3): 5-49. Diagram the institutional and realist strands presented in Mearsheimer Essay prompt posted Week 11 April 4: Restraints on States and Internal Pathologies *Alter, Karen J. 1998. “Who are the "Masters of the Treaty"?: European Governments and the European Court of Justice.” International Organization 52(1): 121-147. * Ikenberry, G. John, “Democracy, Institutions, and American Restraint,” in America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power, G. John Ikenberry, ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), 213-238. *Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. 1999. “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations.” International Organization 53(4): 699-732. Essay and journals due Week 12 April 11: Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy *Norrin M. Ripsman, “Neoclassical Realism and Domestic Interest Groups,” in Steven E. Lobell et al., eds. Neoclassical Realism, the State, and Foreign Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 170-193. *Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Neoclassical Realism and Resource Extraction: State Building for Future War,” in ibid., 194-226. *Kupchan, Charles., and Peter. Trubowitz. 2007. “Dead Center: The Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States.” International Security 32(2): 7-44. Diagram Ripsman and Kupchan/Trubowitz

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Week 13 April 18: Strategic Interaction: Games and Time-Horizons * Stein, Arthur A. 1990. Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations. Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 176-84. *Lake, David A, and Robert Powell, eds. 1999. Strategic Choice and International Relations. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 3-38. *Jervis, Robert. 1997. System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 3-28. *Axelrod, Robert M. 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 3-24. Diagram the different approaches discussed in Stein How dies each author conceive of strategic interaction? How does strategic interaction so conceived differ from realism and liberalism? Essay prompt posted Week 14 April 25: Testing the Logic of the Democratic Peace Proposition *Doyle, Michael W. 1986. “Liberalism and World Politics.” The American Political Science Review 80(4): 1151-1169. *Rosato, Sebastian. 2003. “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory.” The American Political Science Review 97(4): 585-602. *Kinsella, David. 2005. “No Rest for the Democratic Peace.” The American Political Science Review 99(3): 453-457. *Slantchev, Branislav L., Anna Alexandrova, and Erik Gartzke. 2005. “Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace.” The American Political Science Review 99(3): 459-462. *Doyle, Michael W. 2005. “Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace.” The American Political Science Review 99(3): 463-466. *Rosato, Sebastian. 2005. “Explaining the Democratic Peace.” The American Political Science Review 99(3): 467-472. Essay and journal due

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